The Journal

OF

PHILOLOGY.

EDITED BY

W. ALDIS WRIGHT, M.A.

INGRAM BYWATER, M.A.

AND

HENRY JACKSON, LITT. D.

VOL. XV.

London and Cambridge:
MACMILLAN AND CO.
DEIGHTON, BELL AND CO. CAMBRIDGE.
1886

Cambridge:
PRINTED BY C. J. CLAY, M.A. AND SONS,
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS.

BIBL.
LONDIN.
UNIV.

CONTENTS.

No. XXIX.

	PAGE
Adversaria. R. Ellis	1
On Propertius. R. Ellis	12
Coniectanea. H. Nettleship	21
Notes in Latin Lexicography. H. Nettleship	24
Part of the *Excerpta Charisii* and the Fragment *De Idiomatibus Generum* printed in the fourth volume of Keil's *Grammatici Latini*. H. Nettleship	27
Notes on Vergil. H. Nettleship	29
The Historical Development of Classical Latin Prose. H. Nettleship	35
Cicero *De Oratore*, Lib. I. §§ 41; 42; 56; 173; 175; 179. Henry J. Roby	57
Caesura in the Iambic Trimeters of Aeschylus. John B. Bury	76
Questions connected with Plato's Phaidros. John B. Bury	80
On the Date of the Composition of the History of Herodotus. Evelyn Abbott	86
Note on the use of the word πόλις in Herodotus. Evelyn Abbot	97
Aeschyli Choephori. F. W. Newman	98
On the Persian word گون زد or گون زدن William Wright	101
The Battle at the Colline Gate, B.C. 82. Henry Elliot Malden	103
Platonica. J. P. Postgate	111
On the Signification of the Monster Grendel in the Poem of Beowulf; with a Discussion of Lines 2076—2100. W. W. Skeat	120
Miscellanea Critica. 1. Dierectus. 2. Emendations in Tibullus. 3. Two Emendations in Propertius. A. Palmer	132
Note on the Early Italian Huts. J. G. Frazer	145
On Plato, Theaetetus 158 E—160 A. R. D. Archer-Hind	149
Note on Propertius I. 21. 1—4. J. H. Onions	152
A last Word on Propertius I. 21. 1—4. J. P. Postgate	158

No. XXX.

PAGE

On Aurelius Victor. F. Haverfield 161

Aristotle Politics III, 2. 2 (Congreve); 1275*b*, 26. William Ridgeway 164

Notes on Plautus, Mercator, Prol. 54, and III. 1, 26, (524). J. H. Onions 165

Placidiana (ed. Deuerling). J. H. Onions 167

ἄπρακτος—ἄπρατος Pionii vita Polycarpi 8 (Lightfoot's Ignatius and Polycarp II 1021 39). John E. B. Mayor 171

Suetonius *Augustus* 92. John E. B. Mayor 173

ἡ ἐνεγκοῦσα in Heliodorus. John E. B. Mayor 174

Eunapius Vit. Soph. p. 477 35 Didot. John E. B. Mayor . . 176

Eunapius p. 480 14. John E. B. Mayor 176

Seneca de Beneficiis VI 16 § 2 *Medicus Amicus, Medicus Imperator*. John E. B. Mayor 177

Clem. Al. *Strom.* IV. § 62 p. 592 Potter. John E. B. Mayor . . 180

Dierectus. H. Nettleship 186

The Study of Latin Grammar among the Romans in the First Century A.D. H. Nettleship 189

Herodotus in Egypt. D. D. Heath 215

Notes of a Fortnight's Research in the Bibliothèque Nationale of Paris. Robinson Ellis 241

On the Trilogy and Tetralogy in the Greek Drama. A. E. Haigh . 257

Plato's Later Theory of Ideas. VI. The *Politicus*. Henry Jackson 280

William Hepworth Thompson. C. Merivale 306

THE JOURNAL

OF

PHILOLOGY.

ADVERSARIA.

Petron. S. 29 Bücheler

Interrogare ergo atriensem coepi, quas in medio picturas haberent. 'Iliada et Odyssian' inquit, ac Laenatis gladiatorium munus. non licebat †multaciam considerare.

Among the numerous conjectures mentioned by Bücheler or in other editions, I do not notice *maltaceam*. As he is speaking of frescoes, it seems natural that he should go on to speak of stucco. *Malta* or *maltha* is mentioned by Pliny H. N. XXXVI. 181 *Maltha e calce fit recenti. glaeba uino restinguitur, mox tunditur cum adipe suillo et fico, duplici lenimento, quae res omnium tenacissima et duritiam lapidis antecedens.* From *maltha* was formed *malthare*, and it is certain that an adjective must have existed.

Amm. Marcell. XXX. 2. 11

Quem ibi morantem securius praefectus praetorio Maximinus reuersum ad otium spernens, ut solebat dirae luis ritu grassari per omnia, laedere modis quibus poterat adfectabat.

In the fragments of the Marburg Codex published by Nissen (Ammiani Marcellini Fragmenta Marburgensia Berolini 1876) the words *dirae luis* are written *diraeruis*, whence *ruis* not *luis*

seems to have been the original reading. I believe this is right; the word *rues* is proved by the S. Gallen Glossary just published by Prof. Minton Warren [Cambridge (America) 1885] where *rues : ruina* is written twice consecutively. The idea is probably of an *avalanche* which in its fall sweeps away all before it.

Manil. v. 465 sqq.

Quin et Medeae natos fratremque patremque
Hinc uestes, flammas illinc pro munere missas,
Aeriamque fugam †uectosque ex ignibus annos.

Bentley conj. *iunctosque in curribus angues,* which is very wide of the MSS. In all probability the correction is much slighter: read *uictosque ex ignibus annos* 'and age overpowered (by youth) when emerging from the fire.' The allusion is to the magic cauldron in which Medea restored the aged Aeson to juvenescence.

Manil. v. 477

Et si tanta operum uires commenta negarint,
Externis tamen aptus erit nunc uoce poetis,
Nunc †saturo gestu, referetque affectibus ora
Et sua dicendo faciet.

If the man born under Aquarius cannot be a great tragic or comic *poet,* he will still (*tamen*) be a skilful *actor,* able to express by *outward gestures* (*externis*) what dramatists have written. Manilius has just mentioned Menander and is still thinking of comedy: hence for *saturo* it seems probable that we should read *fatuo,* 'the gestures of a clown.'

516 sqq.

Hinc lenocinium formae cultusque repertus
Corporis, atque auro quaesita est gratia frontis,
Perque caput ducti lapides, per colla manusque
Et pedibus niueis fulserunt aurea uincla.
Quid potius matrona uelit tractare creatos,
Quam factum reuocare suos quod possit ad usus?

The last two verses are obscure and are I think mistranslated by Bentley. It is pretty clear that the point turns on

the opposition of *creatos* and *factum* 'why should our matrons wish to handle jewels as nature made them (*lapides creatos*) rather than something *wrought up artificially* (*factum*) which they can (then) apply to their own purposes (of adornment)?'

522—4

Ac ne materies tali sub munere desit
Quaerere sub terris aurum furtoque latentem
Naturam eruere omnem, orbemque inuertere praedae
Imperat.

sub is here to be taken literally 'lest the material which is to serve as *the setting* of such a gift.'

530, 1

Protulit ut legeret census spumantis in aurum
Et perlucentes cuperet prensare lapillos.

Bentley pronounces these verses spurious. The following conj. will at least make them intelligible.

Protulit ut legeret census summatis in aure,
Et perlucentes cuperet pensare lapillos.

'It has led on an artificer to read a noble lady's income in her ear-rings, and long to be weighing (and so estimating) transparent gems.' Sen. Dial. VII. 17. 2 *quare uxor tua locupletis domus censum auribus gerit?*

Stat. S. II. 6. 12 sqq.

ne comprime fletus,
Ne pudeat: rumpat frenos dolor iste, †diesque
Si tam dura placent, hominem gemis (ei mihi subdo
Ipse faces) hominem, Vrse, tuum.

Domitius' change *deisque* makes all intelligible, though the abruptness of the concise *gemis*, which admirably expresses the incoherent and impassioned earnestness of the poet in his efforts to console Ursus, may easily be misunderstood. 'Check not thy tears, be not ashamed to weep; let grief like thine break through all restraint, and if *the Gods* resolve so cruelly, remember, Ursus, that it is a frail *man* thou lamentest, a man

that was thy own slave." The pathos, which, rightly judged, is in the highest vein of poetry, turns on the double sense of *homo* a man (as opposed to a God) and a slave.

S. v. 1. 205

Ille etiam erecte (erepte) rupisset tempora uite.

Sectae seems a probable conj.

Avienus, Arat. 819, 820 ed. Breysig

Nec expectanda forent ponto quod sola carerent.
Cetera descriptis aptantur singula membris
Formarum.

Avienus is contrasting a group of stars which have no assignable shape or name, with the other stars which have their own configuration severally. I would read therefore

Nec spectanda (so Grotius) *forent puncto q. s. c.*

'Nor ought they to be looked for with the eye, *as having* by themselves *no magnitude.*' See Forcellini s. v. *punctum.*

Non. 115

In the difficult passage of Varro's *Mutuum muli scabunt* which Prof. Nettleship has treated in his newly-published Essays p. 349, may not the strange word *finaremolet* or *efynareinolet* represent a corruption of *φαινόμηροι et?* The word, it will be said, is not known to exist. But it seems at least possible that Varro may have read it somewhere, or invented it as a suggestion from *φαινομηρὶς* to suit an occasional purpose.

Donati Vita in Hagen's Anecd. Helvet. p. CCLX

Quadam namque die aeolicum ingressus consistorium digna sibi nacta cauillatione cum magno pudore delituit, quem ita quidam Graeco lepore insultans suapte ingressus est.

Βλρξωκcωλλωνπογcτον μηλωδος απρincinan

quod dicitur latine 'Cede loco rustice modicarum opilio ouium.'

The Greek letters are repeated on the right hand margin of the MS with these variants; for λλων it gives αμον; for πογcτον it has πογc τογ; for μηλωδος it has μηλοδος.

It is tolerably clear that *Aeolicum* cannot be right; Donatus was reared in Italy, where he pastured she-goats. He might therefore reasonably be thrown into the company of other herdsmen; hence read *aepolicum*. The Greek words are thus transliterated by Hagen Ἄγροικε ἀπαλλάττου οἰῶν μηλοβοτὴρ ἰσχνᾶν. But, as he suggests, it is pretty certain that a verse lurks in the fragm., and this may be

ΒΑCΚ ΕΞΩ ΠCΩΛΩΝ ΜΗΛΩΡΟC ΑΠ ICΧΝΑΝ

Hesych. Πόσθων· *πόσθην τὸ ἀνδρεῖον αἰσχρὸν λέγουσι. πόσθωνας δὲ παρὰ τοῦτο τοὺς παῖδας, τινὲς δὲ τοὺς ψώλωνας, ἄλλοι μωροὺς ἢ παιδαριώδεις.* Hence ψώλων = 'a lewd fellow,' which might easily be used in as general a meaning as many equally strong country-phrases in our own language. Hagen seems right in his conj. ἰσχνᾶν, and μηλωρὸς a keeper of sheep might be supported by στασιωρός. But what the word was which is represented by ΠΟΥCΤΟΝ or ΠΟΥCΤΟΥ is very dubious; possibly ΓΟΙΤΩΝ, if we can trust Hesychius' gloss γοῖτα οἷς. The Latin word is *ouium:* but none of the ordinary Greek equivalents seems to correspond.

Cic. de Legg. II. 13

Neque tot nationes id ad hoc tempus retinuissent †apparigum Phrygum Lycaonum Cilicum maximeque Pisidarum, nisi uetustas ea certa esse docuisset.

Mommsen considers *apparigum* as a dittography for *Phrygum.* The letters are not far from *Cappadocum.*

II. 22

Nam prius quam in os iniecta glaeba est, locus ille ubi crematum est corpus, nihil habet religionis: iniecta glaeba †tumulis et humatus est et glaeba uocatur, ac tum denique multa religiosa iura complectitur.

Possibly *tumulo is et humatus est et glaeba uocatur.* When the earth has been thrown on, the man is considered to have been formally buried in a tomb, and the so-called earth-throwing is effected; and from that time forward the place of sepulture (*locus ubi crematum est corpus*) comprehends a number of religious sanctions.

Amm. Marcell. XXII. 14. 3

Et quamquam his paribusque de causis indignaretur, tacens tamen motumque in animi retinens potestate sollemnia celebrabat.

It would be more like ordinary Latin if Amm. wrote *inmotamque animi retinens potestatem.*

XXII. 15. 16 Speaking of the crocodile Amm. says

Noctibus quiescens per undas, diebus humi †uituperatur confidentia cutis, quam ita ualidam gerit ut eius terga cataphracta uix tormentorum ictibus perforentur.

I fancy Amm. wrote *uiperatur* 'it basks like a viper' on the ground. But I have not been able to find any authority for this in itself natural word.

XXIV. 3. 17

Aemilianus enim testudine lapidea tectam successerat portam, sub qua tutus et latens dum moles saxeas †detegunt hostes urbem nudatam inrupit.

What meaning is there in *detegunt*? The stone masses are not *uncovered*, but *aimed* at the besieging works, i.e. *derigunt.*

XXIV. 6. 13

perrupissetque ciuitatis aditus lapsorum agminibus mixtus, ni dux Victor nomine manibus erectis prohibuisset et uocibus.

For *lapsorum*, I suspect we should write *lassorum.*

14. *Sonent Hectoreas poetae ueteres pugnas, fortitudinem Thessali ducis extollant, longae loquantur aetates Sophanem et Aminiam et Callimachum et Cynaegirum, Medicorum in Graecia fulmina illa bellorum.*

This passage is one of the most signal illustrations of a fact not, so far as I know, observed hitherto of Ammianus' style, its tendency to the rhythm of the scazon. It may be traced in almost every part of his history.

Vetus poesis Hectoris sonet pugnas,
Tollatur astris Thessali ducis uirtus,
Longae Sophanen proloquantur aetates,
Ameinian Callimachon et Cynaegiron,
Tot Medicorum fulmina illa bellorum.

XXV. 1. 3

Hinc recedentibus nobis longius Saraceni nostrorum metu peditum repedare compulsi, paulo postinea innexi Persarum multitudine ocius irruebant.

Are we not obliged to recognize here the Plautine *postidea*? Unless indeed *inea* can be considered a dittographic error for *inex*, as *īnexi* immediately follows.

XXV. 9. 2

Sed uentis loquebantur in cassum.

The words recall Catullus' *Ne tua dicta uagis nequiquam credita uentis*; indeed the parallel is an unusually close one; it is not merely talking to the winds, but talking *in vain*: perhaps the pleonasm is borrowed by the historian from the poet.

Cat. LXIII. 9

Typanum, tubam Cybelles, tua, mater, initia.

Munro denies that *tubam* has any meaning, and conj. *ac typum*, 'a medallion.' In reading Hesychius it struck me that his gloss ταβάλα· ταβῆλα ὑπὸ Πάρθων οὕτω καλεῖται ὄργανον κριβάνῳ ἐμφερὲς, ᾧ χρῶνται ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις ἀντὶ σάλπιγγος might possibly conceal some form of the real word used by Catullus. *Tabl* is Persian for a kettle-drum, whence Spanish *atabales*, a word which some of our best writers, as quoted in the new English Dictionary now in course of editing by Dr J. A. H. Murray, use in that meaning. In Latin the word exists in the form *tabala*. Sen. Epist. 56 *aut huic qui ad metam sudantem tabalas experitur aut tibias* (Schmidt s. v.). Catullus may have written either *tabal* or perhaps *tablam*.

Panegyr. IV. ed. Bährens

IX. *Qui cum se occursu laetae iuuentutis affici non solum liberalitate quam ipsi tribuunt, sed etiam litteris quibus me ad institutionem eius cohortantur ostendant, quanto plus capient uoluptatis, cum reparatum uideant ipsum conciliabulum iuuentutis?*

There must be a mistake here, as the meaning is obviously that the large sums given to support the schools, and the letters which Eumenius received urging him to undertake the teaching in them, proved that those who gave so largely and wrote so enthusiastically felt a pleasure in encountering in the streets the youths there educated. Possibly *laetae* is an error for *laete*, which with *affici* might = *laetitia affici* 'to be delighted'; but if so, it is somewhat out of its natural position; though this is a very uncertain objection in the Latin of so late a period. Or, retaining *laetae*, we may suppose some word like *pariter* or *gaudio* has fallen out, perhaps from the crowding of ablatives in the sentence.

Paneg. VII. B.

v. *Exercitum illum qui Bononiensis oppidi litus insederat terra pariter ac mari saepsit, cum reciprocos aestus illius elementi iactis inter undas uallis diremisset, ut quorum portas fluctus allueret, mare et quod tangerent perdidissent.*

Bährens changes *mare et quod* to *ei quo mare*. Accepting *ei*, I should prefer to leave the rest unchanged, *mare ei quod tangerent perdidissent*, 'the very men (the inhabitants of Boulogne) whose gates were washed by the waves, had lost the sea which was in reach of their hands.'

Pacati Panegyr. X.

Vt indefessa uertigo caelum rotat, ut maria aestibus †inquinata sunt, ut stare sol nescit: ita tu, imperator, continuatis negotiis et in se quodam orbe redeuntibus semper exercitus es.

The Vatican MS. which gives *inquinata* has also a correction of it *inquieta*. Bährens conj. *inclinata*, which is too *particular* a word, in my judgment: may not the right word be *inquietata*? whether as a distinct participle 'the seas have become restless by the movement of the tides', or as one of the numerous class of participial adjectives collected by Dräger Synt. I. 24 sqq.: cf. *concitatus*.

Ovid. Pont. II. 7. 24

In a review of Korn's edition of the Epistles from Pontus

which appeared in the *Academy* of Jan. 8, 1870, I wrote as follows (p. 114):

'Again in II. 7. 24 A (the Hamburgensis) has *Nec planis nostris casibus esse potes*, β (the Bavaricus) *Nec planus nostris c. e. p.*, whence the probable reading *Nec planus e nostris casibus esse puter* against the *Nec numerus nostris, nec fraus in n., non numerus nostris* &c. of the inferior MSS.'

This conj. I subsequently sent to Merkel, who admitted it into his text of 1884. In Güthling's new edition of the Pontic Epistles a nearly identical conj. *Nec planus in nostris casibus esse putor* is admitted, of which *planus in* is ascribed to A. Rothmaler, *putor* to Korn. On purchasing Rothmaler's pamphlet, I find that he read the line *Nec planus in nostris casibus esse potest*; but that his work was not published till after the battle of Sedan Sept. 1, 1870. I may therefore claim to myself *priority* in this certain and indubitable restoration.

The same review contains also the following emendations of two passages of the Pontic Epistles.

'Again II. 8. 11 A has *quanta meridi*, β *quanta a te merui*, whence the probable reading *Quanta tamen uidi* (not as M. Korn, *Quanta dei merui*) *tamen* being like 55 *Nos quoque uestra iuuet quod qua licet ora uidemus* in spite of my not being able to see Cæsar in person; in II. 8. 70 A has *Vtque meas aquila signa sequar*, β *Vtque meas aquilas* $\begin{matrix} uestraque \\ tutaque \end{matrix}$ *signa* $\begin{matrix} sequar \\ querar \end{matrix}$' whence the probable reading *V. m. a. signaque rara sequar*, the intermediate stage of corruption being *signa querar sequar*.'

I add a conj. on de Medic. Faciei 1, 2 which was published in my review of Kunz's edition (*Academy*, Nov. 1883, p. 317):

Discite quae faciem commendet cura, puellae,
Et quo sit nobis †*cura tuenda modo.*

'If we are to suppose the second *cura* anything more than a dittographical error, I would propose to read *pura tuenda* "and how it is to be guarded free from spots," comparing 78 *Ore fugant maculas* and 98 *Haerebit toto nullus in ore color*.'

Lucret. I. 551—555

Denique si nullam finem natura parasset
Frangendis rebus, iam corpora materiai
Vsque redacta forent aevo frangente priore,
Vt nil ex illis a certo tempore posset
Conceptum summum aetatis peruadere †finis.

The passage of Varro d. L. L. cited by Lachmann on 555 '*quare quod est peruade polum*' *ualet* '*uade per polum*' would justify a correction less violent than his *summa aetatis peruadere finis*, namely of *finis* to *fini*, retaining *summum* 'nothing could reach through the crowning-point of life with an end,' i.e. pass through the stages of birth and consummation to destruction.

Lucret. V. 396

Ignis enim superauit et ambens multa perussit.

The alteration of Lachmann *superat et lambens*, although *lambens* is found already in B as a correction, has never seemed to me convincing. The obvious meaning of *ambens*, whether for *ambiens* or a distinct word with the same sense, is 'compassing.' *Ambens* is perhaps not unique in this passage of Lucretius. It seems to be the right word in Stat. Theb. III. 443, where most MSS. give *amens*. The aged Adrastus rises at dawn 'compassing' or 'scheming much' about the coming struggle.

Multa super bello generisque tumentibus ambens
Incertusque animi, daret armis iura nouosque
Gentibus incuteret stimulos, an fraena teneret
Irarum et motos capulis adstringeret enses

and after long hesitation

dubio sententia tandem
Sera placet, uatum mentis ac prouida ueri
Sacra mouere deum.

There is no talk of *amentia* here: it is the divided opinion of an old man pondering the doubtful issues of the future. Gronovius saw this and finding *aniens* in his best MS. conjectured *angens*, which however is impossible. Here again we must

wait for further light from Glossaries, and from the unpublished scholia of the numerous unexamined MSS. of the Thebais.

Gloss. Phillipps s.v. Adfricare. *Adfricare est inficere vnde seneca conuictor delicatus paulatim eneruat et emollit uicinus diues cupiditatem irritat malignus comes quamuis candido et simplici rubiginem suam adfricuit .i. sua illum rubigine infecit.*

The passage of Seneca is Epist. 7. 7. I give publicity to this gloss because, so far as I have observed, glosses on words from Seneca, in which the author is named, are of rare occurrence.

R. ELLIS.

ON PROPERTIUS.

I. 18. 27, 8

Pro quo diuini fontes et frigida rupes
Et datur inculto tramite dura quies.

Any one who attentively reads this Elegy will, I think, convince himself that *diuini* is wrong. It is quite out of keeping with the feeling of the passage, not in itself (for, as Passerat shows, Theocritus in one of his finest Idylls invokes the Rivers as divine, Ἄγκεα καὶ ποταμοί, θεῖον γένος VIII. 33) but in the particular setting in which it is found. 'And now, as a return for my long patience, my reward is a rugged track, a cold rock, and *divine* springs.' It is not difficult to conceal the feebleness of this by some poetical equivalent like 'haunted' or 'hallowed': but the incongruity remains, as the various conjectures of Palmerius, Scaliger, Gronovius, Heinsius, and Markland show. Gruter's *Clitumni fontes* does not suit the scene described, which is wild and rocky, not rich and *riant*; but I follow him in believing that a proper name is to be looked for; such a name is *Clusini*. Every school-boy is familiar with Horace's complaint that Baiae with its hot springs was deserted for the cold founts of Clusium. Epp. I. 15. 5

sane murteta relinqui
Dictaque cessantem neruis elidere morbum
Sulphura contemni uicus gemit, inuidus aegris
Qui caput et stomachum supponere fontibus audent
Clusinis, Gabiosque petunt et frigida rura.

I fancy the coincidence found in many passages of the Roman Alcaeus with the Roman Callimachus may be traced

here. Propertius, sick with love, or real illness, is advised by his doctor, perhaps the same Musa who had brought the cold-water cure into fashion, to retire for change of air and cold bathing to Clusium. The scene described by the poet in the 18th Elegy is, we may suppose, an unfrequented spot in that neighbourhood; a mixture of wood rock and water falling over rock such as might give the idea of complete seclusion described in vv. 1, 2, *Haec certe deserta loca et taciturna querenti et uacuum Zephiri possidet aura nemus.* As to the palaeographical change, cl for d, or d for cl, is of the commonest; *dusini* would easily become *diuini.*

Prop. I. 20. 20

Can it have been from this v. that Albertus Stadensis took the end of *his* pentameter, (Troilus I. 48)

Mirandam Phrygibus applicuisse ratem?

If he did, Propertius or at least excerpts from him must have been read circ. 1230—1250, which is generally denied at the present time. Cf. I. 711 *lacrimis femina trita suis* with Prop. III. 11, 30 *Et famulos inter femina trita suos;* II. 106 *Fidens in celeres Protesilae pedes* with Prop. III. 9, 18 *Est quibus in celeres gloria nata pedes.* At any rate it is to be remembered that the Anthologies or Deflorations of Latin poetry made in the Middle Ages sometimes contain not more than two, or at most three, passages from particular authors. The Bodleian Library three or four years back bought a Defloration in which there are four verses of Valerius Flaccus, I. 76, I. 39, V. 324, VII. 416, and no more. The fact is interesting in itself, from the extreme rarity of quotations from Valerius Flaccus, and as suggesting what may have occurred in other cases. Albertus Stadensis (a wholesale pilferer) has, so far as I have been able to observe, only one distich from the Ibis, vv. 203—4 which occur VI. 147, 148.

Prop. II. 2. 12

That Turnebus was right in restoring *Brimo* for *primo,* seems probable from the epithet *φοβερόμματος* applied to

her on a gem, in the vocative φοβερόμματε Βριμώ (Kopp de difficult. interpr. § 629 gives a perverse explanation of this which will hardly stand the test of criticism). For the whole elegy consistently describes Cynthia as an awe-inspiring beauty: she is compared with Pallas bearing the Gorgon's head on her breast, with Ischomache the heroic-limbed, the grand figure that inspired the lust of the Centaurs, lastly with the virginal Brimo of the terrible eyes.

II. 3. 22

Carminaque Erinnes non putat aequa suis.

Lucian de Mercede Conductis 38 ἓν γάρ τι καὶ τοῦτο τῶν ἄλλων καλλωπισμάτων αὐτοῖς δοκεῖ, ἣν λέγηται ὡς πεπαιδευμέναι τε εἰσὶ καὶ φιλόσοφοι καὶ ποιοῦσιν ἄσματα οὐ πολὺ τῆς Σαπφοῦς ἀποδέοντα.

44 *Uret et Eoos, uret et Hesperios.*

Oraculum ap. Paus. VI. 8, 9 Δμηθεὶς ἑσπερίοισιν ὑπ' ἀνδράσιν ἠῴοις τε.

II. 10. 13

Iam negat Euphrates equitem post terga tueri
Parthorum et Crassos se tenuisse dolet.

Hertzberg translates 'Henceforth Euphrates declares that no Parthian horseman looks behind him.' This is not the natural meaning of the words, and was doubtless caused by the awkwardness of *post terga* being applied to a river. It seems a sufficient answer to this objection that the river is very distinctly personified; it denies (*negat*) and grieves (*dolet*). The expression is obviously taken from an army or commander *retreating before a victorious foe,* and continually looking back to see whether he is on the track. Pacatus in his Panegyric addressed to the Emperor Theodosius has a very similar passage c. XXXVII. *Ibat interim Maximus, ac te post terga respectans in modum amentis attonitus auolabat.*

II. 16. 8

Et stolidum pleno uellere carpe pecus.

The comparison of a rich and stolid lover with a thick- or gold-fleeced sheep is common. Diog. L. Vit. Diog. 47 *τὸν πλούσιον ἀμαθῆ πρόβατον εἶπε χρυσόμαλλον.* Caligula called Iunius Silanus a golden sheep (Tac. Ann. XIII. 1, cf. Dion C. LIX. 8).

II. 29. 35, 6

Apparent non ulla toro uestigia presso
Signa uoluptatis, nec iacuisse duos.

Voluptas seems to have here a quasi-special meaning = *semen emissum*, as in Hyg. P. A. II. 13 of Hephaestus *effudit in terram uoluptatem;* and nearly so Truc. II. 6, 38 Schöll *Quique mihi magni doloris onus per uoluptatem tuam Condidisti in corpus.*

II. 30. 33, 4

Nec tu uirginibus reuerentia moueris ora
Hic quoque non nescit quid sit amare chorus.

A very good commentary on this passage is supplied by Tzetzes' Scholia on Lycophron 831. *Αἱ Μοῦσαι τῇ πρὸς Ἀφροδίτην ὀργῇ φερόμεναι, διότι πολλὰς αὐτῶν εἰς ἔρωτα κινήσασα ἐποίησεν ἀνδράσι μιγῆναι καὶ τεκεῖν, οἷον* Καλλιόπην *ἐξ* Οἰαγροῦ *τεκεῖν* Ὀρφέα *καὶ* Κυμόθωνα, Τερψιχόρην *ἐκ* Στρύμονος Ῥῆσον, Κλειὼ δ' *ἐκ* Μάγνητος Λῖνον, *τὸν ἐρώμενον αὐτῆς* Ἄδωνιν *ἀπέκτειναν.*

II. 32. 6

Appia cur totiens te uia ducit anum?

I believe this, the reading of all good MSS., to be right. Cynthia, as she grew more profligate, withdrew more and more from the places where she was likely to encounter Propertius. She made journeys to Praeneste or Tusculum; had herself driven to Tibur: was carried along the Appian road—Propertius does not say where,—possibly to Lanuvium, possibly to Cumae; for Cumae would be reached by a branch-road from Capua to which the *uia Appia* led. But wherever it was, she went *in the disguise of an old woman:* for such is the natural meaning of the words, as I saw long ago, and as I find from Bährens' edition, Fonteine (a critic for whose opinion I have, in general, no great respect) has also divined. But why should she go

in this disguise? (1) To escape observation (2) as a decent plea for bandying abusive language (3) as a *frolic*. An old woman driving in a fast equipage (IV. 8. 15—18) along so frequented a thoroughfare would attract the notice of roystering or rowdy young men; they would surround and stop the vehicle; would threaten, even attempt forcible hustling; on ascertaining the secret, perhaps the motive of the disguise, would change their tone and assume the respectful demeanour of admirers or gallants. A passage of Nonnus (Comm. on Gregory Nazianzen I. 64) suggested and will explain my view *Γυνή τις καλουμένη, ὡς μέν τινες λέγουσι, Σιβυλλα, ὡς δὲ ἄλλοι Φιμόνη, ὡς δὲ ἕτεροι, Φιλύρα, ἐσείσθη παρά τινος νεανίσκου. Ἡ δὲ γυνὴ ὑβριστικώτερον διενεχθεῖσα πρὸς τὸν νεανίσκον ὕβρισεν αὐτόν. Ἦν δὲ ἡ ὕβρις ἡ λεχθεῖσα ἔμμετρος στίχος, καὶ τῆς ἁρμονίας τοῦ λόγου τῆς γραὸς ἀρεσάσης τοῖς παρισταμένοις τὸ μέτρον τοῦ στίχου ἔλαβον· καὶ οὕτως ἐτεχνώθη τὰ περὶ τοὺς στίχους.* This extraordinary version of the story of the Sibyl (Phemonoe) is obviously an invention drawn from every-day life. The young man shakes the crone; she replies with insulting language, which falls naturally into cadence; the bystanders catch the trick, and the divine art of poetry is the result. May we now return to Cynthia, and on the strength of Nonnus' story, invent a possible episode of real Roman life? Propertius in the Elegy where he describes the person of Cynthia (II. 2) ends with this prayer:

> *Hanc utinam faciem nolit mutare senectus*
> *Etsi Cumaeae saecula uatis aget.*

and we know from II. 3. 21, 22 that she composed verses. She has heard the Euhemeristic explanation of this story of the Cumaean Sibyl, and acts it in person: assumes the dress of an aged woman, white hair, bowed and tremulous body &c, and is driven so on the Appian way in the direction of the legendary abode of the prophetess. On the way she falls in with a party of young men; they treat her rudely; she replies with abusive verses; then a noisy scene ensues, which ends with the discovery of the disguise and the retirement of the party to a *taberna* such as is described in IV. 8.

A well-known passage of Aristophanes' Plutus forms a fair illustration of my hypothesis, 1006 Velsen

ΓΡ. Καὶ μὴν πρὸ τοῦ γ' ὀσημέραι νὴ τὼ θεὼ
ἐπὶ τὴν θύραν ἐβάδιζεν ἀεὶ τὴν ἐμήν.
ΧΡΕ. ἐπ' ἐκφοράν; ΓΡ. μὰ Δί' ἀλλὰ τῆς φωνῆς μόνον
ἐρῶν ἀκοῦσαι. ΧΡΕ. τοῦ λαβεῖν μὲν οὖν χάριν.
ΓΡ. καὶ νὴ Δί' εἰ λυπουμένην αἴσθοιτό με
νηττάριον ἂν καὶ φάβιον ὑπεκορίζετο.
ΧΡΕ. ἔπειτ' ἴσως ἤτησ' ἂν εἰς ὑποδήματα.
ΓΡ. μυστηρίοις δὲ τοῖς μεγάλοις ὀχουμένην
ἐπὶ τῆς ἁμάξης ὅτι προσέβλεψέν μέ τις,
ἐτυπτόμην διὰ τοῦθ' ὅλην τὴν ἡμέραν,
οὕτω σφόδρα ζηλότυπος ὁ νεανίσκος ἦν.

II. 32. 23

Nuper enim de te nostra me ledit ad aure(s)
Rumor et in tota non bonus urbe fuit.

There is an imitation of this passage in a hexameter poem ascribed to S. Cyprian (IV. 35 ed. Hartel)

Rumor et ad nostras peruenit publicus aures
Te dixisse

which seems to support the old reading *nostras peruenit ad aures* against any of the later conjectures, including Bährens' *nostram deuenit ad aurem*, which otherwise appears to me very plausible. Prof. Palmer retains *me laedit*: harshly, I cannot but think.

II. 32. 35

Quamuis Ida †Parim pastorem dicat amasse
Atque inter pecudes accubuisse deam.

Parim must be wrong; the allusion is obviously to Anchises, whose furtive meeting with Aphrodite is described in one of the finest of the Homeric Hymns.

53—55

Ἀγχίσεω δ' ἄρα οἱ γλυκὺν ἵμερον ἔμβαλε θυμῷ,
ὃς τότ' ἐν ἀκροπόλοις ὄρεσιν πολυπιδάκου Ἴδης
βουκολέεσκεν βοῦς, δέμας ἀθανάτοισιν ἐοικώς.

The Hymn here describes Anchises as tending cattle on Mount Ida; Propertius goes further and imagines him *reared* on Ida: hence *Ida parens* is, I imagine, the right reading.

III. 1. 25—27

Nam quis equo pulsas abiegno nosceret arces,
Fluminaque Haemonio comminus isse uiro,
Idaeum Simoenta Iouis cunabula parui.

Haupt, as is well known, following the Naples MS. which omits the words *cunabula parui*, accepted a conj. of Gustav Wolff's *Iouis cum prole Scamandro*, which has been adopted by the last German editor as well as by Mr Postgate. I am glad to see that Palmer has not been misled by this ingenious emendation, which I cannot but think wrong. Not only has Manilius II. 15 *Iouis et cunabula magni*, Ovid *Iouis incunabula Creten*, but the very expression of Propertius is to be found in Pacatus' Paneg. Theodos. IV. *terra Cretensis parui Iouis gloriata cunabulis.* Palmer's clever conj. *Idaeos montes Iouis incunabula parui* may be right: but I do not feel certain that the MS. reading is vicious. What harshness is there in supposing that the poet in v. 26 spoke of rivers *generally*, then in 27 specified *one*? At any rate the superstructure which has been built up on the accidental omission of two words in the Naples MS. is very frail, and will not stand the test of serious criticism. Hertzberg's note sufficiently, to my mind, explains the confusion between the Cretan and Trojan Ida.

III. 9. 43, 44

Inter Callimachi sat erit placuisse libellos
Et cecinisse modis, dure poeta, tuis.

It is just possible that *dure poeta* is right, and alludes to the *harsh sweetness* of Callimachus' elegies. Meleager in Anth. P. I. 1. 21, 22 speaks of ἡδύ τε μύρτον Καλλιμάχου, στυφελοῦ μεστὸν ἀεὶ μέλιτος. And does not this well characterize the peculiar mixture of tenderness and hardness in the poems of Propertius?

III. 11. 5

Venturam melius praesagit nauita mortem
Vulneribus didicit miles habere metum.

Propertius seems here to have in his mind a passage of Pindar, Nem. VII. 17

> σοφοὶ δὲ μέλλοντα τριταῖον ἄνεμον
> ἔμαθον, οὐδ' ὑπὸ κέρδει βάλον.

In this σοφοὶ seems to correspond to *nauita*, the seaman, i.e. the *trained* seaman, as opposed to the man who commits his life to the waters without any knowledge of the sea. But *mortem* of MSS. can hardly be right, and *noctem* which is found as a correction in F and V is not much better. I suggest *molem*, used in the same sense as in Aen. v. 789 *Ipse mihi nuper Libycis tu testis in undis Quam molem subito excierit.*

III. 23. 19

> *Me miserum, his †aliquis rationem scribit auari.*
> *Et ponit duras inter ephemeridas.*

The Bodl. MS. purchased by Mr H. O. Coxe in 1870 has *aliquid*. This seems to me very probably right. 'Some miserly thing writes an account in these tablets.' This is not the only place where I think this MS. may be worth considering. All Bährens' MSS. in the above passage agree in *auari*.

IV. 3. 47, 8

> *Nec me tardarent Scythiae iuga, cum pater altas*
> *†Africus in glaciem frigore nectit aquas.*

Possibly *Arcticus*.

IV. 5. 21

> *Si te Eoa* { *Dorozantum* / *Derorantum* } *iuuat aurea ripa*
> *Seu quae sub Tyria concha superbit aqua.*

I have never doubted that the mysterious *dorozantum* or *doroxatum* or *derorantum* was some Oriental name: see my University College (London) Programme for 1872—3. The name I now think may be Dar(i)sanum or Darizanum, an expanded form of the same word as Stephanus of Byzantium has preserved s. v. Δαρσανία. πόλις Ἰνδική, ἐν ᾗ αὐθημερὸν ἱμάτιον ἱστουργοῦσι γυναῖκες, ὡς Διονύσιος Βασσαρικῶν τρίτῃ. We might then read *rica*, and understand a kind of Indian shawl

which could be used to cover the face like a veil. The texture of these Indian *πέπλα*, as well as the fact of their being woven in one day, would make them curious and therefore sought after by women like Cynthia.

IV. 5. 64

Per tenues ossa sunt numerata cutes.

Lactant. de mort. Persecutorum XXXIII. *miserabili macie cutis lurida longe inter ossa consederat.*

IV. 7. 77, 8. In a former number of this Journal I proposed to read these two verses thus

Vna Clytaemnestrae stuprum uel adultera Cressae
Portat mentitae lignea monstra bouis.

I have since found the following illustration of my conj. Anth. L. 131 Riese

Vatem te poterit reddere ligneum.
Qui uaccam trabibus lusit adulteris.

IV. 10. 18

Vrbis uirtutisque parens sic uincere sueuit,
Qui tulit aprico frigida castra lare.

Until some tolerable explanation of *aprico* is discovered, I shall continue to prefer Passerat's *a prisco* to any of the conjectures I have seen. 'Who from the plainness of his old-fashioned house learnt to bear the cold of the camp.'

IV. 7. 79, 80

Pelle hederam tumulo, mihi quae pugnante corymbo
†Molli contortis alligat ossa comis.

It seems very strange that all modern editors that I have seen write *Mollia*. Can there be any reasonable doubt that it is not the bones of Cynthia, but the ivy which wreaths about them, that is *soft*? Read therefore *Mollis*. The rhythm is the same as in X. 38

Ceruix Romanos sanguine lauit equos.

R. ELLIS.

CONIECTANEA.

Varro.

Nonius p. 543 has the following gloss: *Encombomata et pernacides, genera vestium puellarium. Varro, Cato vel de liberis educandis, "Ut puellae habeant potius in vestitu chlamydas, encombomata ac pernacidas, quam togas."* For *pernacidas* (this, not *parn-* is the MS. spelling) I propose to read *peronatridas*, or *peronetridas*. See Liddell and Scott s.v. *περονητρίς*.

Cicero.

Pro Plancio § 95 *me arcem facere e cloaca, lapidemque ex sepulchro venerari pro deo.* Dobree conjectured *aram* for *arcem:* perhaps we should read *arcum*, an arch, which would be more to the point.

Lucretius.

4 418 *Nubila dispicere et caelum ut videare videre*
Corpora mirando sub terras abdita caelo.

For *caelum* (see Munro's critical note) I would propose *rerum:* so that *corpora rerum* would = *res*: see Munro on 5 235, "*terrai corpus*, a favourite periphrasis, as *corpus aquae, Neptuni*, and the like."

Livy.

2 23 8 *Nexi vincti solutique se undique in publicum proripiunt.* I think *vincti* is a gloss on *nexi*, and therefore propose to expunge it.

Quintilian.

1 6 1. The words *est etiam sua loquentibus observatio, sua scribentibus,* surely belong to the end of the fifth chapter, not to the beginning of the sixth. The sixth properly begins with the definition of *sermo* or usage, while the fifth ends with the discussion of *words.* I would therefore propose to write the whole as follows: 1 5 72 *Nam ne 'balare' quidem aut 'hinnire' fortiter diceremus, nisi iudicio vetustatis niterentur. Est etiam sua loquentibus observatio, sua scribentibus.*

6 1. *Sermo constat ratione, vetustate, auctoritate, consuetudine.*

10 1 83. *Quod de Pericle veteris comoediae testimonium est ...in labris eius sedisse quandam persuadendi deam.* The last three words are so clumsy that I cannot but think that *quandam* is a corruption for *Suadam,* upon which *persuadendi deam* is a gloss. Compare Cicero *Brutus* § 59 Πειθώ *quam vocant Graeci, cuius effector est orator, hanc Suadam appellavit Ennius, ut, quam deam in Pericli labris scripsit Eupolis sessitavisse, huius hic medullam nostrum oratorem fuisse dixerit.*

Marius Victorinus.

P. 9 Keil (from Varro). [*Nemo et nullus*] *quorum genetivum casum aliter quam nos veteres extulerunt: nemini enim et nulli dixerunt. Item ad bonae fruges quoque, nos bonae frugi* etc. I propose *At idem bonae frugis quoque: idem* meaning *veteres.*

P. 11. *Nostri Latini cum litteris uterentur:* surely *Latini* is a gloss for *nostri.*

Cledonius.

P. 47 Keil. *Gemitumque carentum pro carentium.* Read *cadentum pro cadentium:* Aen. 10 674 *gemitumque cadentum Accipio.*

Servius in Donatum.

P. 444 Keil. *Plinius dicit barbarismum esse sermonem unum in quo vis sua esset contra naturam.* Pliny seems to have

differed from other scholars in applying the word *barbarismus* not only to mistakes in single words, but to mistakes in sentences or combinations of words (*sermones*): and to have distinguished between *barbarismus* and *soloecismus* as between a violation of nature and a violation of custom: Pompeius p. 283 Keil; *Vide quem ad modum expressit Plinius..... Quid est barbarismus? quod non dicitur per naturam. Quid est soloecismus? quod male per artem dicitur. Barbarismus* is also applied to a faulty combination (in this case a faulty scansion) by Consentius p. 393 Keil: *primum illud dicunt, structuras contra rationem temporum factas barbarismi vitio censendas.* Taking this passage into consideration I should propose to read in Servius *Plinius dicit barbarismum esse sermonem unum cuius* (for *unum in quovis*) *structura* (for *sua*) *esset contra naturam*: using *structura* in the general sense of *structure.*

[Sergius] Explan. ad Donatum.

P. 532 Keil (from Varro). *Sic in loquentium legentiumque voce, ubi sunt prosodiae velut istamina, acuta tenuior est quam gravis* &c. For *istamina* Keil prints *stamina,* meaning, I suppose, threads or strings. But these are called in the rest of the passage *chordae,* and, besides, the context requires a word meaning *intervals.* Seeing this, Wilmanns (*De M. Terenti Varronis Scriptis Grammaticis* p. 59) proposed διαστήματα: it would be nearer to the manuscripts to read *distamina.*

Salvian De Gubernatione Dei.

1 § 47. *Quia ut ille ait, aliena nobis, nostra plus aliis placent.* For *ille* I propose *Publilius,* i. e. *Publilius Syrus.*

NOTES IN LATIN LEXICOGRAPHY.

[Words marked * are not to be found in the lexicons of Georges or Lewis and Short, but some of them are in De Vit's Forcellini.]

Alapa manumissionis. A trace of this supposed proceeding may perhaps be found in the words of Sedulius, Carm. Pasch. 5 102,

> *Haec sputa per Dominum nostram lavere figuram,*
> *His alapis nobis libertas maxima plausit.*

In a former note in this Journal, in which I tried to shew that there was very little evidence, if any, for the *alapa manumissionis*, I omitted to quote Isidore 9 4 48 (= Schol. to Persius 5 75) *Apud veteres quotiens manu mittebant, alapa percussos circumagebant.*

Assisa is quoted from Isid. Ord. Creat. 9 7 by Georges as = the flood-tide. The word is surely *accessa:* Servius Aen. 1 246.

Babiger, or *brabiger stultus*: so a great many glossaries: see Loewe, Prodromus p. 54. Surely for *barbiger*, a greybeard: compare Cicero pro Murena § 26, where *barbatus* is used in this sense; *haec iam tum apud illos barbatos ridicula, credo, videbantur.*

Cabanna. Add Commentum Bernense in Donati Barbarismum, (Hagen's *Anecdota Helvetica* p. cxv) *casulae pastorum vel cavannae.*

Censeo, to brand, with abl. of the offence: Consentius p. 393 Keil, *barbarismi vitio censendas.*

Circumactio: add Pliny (?) ap. Charis. p. 88 Keil, *vult Plinius.....vorticem circumactionem undae esse.*

**Conlativus*, grammatical t. t., = susceptible of comparison; Charis. p. 189 Keil (according to the Naples MS.) *conlatia* (i.e. *conlativa*) *sunt adverbia...propius, proxime.* Keil reads *conlata.*

Dissertor. Add Servius (Daniel) Aen. 2 149; *unde qui plane loquuntur dissertores fiunt et diserti vocantur.*

Dissimilis ab, unlike to: add Consentius p. 396, Cledonius p. 11 Keil.

Duplex as grammatical t. t., = *dualis:* Charis. p. 175 *dixere pro dixerunt, muniere pro munierunt, quam figuram alii duplicem existimant.*

Factura = make. Georges has only one instance from Gellius; add Ti. Donatus on Aen. 5 262, *duplicem facturam.*

Facundus and *facundia,* of style in writing: Quintilian 8 1 3 *T. Livio, mirae facundiae viro:* Martial 5 30 3 *facundi scaena Catulli:* Statius Silv. 1 4 28—30 *seu plana solutis Cum struis orsa modis, seu cum tibi dulcis in artum Frangitur et nostras curat facundia leges.*

**Follesco* = *tumesco,* Gloss. Epinal.

Iuxta = concerning: add Faustus Reiensis Epist. p. 6 (Engelbrecht) *quo modo iuxta substantiam Dei in quadam epistula scriptum sit.*

Libitus -ūs, inclination: add Cledonius p. 25 Keil.

Lucunar, parallel form of *lacunar,* Charis. p. 38.

**Malchio.* On a former occasion I called attention to the Latin-Greek gloss *Malchio ἀηδής,* and suggested that *Trimalchio* meant therefore *τρὶς ἀηδής.* This hypothesis is supported by the fact that Martial calls his Zoilus *Malchio:* 3 82 32 *hos Malchionis patimur improbi fastus.*

Nexus of a prisoner: add Sedulius Pasch. Carm. 4 25 *solatur nexos in carcere.*

Oblitteratus in grammar = pluperfect: Charis. p. 168 *oblitteratae ut limaveram.*

Obter; preposition, add Charis. p. 230.

* *Occruciare;* Scriptor De Idiom. Gen., Gramm. Lat. 4 p. 570 Keil.

Pactilis. Mr Lindsay of Jesus College adds, to the instance quoted in Georges, Acta Fratrum Arvalium p. cxix l. 35 Henzen, (and *passim*), *cum corona pactili rosacia.*

**Parentarium,* a service in honour of parents, Charis. p. 34.

Partio = *qualitas.* Charisius p. 114 Keil *Nam partiones orationis quae appellantur qualitates hoc modo observandum. Nam qualitas est et speciei, ut niger taeter, et quantitatis, ut magnus ingens. Hae partiones trifariam declinantur, id est*

absolutive comparative superlative. Is the word *partio* in this sense the abstract from *pario?* If so it must mean metaphorically *genus,* kind or species.

Passio, of verbs, passive force, as opposed to *actus,* Consentius p. 366, 368 Keil. And so

Patientia. Consentius p. 366 *ea quae patientiam habent interdum eiusmodi sunt ut agentem extrinsecus demonstrent, sicuti est secor pulsor vapulo.*

Perfectus, as grammatical t. t., = superlative, Charis. p. 189, of the adverbs *penissime* and *penitissime.* Of the positive degree, Consentius p. 343 Keil.

Plăga in the sense of a line. Add Q. Curtius 6 2(6) 13 *ad Tanaim recta plaga attinent.*

Popa = tabernarius: Gloss. Epinal.

Praesento = to represent: Cledonius p. 49 Keil; *Ideo pronomen vocativum casum non habet, res quae nomen praesentat.*

**Praesilium.* I infer the existence of this word from the passage of Varro preserved by Marius Victorinus p. 9 Keil, *Sed nos nunc et adventum et apud per d potius quam per r scribimus, arventum et apur, et linguam per l potius quam per d, et praesidium per d potius quam per l.* I suppose that *praesilium* must have stood to *praesul* as *consilium* to *consul,* and that confusion afterwards arose between *praesilium* and *praesidium.*

Recidivus = returning: Sedulius Pasch. Carm. 4 140 *recidivo tramite:* so Pasch. Op. 4 12. *Recidiva lux* = returning light, Pasch. Op. 3 12.

Recuro = to repair. Add to the instances in Georges C. I. L. 9 5804 (Cluentum) *inpendio suo recuraverunt.*

Regularis = regular. Add Cledonius p. 33 Keil, *accentus in Romanis verbis et in regularibus quaerere debemus.*

Scriptor in the sense of a prose author as opposed to a poet, Varro ap. Diom. p. 426 Keil, *eorum quae apud poetas et scriptores dicuntur: apud poetas, ut ordo servetur, apud scriptores, ut ordo careat vitiis.*

Succedaneus: applied as a grammatical term to the pronoun: Varro ap. Cledon. p. 49 *Ideo haec pars succedanea dicitur, quia non potest in eadem locutione esse, hoc est, quia bis nomen repeti non potest.*

Superfusio: add Ti. Donatus Aen. 5 323 *ex superfusione aquae.*

* *Tilinus,* of linden-wood: Gloss. Hild. *tilinum philyrinum.*

Unitus as a grammatical term: Cledonius p. 44, *Unita* (*forma nominis*) *est quando omnes casus similes sibi sunt:* opposed to *binaria, ternaria, quaternaria, quinaria, senaria.*

PART OF THE *EXCERPTA CHARISII* AND THE FRAGMENT *DE IDIOMATIBUS GENERUM* PRINTED IN THE FOURTH VOLUME OF KEIL'S *GRAMMATICI LATINI.*

On pp. 551—554 of the first volume of Keil's *Grammatici Latini* is a list of nouns which, though identical in meaning, differ in gender in Greek and Latin. I do not know whether it has been observed that this list and that given by the *Scriptor de Idiomatibus Generum* in Keil's fourth volume are evidently copies from the same original catalogue, and may be used to supplement each other. An important point of difference between them is that the list in the *Excerpta Charisii* constantly omits the Greek equivalent. Let me proceed to prove my statement by a comparison of the two:

Nomina quae apud Romanos masculina, apud Graecos feminina.

Exc. Charis.	Scriptor De Idiom. Gen.
Hic actus ἡ πρᾶξις	*hic adventus ἡ παρουσία*
— *affectus*	*accentus ἡ προσῳδία, ἄρσις*
— *accentus*	*arcus ψαλίς, ἁψίς*
angulus γωνία	*arbitratus μεσιτεία*
ascensus	*amplexus περιπλοκή*
aditus	*ardor καῦσις*
adventus	*actus πρᾶξις*
anus ἡ ἕδρα	*affectus διάθεσις*
apex κέραια	*aditus εἴσοδος, ἔντευξις*
clamor	*angulus γωνία*
conplexus	*alvus γαστήρ*
casus	*alveus ἡ τοῦ ποταμοῦ κοίτη,*
clipeus	*ἤτοι τὸ βάθος*

conspectus
coetus
coitus
calx πτέρνα λάκτισμα ἄσβεστος
carcer
conatus
census
cibus
coactus ἡ ἀνάγκη
canus πολιά
concursus
cantus
concentus συνῳδή
collis ἀκρώρεια
cultus
calix κύλιξ
comitatus συνεκδημία
clivus ἀνάβασις
calor
calculus ψῆφος
callis ἀτραπός
culmus καλάμη
consulatus
carduus κινάρα
cippus στήλη

auditus ἀκοή
arbutus κόμαρος
aspectus πρόσοψις
accessus ἐπίβασις
ascensus ἀνάβασις
acus ῥαφίς, βελόνη
apex ἡ κέραια
hic clamor ἡ βοή, ἡ κραυγή
complexus περιπλοκή
casus πτῶσις
clipeus ἀσπίς
conspectus ἄποψις
coetus σύνοδος
coitus συνουσία
calx πτέρνα
carcer φυλακή, ἀφετηρία
census ἀπογραφή
cibus τροφή
canus πολιά
concursus συνδρομή
cantus ᾠδή
concentus συνῳδία
collis ἀκρώρεια
cultus τημέλεια
conventus σύνοδος
calix κύλιξ
comitatus συνοδία
calor θέρμη
calculus ψῆφος
culmus ἡ καλάμη τοῦ σίτου
consulatus ὑπάτεια
carduus κινάρα
capex πυρκαϊά
cippus στήλη.

I might shew similar correspondences through the remaining lists, but these, I imagine, will be taken as sufficient to prove my point.

NOTES ON VERGIL.

Eclogues.

1 13. An analogous distinction to that drawn by some ancient grammarians between *protenus* and *protinus* was made by Verrius Flaccus between *quatenus* and *quatinus*: Festus p. 258 Müller; *Quatenus significat qua fine....at quatinus quoniam.*

5 37. For the nuisance caused by the presence of *avena* compare Cato R. R. 37 5 *avenamque destringas:* Cic. Fin. 5 § 91 *ne seges quidem spicis uberibus et crebris si avenam uspiam videris:* Digest 9 2 27 14 *si lolium aut avenam in segetem alienam inieceris, quo eam tu inquinares.*

Georgics.

1 106. *Deinde satis fluvium inducit rivosque sequentis.* The *Codex Romanus* reads *fluentes* for *sequentis.* I suppose that *fluentes* points to a lost reading *recentes,* on which *fluentes* was a gloss: compare Servius Aen. 6 635 *recens semper fluens.*

1 257. The expression *signorum obitus et ortus* may be found in Cicero De Inventione 1 § 59.

1 442. Consentius p. 398 Keil quotes with *refulserit* for *refugerit.*

2 445. *Pandas carinas* is from Ennius (Ann. 560 Vahlen) *pandam ductura carinam.*

3 234. *Ad pugnam proludit. Proludo* and *prolusio* in this sense may be illustrated from Cic. De Oratore 2 § 325: *ipsis sententiis quibus proluseris:* Divin. in Caec. § 47, where *prolusio* is opposed to *pugna*: Seneca De Ira 2 2 *principia proludentia adfectibus:* Juvenal 5 26 *iurgia proludunt.*

4 72. *Fractos sonitus tubarum.* Comp. Tacitus Germania 3 *asperitas soni et fractum murmur.*

4 167. *Aut—aut = alii—alii:* so Sallust Iug. 60 4 *monere alii, alii hortari, aut manu significare aut niti corporibus:* Aen. 7 164 *Aut acres tendunt arcus, aut lenta lacertis spicula contorquent.* The usage is frequent in Tacitus.

4 199. *Aut fetus nixibus edunt.* The well-attested reading *nexibus* is supported by Prudentius Cathem. 3 75, *apis...nexilis inscia conubii.*

Aeneid.

1 1. One more important testimony should be added to the many already collected in support of the theory that the Aeneid begins with *Arma virumque cano* and not with *Ille ego.* It is that of Quintilian (11 3 35 foll.), who distinctly treats the passage *Arma virumque—moenia Romae* as an independent paragraph or period. *Secundum est ut sit oratio distincta, id est qui dicit ut incipiat ubi oportet et desinat. Observandum etiam, quo loco sustinendus et quasi suspendendus sermo sit, quod Graeci ὑποδιαστολήν vel ὑποστιγμήν vocant, quo deponendus. Suspenditur 'arma virumque cano,' quia illud 'virum' ad sequentia pertinet, ut sit 'virum Troiae qui primus ab oris' et hic iterum. Nam etiamsi aliud est unde venit quam quo venit, non distinguendum tamen, quia utrumque eodem verbo continetur 'venit.' Tertio 'Italiam,' quia interiectio est 'fato profugus' et continuum sermonem, qui faciebat 'Italiam Lavinaque' dividit. Ob eandemque causam quarto 'profugus,' deinde 'Lavinaque venit litora,' ubi iam erit distinctio, quia inde alius incipit sensus. Sed in ipsis etiam distinctionibus tempus alias brevius, alias longius dabimus: interest enim sermonem finiant an sensum. Itaque illam distinctionem 'litora' protinus altero spiritus initio insequar: cum illuc venero 'atque altae moenia Romae,' deponam et morabor et novum rursus exordium faciam.*

102. *Talia iactanti.* Compare Livy 3 47, *similia his ab Icilio iactabantur.*

122. *Laxis laterum compagibus,* &c. Compare Seneca De Ir. 2 10 8 *cuius navigium multam undique laxatis compagibus aquam trahit.*

224. *Despicio,* to look down upon: Martial 13 99 2 *despicit illa (caprea) canes.*

264. *Moresque viris et moenia ponet.* Martial 9 102 21 *templa deo, mores populis dedit, otia ferro.*

355. *Crudeles aras.* Charisius p. 33 Keil, *'arae' pro penatibus; dicimus namque 'ara' singulariter.*

448. *Nexaeque Aere trabes.* It should have been added, in Conington's note, that the reading *nixae* is confirmed by the passage of Varro quoted by Servius, *trisulcae fores...graves atque innixae in cardinum tardos turbines.*

452. *Adflictis melius confidere rebus.* Comp. Sallust Iug. 75 1, *Iugurtha rebus suis diffidens:* C. I. L. 1 1175 *re sua difeidens aspere afleicta.*

726. To my note on *laquear* and *lacuar* add the testimony of Priscian 1 p. 127 Keil, *lacus lacunar, laqueus autem (facit) laquear.*

2 265. *Pelidesque Neoptolemus, primusque Machaon.* Comp. Aen. 3 58 *delectos populi ad proceres primumque parentem.*

322. *Res summa,* I have here observed, probably means *res publica.* This usage may be illustrated by Livy 3 51, *placere decem creari qui summae rei praeessent;* 'to take the common cause in hand.'

591. *Confessa deam.* Martial 10 84 9, *Vis tu simplicius senem fateri.*

654. *Inceptoque et sedibus haeret in isdem.* With this conceit compare Caesar Bell. Civ. 3 39, *Huic officio atque oppido Manius Acilius legatus praeerat.*

3 230. The well attested reading *clausam circum* may perhaps point to *clausa in circum,* closed so as to form a circle. *Circus* is used in this sense 5 109, 289, 551.

363. For *religio* in the sense of a supernatural power compare further Nonius p. 52, *Adorare, propitiare religiones.*

484. For *honos = vir honoratus* compare Martial 8 8 4, *Te colat omnis honos.*

549. *Obvertimus* should simply be explained 'turn round,' *ob = circum* as in *obambulare, obsidere, obire* and many other verbs.

4 51. *Moras nectere,* I should have said, occurs in Seneca Ir. 3 39 3.

213. *Loci leges* should be explained, not with Conington and Schaper, 'the sovereignty over the spot,' nor quite, with Kennedy, 'the laws regulating the site,' but 'the conditions on which she is allowed to occupy the place.'

329. *Qui te tamen ore referret.* I am inclined to take *tamen* with *ore*, 'if only by his face,' on the analogy of the combination *tamen aliquid*, 'some small thing' and similar expressions, which I have quoted in a note printed by Mr Owen in his commentary on Ovid's Tristia 1 1 96.

382. *Pia numina.* Martial 11 3 9 *cum pia reddiderint Augustum numina terris.*

423. *Aditus et tempora noras.* Martial 5 6 9 *nosti tempora tu Iovis sereni.*

5 199. *Subtrahiturque solum.* Ti. Donatus explains *Sic intenti plenis studiis remis incumbebant, ut nihil praeter se et navem viderent.* This is supported by Silius 14 375 *vix meminere maris: tam vasto ad proelia nisu Incumbunt proni.*

426. Apollonius Rhodius (2 90) is wrongly quoted by Conington ἐπ' ἀκροτάτοισιν ἀερθείς, as if ἀκροτάτοισι were used substantivally; it really agrees with πόδεσσι.

694. For *sine more* = *sine exemplo* compare Seneca Ir. 3 2 5, *sine more, sine auspiciis populus ductu irae suae egressus fortuito raptaque pro armis gessit;* and Sedulius Pasch. Carm. 1 171 *Heliam corvi quondam pavere ministri, Praebentes sine more dapes.*

840. *Tibi somnia tristia portans Insonti.* My explanation of the words is, I think, strongly confirmed by Iliad 10 496, κακὸν γὰρ ὄναρ κεφαλῆφιν ἐπέστη Τὴν νύκτ', Οἰνεΐδαο πάϊς, διὰ μῆτιν Ἀθήνης, where, as Mr Monro has pointed out, the reality is grimly described as a dream.

867. *Fluitare* of a ship. Compare, besides the passage which I have quoted from Quintilian, Cic. Sest. § 46, *rei publicae navem, ereptis senatui gubernaculis fluitantem in alto tempestatibus seditionum ac discordiarum.*

6 160. *Multa inter sese vario sermone serebant.* Add to Conington's note Livy 3 43, *secessionis mentionem ad vulgus sermonibus occultis serentem.*

278. Of *sopor* in the sense of unconsciousness, lethargy, the following instances may be added to those which I have quoted in Conington's note: Seneca Epist. 78 9 *in alienationem soporemque*, Apuleius Met. 10 11 (of a trance induced by a drug) *sopor morti simillimus.*

610. *Incubuere divitiis.* Add Seneca Ir. 1 21 2 *acervis auri*

argentique incubat: Martial 12 53 3 *largiris nihil, incubasque gazae.*

639. *Fortunatorum nemorum sedesque beatas.* The structure of the line was perhaps suggested by Catullus 64 85, *magnanimum ad Minoa venit sedesque superbas.*

747. *Sensus = νοῦς*: Hor. 1 Sat. *sensus moresque repugnant, Atque ipsa utilitas:* Gloss. Lat. Graec. (Philoxenus) *Sensus νοῦς.*

810. *Primam qui legibus urbem Fundabit.* Quintilian 1 Praef. 10, *fundare urbes legibus.*

7 37. With *tempora rerum*, 'the times at which things took place,' compare Ovid Trist. 1 1 37 *Iudicis officium est ut res, ita tempora rerum Quaerere.*

485. Charisius p. 178 Keil spells *Turrus*, which is probably right.

710. *Una ingens Amiterna cohors priscique Quirites.* It should be noticed that Amiternum was in the *tribus Quirina* (C. I. L. 9 397).

8 18. *Talia per Latium.* So Livy 21 24, *Et per nuntios quidem haec.*

25. The form *lacuaria* is given by the Bamberg MS. (first hand) of Quintilian 11 3 160.

9 315. *Castra inimica petunt, multis tamen ante futuri Exitio.* For this elliptical use of *tamen* we may perhaps compare Cic. Verr. 2 4 § 123, *Videte quanto taetrior hic tyrannus Syracusanis fuerit quam quisquam superiorum umquam. Illi tamen ornarunt templa deorum immortalium, hic* &c.

449. *Pater Romanus.* Add to the passages which I have quoted from Martial Statius Silvae 5 3 232, *parens Tarpeius* (of Domitian).

502. *Inter manus:* add Livy 3 13 *inter manus domum ablatum.*

11 158. *Sanctissima coniunx.* Add C. I. L. 9 5924 *Licustenae Veneriae coniugi sanctissimae.*

283. *Quantus In clipeum adsurgat.* The phrase seems to have been a military one: Vegetius R. M. 2 23 *adsuescant... insurgere tripudiantes in clipeum rursusque subsidere.*

12 529. For *sonare* transitive, = to boast or talk loudly about a thing, compare further Martial 4 79 8 *Sigeriosque meros, Partheniosque sonas:* 6 19 8 *Tu...Sullas Mariosque Muciosque Magna voce sonas, manuque tota:* 12 66 9 *Deinde ducenta sonas, et ais non esse minoris:* Statius Silv. 4 2 66 *Cum modo Germanas acies, modo Daca sonantem Proelia:* 4 4 78 *Haec ego Chalcidicis ad te, Marcella, sonabam Litoribus.*

605. For an additional instance of the adjective *florus* see C. I. L. 9 5925 (at Ancona), *florae crescentiue eius.*

H. NETTLESHIP.

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CLASSICAL LATIN PROSE.

WERE any one asked who in his opinion were the main representatives of Latin Prose style, there can I suppose be little doubt that he would mention Cicero, Livy, and Tacitus. These three names, in fact, mark three definite stages in the development of classical Latin Prose. To speak more accurately, there are two stages, each of which marks the extreme point of a line of tendency. These stages are represented respectively by the styles of Cicero and of Tacitus, between whom Livy, who has a manner peculiar to himself, occupies the middle place.

The elements of a good style are two, luminousness and beauty. By luminousness I mean its power of representing thought and passion. To express thought it must be lucid, to represent thought and passion it must be simple and strong. By beauty I mean such a choice of words, and such an arrangement of them, as satisfies the requirements of the ear.

In a masterly style these two elements are combined in a manner which is felt to defy dissection, and to require none. The impression produced is one and indivisible, and we do not care to analyse it. Such a passage as the conclusion of Cicero's second Philippic speaks home to us with a living impression of unity and directness which we acknowledge without question. We admire and ask for nothing more [1].

[1] § 118. *Respice, quaeso, aliquando rem publicam, M. Antoni; quibus ortus sis, non quibuscum vivas, considera. Mecum, ut voles; cum re publica redi in gratiam. Sed de te tu ipse videris; ego de me ipso profitebor. Defendi rem publicam adulescens, non deseram senex; contempsi Catilinae gladios, non pertimescam tuos. Quin etiam corpus libenter obtulerim, si repraesentari morte mea libertas civitatis potest, ut aliquando dolor populi Romani pariat quod*

But Rome was not built, nor the Latin prose of Cicero formed, in a day. It is possible to trace with tolerable clearness the course of literary development of which it is the climax, and to observe the laborious process by which, from writer to writer, the combination of luminousness with beauty was gradually perfected.

Isidore 1 37 (29) 2 preserves a tradition, which probably comes from Varro, that the first Latin prose was written by Appius Claudius Caecus. *Tam apud Graecos quam apud Latinos longe antiquiorem curam fuisse carminum* (supply probably *Varro ait*) *quam prosae. Omnia enim prius versibus condebantur, prosae autem studium sero viguit. Primus apud Graecos Pherecydes Syrus soluta oratione scripsit. Apud Romanos autem Appius Caecus adversus Pyrrhum solutam orationem primus exercuit. Iam ex hinc et ceteri pro se eloquentiam condiderunt.*

This notice probably represents the accepted literary tradition of Rome; and whatever truth there may be in it, it is quite clear that for the purposes of oratory Latin prose composition must have been in existence before the Punic wars. We have Cicero's express testimony to the existence of *mortuorum laudationes* in rude prose[1]. In an ancient city community like that of Rome—a community in which the people had to be persuaded—some kind of oratory must have arisen at a very early period. We may however almost say of Latin prose as we may of Latin poetry, that in order to study it we must begin at the end. The earliest specimens of Latin prose style which now survive are the fragments of the speeches and histories of the elder Cato (for the *Res Rustica* as we have it is written in no style at all), and Cato, whose life extended from 234—149 B.C. or eighty-five years, comes at the end of what we

iam diu parturit. Etenim si abhinc annos prope viginti hoc ipso in templo negavi posse mortem immaturam esse consulari, quanto verius nunc negabo seni? Mihi vero, patres conscripti, etiam optanda mors est, perfuncto rebus iis quas adeptus sum quasque gessi. Duo modo haec opto, unum ut moriens populum Romanum liberum relinquam, alterum ut ita cuique eveniat, ut de re publica quisque mereatur.

[1] Brutus § 61; *Nec vero habeo quemquam antiquiorem (Catone) cuius quidem scripta proferenda putem, nisi quem Appii Caeci oratio haec ipsa de Pyrrho et nonnullae mortuorum laudationes forte delectant.*

may call the Italian period proper, and at the moment when the study of Greek literature was beginning to change the form of Latin composition. Anti-Hellenist as he was, it is difficult to suppose that Cato altogether escaped the influence of the new fashion, and in his old age it is known that he took to the study of Demosthenes and (to a certain extent) to that of Thucydides. Let us take some specimens of Cato's oratory from the few fragments which survive.

Meyer, Fragmenta Oratorum Romanorum p. 41. *Tuum nefarium facinus peiore facinore operiri postulas, sucidias humanas facis, tantas trucidationes facis, decem capita libera interficis, decem hominibus vitam eripis, indicta causa, iniudicatis, incondemnatis.*

Ib. p. 43. *Dixit a decemviris parum sibi bene cibaria curata esse. Iussit vestimenta detrahi, atque flagro caedi. Decemviros Bruttiani verberavere: videre multi mortales. Quis hanc contumeliam, quis hoc imperium, quis hanc servitutem ferre potest? Nemo hoc rex ausus est facere: eane fieri bonis, bono genere gnatis, boni consulitis? Ubi societas, ubi fides maiorum? Insignitas iniurias, plagas, verbera, vibices, eos dolores atque carnificinas per dedecus atque maximam contumeliam, inspectantibus popularibus suis atque multis mortalibus, te facere ausum esse? Sed quantum luctum quantumque gemitum, quid lacrimarum quantumque fletum factum audivi! Servi iniurias nimis aegre ferunt. Quid illos, bono genere gnatos, magna virtute praeditos, opinamini animi habuisse atque habituros esse, dum vivent?*

The following fragment is from the *Oratio pro Rhodiensibus* (Meyer p. 104).

Scio solere plerisque hominibus rebus secundis atque prolixis atque prosperis animum excellere, superbiam atque ferociam augescere atque crescere. Quod mihi nunc magnae curae est, quod haec res tam secunde processit, ne quid adversi eveniat, quod nostras secundas res confutet, neve haec laetitia nimis luxuriosa eveniat. Adversae res domant, et docent quid opus sit facto. Secundae res laetitia transversum trudere solent a recte consulendo atque intellegendo. Quo maiore opere dico suadeoque, uti haec res aliquot dies proferatur, dum ex tanto gaudio in potestatem nostram redeamus.

Atque ego quidem arbitror, Rhodienses noluisse nos ita depugnare, uti depugnatum est, neque regem Persen vicisse. Non Rhodienses modo id noluere, sed multos populos atque multas nationes idem noluisse arbitror. Atque haud scio an partim eorum fuerint, qui non nostrae contumeliae causa id noluerint evenire: sed enim id metuere, si nemo esset homo, quem vereremur, quodque luberet faceremus, ne sub solo imperio nostro in servitute nostra essent: libertatis suae causa in ea sententia fuisse arbitror. Atque Rhodienses tamen Persen publice numquam adiuvere. Cogitate, quanto nos inter nos privatim cautius facimus. Nam unus quisque nostrum, si quis advorsus rem suam quid fieri arbitratur, summa vi contra nititur ne advorsus eam fiat: quod illi tamen perpessi.

Ea nunc derepente tanta nos beneficia ultro citroque tantamque amicitiam relinquemus? Quod illos dicimus voluisse facere, id nos priores facere occupabimus?

Qui acerrime advorsus eos dicit, ita dicit, hostes voluisse fieri. Ecquis est tandem vostrum qui, quod ad sese attineat, aequom censeat poenas dare ob eam rem quod arguatur male facere voluisse? Nemo, opinor: nam ego, quod ad me attinet, nolim.

The next is from the *Origines* (p. 19 Jordan)

Di immortales tribuno militum fortunam ex virtute eius dedere. Nam ita evenit, cum saucius multifariam ibi factus esset, tamen vulnus capiti nullum evenit, eumque inter mortuos defatigatum vulneribus atque quod sanguen eis defluxerat cognovere, eum sustulere, isque convaluit, saepeque postilla operam rei publicae fortem atque strenuam praehibuit, illoque facto, quod illos milites subduxit, exercitum servavit. Sed idem benefactum quo in loco ponas nimium interest. Leonides Laco, qui simile apud Lacedaemonios fecit, propter eius virtutes omnis Graecia gloriam atque gratiam praecipuam claritudinis inclutissumae decoravere monumentis, signis statuis elogiis historiis aliisque rebus: gratissimum id eius factum habuere. At tribuno militum parva laus pro factis relicta, qui idem fecerat atque rem servaverat.

Ea omnia, as Gellius[1] says of the speech *pro Rhodiensibus, distinctius numerosiusque fortassean dici potuerunt, fortius atque vividius potuisse dici non videntur.* The style is clear and

[1] N. A. 6 3 52.

forcible, it is therefore luminous: but harmony, and therefore beauty, it has none. The sentences follow the thoughts, without any idea of rhythm to modify them; *sucidias humanas facis, tantas trucidationes facis, decem funera facis, decem capita libera interficis.* There are but few connecting particles, those employed being of the simplest kind, such as relatives, conditionals, or adversatives. Verbs are constantly placed in the same position at the end of the sentence, without any attempt to vary the sound: *excellere, augescere, crescere: processerit,—eveniat,—confutet,—eveniat: proferatur,—redeamus.* The order of the words is sometimes entirely without art; *secundae res trudere solent a recte consulendo atque intellegendo.* The same idea is reiterated by the use of words almost synonymous; *rebus secundis atque prosperis atque prolixis: superbiam atque ferociam: multos populos atque multas nationes.* Words are repeated for emphasis and distinctness, to the destruction of true rhetorical effect; *adversae res, secundae res: depugnare uti depugnatum est: adversus rem suam,—adversus eam: dicit,—ita dicit.* In the same careless spirit Cato (in the *pro Rhodiensibus*) begins three consecutive sentences with *atque.*

Very much the same characteristics meet us in the fragments of the historian Cassius Hemina, whose *floruit* is assigned to B.C. 146 or thereabouts.

Fragm. ap. Peter H. R. Rell. p. 98 *Pastorum volgus sine contentione consentiendo praefecerunt aequaliter imperio Remum et Romulum, ita ut de regno pararent inter se. Monstrum fit: sus parit porcos triginta: cuius rei fanum fecerunt Laribus Grundulibus.* Ib. p. 107 *Mirabantur alii, quomodo illi libri durare possent. Ille ita rationem reddebat: lapidem fuisse, quadratum circiter in media arca evinctum candelis quoquo versus. In eo lapide insuper libros insitos fuisse: propterea arbitrarier, non computuisse. Et libros citratos fuisse: propterea arbitrarier, tineas non tetigisse. In iis libris scripta erant philosophiae Pythagoricae.*

Of the speeches of Metellus Macedonicus, who was praetor 148 and consul 143 B.C. we have the following fragments (Meyer p. 161); the first of which reflects what was evidently the current style of the time:

Di immortales plurimum possunt, sed non plus velle debent nobis quam parentes. At parentes, si pergunt liberi errare, bonis exheredant. Quid ego nos a dis immortalibus diutius expectemus, nisi malis rationibus finem faciamus? His denum deos propitios esse aequum est, qui sibi adversarii non sunt. Di immortales virtutem approbare, non adhibere debent.

There is more structure in the following:

Si sine uxore esse possemus, Quirites, omnes ea molestia careremus: sed quoniam natura ita tradidit, ut nec cum iis satis commode, nec sine illis omnino vivi possit, saluti potius perpetuae quam brevi voluptati consulendum.

After the death of Cato the stream of Greek influence flowed stronger and ever stronger into the channel of Italian thought until the end of the Ciceronian age. In the few fragments of the speeches of Scipio Aemilianus (184—129 B.C.) and C. Laelius (consul 130) it is, I think, possible to trace an attempt to realise a more artistic manner of expression. Take the following from Scipio (Meyer p. 184)

Omnia mala, probra flagitia, quae homines faciunt, in duabus rebus sunt, malitia atque nequitia. Utrum defendis malitiam, an nequitiam, an utrumque simul? Si nequitiam defendere vis, licet. Sed tu in uno scorto maiorem pecuniam absumpsisti quam quanti omne instrumentum fundi Sabini in censum declaravisti. Si hoc ita est, quis spondet mille nummum? Sed tu plus tertia parte pecuniae paternae perdidisti atqui absumpsisti in flagitiis. Si hoc est, quis spondet mille nummum? Non vis nequitiam. Age, malitiam saltem defendas. Sed tu verbis conceptis coniuravisti sciens sciente animo tuo. Si hoc ita est, quis spondet mille nummum?

Meyer p. 192. *Docentur praestigias inhonestas: cum cinaedulis et sambucis psalterioque eunt in ludum histrionum. Discunt cantare quae maiores nostri ingenuis probro ducier voluerunt. Eunt, inquam, in ludum saltatorium inter cinaedos virgines puerique ingenui. Haec mihi cum quispiam narrabat, non poteram animum inducere ea liberos suos homines nobiles docere. Sed cum ductus sum in ludum saltatorium, plus medius fidius in eo ludo vidi pueris virginibusque quingentis: in his unum, quod me rei publicae maxime miseritum est, puerum bullatum, petitoris*

filium, non[1] *minorem annis duodecim, cum crotalis saltare, quam saltationem impudicus servulus honeste saltare non posset.*

In the first of these fragments, and to a certain extent in the second, we may observe the same simplicity of order, the same tendency to repetition, as in Cato: but there is in the second a great advance towards appreciation of rhythmical effect.

Isidore (2 21 4) has preserved the following examples of climax from Scipio Aemilianus:

Ex innocentia nascitur dignitas, ex dignitate honor, ex honore imperium, ex imperio libertas.

Vi atque ingratus coactus cum illo sponsionem feci, facta sponsione ad iudicem adduxi, adductum primo coetu damnavi, damnatum ex voluntate dimisi.

The fragments of the orations of Gaius Gracchus (B.C. 154—121), besides the genius and intensity which raised him, in the opinion of Cicero, to the very highest position among Roman orators, shew also an advancing sensibility to the requirements of harmonious composition.

Meyer p. 231. *Versatus sum in provincia, quomodo ex usu vestro existimabam esse, non quomodo ambitioni meae conducere arbitrabar. Nulla apud me fuit popina, neque pueri eximia facie stabant et in convivio liberi vestri modestius erant quam apud principia...*

Ita versatus sum in provincia, ut nemo posset vere dicere assem aut eo plus in muneribus me accepisse, aut mea opera quemquam sumptum fecisse. Biennium fui in provincia. Si ulla meretrix domum meam introivit, aut cuiusquam servulus propter me sollicitatus est, omnium †nationum†[2] *postremissimum nequissimumque existimatote. Cum a servis eorum tam caste me habuerim, inde poteritis considerare, quomodo me putetis cum liberis vestris vixisse...Itaque, Quirites, cum Romam profectus sum, zonas, quas plenas argenti extuli, eas ex provincia inanes rettuli. Alii vini amphoras, quas plenas tulerunt, eas argento repletas domum reportaverunt.*

[1] Surely *non* should be omitted.

[2] For *nationum, hominum natorum* and *latronum* have been proposed. I have conjectured *raponum* (Lectures and Essays, p. 345).

Meyer p. 234. In the following fragment there is considerable elaboration of structure, and an almost musical cadence:

Si vellem apud vos verba facere et a vobis postulare, cum genere summo ortus essem, et cum fratrem propter vos amisissem, nec quisquam de P. Africani et Ti. Gracchi familia nisi ego et puer restaremus, ut pateremini hoc tempore me quiescere, ne a stirpe genus nostrum interiret, et uti aliqua propago generis nostri reliqua esset; haud scio an lubentibus a vobis impetrassem.

In narrative Gracchus had a rapid but somewhat rude and unconnected manner:

Meyer p. 236. *Nuper Teanum Sidicinum consul venit: uxor eius dixit se in balneis virilibus lavari velle. Quaestori Sidicino a M. Mario datum est negotium, uti balneis exigerentur qui lavabantur. Uxor renuntiat viro, parum cito balneas traditas esse et parum lautas fuisse. Idcirco palus destitutus est in foro, eoque adductus suae civitatis nobilissimus homo M. Marius. Vestimenta detracta sunt; virgis caesus est. Caleni ubi id audierunt, edixerunt nequis in balneis lavisse vellet, cum magistratus Romanus ibi esset. Ferentini ob eandem causam praetor noster quaestores arripi iussit: alter se de muro deiecit, alter virgis caesus est.*

Quanta libido quantique intemperantia sit hominum adulescentium, unum exemplum[1] *vobis ostendam. His annis paucis ex Asia missus est, qui per id tempus magistratum non ceperat, homo adulescens pro legato. Is in lectica ferebatur. Ei obviam bubulcus de plebe Venusina venit, et per iocum, cum ignoraret qui ferretur, rogavit num mortuum ferrent. Ubi id audivit, lecticam iussit deponi, struppis, quibus lectica deligata erat, usque adeo verberari iussit, dum animam efflavit.*

Rude as these passages are as a whole, they have clauses in them of true rhythmical beauty. *Idcirco palus destitutus est in foro, eoque adductus civitatis suae nobilissimus homo M. Marius. His annis paucis ex Asia missus est, qui per id tempus magistratum non ceperat, homo adulescens pro legato. Is in lectica ferebatur. Ei obviam bubulcus de plebe Venusina venit, et per iocum, cum ignoraret qui ferretur, rogavit num mortuum ferrent.*

[1] *Uno exemplo?*

From this time the style of Latin prose becomes manifestly more formed and artistic. We may note the progress in the following fragments of Quintus Metellus Numidicus (consul 109 B.C.)

Meyer p. 272. *Nunc quod ad illum pertinet, Quirites, quoniam se ampliorem putat esse si se mihi inimicum dictitaverit, quem ego mihi neque amicum recipio neque inimicum respicio, in eum ego non sum plura dicturus. Nam cum indignissimum arbitror cui a viris bonis bene dicatur, tum ne idoneum quidem, cui a probis male dicatur. Nam si in eo tempore huiuscemodi homunculum nomines, in quo punire non possis, maiore honore quam contumelia adficias.*

Meyer p. 275. *Qua in re quanto universi me antestatis, tanto ille vobis quam mihi maiorem iniuriam atque contumeliam facit, Quirites, et quanto probi iniuriam facilius accipiunt quam alteri tradunt, tanto ille vobis quam mihi peiorem honorem habuit. Nam me iniuriam ferre, vos facere volt, Quirites, ut hic conquestio, istic vituperatio relinquatur.*

In the fragments of Lucius Licinius Crassus (140—91 B.C.), though a few archaisms still linger, a transition to the style of Cicero may be observed.

Meyer p. 310. *'Forte evenit ut in Privernati essemus.' Brute, testificatur pater, se tibi Privernatem fundum reliquisse. Deinde ex libro secundo 'In Albano eramus ego et Marcus filius.' Sapiens videlicet homo cum primis nostrae civitatis norat hunc gurgitem; metuebat ne, cum is nihil haberet, nihil esse ei relictum putaretur. Tum ex libro tertio 'In Tiburti forte adsedimus ego et Marcus filius.' Ubi sunt ii fundi, Brute, quos tibi pater publicis commentariis consignatos reliquit? Quod nisi puberem te iam haberet, quartum librum composuisset, et se etiam in balneis locutum cum filio scriptum reliquisset.*

Brute, quid sedes? Quid illam anum patri nuntiare vis tuo? quid illis omnibus, quorum imagines duci vides, quid maioribus tuis? Quid L. Bruto, qui hunc populum dominatu regio liberavit? quid te facere, cui rei, cui gloriae, cui virtuti studere? Patrimonione augendo? At id non est nobilitatis. Sed fac esse, nihil superest: libidines totum dissipaverunt. An iuri civili? Est paternum. Sed dicet te, cum aedes venderes, ne in rutis qui-

dem et caesis solium tibi paternum recepisse. An rei militari? qui nunquam castra videris? An eloquentiae, quae nulla est in te, et quicquid est vocis ac linguae, omne in istum turpissimum calumniae quaestum contulisti? Tu lucem aspicere audes, tu hos intueri? tu in foro, tu in urbe, tu in civium esse conspectu? tu illam mortuam, tu imagines ipsas non perhorrescis? quibus non modo imitandis, sed ne conlocandis quidem tibi ullam locum reliquisti.

P. 313. *An tu, cum omnem auctoritatem universi ordinis pro pignore putaris, eamque in conspectu P.R. concideris, me his existimas pignoribus terrori? Non tibi sunt illa caedenda, si L. Crassum vis coercere: haec tibi est excidenda lingua, qua vel evulsa spiritu ipso libidinem tuam libertas mea refutabit.*

L. Licinius Crassus died in 91 B.C., and we are now, not only in the natural sequence of events, but in the progress from cause to effect, brought to consider the style of Cicero. For, as we have seen, Crassus seems to have cultivated and brought to a considerable height of excellence the periodic manner of writing which the genius of Cicero perfected. Cicero says in the *Orator* (§ 223) that the clause which he most likes should consist of two *κόμματα* or short sentences, a *κῶλον* or longer sentence, and a *comprehensio* or concluding period. *Crassus*, he says, *sic plerumque dicebat, idque ipse genus dicendi maxime probo.* He adds an instance from Crassus; *Domus tibi deerat? At habebas. Pecunia superabat? At egebas. Incurristi amens in columnas: in alienos insanus insanisti: depressam, caecam, iacentem domum pluris quam te et fortunas tuas aestimasti.* And below he adds (§ 226) *ego Crassi et nostra posui, ut qui vellet auribus ipsis quid numerosum etiam in minimis particulis orationis esset iudicaret.*

Crassus was a great student of Greek, and according to Cicero could speak it with as much ease as his mother tongue[1]. So it was also with Antonius; and it was by these two great orators that Cicero was educated in his youth. The attempt to write a periodic style was the result of the study of Greek prose, and in particular that of Isocrates and Ephorus, the mechanical structure of whose writing Cicero thinks the most

[1] *De Oratore* 2 § 2.

serviceable as a model for study (*Orator* § 207). From the first Cicero's style is characterised by the wide compass and elaborate balance of his paragraphs. Take, for instance, the first sentences of his earliest work (*Inv.* I 1) *Saepe et multum hoc mecum cogitavi, bonine an mali plus attulerit hominibus et civitatibus copia dicendi ac summum eloquentiae studium. Nam cum et nostrae rei publicae detrimenta considero et maximarum civitatum veteres animo calamitates colligo, non maximam video per disertissimos homines invectam partem incommodorum: cum autem res ab nostra memoria propter vetustatem remotas ex litterarum monumentis repetere instituo, multas urbes constitutas, plurima bella restincta, firmissimas societates, sanctissimas amicitias intellego cum animi ratione, tum facilius eloquentia comparatas.* This is his most redundant and diffuse manner, which continues with him, so far as we can see, until about his thirty-fifth year. In the Verrine Orations he has, however, nearly mastered the art of expression. His prose rises and falls, expands and contracts, strikes hard or gently, as he chooses. *In Verrem* Act. I 1 *Inveteravit enim iam opinio perniciosa rei publicae vobisque periculosa, quae non modo* [*Romae, sed etiam*] *apud exteras nationes omnium sermone percrebruit, his iudiciis, quae nunc sunt, pecuniosum hominem, quamvis sit nocens, neminem posse damnari. Nunc in ipso discrimine ordinis iudiciorumque vestrorum cum sint parati, qui contionibus et legibus hanc invidiam senatus inflammare conentur, reus in iudicium adductus est C. Verres, homo vita atque factis omnium iam opinione damnatus, pecuniae magnitudine, sua spe et praedicatione absolutus. Huic ego causae, iudices, cum summa voluntate et expectatione populi Romani actor accessi, non ut augerem invidiam ordinis, sed ut infamiae communi succurrerem. Adduxi enim hominem in quo reconciliare existimationem iudiciorum amissam, redire in gratiam cum populo Romano, satis facere exteris nationibus possetis, depeculatorem aerarii, vexatorem Asiae atque Pamphyliae, praedonem iuris, labem atque perniciem provinciae Siciliae.* He has not, however, at this period, nor indeed for some years afterwards, entirely emancipated himself from the artificiality of the former generation. The peroration of the Verrines is a great effort, but one feels that it is an

effort; there is still a certain air of constraint about it. How different is the following from the Laelius, written twenty-five years afterwards (B.C. 45)

(§ 10) *Ego si Scipionis desiderio me moveri negem, quam id recte faciam viderint sapientes, sed certe mentiar. Moveor enim tali amico orbatus, qualis, ut arbitror, nemo umquam erit, ut confirmare possum, nemo certe fuit. Sed non egeo medicina: me ipse consolor et maxime illo solacio, quod eo errore careo quo amicorum decessu plerique angi solent. Nihil mali accidisse Scipioni puto: mihi accidit, si quid accidit: suis autem incommodis graviter angi non amicum, sed se ipsum amantis est. Cum illo vero quis neget actum esse praeclare? Nisi enim, quod ille minime putabat, immortalitatem optare vellet, quid non adeptus est quod homini fas esset optare, qui summam spem civium, quam de eo iam puero habuerant, continuo adulescens incredibili virtute superavit: qui consulatum petivit numquam, factus est bis, primum ante tempus, iterum sibi suo tempore, rei publicae paene sero: qui duabus urbibus eversis inimicissimis huic imperio non modo praesentia, verum etiam futura bella delevit?*

As far as can be ascertained, Cicero is the first writer who attempted to form a systematic theory of what the rhythm of Latin prose should be. The rules which he lays down in the *Orator* are all based upon the idea of accommodating the rhythmical laws of Greek prose to the requirements of the Italian ear.

Cicero has been universally accepted as the great master of classical Latin prose, that is, of the prose which best represents the genius of ancient Italy when in the fullness of its life and activity. He won that position because his conception of oratory was the widest possible, because in his hands eloquence was made to include all accessible culture: again, because he set himself to study and interpret to his countrymen the great masterpieces of Greek literature; and again because, having these masterpieces before him, he determined that his style should be thoroughly Latin, that Greek culture should be used as an instrument towards developing the capacities of Italian thought and diction. The general character of his writing is determined by two facts: first, that the prose style of his age was, and that he knew it to be, formed by the exigencies of

public life. It is the prose of the speaker more than of the writer. Secondly, it is the style of the Graecizing school, the school which felt the need of beauty and harmony as well as of perspicuity in expression. Every clause must be rhythmical: every clause must, as a general rule, be connected by some mark of expression with the preceding clause.

Now as far as the mere mechanism of this style is concerned, Caesar is as much a master of it as Cicero. He has the clearness of Cicero, and his cohesion. We must of course remember that while much of Cicero's writing has come down to us in its most finished shape, nothing of Caesar remains but his most carelessly written work; and thus we have no means of judging what was the main secret of his success as an orator, whether it lay in his style, or in the genius and power of the man, or, as is most probable, in both together. The general resemblance between Cicero and Caesar was undoubtedly felt in the first century A.D.[1] Where then lies the main difference between Cicero's style and Caesar's?

It must be pointed out that Cicero's success was not merely due to his having mastered the laws of prose rhythm, nor merely to his general power as a stylist. His mind was of the poetical and imaginative order, while Caesar's, manly, sound, and robust, was without a touch of poetry. Strength of passion Caesar has, but no imagination. Cicero, nearly a poet and a considerable master of metre and poetic diction, really writes a poetical prose. Poetical, not like that of Livy and Tacitus, because it is filled with mechanical reminiscences of passages from the poets, but because of the spontaneous bent of Cicero's own genius. His prose is not only harmonious and pleasant to the ear, but is charged with metaphorical expression to an extent altogether without parallel in any prose writer of his age. It rises far beyond the average writing of the gifted and cultivated Romans of that time. While it represents the highest stage then attained by the healthiest literary culture, it is also penetrated and illuminated by the individuality of Cicero's own imaginative temperament.

[1] See Tacitus, *Dialogus* 20—24.

The tendency of Italian literary culture seems then to have set towards the formation of a broad, clear, and periodic style, the chief representatives of which, though in very different ways, are Caesar and Cicero. But we have now to note the existence of a very different tradition, of which the earliest existing representative may perhaps be said to be Cornificius, though by far its most remarkable champion in the last century of the republic is Sallust.

The remarkable treatise on rhetoric which bears the bastard Latin title *Auctor ad Herennium* is now generally attributed to Cornificius. It belongs to the first sixteen years, or thereabouts, of the last century of the republic[1], and is in tone somewhat anti-Hellenic. The style is on the whole the style of the newer school, but many of the instances of various kinds of writing which the author has invented in his fourth book have the tinge of the archaic, unperiodic manner. Cornificius, however, was not powerful enough to create a typical style. It was reserved for Sallust to head a reaction against the Ciceronian manner. The peculiarities of Sallust's writing, which have been analysed carefully by Mr A. M. Cook of Wadham College in his recent edition of the *Bellum Catilinae*, are, I suppose, in the main traceable to two causes: his admiration for Cato, and his admiration for Thucydides. These authors were to Sallust what Crassus and Isocrates were to Cicero. That Sallust borrowed many archaic words from Cato was a commonplace of criticism[2]; and I suspect also that he imitated Cato in the abrupt, unconnected character of his sentences. Cicero and Caesar like to extend their clauses and to connect them, so that one easily flows from another. In Sallust the clauses are comparatively independent, and the effect is produced by crowding one short sentence upon another. *Qui labores, pericula, dubias atque asperas res facile toleraverant, eis otium divitiae, optanda alias, oneri miseriaeque fuere. Igitur primo pecuniae, deinde imperii cupido crevit; ea quasi materies omnium malorum fuere. Namque avaritia fidem probitatem ceterasque artes bonas sub-*

[1] Mr W. Warde Fowler has shewn (*Journal of Philology* Vol. X.) that 84 B.C. is the latest date to which there is any positive allusion in the book.

[2] Quintilian 8 3 29.

vertit: pro his superbiam crudelitatem, deos neglegere, omnia venalia habere edocuit. Ambitio multos mortales falsos fieri subegit, aliud clausum in pectore, aliud in lingua promptum habere, amicitias inimicitiasque non ex re sed ex commodo aestimare, magisque voltum quam ingenium bonum habere.

In all this I think it highly probable that Sallust is following in the steps of Cato, of course under the conditions imposed by a different age and state of culture. In pregnancy of thought and expression he would fain have figured as the Roman Thucydides; and indeed, if Quintilian's opinion could have exalted him to this position, he would have held it in the eyes of the world[1].

Cicero, writing towards the end of his life, complains in his *Orator* (§ 30) of a school of stylists who called themselves Thucydideans. His remarks are directed ostensibly to oratory, but I think it not unlikely he is aiming a side-thrust at Sallust. His protest in favour of a rhythmical as against an unrhythmical prose is in any case worth quoting here (§ 233): *Age sume de Gracchi apud censores illud, 'Abesse non potest quin eiusdem hominis sit probos improbare qui improbos probet': quanto aptius si dixisset, 'quin eiusdem hominis sit, qui improbos probet, probos improbare!' Hoc modo dicere nemo umquam noluit, nemoque potuit quin dixerit: qui autem aliter dixerunt, hoc adsequi non potuerunt: ita facti sunt repente Attici. Quasi vero Trallianus fuerit Demosthenes!.....Res autem sic se habet, ut brevissime dicam quod sentio; composite et apte sine sententiis dicere insania est, sententiae autem sine verborum et ordine et modo infantia: eius modi tamen infantia, ut ea qui utantur non stulti homines haberi possint, etiam plerumque prudentes: quo qui est contentus utatur.*

The consideration of the style of Sallust brings us to the commencement of the great change, which, beginning in the Augustan age, ended by forming the style of Tacitus. Livy stands at the meeting point of the older and the later periods. Among all the Latin writers he is perhaps the best representative of the periodic style; witness among a thousand instances which I might quote his character of Cicero. *Ingenium et operibus et praemiis operum*

[1] 10 1 101 *Nec opponere Thucydidi Sallustium verear.*

felix, ipse fortunae diu prosperae et in longo tenore felicitatis magnis interim ictus vulneribus, exilio, ruina partium pro quibus steterat, filiae exitu tam tristi atque acerbo, omnium adversorum nihil ut viro dignum erat tulit praeter mortem, quae vere aestimanti minus indigna videri potuit, quod a victore inimico nil crudelius passurus erat quam quod eiusdem fortunae compos in eo fecisset.

No doubt Livy must have agreed with Cicero that the style best suited for a continuous history was that of Isocrates and Theopompus, not that of Thucydides; not the abrupt and broken manner, but the periodic. But there is a marked difference between the period as constructed by Livy and as constructed by Cicero. Cicero aims simply at such a balance of clauses as will raise the expectation and satisfy the demands of the ear: Livy wishes to do this and a great deal more. Cicero's grammatical construction is perfectly simple, and not modified by the exigencies of his theory of composition. Livy, on the contrary, in order to build a harmonious clause, tempers and varies his grammatical constructions so as to produce a welded mass of writing over which the reader must pause before he can grasp it as what it is, a carefully articulated whole. *Ipse fortunae diu prosperae et in longo tenore felicitatis magnis interim ictus vulneribus:* this triply constructed sentence would in Cicero or Caesar have been broken up into three. Cicero aims always at being understood at first hearing or first reading; his manner is that of an orator. Livy's style is the style of a scholar, not of a statesman. He speaks not to be heard but to be read, and aims mainly at satisfying the taste of literary men and winning admiration for his art. His method consists in ingenious condensation of thoughts and combination of clauses. In the first he probably wishes to rival Sallust, in the last to comply with the precepts of Cicero. It is also important to observe that when (as in the first decade) the subject seems to require it, he adopts a poetical tone and colouring, which suggests that he is writing with the ancient poets (if not indeed with Vergil) open before him.

Quintilian twice tells us that Asinius Pollio found in Livy something of a provincial tone (*Patavinitatem quandam*). The

information is given us in such a way as to leave us uncertain of the real point of the criticism: 1 5 56 *taceo de Tuscis et Sabinis et Praenestinis quoque: nam et eorum sermone utentem Vettium Lucilius insectatur, quemadmodum Pollio reprehendit in Livio Patavinitatem.* 8 1 3 *multos enim, quibus loquendi ratio non desit, invenias, quos curiose potius loqui dixeris quam Latine, quomodo et illa Attica anus Theophrastum, hominem alioqui disertissimum, adnotata unius adfectatione verbi hospitem dixit, nec alio se id deprendisse interrogata respondit, quam quod nimium Attice loqueretur. Et in Tito Livio, mirae facundiae viro, putat inesse Pollio Asinius quandam Patavinitatem.* Putting these two passages together, one may reasonably infer Pollio's meaning to have been that Livy shewed his provincialism in an overstrained literary purism: that, like a student, he would sometimes take words from provincial Italians: that he was more anxious to form a *recherché* and scholarly style than a man would have been who had taken an active part in the public life of Rome.

It was not, however, the style of Livy nor even that of Cicero that was destined to prevail. Livy, indeed, is like no one before or after him. Like Horace, he brought to perfection a peculiar manner which no one was able to imitate. And for the style of Cicero it soon appeared that there was no public. The extinction of the republican life of Rome destroyed the demand for the broad and massive oratory of the forum. The aristocracy and the *equites* found themselves more and more driven into forming a literary clique. For good or for evil they had now to shape their course in the presence of a power greater than their own. Oratory was driven from the forum into the law-courts, where it was of necessity confined to technical points, or it was shut up in the senate, where in many cases the expression of opinion was no longer free. And as the sphere of oratory became narrower, the cultivation of style became nicer and more minute. The character of Roman education was changing. Ennius and Accius and Pacuvius were driven from the field, and Vergil and Horace became the classical poets on whom the taste and thought of the rising generation were moulded. Their writings were learned by heart as a regular

part of the school *curriculum*, and prose writing, in the hands of the more gifted authors, naturally took a poetical (I should rather have said a Vergilian) tinge. As before, indeed, the Roman youth were trained to be speakers. Well and good: but what if the conditions were absent under which alone a manly oratory could be developed? In the atmosphere that was now rising, nothing could in the long run thrive but the desire of pleasing a picked audience by finely-chosen words, pithy sentences, and artificial points[1]. In fine, men began to study, not things, but words and phrases. Before the first century had run its course, the change was complete, and Quintilian spends much of his force in a vain attempt to revivify the style and spirit of the republican literature.

The new tendency was greatly encouraged by an important change which now took place in the method of education. Rhetorical education in the time of Cicero and Caesar was planned upon broad outlines. The Greek classics were carefully studied, and youths were exercised thoroughly in Greek and Latin composition. The understanding was strengthened and the range of knowledge extended by the writing and reading out of essays on general topics, *proposita* as Cicero calls them, as the Greeks called them θέσεις, and by the treatment of *communes loci*, or the topics which were sure to come up in the course of any serious discussion on a matter of practice[2]. The

[1] The name with which the change is associated is that of Cassius Severus: Tacitus, *Dialogus* 19: *Nam quatenus antiquorum admiratores hunc velut terminum antiquitatis constituere solent, Cassium Severum, quem primum adfirmant flexisse ab illa vetere atque derecta dicendi via, non infirmitate ingenii nec inscitia litterarum transtulisse se ad aliud dicendi genus contendo, sed iudicio et intellectu. Vidit namque, ut paulo ante dicebam, cum condicione temporum et diversitate aurium formam quoque et speciem orationis esse mutandam. Facile perferebat prior ille populus, ut imperitus et rudis, impeditissimarum orationum spatia... At hercule pervulgatis iam omnibus, cum vix in cortina quisquam adsistat quin elementis studiorum, etsi non instructus, at certe imbutus sit, novis et exquisitis eloquentiae itineribus opus est, per quae orator fastidium aurium effugiat.*

[2] The following evidence on this subject seems worth quoting: Cicero *Top.* §§ 78—81 *Quaestionum duo sunt genera, alterum infinitum, definitum alterum. Definitum est quod ὑπόθεσιν Graeci, nos causam: infinitum, quod θέσιν illi appellant, nos propositum possumus nominare. Causa certis personis, locis, temporibus, actionibus, negotiis cernitur aut in omnibus aut in*

written treatment of *θέσεις* and *communes loci* was the main if not the only exercise of originality known to the educationists of Cicero's day. But towards the end of Cicero's life the habit of *declamatio,* or speaking in private on fictitious themes, began to prevail. It is probable that young men aspiring to become orators also exercised their powers on *causae,* or fictitious cases of a definite character, corresponding generally to what was afterwards called *controversia.* It is however important to observe that the *declamatio,* with its two branches the *controversia* and *suasoria,* tended more and more to drive out the *θέσις* and *communis locus* in the schools. This we must infer from the words of the elder Seneca quoted in the note,

plerisque eorum: propositum autem in aliquo eorum aut in pluribus nec tamen in maximis. Part. Or. § 61 *Duo sunt, ut initio dixi, quaestionum genera, quorum alterum finitum temporibus et personis causam appello, alterum infinitum nullis neque personis neque temporibus notatum propositum voco. Sed est propositum quasi latior pars causae quaedam.* He proceeds to distinguish the different kinds of *proposita,* speculative and practical.

Seneca *Contr.* 1 praef. 12 (p. 50 Bursian) *Declamabat autem Cicero non quales nunc controversias dicimus, ne tales quidem quales ante Ciceronem dicebantur, quas thesis vocabant. Hoc enim genus materiae quo nos exercemur adeo novum est, ut nomen quoque eius novum sit. Controversias nos dicimus; Cicero causas vocabat. Hoc vero alterum nomen Graecum quidem sed in Latinum ita translatum, ut pro Latino sit, scholastica controversia multo recentius est, sicut ipsa declamatio apud nullum antiquum auctorem ante Ciceronem et Calvum inveniri potest, qui declamationem distinguit; ait enim 'declamare est domi non mediocriter dicere.' Bene alterum putat domesticae exercitationis esse, alterum verae actionis. Modo nomen hoc prodiit; nam et studium ipsum nuper celebrari coepit; ideo facile est mihi ab incunabulis nosse rem post me natam.*

Quintilian 12 2 25 *Peripatetici studio quoque se quodam oratorio iactant, nam thesis dicere exercitationis gratia fere est ab iis institutum.* 2 1 9 *An ignoramus antiquis hoc fuisse ad augendam eloquentiam genus exercitationis, ut thesis dicerent et communes locos et cetera citra complexum rerum personarumque quibus verae fictaeque controversiae continentur? Ex quo palam est quam turpiter deserat eam partem rhetorices institutio quam et primam habuit et diu solam...Non communes loci, sive qui sunt in vitia derecti, quales legimus a Cicerone compositos, seu quibus quaestiones generaliter tractantur, quales sunt editi a Q. quoque Hortensio, ut 'sitne parvis argumentis credendum' et pro testibus et in testes in mediis litium medullis versantur? Arma sunt haec quodammodo praeparanda semper, ut iis, cum res poscet, utare.* 2 4 24 *Theses autem, quae sumuntur ex rerum comparatione, ut 'rusticane vita an urbana potior,' 'iuris periti an militaris viri laus maior', mire sunt ad exercitationem dicendi speciosae atque uberes.*

studium ipsum nuper celebrari coepit. I understand Seneca to mean, not that *declamatio* was in his youth an absolutely new thing, but that it was new as an almost exclusive instrument of education.

In treating a θέσις or *communis locus* the student had to find and arrange his own facts: in a *declamatio*, whether it were a *controversia* or fictitious controversy on a point of law or politics, or a *suasoria*, in which advice was given to a fictitious person, the facts were found for him. In driving the θέσις from the schools, therefore, the masters were depriving rhetorical education of its most valuable element, of the element most likely to develop originality and encourage thoroughness.

The *declamatio*, as was natural, soon degenerated into a barren exercise which produced little save artificial antithesis and false points. Cornificius (4 § 35) says of a manly style, *sententias interponi raro convenit, ut rei actores, non vivendi praeceptores videamur esse.* But a *declamatio* could not exist without a number of pointed *sententiae.* As the elder Seneca, who witnessed the birth and growth of *declamatio*, well says (*Contr.* 9 praef. p. 241 Bursian) *qui declamationem parat, scribit non ut vincat sed ut placeat. Omnia itaque lenocinia conquirit: argumentationes quia molestae sunt et minimum habent floris, relinquit: sententiis, explicationibus audientis deliniri contentus est. Cupit enim se approbare, non causam. Sequitur autem hoc usque in forum declamatores vitium, ut necessaria deserant dum speciosa sectantur.*

Looking at the results of the system in his own time Quintilian says (7 1 41) *famam adfectantes contenti sunt locis speciosis:* and a little further on he speaks of the *sententiae praecipites vel obscurae* (*nam ea nunc virtus est*) which had come to be the fashion.

Who, when he hears of obscurity, does not think of the memorable story quoted from Livy by Quintilian (8 2 18) *fuisse praeceptorem aliquem qui discipulos obscurare quae dicerent iuberet, Graeco verbo utens σκότισον: unde illa scilicet egregia laudatio, 'tanto melior, ne ego quidem intellexi'.* Who has not struggled with the obscurity of Persius, the direct result of this training? *Et quod recte dici potest* (says Quintilian 8 prooem.

24 foll.) *circumimus amore verborum, et quod satis dictum est repetimus, et quod uno verbo patet, pluribus oneramus, et pleraque significare melius putamus quam dicere. Quid, quod nihil iam proprium placet, dum parum creditur disertum, quod et alius dixisset? a corruptissimo quoque poetarum figuras seu translationes mutuamur, tum demum ingeniosi scilicet, si ad intellegendos nos opus sit ingenio. Atqui satis aperte Cicero praeceperat 'in dicendo vitium vel maximum esse a vulgari genere orationis atque a consuetudine communis sensus abhorrere.' Sed ille est durus atque ineruditus: nos melius, quibus sordet omne quod natura dictavit,* &c.

These causes combined from several sides to popularize the abrupt and sententious style of Latin. The passion for *sententiae* or pithy sayings well expressed became dominant: Seneca the younger is full of them, and even Quintilian lays it down as a rule for a master's guidance that he should every day say something for his hearers to carry away (2 1 8 *ipse aliquid, immo multa, cottidie dicat, quae secum oratores referant*). An attempt was indeed made by Tacitus in his *Dialogus,* and by Quintilian in his *Institutio,* to galvanize the republican style into life[1]; but the spirit of the age was too strong for them, and Tacitus, with a true sense of the fact, abandoned the attempt. Few now understood the virtues of the ancient manner. To make an impression it was necessary to strike a series of sudden blows, to arrest the ear by a succession of smart points. The idea of forming harmonious clauses, of exhibiting thought and passion in perfect clearness, was thrown to the winds. The language was strained beyond its power. Becoming an end itself, it ceased to be the natural instrument for expression of thought and feeling. The reign of the artist is over and that of the *virtuoso* has begun, who writes, not to move the heart,

[1] The letters of the younger Pliny are also written in a style intended to recall that of Cicero. Pliny, it must be remembered, was a pupil of Quintilian, and it is surely very probable that Tacitus was also. This hypothesis would account for the style of the *Dialogus*, as well as for the striking similarity of its spirit and criticisms to those of Quintilian. I am glad to find that this view is also adopted by Dr Gruenwald, in his tract entitled *Quae ratio intercedere videatur inter Quintiliani Institutionem Oratoriam et Taciti Dialogum.*

but to display the capacity of his instrument. Men were now called upon to admire, not the adaptation of language to thought, but the language itself. It must be *recherché*, it must recall Vergil, it must say more than it ought to say. The process ended not merely in destroying the framework of Latin style, but in corrupting the clearness of the Latin language. Not only does the stately structure of the Ciceronian period crumble into dust in the Latin of the silver age, but the meaning of words is perverted. In Sallust, though the style has a false ring, the language, as a vehicle of thought, preserves its integrity. The younger Seneca, though always striving to make points, writes with perfect clearness; but in Tacitus the language itself is touched with decay.

Let me not be misunderstood, or be supposed to wish for a moment to depreciate the genius of Tacitus. It would be unpardonable to represent him as other than what he is, a man of profound feeling, of splendid imagination and dramatic power. I am only concerned to show that the course of events had destroyed the literary structure of the language in which he had to write; that he was a great artist working with bad tools. The very force of his genius makes him employ to excess the only means he has of making himself heard. His style is the natural result of the situation. Astonishing in its condensation and in its pathos it is in composition structureless, in language strained and obscure[1].

There is no great Latin prose after Tacitus. Suetonius is an able writer, but no stylist; aiming much lower than Tacitus, he has none of his excellencies, and succeeds in avoiding his faults. Suetonius is succeeded by writers of the stamp of Gellius and Fronto, and creative genius is extinct.

H. NETTLESHIP.

[1] I content myself with quoting the following specimens from the second book of the Histories: 48 *Pecunias distribuit parce nec ut periturus. Non enim ultima desperatione, sed poscente proelium exercitu remisisse rei publicae novissimum casum.*

49. *Othoni sepulchrum exstructum est modicum et mansurum.*

76. *Nec speciem adulantis expaveris. Abiit iam et transvectum est tempus, quo posses videri concupisse; confugiendum est ad imperium. An excidit trucidatus Corbulo?*

CICERO *DE ORATORE*, Lib. I. §§41, 42; 56; 173; 175; 179.

In reading again the first book of Cicero's *de Oratore* in Professor Wilkins' excellent edition a few passages struck me either as requiring somewhat fuller explanation than was there given, or on which I am inclined to a different view from his. The most important relate to matters of law, and with some I propose here to deal.

§§ 41, 42. Q. Scaevola, the augur and the early instructor of Cicero, objects to the extended scope which Crassus gives to the work of oratory and charges him with trespassing on others' domains.

Quod uero in extrema oratione quasi tuo iure sumpsisti, oratorem in omnis sermonis disputatione copiosissime uersari posse, id nisi in tuo regno essemus non tulissem, multisque praeessem qui aut interdicto tecum contenderent aut te ex iure manum consertum uocarent, quod in alienas possessiones tam temere inruisses. Agerent enim tecum lege primum Pythagorei omnes atque Democritii ceterique sua in iure physici uindicarent, ornati homines in dicendo et graues, quibuscum tibi iusto sacramento contendere non liceret: &c.

Praeessem is the reading of most, and apparently the best, MSS, but by most recent editors has been changed to *praeissem*, on the ground that *praeesse* is a tame word ('*ineptissima*' Ellendt), and that *praeire* is a legal word, suitable to Scaevola and 'used of those who furnish *formulae* or instruction to unskilled persons both in sacred and profane matters.' So Henrichsen. But Gellius (XIV. 2. § 12) is, so far as I see, the only author who uses the word in the general sense of giving instruction. And he was an antiquarian, who often misused old expressions and

words. In all other places, that I can find, it is used of uttering the words of an oath or prayer, &c. for others to say after. See Cic. *Dom.* § 133; Liv. IV. 21; VIII. 9, &c.; Curt. IV. 13 § 15; Plin. *Pan.* 64. So Quintilian uses it of reading over for others to read after (II. 5. § 3): and Cicero, applying this metaphorically, speaks of a mob dictating a verdict, *ut uobis uoce praeirent quid iudicaretis* (*Mil.* § 3). But this is not the meaning wanted here. Scaevola did not wish to recite a formula for others to repeat, nor to dictate a decision, but to head a band of litigants. He was ready to bring an action himself as well as to encourage others. He was fighting not on behalf of philosophers only, but for himself and his brother lawyers. Crassus had invaded the territory of both, and must expect suits from all the dispossessed or endangered occupiers. That the reading *praeissem* has proved so attractive, is perhaps due to a recollection of the famous passage in the *Murena* (§ 26) where Cicero pours ridicule on lawyers for inventing certain formulae which had to be pronounced by litigants, as Cicero puts it *metaphorically*, with a lawyer at their elbow prompting them. *Transit idem iurisconsultus tibicinis Latini modo 'Unde tu me' inquit, 'ex iure manum consertum uocasti inde ibi te reuoco,'* the very phrase which Cicero uses in the next line of our passage. Curiously enough Cicero does not there use the word *praeire*, though the meaning was suitable. I object to *praeissem* in our text (1) because the meaning is not here apposite: these forms were perfectly well known and no jurisconsult would go into court to prompt these formulae. They were an ordinary legal ritual, of no religious significance, and would be none the more effectual for Scaevola's help. (2) *Multis praeissem* is too absolute an expression. We want an object either expressed or at least plainly suggested. There is nothing of the kind here: the next clause deals with interdicts, which so far as we know had no special formulae of pleading; and the succeeding clause (*te ex iure manum consertum uocarent*) does not appear in the guise of a formula.

Huschke (*Multa* p. 70) dissatisfied with both *praeessem* and *praeissem* ingeniously, as usual, suggests *praes essem*, quoting Fronto *ad M. Caes.* III. 16 *me uade, me praede, me sponsore*

celeriter te in cacumine eloquentiae sitam (*sistes?* Huschke). He admits that in the interdictal procedure, as given us by Gaius, there was no use of *praedes*, but assumes an earlier stage, corresponding to that of the statutable actions (*lege agere*), in which the magistrate would enforce his injunction by a fine, and require securities (*praedes*) for its payment (see ib. pp. 75, 94). But this is to a large extent conjectural; and the position of a *praes* is not that best suited to a great jurisconsult like Scaevola. A leading lawyer would rather say 'There are a whole host of people, who I should advise would have a good case against you', than think of himself as a clerk of assize prompting the formulae or as security for costs.

If however the advocate's part had been meant, we should have had *adessem*. I understand Scaevola to say that he would have 'captained' a host of litigants to resist Crassus' unjust usurpation. *Praeesse* is habitually used of one in command, e.g. the governor of a province, the commander of an army, the overlooker of slaves or the superintendent of a particular piece of work.

Alf. Pernice (*Zeitschr. für Savigny-Stiftung* v. p. 34 n.) rejects absolutely Huschke's suggestion, and quite approves of *praeissem*, holding the pluperfect to be necessary after *tulissem*, and translating 'Ich würde ihnen die Formel an die Hand gegeben hatte'. I do not see the necessity. Cf. this book § 154 *quod occupasset aut Ennius si...exercerem, aut Gracchus si... proposuissem; Rosc. Am.* § 114 *si mandauisset...inque eam rem...interponeret illeque...recepisset;* and plenty of instances with *cum*, e.g. *Verr.* II. 37 *cum tanta hereditas in controuersiam uenisset iudicioque peteretur; Rosc. Am.* 18 *cum hic...esset, cumque se...dedisset ipse autem...esset* &c. The fact is, the tense depends on the meaning intended, whether in a conditional or other clause, and whether joined by *-que* or not. *Praefuissem* would have been wrong, as implying that Scaevola had previously been captain: as it is, the meaning is appropriate "I should not have borne it for a moment and should have put myself at the head of numbers who &c." Pernice seems not to have noticed the objections which lie against *praeissem*.

The nature of the litigation threatened by Scaevola is explained by the subjoined remarks.

qui aut interdicto &c.] Crassus in the concluding words of his speech had claimed an importance for the orator which left little for the lawyer and philosopher. 'To the orator rather 'than to any one else belongs as his proper sphere, not only his 'own dignity, but the safety of numberless individuals and of 'the state as a whole' (§ 34). Scaevola at once takes up the challenge, and, using the phraseology which naturally rises to the lips of a lawyer, warns Crassus of the risk of invading the territory of others. He renders himself liable either to an interdict or to a regular action at law. The first is applicable when a claim to the possession, the second when a claim to the ownership, is in issue.

1. Possession and ownership differ as the ostensible or temporary enjoyment and the permanent right to enjoyment differ. A possessor may actually be exercising all the rights an owner could care to exercise, and yet may be neither the owner nor even be legally entitled to hold and enjoy the property. But the contrary is also true: the possessor visible to the eyes of the world may be the real owner, or may have such an interest in the property as to be fully justified in occupying it and dealing with it. Anyhow he is there; and the law in justice to itself forbids any violent dispossession, and, alive to the possibility of the possessor being in the wrong, provides a judicial procedure of a more summary character than that necessary for determining a title to ownership. Such summary procedure was in Rome an interdict, issued by the praetor, forbidding all forcible interference with an existing position, or, if force had already been used, directing immediate restitution.

There were two interdicts specially applicable to such cases as that in our text. If it was a mere encroachment, and the possessor, though annoyed or hindered, still remained in possession, he would apply to the praetor for an interdict *uti possidetis*, i.e. an injunction addressed to both parties requiring them not to disturb the existing state of things. But the injunction would not be maintained if the possessor had himself obtained his possession from his adversary by unfair means.

What he might have done to others was not in question: but, as between the two contending parties, the praetor would grant the law's protection only to him who had dealt fairly. The applicant must show that he had not obtained possession from his adversary either by force or by stealth or on sufferance. Accordingly that interdict ran, at least as we find it given in the Digest from Ulpian, *Uti eas aedes* (or *eum fundum* &c.), *quibus de agitur, nec ui nec clam nec precario alter ab altero possidetis, quo minus ita possideatis, uim fieri ueto.* (D. XLIII. 17. 1 1 pr.; cf. Gai. IV. 150, 160; Fest. p. 233 Müll.)

But if the adversary had not merely interfered practically with the possessor's enjoyment, but had ejected him altogether from possession, a different interdict was required to restore him to what he had lost. This interdict was called *de ui*, or, from the words of the formula, *unde ui*. There were in Cicero's time two forms of it, or, as it may be said, two interdicts against forcible dispossession[1]. If the ejection was alleged to have been caused by armed violence, *ui armata*, or, as Cicero describes it (*Caecin.* § 23), *ui hominibus armatis*, the praetor tolerated no conditions but peremptorily ordered restitution of the ejected party. But if the ejection was forcible (i.e. against the will of the possessor, cf. D. XLIII. 24. 1 1 § 5—1 3 § 2), but not accompanied by arms, the restitution was ordered only on the same condition as that of the interdict *uti possidetis*, i.e. that the possessor had not himself acquired possession from his opponent either by force or by stealth or on sufferance. Whether the fact was so or not, was determined in each case by a judicial inquiry after the issue of the edict (Cic. *Caecin.* § 23; Gai. IV. 162—168).

In the case of either interdict the task which lay upon the applicant was a comparatively light one. He was merely concerned with his relations to his opponent, and unless that opponent proved that the possession, which he had disturbed or from which he had ejected the applicant, had been obtained

[1] See Cic. *Caecin.* § 91. Justinian has combined the two, D. XLIII. 16. A further question arises as to the priority or special applicability of the two forms of the *interdictum de ui* (*non armata*) given in Cic. *Tull.* § 29 and § 44. On this see Keller *Semestr.* p. 304 sqq.

from him, the disturber or ejector, *aut ui aut clam aut precario*, the disturbed or ejected party retained or regained his possession (cf. Cic. *Tull.* § 44). As possessor, he had a proverbially[1] favourable position, in case any one claimed against him to be the owner of the property. He was defendant and as such would have no need to prove his title. However bad his title might be, unless the claimant proved a good one, the possessor would win. And proving a title is not merely proving that the claimant has honestly purchased or inherited the property, but that the person from whom he purchased or inherited had himself a good title. So much more onerous was the burden of proof on one not in possession, that it was a natural course for a claimant to the ownership to try first to get into possession in order to throw this burden off from himself. An interdict was therefore frequently used not merely by those who claimed only the possession and had no thought of claiming the ownership, but also by those who claiming the latter found it the easier course first to claim the former, and, if successful, to hold the property by a possessory title till usucapion converted their possessory title into ownership. So Gaius Dig. VI. 1 l 24 *Is qui destinauit rem petere animaduertere debet an aliquo interdicto possit nancisci possessionem, quia longe commodius est ipsum possidere et aduersarium ad onera petitoris compellere quam alio possidente petere.* And similarly Frontinus (Gromat. p. 44 Lachmann).

2. The regular action to establish ownership was called a *uindicatio*, and in Cicero's time was conducted in accordance with an ancient procedure of which two characteristic features are mentioned here, viz. the *sacramentum* or deposit of money which each party had to make as a guaranty of good faith (Gai. IV. 13), and the simulated struggle (*manus conserere*) over the object in dispute (Gell. XX. 10 § 9, cf. Gai. IV. 16, 17). This sacramental action was one of the statutable suits (*legis actiones*) (Gai. IV. 11), and as such is referred to in our passage in the words *Agerent enim tecum lege* &c.

The same analogy of a dispute about possession of land is used in the like connexion in the 3rd book of the *de Oratore* §§ 108, 110, 122.

[1] '*Beati possidentes.*' 'Possession is nine points of the law.'

In several places recent editors have supposed interpolations in the text, often without, as I think, sufficient ground. Three of these cases may be specially noticed.

§ 56. *Etenim cum illi in dicendo inciderint loci, quod persaepe euenit, ut de dis immortalibus, de pietate, de concordia, de amicitia, de communi ciuium, de hominum, de gentium iure, de aequitate, de temperantia, de magnitudine animi, de omni uirtutis genere sit dicendum, clamabunt credo omnia gymnasia atque omnes philosophorum scholae sua esse haec omnia propria, nihil omnino ad oratorem pertinere.*

Piderit, followed by others, on the ground of the usual contrast between *ius civile* and *ius gentium*, and Gaius' identification of the latter with *commune omnium hominum ius* (Gai. I. 1), and some other unimportant grounds, reads *de communi gentium iure*. Prof. Wilkins, following Sorof, wishes to read *de communi hominum iure*. I am at a loss to see any objection to the reading of the MSS, unless it can be shown that Cicero would not use words of ordinary life in any but a technical sense. To say (as Piderit does) that *commune ius civium* is a '*contradictio in adjecto*' is very droll; as if citizens could have no law in common! The passage gives a natural series of ideas. The commonplaces which may occur to a speaker are exemplified by 'the immortal gods, dutiful affection (to parents), kindly 'feeling (in a family), friendship, rights common to fellow citi-'zens, to men, to nations, fairness, temperance, greatness of 'soul, &c.' The sphere of thought is gradually enlarged: family, friends, citizens, men, nations. *Homines* includes foreigners, perhaps even slaves, as well as citizens. *Gentes* may refer either specially to the relations of nations *inter se*, or generally denote the whole world. (See examples in Prof. Nettleship's paper in this journal vol. XIII. p. 132 sqq.)

§ 173 *in causis centumuiralibus, in quibus usucapionum, tutelarum, gentilitatum, agnationum, adluuionum, circumluuionum*[1], *nexorum, mancipiorum, parietum, luminum, stillicidiorum, testamentorum ruptorum aut ratorum, ceterarumque rerum*

[1] Should we not read *circumfluuionum*? At any rate the substantive here corresponds in meaning to *circumfluere*, as *alluuio* does to *alluere* in Dig. XLI. 1. 1 30 § 2.

innumerabilium iura uersentur. Most editors omit or bracket *ruptorum aut ratorum.* It is true that all the words preceding *testamentorum* in this long series are substantives without any attributes; but variety is not fatal, and these attributes happen to be very appropriate. They limit the general head of 'cases on wills' in a way which brings out the usual functions of the centumviral court.

Wills might be invalid (*irrita*) either because not duly made (*non iure facta*) or because though duly made they were displaced by subsequent events. Such events were (*a*) another will, (*b*) the birth or adoption of a son (*sui heredis agnatio*), (*c*) the loss of civic position on the part of the testator (*capitis diminutio*), or (*d*) the failure of all heirs named in the will. In the last two cases the will was, according to the more precise use of words, said *irrita fieri,* in the two (or three) former cases it was said *rumpi.* But these terms were not exclusively appropriated to these respective classes (Gai. II. 138—146).

In our passage the convertibility of *rupta* and *irrita* is implied by the opposition of *ruptorum* to *ratorum*; and the special jurisdiction which is emphasized by these attributes is the setting aside or upholding of wills. Was or was not this jurisdiction a special province of the centumviral court? Both this book of Cicero and the evidence of other authors favour an affirmative answer. Cicero proceeds by the mouth of Crassus to refer to some cases heard by the *centumuiri.* Two of these relate to wills (§§ 175, 180). Both of them are cases where the subsequent course of events has proved different from what the testator expected, or was alleged to have expected, when he made the will. The question in the first case was, whether the will should be deemed to be broken[1] by the reappearance of a son supposed by his father to be dead: in the second case, whether a condition of heirship, and therefore possibly of the validity of the will, should be deemed to be fulfilled by events coming plainly within the intent, but not within the words, of the testator.

[1] The reappearance of a son supposed to be dead is so closely analogous to the birth or adoption of a son that I may fairly apply *rumpi* to it.

Other authors point in the same direction. Quintilian speaks of questions of inheritance to an intestate and of the age of puberty as coming before the *centumviri* (IV. 2. § 7), but both might easily be incidental to a case which turned on the validity of a will (e.g. cf. Dig. V. 2. l 6). His language is however quite clear in VII. 4. § 11 *nam quae in scholis abdicatorum, haec in foro exheredatorum a parentibus et bona apud centumuiros repetentium ratio est*; 'the questions raised 'by rhetoricians in the hypothetical cases of sons disowned 'by their fathers are raised in real life when sons are disinherited 'by their parents' wills and apply to the *centumviri* to restore 'them the property' (cf. ib. § 20). The plaint of an unduteous will (*querela inofficiosi testamenti*), at first probably an extraordinary application for redress (cf. Cic. *Verr.* II. 2 § 107)[1], had by the time of Quintilian and Pliny become formally recognized as a regular mode of proceeding. Pliny in his letters often speaks of the *centumviri*, but twice only indicates precisely the character of the case concerned. Both these are cases in which a testator has disinherited a child (in *Ep.* V. 1 a son, in VI. 33 a daughter) and the *centumviri* had to decide whether the will should be upheld. The Digest contains a whole title on the subject of the *querela* (Dig. V. 2), and even refers to this proceeding by the name of *centumuirale iudicium* (Dig. V. 2. l 13; XXXIV. 3. l 30).

In fact on one ground or other the impeachment of a will was a frequent and special matter of the centumviral jurisdiction. It might be urged that the will was *non iure factum* and therefore *nullum*, because the testator had passed over his son as in Cicero's first case and Val. M. VII. 7. § 2 (§ 1 is the same as Cicero's); or because the testatrix was insane, as in Val. M. VII. 8. § 1; or that it was *iure factum sed inofficiosum* (cf. Dig. V. 2. l 2) 'a good will in itself but wanting in proper regard to near relations' as in Pliny's two cases and Val. M. VII. 8. § 4. Quintilian is evidently speaking of this class of cases when he uses the words *de rescissis patrum testamentis uel contra filios confirmatis*. Valerius Maximus

[1] Valerius Maximus (VII. 7 and 8) has instances of such applications to the praetor, to the consul, to Augustus, and to the *centumviri*.

(VII. 8. pr.) says *His rescissorum testamentorum exemplis contenti, attigamus ea quae rata manserunt.* Why should we object to Cicero describing the like class as *testamentorum ruptorum aut ratorum?*

§ 175. *Quae potuit esse causa maior quam illius militis, de cuius morte cum domum falsus ab exercitu nuntius uenisset, et pater eius re credita testamentum mutasset, et quem ei uisum esset fecisset heredem, essetque ipse mortuus, res delata est ad centumuiros, cum miles domum reuenisset egissetque lege in paternam hereditatem testamento exheres filius. Nempe in ea causa quaesitum est de iure ciuili, possetne paternorum bonorum exheres esse filius, quem pater testamento neque heredem neque exheredem scripsisset nominatim.*

The words *testamento exheres filius* are supposed by many editors to be an interpolation, though Piderit decidedly, and Prof. Wilkins with some hesitation, defend them. The latter pertinently asks why a marginal gloss should have been added here, as the meaning is unambiguous. I see no reason for supposing them to be an interpolation: they are intended to give pointedly the ground of the son's action. 'He brought a statutable action for his father's inheritance as a *son* disinherited by the will.' The words at the end of the section are consistent with the supposition that the testator simply omitted all mention of the son. But the suspected words show that in some way the son was not merely passed over (*praeteritus*), but was disinherited by the will, and they give additional importance to the word *nominatim.* No doubt the testator, after appointing an heir, went on with the words *ceteri omnes exheredes sunto.* According to the terms of the will therefore the son was disinherited. But he was *son,* not daughter nor grandson: and the question therefore was, could a *son* be disinherited by general words without express mention (*nominatim*)? Perhaps this case led to the settlement of the law. For that the son was still *in patris potestate* may safely be assumed; and then, Gaius tells us, express mention was required for disinheritance (Gai. II. 123—129).

This case was not a *querela inofficiosi testamenti,* for it is described as *lege agere in hereditatem* i.e. it was the regular

sacramental action brought by the son claiming to be heir *ex intestato* because the will was invalid. The primary result of both actions if successful was the same: the will would be upset in our case, because the son was passed over; in other cases, because the will, though expressly disinheriting the son, would be held to have been framed without due regard to natural claims. In the former class of cases the testator was supposed to have acted in forgetfulness or ignorance of claims which he would otherwise have recognised: in the latter he was supposed to have exercised a judgment which the facts did not justify and which was therefore not sane in the eyes of the law. Cf. Dig. v. 2. 1 2; 1 5.

§ 179. *Quo quidem in genere familiaris noster M. Buculeius, homo neque meo iudicio stultus et suo ualde sapiens et ab iuris studio non abhorrens, simili in re quodam modo nuper errauit. Nam cum aedes L. Fufio uenderet, in mancipio lumina uti tum essent, ita recepit. Fufius autem, simul atque aedificari coeptum est in quadam parte urbis, quae modo ex illis aedibus conspici posset, egit statim cum Buculeio, quod, cuicumque particulae caeli officeretur, quamuis esset procul, mutari lumina putabat.*

The case of Fufius v. Buculeius respecting the lights in a house bought by the plaintiff from the defendant, has received a good many comments, but I think there is still room for another. For though Prof. Wilkins, in his note on the passage has taken the right view, the matter requires a fuller explanation than he has given.

Crassus is represented by Cicero as desirous of showing the necessity of a knowledge of law to public orators, and for this purpose he instances one case after another in which the arguments turned not on matters of ordinary life and interest, but on strictly legal questions. In the case mentioned just before ours, Marius Gratidianus the vendor of a house, had not declared in the statement accompanying the conveyance, that a part of the house was subject to an easement in favour of another. Crassus had argued on behalf of the purchaser Orata that the vendor ought to have disclosed any fault or defect in the house

which was in his knowledge. The mention of this case suggested to Crassus another, which had occurred, as he said, lately. It was of the same class, (*quo in genere*), and occurred to a friend, viz. M. Buculeius, a man, whom Crassus thought no fool, who thought himself very clever, and who moreover was a bit of a lawyer. Here we come to a difference in the reading. Some of the best MSS have *simili quodam modo errauit*; others have *simili in re quodam modo errauit*. The former of these two readings makes the blunder of Buculeius to have been somewhat like that of the vendor in the other case, the latter makes him to have blundered but only in a like matter. If this last reading be adopted, we have to find a meaning for *simili in re* as well as for *quo in genere*, unless the one be taken as a careless repetition of the other. But there is no necessity to suppose carelessness. *Quo in genere* may refer to the incompleteness of a declaration, and *simili in re* to the question of sale of a house, or, more specifically, to questions respecting an easement arising on the sale of a house. If the latter reading be adopted, we have to find a similarity in the blunder as well as in the subject matter. But then we can take *quo in genere* of sales of houses and *simili modo errauit* of incomplete declarations by the vendor. And therefore whichever of these readings be adopted, there is not much decisive help gained to the interpretation of our passage. The case relates on either supposition to the sale of a house, to the existence or nature of an easement and to the imperfect or erroneous declaration of the vendor.

It is always venturesome to explain a lawcase unless one has a full report by a competent hand. In a speech of Cicero's we have no doubt a number of facts, or matters intended to be taken as facts, but we know not how many other facts are suppressed altogether, and whether the statement of those which are given is so full, so accurate, and so fair, as to justify the inferences which we should be inclined to draw. In the brief mention of a case, such as we have here, we can only expect to have one point or aspect presented, and it is therefore of some importance to ascertain from what point of view the narrator regards it. In our passage it is not stated that Crassus

was himself engaged in the case on either side, nor is it said that it led to an elaborate legal discussion. The mention of it at all appears to be due to the similarity of the matter, and possibly of the blunder, to that of Marius; but it is reasonable to suppose that the case was instanced, like the rest, to prove Crassus' thesis, that in such a matter there was ample call for thorough knowledge of law. Yet we cannot assume that we have in the statement here given all the important points of the case. For the case of Marius as given in § 178 is certainly deficient. Cicero has referred to it again in the *de officiis* III. 16 § 67, and there he mentions, what is not told here, that the house now sold to Orata by Marius had a few years before been purchased by Marius from Orata, and that this fact formed the pivot on which Antonius' defence turned. It was absurd, he argued, for Orata to complain that Marius had not told him of this easement on the house, when Orata had owned the house and knew of the easement as well as Marius could tell him. With this example before us of the incompleteness of Cicero's statements, we must hesitate before we assume that Fufius v. Buculeius has been adequately reported.

In a city like Rome where the buildings were close to one another and the streets were narrow, the comfort and indeed habitability of a residence largely depends on its neighbours. One house may actually require the support of another, or it may have no other way of carrying off its rainwater, except over the roof or into the area of its neighbour. Its prospect or its light may be open, only so long as the neighbours do not build in a particular direction or to a particular height. Yet each owner is *prima facie* entitled to do what he likes with his own building or area, to pull down or to build higher, to stop his neighbour from sending his drains through or over his (the first owner's) premises, or in any way interfering with the first owner's arrangements. But sometimes an owner can be induced to secure to his neighbour such conveniences, and to impose on his own house a servitude to some specific effect in favour of his neighbour's house. And nothing can be more natural than for the owner of two neighbouring houses in selling one or both to impose upon one or both a servitude in

favour of the other. While the houses were in the same ownership, these rights may have been mutually enjoyed, and may have become necessary for their convenient use as residences. A purchaser would require them, and a vendor would guaranty or reserve them.

The explanation of our passage taken generally by lawyers is set forth by Rein *Civil-Recht* p. 322, and more fully by Griesinger *de seruitute luminum* 1819. pp. 128—154. On one point there is a slight divergence (see Rein p. 323 and Voigt, *Ius naturale* III. p. 306).

Griesinger's view is as follows. The house of Buculeius enjoyed a servitude *ne luminibus officiatur* granted by a neighbour either to Buculeius himself or to a former owner of Buculeius' house. This grant would be in the usual words (cf. D. VIII. 2. l 23; XVIII. 1. l 33) *lumina, uti nunc sunt, ut ita sint.* The effect of this servitude was that the particular neighbour was prevented from so building as to interfere with the lights of Buculeius' house. Buculeius now in selling to Fufius used exactly the same formula, i.e. he undertook that the lights should always be as they then were. Buculeius (according to Griesinger) meant to guaranty only the servitude previously granted by his neighbour. But his words, taken strictly, had a wider meaning; and Fufius took advantage of it, maintaining that he was thereby guarantied against any obstruction of any portion of the sky visible from his house. On a building being erected a long way off, but just visible from his house, Fufius at once brought an action against Buculeius for this interference with his lights. Buculeius' error was this. In the mouth of a neighbour constituting a servitude the words could only relate to his own house, and imposed this restriction of their rights on himself and subsequent owners of the servient house only. But Buculeius as seller of the dominant house might, wisely or unwisely, undertake a personal liability to the purchaser for any privileges or advantages he chose to connect with the house. If he promised Fufius security against interference with his lights, not from one or more persons, who owned servient houses, but from all the world, he might not, it is true, be able to keep his bargain, but he would be liable

on his covenant[1], and must compensate Fufius. And it was a principle of the law that ambiguous words should be construed against the vendor (cf. D. II. 14. 1 39). Some such case is apparently referred to by Pomponius in D. XVIII. 1. 1 33. *Cum in lege uenditionis ita sit scriptum 'flumina stillicidia uti nunc sunt, ut ita sint,' nec additur quae flumina uel stillicidia, primum spectari oportet quid acti sit: si non id appareat, tunc id accipitur quod uenditori nocet: ambigua enim oratio est.*

Voigt (with others) supposes that Buculeius was not covenanting for the continuance of an already existing servitude (he doubts this being the practice), but that by the use of the words *lumina uti nunc sunt ut ita sint* he imposed a servitude on another of his own houses in favour of that he was selling.

Griesinger thinks that Fufius would win on account of the strict construction of words in early times. Voigt apparently thinks he would lose his case, because there could be no doubt of Buculeius' real meaning.

Had Cicero's words been different, I should have thought such an explanation, whether Griesinger's or Voigt's, probable and reasonable. But Cicero does not say *lumina uti tunc essent ut ita essent*, and he does not use the word *promisit* or *spopondit*, but *recepit*.

Ita recepit is rather too short an expression for *recepit ita futura esse*; and it is at least as probable that *ita* does not relate to the favourable position of the lights but to the accurate representation of the formula. That is to say *ita* may mean 'in these words,' quite as well as 'in this arrangement.' Instances may be found to justify either interpretation, e.g. both occur in the passage of Pomponius just quoted.

Recipere in law Latin is used in several senses. It means 'to recover,' 'to receive' physically and metaphorically, (e.g. *receptum est* 'it is the received opinion'), 'to undertake' e.g. *obligationem alienam, in se recipere periculum*, &c. In this last sense it is used not unfrequently by Cicero, chiefly in his letters,

[1] Is this so? If it were a formal stipulation, Griesinger may be right. But if it was in the *lex mancipi* or an attached *pactum*, it would I think be cut down to what properly concerned the convenience and commercial interest of the house sold (cf. D. VIII. 3, 1 5 fin. 1 6 pr.).

e.g. *omnia se facturum recepit* (Cic. *Att.* v. 13 § 2), *in me recipio fore eum tibi uoluptati* (*Fam.* XIII. 10. § 3). Several times it is combined with *spondeo*, &c., e.g. ib. 17; *et ipse spondeo et omnes hoc tibi tui pro me recipiunt maximum te fructum facturum* (ib. 50 § 2); *Promitto, recipio, spondeo C. Caesarem talem semper fore ciuem, qualis*, &c. (*Phil.* v. 18 fin.); *de aestate polliceris uel potius recipis* (*Att.* XIII. 1 § 2). So the substantive *receptum* e.g. *satis est factum officio ac necessitudini, satis promisso nostro ac recepto* (*Verr.* v. 53 § 139), *ille promissum et receptum interuertit ad seque transtulit* (*Phil.* 2. 32 § 79). Both verb and noun are found in this sense in the Digest though not very often, e.g. D. XXVIII. 5. l 47; and the rubric of IV. 8 *de receptis: qui arbitrium receperint ut sententiam dicant*, i.e. 'Of undertakings: herein specially that those who have undertaken an arbitration, should declare their opinion.' Bekker has discussed this use of the word in *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung* III. 1 sqq.

The construction of *recipio* in this sense is either absolute, or with an infinitive object sentence, or with *de*, or with abstract words like *causam, periculum, mandatum*, &c. None of these usages resembles that in our text; *lumina uti tunc essent ita recepit*. Nor have I noticed this sense of *recipere* to occur in connexion with engagements between vendor and purchaser.

But there is yet another meaning of *recipere* which suits the passage, and is free from these objections. It is best illustrated by such passages as the following, which are taken from just those parts of the Digest which naturally deal with our present subject-matter. The first is from the title on general rules affecting servitudes: the second from that on the action to enforce the mutual obligations of vendor and purchaser, the third from that on the purchaser's claim for double damages when he has not got quiet enjoyment of the object purchased. The regular meaning of *recipere* in such matters is 'to reserve' from the conveyance. The word was synonymous with *excipere, detrahere, deducere* (cf. D. VII. 1. l 36 § 1).

D. VIII. 4. l. 10 (Ulp.) *Quicquid uenditor seruitutis nomine sibi recipere uult, nominatim recipi oportet: nam illa generalis receptio 'quibus est seruitus utique est' ad extraneos pertinet,*

ipsi nihil prospicit uenditori ad iura eius conseruanda: nulla enim habuit, quia nemo ipse sibi seruitutem debet, i.e. a vendor wishing to reserve to himself a servitude over the property sold must do so in express terms. A mere general clause of reservation—'for those who have servitudes and as they have them'[1]—is good to preserve the rights of third parties, but not good for the vendor, who cannot have a servitude over his own property and cannot therefore be included in the words *quibus est.*

D. XIX. 1. l. 53 (Labeo) *Si habitatoribus habitatio lege uenditionis recepta est, omnibus in ea habitantibus praeter dominum recte recepta habitatio est.* (Paul) *Immo si cui in ea insula quam uendideris gratis habitationem dederis et sic receperis 'habitatoribus ad* (*aut* MS) *quam quisque diem conductum habet,' parum caueris, nominatim enim de his recipi oportuit, itaque eos habitatores emptor insulae habitatione impune prohibebit*, i.e. a right of free lodging cannot, according to Paul, be reserved on a sale, unless it be by express words for particular individuals.

D. XXI. 2. l 69 § 5 (Scaev.) *Qui fundum tradit et, cum sciat certam seruitutem deberi, perfusorie dixerit 'itinera actus quibus sunt utique sunt recte recipitur,' euictionis quidem nomine se liberat, sed quia decepit emptorem empti iudicio tenetur*, i.e. a vendor with knowledge of a definite servitude to which the house &c. is subject must inform the purchaser of it. Mere general words by which due reservation is made for all who have rights of road and driving according to the character of such rights, are

[1] I take *utique* here as adverb of manner (*uti*) with the copulative *que* (cf. e.g. Lex Jul. Mun. 5; Edict. ap. D. XXI. 1. l 38; &c.), and the sentence to require for completeness the expression of an apodosis in some such words as *recte recipitur*. (See the passage of Scaevola, above.) Such imperfect quotations are common e.g. D. XVIII. 1. l 7 pr.; l 59; l 66 § 2; XXI. 2. l 48; &c. The Greek commentators apparently, unless merely paraphrasing, took *utique* as meaning 'of course', for they translate *οἷς ὁ ἀγρὸς δουλεύει, δουλευέτω* Tipucitus ap. Heimb. Bas. v. p. 197 (and similarly in Bas. XIX. 2. l 68 ed. Zachar. = D. XXI. 2. l 69, § 5). Hence Mommsen in his larger edition of the Digest suggested *utique esto*. In the later stereotype edition he has not repeated this suggestion. *Utique* 'anyhow', 'of course', is a conversational expression and is common enough in the Digest in jurists' arguments, but I doubt altogether its occurrence in a formal conveyance. The Greek translation corresponds better to such a phrase (very different from ours) as in D. XIX. 1. l 39 *Qui sic exceperat: si quae seruitutis debentur debebuntur*, which is referred to a case from an ante-Augustan jurist (*apud ueteres*).

not enough to free the vendor from responsibility. The purchaser cannot indeed claim double damages as having been so far evicted, but he can claim full compensation on the ground of being deceived by the vendor.

Other instances of *recipere* in this sense in the Digest are VII. 1. l 36 § 1; VIII. 3. l 30; 4 l 5; l 6 fin.; XVIII. 1. l 40 § 3, § 4; XXXIX. 6. l 35 § 2; l 40 § 3; l 42 pr. It is also found in Plaut. *Trin.* 157 of reserving part of a house; in Cic. *Or.* II. 55 § 226 and also *Top.* § 100 of reserving *ruta caesa*, and by Cato ap. Gell. XVII. 6 § 1 of reserving money in making a dowry; and in *de Re Rust.* 149, where, among the clauses of an agreement for the sale of the winter pasture, comes *bubus domitis binis, cantherio uni, cum emptor pascet, domino pascere recipitur. Holeris asparagis lignis aqua itinere actu domini usioni recipitur*, i.e. "Right is reserved for the owner to pasture along with the purchaser's cattle, two yoke of oxen and one gelding. Right is also reserved for the owner to take vegetables, firewood, water, and to have a road."

The phrase *recte recipitur* was so common that it was denoted by initials *R. R.* See Probi *Notae* IV. p. 276 ed. Keil, cf. p. 327.

It seems strange that this use of *recipere* should not have been mentioned by earlier interpreters of Cicero[1]. There is no doubt of its meaning; it occurs not infrequently, and occurs just in relation to conditions made in conveyance. The form of our sentence is very similar to D. XVIII. 1. l 77 *In lege fundi uendundi lapidicinae in eo fundo ubique essent exceptae erant* where *exceptae* is much the same as *receptae*, as is well shown by D. VIII. 3. l 30.

Qui duo praedia habebat, in unius uenditione aquam quae in fundo nascebatur et circa eam aquam late decem pedes exceperat; quaesitum est, utrum dominium loci ad eum pertineat an ut per eum locum accedere possit. Respondit si ita recepisset 'circa eam aquam late pedes decem' iter dumtaxat uideri uenditoris esse, i.e. "The owner of two estates sold one, but excepted in the conveyance the spring of water in it and ten feet wide around

[1] E.g. Voigt (*Die* XII *Tafeln* ii. p. 154) adheres to his old view, though treating of cases of reservation on sale in the next pages. But Voigt's judgment is very inferior to his learning and patience.

it. Alfenus was consulted whether the effect of this was that the vendor retained the property in the ground for a distance of ten feet round the spring, or had only a right of access over the purchaser's ground to that extent. Alfenus answered that, if the reservation was made just in those words, the vendor had only the right of access."

I think then, following the suggestion of D. XXI. 2. l 69 § 5 quoted above (p. 73), that Buculeius inserted in his conveyance a general *reservation* in some such words as *lumina uti nunc sunt recte recipitur* or possibly *lumina quibus sunt, utique nunc sunt, recte recipitur*, i.e. 'Due reservation is made of the lights as they now are' or 'due reservation is made for all who have lights according to their present condition.' Buculeius probably used them from excess of caution without any definite reference or even any distinctly conceived purpose. Perhaps he liked to show off his acquaintance with legal *formulae*. Or he may have thought that they would protect his own lights or the lights of some neighbouring house against Fufius. Cicero says that he *errauit*, which may very well apply to an erroneous use of a common general form. Fufius however, ignoring the technical sense of *recipitur*, chose to take it as a *guaranty* of his own lights against the world. This was doubly wrong (as the law is in the Digest and probably so in Cicero's time also). For (1) *recipitur* did not mean in such formulae 'a promise is given,' but a 'right is reserved,' and (2) he would have to show not merely that some portion of the sky which was previously visible from his house was now obscured by the new building, but that his light was thereby lessened (cf. D. VIII. 2. l 15; l 16; l 38; l 39). There would still remain the important question *quid actum esset* (D. XVIII. 1. l 33; l 40 § 3; l 77; L. 17 l 34; &c.) i.e. 'what was the real contract between the parties,' and this was a matter which like the case of Curius v. Coponius, quoted next by Crassus, would require in the rival advocates a good knowledge of forms of conveyance, of the practice in sales, and of the respective provinces of verbal expression and other evidence in determining the real meaning of the parties.

Dec. 1885. HENRY J. ROBY.

CAESURA IN THE IAMBIC TRIMETERS OF AESCHYLUS.

In Aeschylus we find not only the ordinary penthemimeral and hepthemimeral caesuras and the quasi-caesural diaeresis accompanied by elision at the end of the third foot, but also a trihemimeral caesura; and we have one instance of a diaeresis accompanied by elision at the end of the second foot serving as a caesura. But we have also a number of lines in which neither caesura nor quasi-caesura seems to occur. The object of this paper is to shew that these lines are not really non-caesural; but contain a phenomenon which approaches more nearly to the effect of the regular caesura than does the quasi-caesura.

The following is my classification of the modes of caesura and the substitutions for caesura employed by Aeschylus.

1. Penthemimeral, *a*, in which fifth half-foot ends a word.
   b, in which fifth half-foot is first part, or last syllable of first part, of a compound word.
   Q, quasi-caesura, elision at end of second foot.

2. Hepthemimeral, *a*, in which seventh half-foot ends a word.
   b, in which seventh half-foot is first part, or last syllable of first part, of a compound word.
   Q, quasi-caesura, elision at end of third foot.

3. Trihemimeral *a*, in which third half-foot ends a word.
b, in which third half-foot is first part or last syllable of first part of a compound word.
[*Q* does not occur.]

1*b*, 2*b*, 3*b* include the phenomenon to which I wish to call attention. All the apparently non-caesural lines (except two, which will be separately considered) come under one of these heads; for example:

Persai 251 *ὡς ἐν μίᾳ πληγῇ κατ‖έφθαρται πολύς.*
„ 501 *στρατὸς περᾷ κρυσταλλο‖πῆγα διὰ πόρον.*

These are instances of 2*b*. It appears to me that this natural pause in the middle of a compound word, or at the end of prefixed prepositions, the sense of whose separable nature was never lost in the popular consciousness, produced the metrical effect which was the end of caesura far more perceptibly than the so called quasi-caesura. Further 1*b* and 2*b* were nearer to 1*a* and 2*a*, than 3*a*. In some lines we find a combination of 2*b* and 3*a* or of 2*b* and 2*Q*, and in both these cases it seems to me that the caesural effect is due much more to 2*b* than to 3*a* or 2*Q*.

As all the modes of caesura except 1*a* and 2*a* are infrequent, it will be useful to give a list of the lines in Aeschylus' seven plays in which they occur.

1*b*.

Agam. 943 *πιθοῦ· κράτος μέν‖τοι πάρες γ' ἑκὼν ἐμοί.*

1*Q*.

Supp. 909 *ἔλξειν ἔοιχ' ὑμᾶς ἀποσπάσας κόμης.*

2*b*.

Prom. 640 *οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως ὑμῖν ἀ‖πιστῆσαί με χρή.*
Pers. 251 *ὡς ἐν μίᾳ πληγῇ κατ‖έφθαρται πολύς.*
„ 352 *ἦ παῖς ἐμὸς πλήθει κατ‖αυχήσας νεῶν;*
„ 501 *στρατὸς περᾷ κρυσταλλο‖πῆγα διὰ πόρον.*
Supp. 401 *ἐπήλυδας τιμῶν ἀπ‖ώλεσας πόλιν.*
„ 947 *οὐδ' ἐν πτυχαῖς βίβλων κατ‖εσφραγισμένα.*

2Q.

Prom. 612 πυρὸς βροτοῖς δοτῆρ' ὁρᾷς Προμηθέα.
Sept. 637 ἤ ζῶντ' ἀτιμαστῆρ' ὅπως ἀνδρηλάτην.
Agam. 1267 ἴτ' ἐς φθόρον πεσόντ', ἐγὼ δ' ἅμ' ἕψομαι
Eumen. 906 εὐηλίως πνέοντ' ἐπιστείχειν χθόνα.

3a.

Sept. 457 καὶ μὴν τὸν‖ ἐντεῦθεν λαχόντα πρὸς πύλαις.
Pers. 503 ἀκτῖνας ὥρμήθη σεσωσμένος κυρεῖ.
„ 519 ὡς κάρτα μοι σαφῶς ἐδήλωσας κακά.
Choeph. 883 ἔοικε νῦν αὐτῆς ἐπὶ ξυροῦ πέλας.

3b.

Pers. 465 Ξέρξης δ' ἀν‖ώμωξεν κακῶν ὁρῶν βάθος.
„ 469 πεζῷ παρ‖αγγείλας ἄφαρ στρατεύματι.
Choeph. 493 πέδαις ἀ‖χαλκεύτοις ἐθηρεύθης, πάτερ.

1b + 3a.

Agam. 1252 ἦ κάρτ' ἄρ‖' ἂν παρ‖εσκόπεις χρησμῶν ἐμῶν.

1Q + 2Q.

Agam. 1254 καὶ μὴν ἄγαν γ|' Ἕλλην|' ἐπίσταμαι φάτιν.

2b + 2Q.

Sept. 635 ἁλώσιμον παιᾶν|' ἐπ‖εξιάκχασεν.
Pers. 489 καὶ Θεσσαλῶν πόλισμ|' ὑπ‖εσπανισμένους.
Supp. 931 καὶ γὰρ πρέπει κήρυκ|' ἀπ‖αγγέλλειν τορῶς.
Agam. 20 νῦν δ' εὐτυχὴς γένοιτ'| ἀπ‖αλλαγὴ πόνων.
„ 1068 οὐ μὴν πλέω ῥίψας|' ἀ‖τιμασθήσομαι.
Choeph. 1 Ἑρμῆ χθόνιε πατρῷ|' ἐπ‖οπτεύων κράτη.
Eumen. 444 τῶν σῶν ἐπῶν μέλημ'| ἀφ‖αιρήσω μέγα.

2b + 3a.

Choeph. 150 ὑμᾶς δὲ‖ κωκυτοῖς ἐπ‖ανθίζειν νόμος.

2Q + 3a.

Agam. 833 φίλον τὸν‖ εὐτυχοῦντ|' ἄνευ φθόνου σέβειν.
„ 946 καὶ τοῖσδε‖ μ' ἐμβαίνονθ' ἁλουργέσιν θεῶν.
Choeph. 919 μὴ 'λεγχε‖ τὸν πονοῦντ' ἔσω καθημένη.

1Q + 2b + 2Q.

Agam. 1270 χρηστηρίαν δ|' ἐσθῆτ'| ἐπ‖οπτεύσας δέ με.

$2b + 2Q + 3a.$

Agam. 1049 *πείθοι' ἂν‖ εἰ πείθοι·'| ἀ‖πειθοίης δ' ἴσως.*

If the MSS. reading in Prom. Desm. 114,

ὑπαιθρίοις δεσμοῖς πεπασσαλευμένος,

be correct, we may make a pause after the reduplication and place the line under $2b$. In that case Pers. 503, now placed under $3a$, may be considered an instance of $2b + 3a$.

A caesura in compound words may be paralleled by such Latin lines as

ut adsidens im‖plumibus pullis avis
dum flagrantia de‖torquet ad oscula
parentibusque ab‖ominatus Hannibal
magnanimi Jovis in‖gratum ad‖scendere cubile.

Two lines still remain. Pers. 509,

Θρῄκην περάσαντες μόγις πολλῷ πόνῳ,

is a real exception to the rule that an iambic trimeter must contain a caesura or quasi-caesura; a designed exception—designed to be a metrical expression of *μόγις*.

The other line is Eum. 26.

Βρόμιος δ' ἔχει τὸν χῶρον οὐδ' ἀμνημονῶ,
ἐξ οὗτε βάκχαις ἐστρατήγησεν θεὸς,
l. 26 *λαγὼ δίκην Πενθεῖ καταρράψας μόρον.*

Here I would read,

ἐξ οὗτε Βάκχαις αἷς στρατηγήσας θεὸς
λαγὼ δίκην Πενθεῖ κατ‖έρραψεν μόρον.

αἷς, the possessive pronoun, fell out after *βάκχαις* owing to parablepsia; participle and verb were altered to verb and participle to suit the metre.

JOHN B. BURY.

QUESTIONS CONNECTED WITH PLATO'S PHAIDROS.

THERE are two questions connected with Plato's *Phaidros*, both of considerable importance, which have been answered in various ways. The first is, what is its subject? The second, what is its date, relatively to the other dialogues?

Some have considered it merely a treatise on formal rhetoric, whilst others have emphasised the matter of Sokrates' second discourse and considered its main subject to be the nature of the soul, or the higher Love. Some have concluded that it was almost the earliest of all the dialogues, and others with more plausibility have looked on it as a kind of inaugural programme, composed about 387 B.C., the conjectural date of the foundation of the Academy.

I. As to its subject, if it be nothing more than a treatise on rhetoric, illustrated by examples, if its only object be to distinguish *εὐτεχνία* from *κακοτεχνία λόγων*, then the matter of the discourses might just as pertinently be shoemaking as Love.

Now I think we may take it for granted that a dialogue treating of two quite unconnected subjects is not Platonic nor indeed Hellenic. Nor can we think that Plato introduced such important doctrines as the nature of the soul and the idea to do nothing more than serve the purpose of a chance illustration. For an illustration has always a subordinate importance, and for a mere illustration it would consequently be inartistic to employ a matter of vital importance, and so upset the balance of the parts. And for this reason shoemaking would be a better illustration.

This being so, we must seek some connexion between the formal motive of the dialogue and the matter of the discourses. We find on the one hand the ordinary demotic rhetoric contrasted with the rhetoric that depends on philosophy—the rhetoric of the δεινός with the rhetoric of the σοφός (see 245 C). This is the formal side. On the other hand we find demotic love contrasted with love accompanied by philosophy. This is the material side. To what whole do these sides belong—what is the higher point of connexion between them?

Dr Thompson is content to look on the *Phaidros* as a 'dramatized treatise on Rhetoric' and to consider the formal motive as *the* motive. Formally, of course, the object of the dialogue is to determine the distinction of good and bad style—εὐτεχνία and κακοτεχνία λόγων. But as form is relative to matter, and the style of a composition should fit its subject like a garment, there is another question with which Plato must concern himself—what is the meet subject of ideal rhetoric? The purpose of all rhetoric, good and bad alike, is to persuade, which means to influence the soul of another. What influence will the ideal Rhetorician be at pains to exert? or, to put it in a concrete[1] form, to what destination will he try to conduct the soul?

Thus then are two things to be determined,

(1) the true method of rhetoric—its form,—
(2) the true object of rhetoric—its matter.

(1) The answer to this question, the formal motive, is given in the latter part of the dialogue. A discourse must not be 'a

[1] I use concrete here in the ordinary, not in the Hegelian, sense. For both the word ψυχαγωγεῖν and the word πείθειν express the same process; the difference is that ψυχαγωγεῖν expresses it by a picture of the imagination—a *Vorstellung*—, πείθειν by a conception of the understanding, a *Begriff*. Thus this expressive word ψυχαγωγεῖν may be used as an instance of the difference between Platonic (and in general Hellenic) thought and Hegelian (and in general modern) thought. This manner of thinking in images is what makes the Platonic system so difficult and strange to a modern; it was the cause of the Neoplatonic erroneous interpretations. The doctrine of ἀνάμνησις is another instance. The argument of the *Phaidon* shews (cf. Mr Archer-Hind's preface) that ἀνάμνησις was to Plato merely the defective way in which the imagination represents the kinship of the soul to the ideas.

bronze maiden,' reversible, without any order of parts. It must be an organism, having beginning, middle and end in irreversible order. Definition and division are necessary, and therefore rhetoric is dependent on philosophy for its method. In this way Higher Rhetoric is distinguished from vulgar rhetoric; it stands between Dialectic and Lower Rhetoric.

(2) The answer to this is contained in the second discourse of Sokrates. The true object of rhetoric is to conduct the soul to its sphere, the world of ideas, to which it is akin. Pure Philosophy alone can completely effect this, but it can be to a certain extent effected by a kind of Inspiration, such Inspiration, for example, as is produced by bodily Beauty and called Love. One inspired thus seeks to communicate his inspiration to the soul of the beloved and bring it into contact with the ideas—and his rhetoric will be the Higher Rhetoric, such as Sokrates uses in the *Phaidros* and *Symposion*. It may be noticed that Sokrates' rhetoric all through is inspired (dithyrambic)—under the influence of the place, the Nymphs and grasshoppers. Both true rhetoric and true Love are inspirations.

The ideal Rhetoric, then, stands between Philosophy and vulgar Rhetoric, and is adapted to conduct those souls which on the one hand do not yet participate in philosophy and on the other hand are not vulgar, such souls as, not philosophical but kept pure by a divine influence, *θεία μοίρᾳ* (like Glaukon and Adeimantos in the *Republic*), might pass through the world unspotted. These are those which are called 'beautiful souls,' *schöne Seelen*, and those of which Wordsworth says that with the genial sense of youth they 'do Thy work and know it not,' guided by the light of love, not by the light of truth. Ideal rhetoric may raise such souls to the sphere of philosophy.

We have then the following relation:

Philosophy : higher Love :: philosophical style : higher Rhetoric
:: soul of a philosopher : a Beautiful Soul.

In the *Parmenides*, *Phaidon*, *Sophistes*, &c. we have examples of the pure philosophical style, in the *Phaidros* and *Symposion* of higher Rhetoric.

Accordingly the true answer to the inquiry as to the object of the *Phaidros* will be: to determine *both the matter and form* of Ideal Rhetoric.

II. From a philosophical point of view the actual date of a dialogue is not of very great importance: the matter of importance is to determine the relative dates of the dialogues—their chronological *order*. In some cases there are direct allusions which determine this, for example the allusion in the *Phaidon* to the *Mênon*. In other cases we must judge from the philosophical content.

A probable allusion in the *Phaidros* (260 E) goes to place it after the *Gorgias*, and as the *Gorgias* is a sufficiently mature production a very early date for the *Phaidros* would seem improbable. But when we come to consider the philosophy in the *Phaidros*, it is difficult to see how we can avoid assigning a comparatively late date. We must at least place it subsequent to the *Phaidon*, as I shall endeavour to shew.

There are three dialogues in which Plato treats officially of the immortality of the soul—*Phaidon*, *Phaidros* and *Republic*. It is the express object of the *Phaidon*, in the other places it has a subordinate interest. Let us compare the arguments of the *Phaidon* and *Phaidros*.

The final argument of the *Phaidon* is briefly this:

That which contains a principle will not admit the opposite of that principle, but will either perish or retreat on its approach. The soul contains the principle of Life, ∴ will not admit death, the opposite, ∴ will either perish or retreat. But the first alternative, destruction, is excluded in virtue of the principle Life, which cannot perish ∴ soul will retreat undestroyed—*ἀνώλεθρον*.

The bases on which this argument rests are

(1) *ζωὴ ἐστιν ἀνώλεθρον*,
(2) Soul contains and carries with it Life.

It must be noticed that the only elucidation that Plato gives of (1)—a statement which a nihilist might question—is contained in the words (106 D) *σχολῇ γὰρ ἄν τι ἄλλο φθορὰν μὴ*

δέχοιτο εἴ γε τὸ ἀθάνατον ἀίδιον ὂν φθορὰν δέξεται; and as to (2) Plato treats the relation of ψυχὴ to ζωή as of a species to a genus, without excluding other possible species. Both these defects are supplied in the *Phaidros*.

The argument in the *Phaidros* is:

The self-moving moves always, for self-motion, αὐτοκινησία, implies continual *Beisichsein* (ἅτε οὐκ ἀπολεῖπον ἑαυτό). It is ἀρχὴ κινήσεως, ∴ ἀγένητον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον (on the principle *ex nihilo*). Now externality implies motion-by-another, ∴ body is not self-moving. Therefore the self-moving is Soul: self-motion is the οὐσία τε καὶ λόγος of Soul. Therefore Soul is immortal.

This argument is superior to the preceding in two ways. (1) It proves the hypothesis that Life is ἀνώλεθρον, by shewing what the essence of Life is—αὐτοκινησία, the negation of mechanism. Plato himself indicates in the *Phaidon* that his argument there is not the most complete but only second best (τὸν δεύτερον πλοῦν ἐπὶ τῆς αἰτίας ζήτησιν ἦ πεπραγμάτευμαι, 99 D). The category of αὐτοκινησία (τὸ αὐτὸ κινοῦν) is the solution Plato has discovered for the difficulty which exercised him as to aitiology when he was studying Anaxagoras.

(2) In the *Phaidon* Soul is made an idea subordinate to Life. In the *Phaidros* Soul and the Self-moving are identified, and this is equivalent to the identity of Being and Thought.

From these considerations we may conclude that the *Phaidros* was composed after the *Phaidon*, and the conclusion is confirmed by a comparison of the methods of exposition. In the *Phaidon* the exposition is analytic and bears to that in the *Phaidros*, which is synthetic, a similar relation to that which Des Cartes' *Méditations* bear to his *Principia*, or Kant's *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* to his *Prolegomena*.

That the *Phaidros* is posterior to the *Republic* also seems probable from a comparison of the passages bearing on the tripartition of the soul. The tripartition is assumed in the myth of the *Phaidros* (246 A), whereas in the *Republic*, Bk. 4, it is announced as a new theory and demonstrated at length, though Sokrates admits that his demonstration is not a full or satisfactory one, but only sufficient for the nature of the investig-

ation. He takes the shorter road in Bk. 4 (435 D), but when he reaches a higher stage of the argument in Bk. 6, he finds it necessary to take the longer way (*μακροτέρα περίοδος*, 504 B). I must postpone examining the relation of the discussion of the *εἴδη* of the soul in Book 4 to that of the *παθήματα* of the soul in Bk. 6, as it does not directly concern the *Phaidros;* but I wish to point out that the *θεία καὶ μακρὰ διήγησις Phaidr.* 246 A, seems to be an intentional allusion to the *μακροτέρα καὶ πλείων ὁδός, Repub.* 435 D and *μακροτέρα περίοδος*, 504 B.

JOHN B. BURY.

ON THE DATE OF THE COMPOSITION OF THE HISTORY OF HERODOTUS.

UNDER the title *Ueber die Entstehungszeit des Herodoteischen Geschichtswerkes* (Zweite Auflage, Berlin, 1878), Kirchhoff has republished, in a small pamphlet, two papers which originally appeared in the Transactions of the Berlin Academy of Sciences. They deal with the difficult problem of the composition of the History of Herodotus, and apparently with such success that the conclusions at which Kirchhoff arrives are treated as established facts by some German scholars.

On p. 26 Kirchhoff thus sums up the results of his first paper. "Herodotus twice resided in Athens for a considerable period; his first residence extended from about 445 to at least the beginning of 443 B.C. and perhaps somewhat longer; his second from the autumn of 431 to at least the end of 428 B.C. The ten years between the two periods he spent partly at Thurii, and partly in travel through lower Italy and Sicily. During his earlier stay in Athens the first books of his history down to 3. 119 inclusive were finished; but in the year which followed, while he was at Thurii, the work was laid aside for reasons unknown to us, and was not resumed till towards the end of his stay there. It appears probable that the end of the third and the fourth book were added about this time. On returning to Athens—amid the confusion of the great struggle then breaking out between Sparta and Athens—he went on vigorously with the continuation of the work, and in the year from the winter of 431 to 430 B.C. he carried it down to the commencement of the seventh book. At this time the more threatening and melancholy state of affairs seems to have re-

pressed his pleasure in the task; in the course of the year 429 and down to the summer of 428 the work went slowly on as far as the beginning of the ninth book. The remainder was finished before the end of 428, and then the work was finally broken off, the original plan being never completely carried out."

These statements, so precise in chronology, and so minute in facts that they fix the very chapter at which an interruption in the work took place, are founded solely on internal evidence. Kirchhoff tells us p. 2 that tradition furnishes no answer to the question 'When did Herodotus begin to write down his work in its present form, and in what space of time did he bring it to the point where it now ends?' He refuses, as every one must refuse, to accept the statement of Suidas that the work was written at Samos, or the statement of Pliny that it was written at Thurii 'about the year 444 B.C.' Ptolemaeus Chennus, who states that Herodotus never published his work at all, but left that duty to his heir Plesirrhous, is, in Kirchhoff's opinion, 'a shameless liar,' and may have been such. The work itself, and it alone, is our evidence for the date at which it was composed.

The question, in itself, is not very important; or perhaps it only becomes of importance when there is some chance of a definite answer. If indeed we knew for certain from external evidence that Herodotus had composed the work at such and such a time, and in such a place, our interest in some of his statements would have a new and deeper force; we should also be enabled to understand some things—especially some omissions—which are now a puzzle. But external evidence is one thing, internal is another; constructive evidence derived from the work itself is at best a doubtful guide in explaining the difficulties of a book. Nevertheless it is worth while to examine the process by which Kirchhoff arrives at such precise results, with nothing but internal evidence to support him.

Kirchhoff assumes that 'every attentive and unprejudiced reader' will agree with him on three points:—

(1) that the work is composed on a settled plan and with a careful arrangement in which the place allotted to the matter dealt with in the episodes was duly considered;

(2) that the present division into 9 books has nothing to do with this plan, and cannot have arisen from Herodotus;

(3) that the work as we have it is only a fragment, 'though a fragment dealing with the larger part of the material contemplated in the plan,' and that as Thucydides only knew the work in its present condition the author was prevented by circumstances from finishing it.

Without refusing to concede these points we may still remark that the first must not be allowed to cover the assertion that the various episodes in the History of Herodotus were composed in the order in which we now have them. These episodes naturally arose in connection with travels, and were written, at any rate in the rough, at the time when Herodotus was in the places which he describes. Whether the plan of the History as a whole was present to the author when he undertook these travels, or any part of them, or whether it grew up in his mind subsequently, it is impossible to tell. Nor is the third point assumed by Kirchhoff so clear as he seems to think: that the history is unfinished, in one sense, every one will allow; there are omissions in it, and references to facts not found in the work as we now have it. But it may have been brought down to the point intended by the author. The battle of Plataea is such a definite event in the contest of Persia and Greece that hardly a better point could have been chosen for bringing the history of that contest to a close, especially for one whose main object in relating it was to illustrate the vengeance in store for arrogance and aggression. All that follows is but the Epilogue to the great drama.

From this plan of the History the author, says Kirchhoff, deviates once in the way of omission. In 1. 106, 184 we have references to the Ἀσσύριοι λόγοι. Now, according to Kirchhoff, a comparison of 2. 161, in which the Λιβυκοὶ λόγοι are mentioned, and 4. 159 ff. in which we have these λόγοι before us, is a convincing proof that when Herodotus wrote the first book he intended to insert at a suitable place an excursus on the history of Assyria—i. e. the kingdoms of Assyria and Babylon. The most suitable place for this is 3. 150, where Herodotus is speaking of the rebellion in Babylon—but neither here nor

elsewhere do we hear of these Ἀσσύριοι λόγοι. And we cannot assume the existence of the λόγοι as a separate work, for the simple reason that such a work is unknown to antiquity, and a work by Herodotus on such a subject could not possibly be unknown. Here, therefore, Herodotus makes a promise which he does not fulfil: it is not a promise concerning an individual fact—in which sense the assertion in 7. 213 that he will relate ἐν τοῖσι ὄπισθε λόγοισι why Athenades slew Ephialtes might be spoken of as an unfulfilled promise—but concerning an important episode of his work. What reason are we to give for this omission?

Either, says Kirchhoff, Herodotus consciously altered his plan after making this promise, or he forgot it (p. 5). Had he altered his plan, he would undoubtedly have cancelled the previous references. We must conclude then that he forgot it, when the opportunity for fulfilling it came, i.e. when he had reached the end of bk 3 in the composition of his work. But this could not have happened, Kirchhoff adds, if books 1—3 had been written at a stretch. It is only possible if we suppose that a considerable period elapsed between the time when the promise was made, and the opportunity came for fulfilling it. "We cannot help assuming then that at some point between 1. 184 and 3. 150 the work was interrupted for a considerable period."

Again, Kirchhoff argues as follows:

In 1. 130 Herodotus mentions, in anticipation, a rebellion of the Medes which took place under Darius. This Darius can only be the son of Hystaspes, and as we know now from native sources that immediately after his accession the Medes rebelled, we must refer the words of Herodotus to this rising. But in 3. 88 where Herodotus relates the circumstances following the accession of Darius, he says nothing whatever of this rebellion. Here then is a second proof of forgetfulness; and this second instance seems to prove that the interruption took place when Herodotus was writing the part of the history between 3. 88 and 3. 150, for it is between these two points that we should expect to have the missing account.

Before we follow Kirchhoff further let us call to mind some facts which he appears to find it convenient entirely to forget.

The promise about the Λιβυκοὶ λόγοι is made as we have seen in 2. 161 and it is fulfilled in 4. 159. Whatever time then elapsed between 3. 88 and 3. 150 elapsed *a fortiori* between 2. 161 and 4. 159. Yet in this case Herodotus has not forgotten his promise, so that we have at least the fulfilment of one promise to set against the omission, through forgetfulness, of the rebellion of the Medes[1], not to mention the Ἀσσύριοι λόγοι.

Again: Kirchhoff's theory that Herodotus forgot his promise of the Ἀσσύριοι λόγοι not only demands that there was an interruption in the work and consequent forgetfulness, it requires that Herodotus should have been unable to refresh his memory. And this it is impossible to assume. How was it likely that he should forget his promise when he had only to turn to the previous part of his work, published or unpublished, in order to remind himself of it? Whatever was the reason for the omission, forgetfulness cannot be pleaded.

Why then did he leave the promise of these λόγοι uncancelled? For the simple reason that when once published he could not cancel what he had said. If we suppose that he wrote and published the first two books of the history down to the invasion of Egypt by Cambyses—or even bk 1 containing the rise of Persia and fall of Lydia—and then changed his mind about the plan of the work, or was unable for some reason to work up his notes on Assyria—we can explain the difficulty before us. He could not cancel his published promise; and he could not or would not fulfil it (cf. Davidson on Polybius, in *Hellenica* p. 406).

We may now return to Kirchhoff.

On p. 7 ff. he tells us:

(*a*) that the first books of the History contain no trace of the author's residence and travels in Italy and Sicily, and, therefore, these books must have been written and published before the journey to Thurii;

(*b*) that bk 2 must have been written after 455 B.C. which is the date of the rebellion in Egypt against the

[1] We might also urge that if a promise made in 1. 184 is afterwards forgotten, and one made in 2. 161 is remembered, this is evidence of a break in the composition between 1. 184 and 2. 161.

Persians. Herodotus as we know from 3. 12 was in Egypt after that event;

(*c*) that 3. 15 was written after 449 B.C. In that chapter we read that Thannyras the son of Inaros, and Pausiris the son of Amyrtaeus, were allowed to receive the posts forfeited by the rebellion of their fathers. Amyrtaeus maintained himself against the Persians till 449 B.C. when Cimon went to his assistance. Thuc. I. 112.

Hence 455 B.C. or even 449 B.C. is the upward limit for this part of the book, and the latter is the more probable, because Herodotus speaks of Egypt as in the peaceful possession of the Persians.

But Kirchhoff can also fix the downward limit for the composition of this part of the book, p. 8. He reasons thus:

In 3. 118, 119, we have the well-known story of the wife of Intaphernes—and this story, we are almost compelled to admit, is alluded to by Sophocles, *Antigone* 905 ff. Some editors, it is true, regard the passage in Sophocles as an interpolation—but Kirchhoff, rightly as I think, rejects this view, and he assumes that Sophocles has in this allusion availed himself of a story fresh in the minds of his hearers; so that at the date of the *Antigone* Herodotus had finished and published, but only recently published, his history down to 3. 119. The *Antigone* was brought out in the spring of 441 B.C., and so 442 B.C. is a reasonable date for the publication of this part of the history, and we get the years 449—442 for the composition of it.

This is I believe a fair representation of Kirchhoff's argument; I have condensed it, but without, so far as I know, omitting a single point of importance or stating it unfavourably in any way.

Let us, in examining the argument, begin at the end. The date of the *Antigone* rests as is well known on the doubtful statement that Sophocles was made a general in the Samian war *on account of the success* of this drama. That he was a general in that war is true: that he was made so in consequence of the *Antigone* is another matter altogether. For this we have no more authority than the *φασί* of a grammarian writing more than 200 years after the event. Can we build on such a foundation as that?

But even if we accept the statement of Aristophanes as representing a historical fact, there is sufficient reason to make us shrink from using it in the way which Kirchhoff does. He assumes that the allusion of Sophocles must have been made shortly after the publication of the story of Intaphernes—so that one date may be applied to fix the other. This is by no means certain, nor even probable. In the *Oed. Col.* of Sophocles l. 337 ff. there is an allusion to the customs of Egypt which brings us as near to Herodotus bk 2, as the passage in the *Antigone* does to the story in bk 3. But the *O. C.* was not published, so far as we know, before 405 B.C. and the book on Egypt may have been published at any time after 449 B.C. Kirchhoff may, if he chooses, insist that the publication down to bk 3. 119 took place before 441 B.C., but how long before he cannot prove. In the parallel case we have a lapse of 40 years between the circumstances and the allusion to them. And it is not even certain that the story of Intaphernes was first made known to the Greeks by Herodotus.

But even the earlier part of the argument is not very sound. Because Herodotus in the first part of his history gives us no trace of his residence in Italy are we to suppose that he had never been there? In 3. 130 ff. we have an account of Democedes, which immediately takes us to Italy. Is it not forcing our hand to say that c. 119 was written before Herodotus was in Italy, c. 130 ff. after, because we find mention of Italy in the one case and not in the other? If it were absolutely certain that when writing c. 119 Herodotus had never been in Italy and certain that when writing 130 ff. he had been there, we should have to make a division in the work at that point, but we know nothing of his movements except so far as we can draw conclusions from the history itself—and our conclusions are *ex silentio*. Moreover there is evidence in bks 1—3. 119 to prove that he was at any rate acquainted with the river Crathis in Italy, 1. 145.

Again when Kirchhoff argues from 3. 15 that this whole portion of the history must have been written after 449 B.C. he excludes the possibility of any later addition to the work when once published. Other writers on Herodotus have taken a dif-

ferent view: Stein, for instance, on 9. 83 gives a number of passages which he supposes to be additions of this kind. Such additions are attended with the difficulty that they presuppose a second edition of the work, and then the unfulfilled promise of the Ἀσσύριοι λόγοι becomes more difficult than ever. Still this difficulty is not insuperable; we may assume that to the last Herodotus intended to publish these λόγοι, possibly as a separate work, and was prevented. But if we admit that later additions were possible, it is obvious that it destroys Kirchhoff's position altogether. For in that case, though any passage may prove the time at which it was written, it proves nothing at all about the context in which it occurs. In this way 3. 15 would, by itself, prove nothing; it is merely an illustration of a statement which may have been made at some previous time. The question is not of much moment, since from other evidence it is probable that bk 2 was written after 449 B.C.

Kirchhoff thinks that there is evidence which makes it probable that Herodotus was at Athens about 446 B.C. (p. 10) and remained there till he went to Thurii in 442 B.C. (K.). During this period he composed the work down to 3. 119, and then it was interrupted by the journey to the new colony. The sort of evidence given in support of this supposed stay at Athens is as follows:

(*a*) In 1. 98 Herodotus compares Agbatana to Athens in extent.

(*b*) In 2. 7 he compares the distance from Heliopolis to the sea with the distance from Athens to Olympia.

(*c*) In 2. 177 he compares the Solonian and Egyptian law περὶ ἀργίας.

(*d*) In 2. 156 he speaks of Aeschylus.

That Herodotus may have resided at Athens during these years, that he may have written part of his work there, and that he may have been interrupted by his departure to Thurii, is what no one can deny. And the interruption may have come precisely at the end of c. 119 in bk 3. But it is not a little remarkable that he should have published exactly to this point—and no further—that Sophocles should have seized on the very latest novelty in literature to give a point to his own poem—that al-

most the first chapters written in Italy should have reference to the Italian Democedes. These are, to say the least, suspicious coincidences. On the other hand, beyond the doubtful date of the *Antigone,* the unfounded assumption that the story of Intaphernes could only be known from the published work of Herodotus—not from other sources or from private intercourse —and the theory that Herodotus could not have been in Italy in bks 1—3. 119, because Italy is never mentioned in that part of the work—there is no reason whatever why the books in question should not have been published far later. Looking back on the course of the argument up to this point can we say that Kirchhoff has made out even a probable case?

But Kirchhoff ventures even to show how long the interruption lasted. For in 3. 160 Herodotus speaks of the 'Zopyrus who deserted to Athens.' This event is mentioned by Ctesias (29, 43 Didot) and it is perhaps possible to place it sometime after 438 B.C. This would give us four years between c. 119 and c. 160 of bk 3. Again from 5. 77 we gather from the mention of the Propylaea at Athens, says Kirchhoff, that this and the remaining portion of the work come after 432 B.C. Hence we have 10 years for the part from 3. 119 to 5. 77, but possibly we ought to omit four years of the ten, and say that 3. 119—5. 77 was written in 438 B.C.—432 B.C.

Kirchhoff goes on to show that Herodotus returned to Athens in 431 B.C. In 6. 98 we have a notice of the earthquake which took place at Delos shortly before the battle of Marathon. This was the first and only earthquake known to Herodotus *καὶ πρῶτα καὶ ὕστατα μέχρι ἐμεῦ σεισθεῖσα.* Thucydides mentions an earthquake which took place in Delos in the spring of 431 B.C. (2. 8.) which is the first recorded earthquake in Delos known to him—*πρότερον οὔπω σεισθεῖσα ἀφ' οὗ Ἕλληνες μέμνηνται.* Kirchhoff (leaving out of sight the difficulty that Thucydides knows nothing of the earthquake mentioned by Herodotus) considers the fact that Herodotus knows nothing of the earthquake mentioned by Thucydides to be a proof that he could not have been in Greece proper at the time when it happened. But as in 6. 91 he mentions the expulsion of the Æginetans which took place in the autumn of 431 B.C. he must

have come to Greece before that date. Hence we get the summer of 431 as the date of the commencement of his second residence in Athens.—Reasoning such as this postulates that a fact occurring in Greece proper could not have been known to a person resident in Magna Graecia, and that a person resident in Greece could not have been ignorant of such a thing as an earthquake at Delos. What conclusion might we not draw by a similar style of argument from the silence of Thucydides respecting the earthquake recorded by Herodotus—we might say that Thucydides wrote before Herodotus published his work, and had no opportunity of altering his statement or forgot to do so—or that Herodotus' work, if published, could not possibly be known to Thucydides, etc.

That Herodotus was in Athens in the winter of 431—430 Kirchhoff considers certain. It was then that Pericles made the funeral oration over the dead, in which according to Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1. 7 (3. 10), he used the metaphor *τὴν νεότητα ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἀνῃρῆσθαι ὥσπερ τὸ ἔαρ ἐκ τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ εἰ ἐξαιρεθείη.* The same metaphor is put by Herodotus, 7. 162, in the mouth of Gelo. 'Go home', he says to the Athenian envoys, 'as quickly as you can; and announce to Hellas that her year has been robbed of its spring', *ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ τὸ ἔαρ αὐτῇ ἐξαραίρηται.* It will be seen that the coincidence is verbal. Pericles, says Kirchhoff, could not have borrowed from Herodotus because his use of the metaphor is so much more striking and just than the use put in the mouth of Gelo, which is clumsily explained in the text of Herodotus (Abicht thinks the explanation is due to an interpolator). Nor is it permissible to assume that both borrowed from a common source—why this is not permissible Kirchhoff does not say—or to assume that Herodotus had heard the words of Pericles from a third person (p. 28). Hence Herodotus heard the funeral oration with his own ears and was in Athens when it was spoken.—Is any comment needed on such an argument? Let us go a step further in the same direction and say: Thucydides does not mention this metaphor in his account of the oration of Pericles, therefore, he did not hear the speech! It is obvious that such a metaphor is common enough, though the application of it by

Pericles was so strikingly beautiful and apposite that it was remembered in that context.

Kirchhoff will also fix the length of this second residence, and the date of the composition of the last part of the work. In 9. 15 Decelea is mentioned, but nothing is said about the Lacedaemonian invasion of Attica. In 9. 73 Decelea is again mentioned and a reason given why the Deceleans were regarded with favour by the Spartans and were not pillaged in the invasion of Attica. Between these two chapters, then, the invasion must have taken place. Kirchhoff assumes that this was the invasion of 428 B.C. There is no absolute reason why it should not be, though from Thuc. 2. 23 the invasion of 431 B.C. is equally probable, but this would not agree with Kirchhoff's theory about the return of Herodotus to Athens in 431. Assuming that Kirchhoff is right we get 432—428 for the composition of bks 5. 77 to the end.

To sum up:

Throughout this discussion Kirchhoff assumes that Herodotus mentions a fact as soon as he is aware of it—he assumes that we can draw conclusions from the mention of an event as to the time *at which* the mention was made; whereas we can only, of course, draw conclusions about the time *after which* it is made. He assumes secondly that if Herodotus does not mention a fact he is not aware of it: but for these two assumptions, we might suppose the whole work to have been composed at a much later date than Kirchhoff is willing to allow. He assumes also that it was written in the order in which we now have it, and published in that order.

For all this there is no sufficient evidence: it is quite possible to begin with another set of suppositions. We may suppose for instance that Herodotus has united in his history two really different things: his experiences as a traveller, and the history of the Persian war. It is possible also to suppose that the episodes were written at a different time from the history, and that Herodotus never lived to finish the Assyrian episode. Lastly, before attempting to answer the question which Kirchhoff proposes we ought to be certain that Herodotus made no subsequent additions to his work when once written,

so that the latest event mentioned in any part of the work marks the point to which the work was carried as a whole at the date of that event.

With these considerations in our minds we can hardly, I think, refuse our assent to the verdict of Stein, Pref. p. xxii, note 2, *Kirchhoff's Versuch...gründet sich auf eine Reihe sehr unsicherer, zum Theil unrichtiger Annahmen, und scheint mir &c. insbesondere in Betreff der ersten Bücher missglückt.*

E. A.

NOTE ON THE USE OF THE WORD πόλις IN HERODOTUS.

THE following passage, to which so far as I know attention has not been drawn, throws light on the use of the word πόλις by Herodotus, when speaking of Elephantine, which is supposed to prove that he had never visited that place.

4. 114. Ἀριστέην γὰρ λέγουσι...ἐσελθόντα ἐς κναφήϊον ἐν Προκοννήσῳ ἀποθανέειν,...ἐσκεδασμένου δὲ ἤδη τοῦ λόγου ἀνὰ τὴν πόλιν ὡς τεθνεὼς εἴη ὁ Ἀριστέης, ἐς ἀμφισβασίας τοῖσι λέγουσι ἀπικέσθαι ἄνδρα Κυζικηνὸν ἥκοντα ἐξ Ἀρτάκης πόλιος....

No one could gather from this that Proconnesus was the name of an island as well as a city, and separated by the sea from Artace.

E. A.

AESCHYLI CHOEPHORI.

ll. 372—379.

ταῦτα μὲν, ὦ παῖ, κρείσσονα χρυσοῦ
μεγάλης δὲ τύχης καὶ Ὑπερβορέου
μείζονα φωνεῖς· οὐ δύνασαι γὰρ
. . . . . .
ἀλλὰ διπλῆς γὰρ τῆσδε μαράγνης
δοῦπος ἱκνεῖται· †τῶν μὲν ἀρωγοὶ
κατὰ γῆς ἤδη, τῶν δὲ κρατούντων
χέρες οὐχ ὅσιαι. †στυγερῶν τούτων
παισὶ δὲ μᾶλλον γεγένηται.

In commenting on the Choephori I despaired of this passage too much to touch it, further than to vindicate *οὐ δύνασαι γὰρ* (*for you are impotent*) as the natural and only rightful correction of *ὀδυνᾶσαι γάρ*. Διπλῆς absolutely needs some explanation which is not in the text. Τῶν *μὲν* has no sense. Ἱκνεῖται without an accusative must mean "reaches *us*": an unlikely phrase. Blomfield clearly accounted it certain that after *οὐχ ὅσιαι* should be a full stop. Μᾶλλον could only refer to *ὅσιον* or *στυγερὸν*, yet neither here gives sense. Γεγένηται (*has become*) must have a predicate. Only very violent change in other words could rescue either *μᾶλλον* or *γεγένηται* from absurdity.

Consider the argument. The Chorus first *reproves* Electra: "Thy wish is extravagant, when thou art quite impotent." Next, *ἀλλὰ γὰρ* seeks to *comfort* her: for the mention of "impure hands" can only mean that Nemesis will overtake the

wicked rulers. Hence I infer that δοῦπος ἱκνεῖται is a topic of comfort. She would not have used the particle ἀλλὰ, if the mention of the whip here brought *solely* a reminiscence of misery. This suggests my first correction, σφῶν μὲν ἀρωγὸν. Then ἤδη, joined with ἱκνεῖται, means *at length.* "The sound "of this double scourge *at length* reaches *your champion* in the "realms of Pluto." But the word τῆσδε demonstrates that words are lost which explained the *double* scourge. Elsewhere the narrative itself explains it: for Orestes has bitterly complained of *Penury* and Electra of *Disgrace.* After οὐ δύνασαι γὰρ it was natural to say: "*thou canst not* even repel Penury and "Disgrace, while framing wishes of extravagant prosperity." Conjecturally I fill up:

οὐ δύνασαι γὰρ
[σπάνιν ἀργαλέαν χὔβριν ἀπείργειν].

With this, all is clear, down to οὐχ ὅσιαι.

Whether, with the Vulgate, we join τούτων with τῶν κρατούντων or with Blomfield imagine an independent clause, στυγερὼ τούτω, no meaning arises for the last line. Γεγένηται needs a *subject* as well as a *predicate,* and here has neither! No comparison can be imagined for μᾶλλον, while τούτων is retained. I have tried:

στυγερὸν ταύτῃ, or τῇδ' οὖν,

for στυγερὸν μὲν ἐμοὶ, but even if γεγένηται for γέγονε be defensible, we need μείζω or χείρω, not μᾶλλον, and it is hardly credible that if the poet had written μείζω or χείρω, it would have been changed to μᾶλλον. I find the compass of space too short to endure a superfluous τούτων, which is a common word very likely to supersede one rarer, when a passage is unintelligible to a copyist. Assuming τούτων also to be corrupt, I conjecture

στυγερῶν τέρμων
παισὶ δ' ἁμιλλῶν πεπόνηται.

"A limit of hateful contests has been hardly earned." Here δὲ as fourth word in a clause is, no doubt, very unusual; nothing

is easier than to expel it by *παισὶν*. But *if* the poet so wrote δὲ, the fact would easily entrain error of punctuation,

χέρες οὐχ ὅσιαι στυγερῶν τέρμων·

out of which instantly might follow a corruption of *τέρμων* into *τούτων*, leaving the last line as an enigma sure of corruption in turn.

F. W. NEWMAN.

P.S. If *ταύταις* may mean the Chorus, an effort to retain *μᾶλλον* may be made by:

Στυγερὸν ταύταις, or *ταῖσδ' οὖν,*
παισὶ δὲ μᾶλλον πεπόνηται.

Yet this is somewhat weak. F. W. N.

ON THE PERSIAN WORD گون ژد OR گون ژده

According to the *Burhân i Ḳâṭi'*, usually reckoned one of our best authorities on Persian lexicography, the word گون ژده *gûn-jada* signifies زنجره *zanjara*, "a cricket."

In the Dean of Canterbury's *Thesaurus Syriacus*, col. 2753 (in the forthcoming fasc. ـے, ـھ), I read as follows:

"ܣܰܪܟܘܩܘܠܐ *σαρκοκόλλα, sarcocolla*, gummi Persicum sic dictum propterea quod *vulnera sanat*, اذمـ ـ. ܣܰܪܟܘܩܘܠܐ ـ. ܙܘܢ ـ انزروت. ـ ـ ـ

According to Vullers, گَوَن *gawan* is "the name of a thorny shrub," نامِ بوتهٔ ایست خاردار; and ژد *jad* is "gum" (صَمغ). Hence گون ژد (or گون ژدهٔ) is "the gum of the *gawan* shrub." The word is to be pronounced *gawan* (*gaun* or *gôn*) *jad* (*jada*), and is a synonym of عنزروت or *sarcocolla* (Greenhill's *Rhazes on the Small-pox and Measles*, p. 192) and of the Persian زنجرو *zanjurû* or *zunjurû*.

Consequently, as conjectured by the Dean of Canterbury, we must read in the *Burhân i Ḳâṭi'* زنجرو instead of زنجرهٔ in the art. گون ژدهٔ, and substitute "sarcocolla" for "cricket" in Vullers' and Johnson's Persian dictionaries as the translation of گون ژدهٔ.

WILLIAM WRIGHT.

THE BATTLE AT THE COLLINE GATE, B.C. 82.

THE operations immediately before this crowning victory of Sulla's are not quite clear, and I venture to think that even Mommsen has been mistaken in his description of them. The importance of the crisis itself can hardly be over-estimated if it be fully considered.

Velleius Paterculus (II. 27) speaking of this battle, in which Sulla and Crassus destroyed the Marian and Italian armies, says, *Respublica non magis periculum adiit Hannibalis intra tertium miliarium castra conspicata quam eo die.* The Samnites had vowed if victorious to utterly destroy the city of Rome; and it is quite possible that Velleius is right in thinking that the Republic was in no less danger than the city. Circumstances had made Sulla the leader not only of the Senatorial but of the Roman party; it was indeed in this strength that he conquered, drawing round him all who feared the tendency to disruption displayed by the Marian faction. The latter had become identified with the Italians who had waged the Social War, and had thrown off almost entirely the superstitious veneration which fortunately made the victors in all the civil wars cling to Rome as the centre of an united Empire. The spirit of disintegration had gone far among the Marians. L. Junius Brutus, a Praetor, Carrinas and Marcius Censorinus of a consular family, who were with the Samnites at the Colline Gate, seem to have raised no objection to the proposed destruction of the city. Cinna had lately, as consul in the Marian interest, appealed to the Samnites of Nola to help him against Rome. Sertorius, the ablest of the Marian leaders, shortly afterwards allied himself with Mithradates, and set up some-

thing very like an independent provincial power in Spain. But the loose Italian confederation, desired by the Samnites, would never have conquered Mithradates nor the Gauls. Sulla at the Colline Gate was fighting for the existence of the united Roman Empire, and all that this implied.

He had defeated the younger Marius at Sacriportus and driven him into Praeneste. Leaving a force to blockade the town he had gone northwards to help his lieutenants against Carbo in Etruria, but was recalled thence to meet a much more formidable enemy, who was marching to raise the siege of Praeneste. The Samnites and Lucanians, who had taken up arms in the Social War, were still unconquered, and under Pontius Telesinus the Samnite and Lamponius the Lucanian had mustered 40,000 men (Velleius Paterculus II. 27), and were threatening Lucretius Ofella whom Sulla had left entrenched before Praeneste. Pontius, according to Plutarch, was *πολεμιστὴς ἀνὴρ καὶ μεγάλων ἀγώνων ἔμπειρος*, a description fully borne out by his action as here recorded. Sulla was able to interpose himself between the besieging and relieving armies, in a strong position covering some narrow pass which could not apparently be turned or forced. Here he held the Italians at bay, but could do no more. Lucius Junius Brutus, Marcius Censorinus and Carrinas, successively detached from the army of Carbo, were able to join Pontius before the pass: *ἐπὶ τὰ στενὰ ἐχώρουν*, as Appian says. This pass has generally been supposed to have been at Sacriportus, between Praeneste and Signia, or at Valmontone, or somewhere at all events on the roads between Praeneste and Campania[1]. But the valley of the Sacco and the country south of Praeneste, though broken by ravines, can hardly be said to offer any positions worthy of the name of defiles, such as an army of desperate men would hesitate to attack or fail to turn, when held by numbers about equal to their own. Neither if the pass were situated in this direction, would it have been easy to effect the junction before it of the Marian and Italian armies. The former coming from Etruria with inferior forces, would have had to pass by Sulla's army, or have taken a long circuitous expedition through central Italy to

[1] Mommsen, Bk IV., ch. 9.

reach the front of a strong position which they might have more easily attacked in the rear. If however they marched along the Apennines by Reate, they could easily have joined the Italians, if the latter were lying on the road from Samnium by Atina, Sora and Treba. Sulla could not have prevented their union on this line without making an advance into the mountains which would have left Lucretius unsupported. The road from the modern Subiaco to Palestrina by Affile, shews positions of defence which might answer to the pass or defiles spoken of. It would need a close examination of the country, aided by military advice, to find the most likely spot, but the mountains offer defensible positions which are not to be found upon the direct roads from Campania to Praeneste. Such a one is close behind the modern Palestrina, towards Poli. The Samnites had picked up troops from Nola on their advance, but had probably clung to the mountains for safety, and also for the purpose of opening communications with Etruria, which they could not have done through Latium and the neighbourhood of Rome. The subsequent account by Plutarch bears out the idea that the enemy were operating on this side, from the east or north, towards Praeneste. It was a line along which they could have advanced without molestation, with their right flank and rear supported by the districts lately in arms with them against the Romans. Moreover, we are told, when Pontius Telesinus saw that he could not dislodge Sulla in front, he was also threatened himself by Pompeius from the rear; *ἐπεὶ δὲ ἤσθετο Σύλλαν μὲν κατὰ στόμα, Πομπηίον δὲ κατ' οὐρὰν βοηδρομοῦντας ἐπ' αὐτὸν, εἰργόμενος τοῦ πρόσω καὶ ὀπίσω κ.τ.λ.* Plut. Sulla, XXIX. Had the Italians been anywhere south of Praeneste this could not have been the case. Pompeius had just dispersed the remains of Carbo's forces, near Clusium. If he were following the line of march taken before him by L. Junius Brutus and Carrinas, through the Sabine mountains, he would be on the way to cut off the retreat of an army operating from Sublaqueum upon Praeneste, but not on the rear of an army south of Valmontone.

The only other supposition that would give any meaning to this fear of the Italian leader, is that he and all his allies were

already between Sulla and Rome. It is not likely that Sulla would have rested on the defensive with his enemies so placed, indeed he would probably have been forced to fight for want of supplies; neither is it credible that in such a case Rome could have been nearly taken by surprise, *ἀφύλακτος*. An enemy within twenty miles, separated by no army from an ill-fortified city, may be expected to attack it.

Thirdly, if Pontius merely had to turn his back upon Sulla and march straight to Rome, the essence of his exaltation of spirit—*ταῖς ἐλπίσιν ἐπηρμένος ὡς τοσούτους ἡγεμόνας καὶ τηλικούτους κατεστρατηγηκώς*—would be destroyed. There would in that case have been no outmanoeuvring in the matter. As it was he justly prided himself on having passed round the army of Sulla and stolen a march on him on the road to Rome. It was a movement similar to that by which Hannibal had tried to raise the siege of Capua, and undertaken with more hope of success, for Rome was now far more open to a *coup-de-main* than in the Second Punic War; it was not now a defensible fortress. Sulla would be obliged to risk a battle at all events to save the city, the blockade of Praeneste might be relaxed, and at the worst the Italian army if not destroyed might escape into the Sabine mountains before the arrival of Pompeius. The resolve was worthy of the skilful leader of a brave people engaged in a life and death struggle, and well executed it all but attained success.

We are met with distinctly contradictory statements as to the line of the Italian march. Plutarch, who knew of and apparently used Sulla's memoirs[1], says that Pontius marched off by night and encamped ten stadia from the Colline Gate. The battle certainly took place here; this was the most accessible side of Rome, where the general level of the Campagna differs little from that of the Quirinal Hill, and where the Pincian Hill overlooks the city from outside the Servian walls. Hannibal in B.C. 211, and Alaric in A.D. 409, encamped here, and it was from this side that the Goths entered the city. Appian tells us (I. 92) that the Italians encamped a hundred stadia from the city, *ἀμφὶ τὴν Ἀλβανῶν γῆν*. These two accounts are incom-

[1] Plutarch, Sulla 37.

patible with each other; for we cannot suppose that the Italians first encamped in the Alban territory, and then after another short march of ten miles encamped again near the Colline Gate, and deferred their attack to the next day. It was not the way to surprise the city, and Sulla would certainly have been able to arrive upon the scene nearly as soon as Pontius, had the latter been so leisurely in his movements. Neither authority is the very best in kind, but for a choice between them Plutarch is the better, especially as we know something of his authorities. Appian is notoriously careless about names and geography. The writer who thinks that Saguntum is north of the Ebro[1] may have written Alba for Antemnae or for some other name. About sixteen Roman miles from Rome, on the *Via Tiburtina*, are the *Aquae Albulae*, *τὰ Ἄλβουλα ὕδατα* (*Strabo* v. iii. p. 238), the modern Solfatara, a warm sulphurous pool. The Samnites can scarcely have marched the whole distance from the mountains north of Praeneste to Rome without stopping, and they may have halted here, by the warm baths, for rest and refreshment before pursuing their way. Appian, a mere compiler, may have blundered over the name and confused it with Alba. Following Plutarch, I should suppose that the Italians moved off by night to their right, descended into the valley of the Anio—near Tibur perhaps, and marched night and day by the *Via Tiburtina*, in hopes of surprising the city. They arrived late on the evening of the day following the night on which they started, and, finding some sort of hurried defence being organized, put off the assault or battle till after a night's rest. Their first movement from before Sulla would not have appeared to be in the direction of Rome, and it would have been far easier to conceal their objective point among the hills than in the comparatively open country south of Praeneste. Probably no intelligence of their intention reached Sulla until the daylight revealed them in full march down the Anio; for, from the time of his arrival, he cannot have set out for Rome till at the earliest the night following their departure. From Praeneste to Rome is twenty-four miles, and if he were north or east of Praeneste he would have rather further to go. The Sam-

[1] *Ἰβηρική* c. 7 and 10.

nite and Lucanian leaders were exulting in destroying the "lair of "the wild beasts of Italy"; to which the leaders and soldiers of the Marian party with them apparently offered no objection, so far had party animosity gone in the destruction of patriotism. The only hope for the city lay in delaying the attack till the arrival of Sulla from before Praeneste, and with that object the more vigorous of the Senatorial party mustered themselves and friends as cavalry, and came out to skirmish with the Italians. They were of course overpowered with loss, but time was gained, and before the assault could be delivered seven hundred cavalry under Balbus appeared along the *Via Praenestina*, the vanguard of Sulla's army, and after a momentary halt to dismount and wipe the reeking flanks of their horses, they took up the cavalry action. On a smaller scale the combat must have been not unlike the famous sacrifice of the German cavalry at Mars-le-tour, sent to delay the march of Bazaine till such time as a force should arrive sufficient to frustrate it entirely. The effort was successful, and the Italians found themselves obliged to witness the advent of Sulla, who had left Lucretius Ofella before Praeneste and marched upon Rome on hearing how he had been outwitted by the enemy. Sulla either led his troops through the city, or perhaps more probably he caused the men in his column of march on the *Via Praenestina* to face to the right so as to form them up in line of battle, and so advanced across the *Via Tiburtina* with his left resting on the Agger of Servius, till it reached the Colline Gate at the angle of the city, and found room to deploy further to the left in front of the walls by the temple of Venus Erycina. In spite of advice to rest his men, Sulla determined after distributing rations to fight at once. Probably the choice was not really his. He had either to await the Italians, with tired men resting on the defensive, discouraged by the feeling that they had been outgeneralled, and with a doubtful spirit among some at least of the city mob behind him,—for there must have been Marians, Italians and slaves in Rome quite ready to help in sack and pillage,—or else he might take the initiative with troops who had never known defeat under his orders.

It was late in the afternoon when the attack began. The

accounts of Plutarch, Appian and Velleius are not absolutely identical; considering the nature of the battle, fought furiously in the dark, it is not likely that they would be; but the general idea is the same. The left wing where Sulla commanded was driven back upon the walls, and fugitives reached Lucretius before Praeneste with reports of a great disaster. But in the midst of a great slaughter of soldiers and citizens before the gates, which were closed behind them, Sulla rallied his men, and the fighting continued far into the night. *νυκτὸς ὅλης ἀγωνισαμένοι πολὺ πλῆθος ἔκτειναν*, according to Appian. Velleius' account is "*post primam demum horam noctis et Romana acies respiravit et hostium cessit.*" This refers perhaps to the success of Crassus on Sulla's right wing, who completely defeated the enemy and drove them back to Antemnae in the angle between the Tiber and the Anio. The right of the Italians, informed of the overthrow of their left, had ceased their attacks upon Sulla during the night; and there seems no reason to reject what is probably Sulla's own account, preserved by Plutarch, that it was a message coming from Crassus desiring commissariat animals or carts to be sent up to him which first informed the general of the complete victory of his right wing. In the morning he advanced without resistance upon Antemnae, to find his bravest opponents, Pontius among them, slain, and the combined Italian and Marian forces ready to make peace with the conqueror by turning their arms against each other. The victory was followed by the slaughter of the prisoners and of the commanders who had escaped from the field. Fifty thousand men are said to have fallen in the battle. A not impossible number considering the rancour of the opponents, and the desperate nature of ancient hand to hand fighting. Had fortune turned the other way, and had the army of Sulla and Crassus been cut to pieces before the walls of Rome, the next day must have seen the city in the possession of the Samnites and Lucanians, determined not to leave one stone upon another. The younger Marius would have been liberated from Praeneste, and it is doubtful if Pompeius could have played the part of a second Camillus and restored the city. There was a great tendency on the part of soldiers in the civil

wars to go over to the winning side. The contest at all events might have been prolonged indefinitely. Sertorius was in Spain, Carbo had fled to Africa, Mithradates was still powerful in the East. We know that afterwards Sertorius was not above allying himself with the king of Pontus against the Roman senate, and if the Roman state had not entirely fallen to pieces about the ruins of the city, a much prolonged civil war might very probably have resulted in at least the sharing of the west and east between Rome and Mithradates.

HENRY ELLIOT MALDEN.

PLATONICA.

I. The Active and Middle of τίθημι.

It is well known that Plato uses the active and middle of τίθημι almost as regular terms for the holding or expression of propositions assumed or maintained. But so far as I know it has not yet been attempted to establish a distinction between them. Ast in his *Lexicon Platonicum* (but for whose valuable collection this paper could never have been written[1]) gives amongst the meanings in the active '*statuo, constituo, instituo: pono* etiam est e.g. *sumo, accipio, existimo*' and for the middle '*statuo: censeo,* uel *existimo.*' The ambiguity of the Latin translations certainly forbids our assuming that Ast perceived no difference between the two voices. But at the same time it must be admitted that if he did, he has expressed it so obscurely that it might well have been ignored altogether. It is obvious that the distinction of the Platonic uses as such cannot be expected from the general lexicons of the Greek language, and though in some of these, e.g. in Rost and Palm, the difference between the voices in Greek usage as a whole is well stated and correctly exemplified, in others again, as in the Dindorf Stephanus and in Liddell and Scott, it seems to be by no means clearly apprehended.

I will now briefly state the difference between the two voices of τίθημι, as it appears from a consideration and comparison of the under-cited passages. τιθέναι is to lay down anything in the way of assertion, definition or mere supposition for the pur-

[1] Generally speaking I have been content to use his materials as I have not the leisure to supplement them by reading through the whole of Plato. But I have verified as well as re-classified his quotations.

pose of conducting an argument. The active does not imply that what is so laid down is the view or hypothesis of any one. On the contrary, in strict consonance with the tenour of Plato's dialectical procedure, it discountenances this implication. It is to *state* something, *not* to hold it; to *assume*, *not* to suppose it. The middle, on the other hand, does contain a reference to the views and thoughts of its subject. The proposition is laid down with his concurrence; it is regarded as his view, and one for which he is responsible.

This may be briefly exemplified. In *Rep.* 539 E we have ἕξ, ἔφη, ἢ τέτταρα λέγεις; ἀμέλει, εἶπον, πέντε θές; which well shows the indifference of the active: 'Do you say four or six years?' 'Oh, put it at five,' 'say five.' *Phil.* 51 E τοῦτ' ἐκείνοις τίθημ' ἀντίστροφον ἅπαν 'I lay down as ἀντίστροφον to the former.' Contrast these passages with *Phil.* 14 B οὐ δήπου πρός γε αὐτὸ τοῦτο φιλονεικοῦμεν ὅπως ἃ 'γὼ τίθεμαι ταῦτ' ἔσται τὰ νικῶντα ἢ ταῦθ' ἃ σύ, 'We are not concerned to secure a victory for our own theories'. Again, in the instructive passage *Phaedo* 100 A, where the theory which is held by the speaker is contrasted with the positions or assumptions taken up in its development, we find τίθημι side by side with ὑποθέμενος: ἀλλ' οὖν δὴ ταύτῃ γε ὥρμησα καὶ ὑποθέμενος ἑκάστοτε λόγον ὃν ἂν κρίνω ἐρρωμενέστατον εἶναι ἃ μὲν ἄν μοι δοκῇ τούτῳ ξυμφωνεῖν τίθημι ὡς ἀληθῆ ὄντα ἃ δ' ἂν μή, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ. In my citation of passages I shall begin with the active, and shall arrange them according to their construction.

(*a*) τιθέναι with *single* object in *accusative* 'to lay down, assume.' *Phaedo* 79 A θῶμεν δύο εἴδη τῶν ὄντων; θῶμεν. *Soph.* 248 C ἱκανὸν ἔθεμεν ὅρον που τῶν ὄντων ὅταν κ.τ.λ. In sense of 'prescribing' *Rep.* 527 C δεύτερον δὴ τοῦτο τιθῶμεν μάθημα τοῖς νέοις; τιθῶμεν, ἔφη. τὶ δαί; τρίτον θῶμεν ἀστρονομίαν; With the addition of οὕτως *Laws* 801 A τιθῶ τοῦτο οὕτω; Compare *Phaedr.* 277 C. More common is a use which naturally developed out of this—that of

(*b*) τιθέναι with an object in accusative and a *predicate* in agreement with it. The supposition is sometimes purely imaginary as in *Protag.* 343 E εἰ θείημεν αὐτὸν Πίττακον

λέγοντα καὶ Σιμωνίδην ἀποκρινόμενον, *Rep.* 572 D, E θὲς...τίθημι. τίθει κ.τ.λ. Other examples in *Theaet.* 165 B εἰ τὸ ὁρᾶν γε ἐπίστασθαι θήσεις, 198 C, *Soph.* 244 D, 246 E, *Rep.* 361 B, 491 E, 539 E (already quoted), 540 A, 605 A, *Philebus* 43 D, *Laws* 689 C, 733 E, 896 D.

(*c*) With an accus. and inf. *Rep.* 532 D ταῦτα θέντες ἔχειν ὡς νῦν λέγεται.

(*d*) τιθέναι with an object in the *accusative* and a predicatival genitive expressing the class etc. amongst which something is or is to be placed: 'to regard as forming part of,' 'to assign to,' 'to class as.' *Soph.* 238 A ἀριθμὸν δὴ τὸν ξύμπαντα τῶν ὄντων τίθεμεν, *Rep.* 424 C καὶ ἐμὲ θὲς τῶν πεπεισμένων. In *Theaet.* 184 E τοῦ σώματος ἕκαστα τίθης = you 'assign to the body.' Closely allied are the uses

(*e*) of τιθέναι with an object in the accusative, and εἰς with the accusative: *Politicus* 281 C ἐὰν αὐτὴν εἰς τὴν καλλίστην καὶ μεγίστην πασῶν τιθῶμεν (sc. ἐπιμέλειαν or τέχνην), 306 C, *Rep.* 360 E, 433 E, 437 B, C, 587 D ἐὰν εἰς ταὐτὸν ἀριστοκρατικὸν καὶ βασιλικὸν τιθῶμεν, *Phileb.* 25 A, 25 C, 54 D.

(*f*) Of τιθέναι with an object in the accusative and ἐν with the dative: *Soph.* 219 D (cf. *Rep.* 475 D), 241 B αὐτὸν ἐν τῇ τῶν ψευδουργῶν καὶ γοήτων τέχνῃ τιθέντες, 245 D, *Rep.* 348 E εἰ ἐν ἀρετῆς καὶ σοφίας μέρει τίθης τὴν ἀδικίαν.

(*g*) τιθέναι with an object in the accusative and a predicate introduced by ὡς: *Rep.* 543 C (E), λέγων ὡς ἀγαθὴν τὴν τοιαύτην τιθείης πόλιν, *Laws* 767 A, B θέντες δὴ καὶ τοὺς δικαστὰς ὡς ἄρχοντας λέγωμεν, 860 C ὡς λέγοντά με τίθετε (imper.), *Rep.* 507 C καὶ οὕτω περὶ πάντων ἃ τότε ὡς πολλὰ ἐτίθεμεν πάλιν αὖ κατ' ἰδέαν μίαν ἑκάστου ὡς μιᾶς οὔσης τιθέντες ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον προσαγορεύομεν, *Rep.* 458 A θέντες ὡς ὑπάρχον εἶναι (? ἤδη) ὃ βούλονται.

We now come to the uses of the middle, which I will arrange according to the heads of constructions which we have observed in the active.

(*a*) The sense of τίθεσθαι, 'to hold' or 'express a view,' is clear in *Phaedo* 91 A κινδυνεύω ἔγωγε ἐν τῷ παρόντι περὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου οὐ φιλοσόφως ἔχειν ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ πάνυ ἀπαίδευτοι φιλονείκως. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ὅταν περί του ἀμφισβητήσωσιν

ὅπῃ μὲν ἔχει περὶ ὧν ἂν ὁ λόγος ᾖ οὐ φροντίζουσιν, ὅπως δὲ ἃ αὐτοὶ ἔθεντο, τοῦτο προθυμοῦνται. *Phil.* 14 B has been already quoted. *Phil.* 14 C ῥᾴδιον ἀμφισβητῆσαι τῷ τούτων ὁποτερονοῦν τιθεμένῳ, *Phil.* 58 B ἐναντία σοι τίθεσθαι, *Rep.* 340 B τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτο ἐτίθετο. In sense of 'putting before oneself.' *Phil.* 16 D ἀεὶ μίαν ἰδέαν περὶ παντὸς ἑκάστοτε θεμένους ζητεῖν, *Rep.* 454 C ὅτε οὐ πάντως τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ τὴν ἑτέραν φύσιν ἐτιθέμεθα.

(*b*) *Theaet.* 158 A τίς λείπεται λόγος τῷ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐπιστήμην τιθεμένῳ; 179 C Θεαίτητος ὅδε οὐκ ἀπὸ σκοποῦ εἴρηκεν αἴσθησιν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ταὐτὸν θέμενος, *Laws* 860 D τῷ τὴν ἀδικίαν ἀκούσιον τιθεμένῳ. In *Theaet.* 208 C ὧν ἕν γέ τι ἔφαμεν λόγον θήσεσθαι τὸν ἐπιστήμην ὁριζόμενον δόξαν εἶναι ὀρθὴν μετὰ λόγου, and *Phil.* 14 D ἆρ' οὖν λέγεις ὅταν τις ἐμὲ φῇ, ἕνα γεγονότα φύσει, πολλοὺς εἶναι πάλιν, τοὺς ἐμὲ καὶ ἐναντίους ἀλλήλοις μέγαν καὶ σμικρὸν τιθέμενος, καὶ βαρὺν καὶ κοῦφον τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ἄλλα μύρια; the active might have been used.

Although this distinction between active and middle of 'laying down as a position' and 'expressing as a view' will be found to be borne out by the passages cited below, yet it will be as well to point out, in order to prevent a possible misconception, that there are a certain number of passages in which either the active or the middle could have been used so far as the general sense is concerned, while in a few places the middle replaces the active, a particular position being for the nonce attributed to a particular speaker.

With predicate to be supplied: *Laws* 689 A (active in C).

(*c*) With accus. and infin., *Phaed.* 93 C τῶν τιθεμένων ψυχὴν ἁρμονίαν εἶναι, *Phileb.* 14 B θέμενον ἡδονὴν εἶναι τἀγαθόν, *Laws* 899 C διδάσκειν ἡμᾶς ὡς οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγομεν τιθέμενοι ψυχὴν γένεσιν ἁπάντων εἶναι πρώτην, *Rep.* 430 B τὴν δὴ τοιαύτην δύναμιν καὶ σωτηρίαν διὰ παντὸς δόξης ὀρθῆς τε καὶ νομίμου δεινῶν πέρι καὶ μὴ ἀνδρείαν ἔγωγε καλῶ καὶ τίθεμαι εἰ μή τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις, *Phileb.* 66 D Φίληβος τἀγαθὸν ἐτίθετο ἡμῖν ἡδονὴν εἶναι, *Parm.* 133 C ὅστις αὐτήν τινα καθ' αὑτὴν αὐτοῦ ἑκάστου οὐσίαν τίθεται εἶναι.

(*d*) *Phil.* 60 D νῦν ὁστισοῦν ἐπαναλαβὼν ὀρθότερον εἰπάτω,

μνήμην καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἀληθῆ δόξαν τῆς αὐτῆς ἰδέας τιθέμενος.

(*e*) Exx.?

(*f*) *Phileb.* 31 C *ἐν ᾧ* (sc. *γένει*) *καὶ ὑγίειαν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἁρμονίαν, ἐτίθεσο.*

(*g*) *Theaet.* 189 D *ἕτερόν τι ὡς ἕτερον καὶ μὴ ἐκεῖνο τῇ διανοίᾳ τίθεσθαι, Phileb.* 55 A *ἐάν τις τὴν ἡδονὴν ὡς ἀγαθὸν ἡμῖν τιθῆται.*

(*h*) *τίθεμαι* without an object but with *οὕτως*, &c.: *Crat.* 433 B *οὕτω τίθεμαι, Timaeus* 49 D *ἀσφαλέστατον μακρῷ περὶ τούτων τιθεμένους ὧδε λέγειν, Rep.* 352 D *ὡς σὺ τὸ πρῶτον ἐτίθεσο.*

An examination of the above passages is at once sufficient to establish the reality of the difference indicated. But a few of them invite special remark. Of these the most interesting are those where the active and middle occur in close juxtaposition. In *Sophist* 244 C Ξ. *δῆλον, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὅτι τῷ ταύτην τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθεμένῳ πρὸς τὸ νῦν ἐρωτηθὲν καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο δὲ ὁτιοῦν οὐ πάντων ῥᾷστον ἀποκρίνασθαι.* Θ. *πῶς;* Ξ. *τό τε δύο ὀνόματα ὁμολογεῖν εἶναι μηδὲν* θέμενον *πλὴν ἓν καταγέλαστόν που;* Θ. *πῶς δ' οὔ;* Ξ. *καὶ τὸ παράπαν γε ἀποδέχεσθαί του λέγοντος ὡς ἔστιν ὄνομά τι λόγον οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι;* Θ. *πῇ;* Ξ. τιθείς *τε τοὔνομα τοῦ πράγματος ἕτερον δύο λέγει που τίνε;* Θ. *ναί.* Ξ. *καὶ μὴν ἂν ταὐτόν γε αὐτῷ* τιθῇ *ἢ μηδενὸς ὄνομα ἀναγκασθήσεται λέγειν ἢ κ.τ.λ.* Here the distinction is as clear as day. The stranger first cites the theory that the One only exists and *θέμενον*, 'holding the view,' is on exactly the same platform as *ταύτην τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθεμένῳ.* (Cf. *Phaed.* 100 A quoted above.) He then refutes it by showing that it involves the *assumption* of one of two propositions (*τιθείς...τιθῇ*), both untenable. These two propositions cannot of course both be *held* by the maintainers of the theory, and it is not known which of them they would hold. Thus the active is not only correct but inevitable. In *Phileb.* 32 A, B we have *καὶ ἑνὶ λόγῳ σκόπε εἴ σοι μέτριος ὁ λόγος ὃς ἂν φῇ κ.τ.λ.* ΠΡ. *ἔστω, δοκεῖ γάρ μοι τύπον γέ τινα ἔχειν.* Σ. *τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἓν εἶδος* τιθώμεθα *λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς ἐν τούτοις τοῖς πάθεσιν ἑκατέροις;* ΠΡ. *κείσθω.* Σ. τίθει *τοίνυν αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς κατὰ τὸ τούτων τῶν παθημάτων*

προσδόκημα τὸ μὲν πρὸ τῶν ἡδέων ἐλπιζόμενον ἡδὺ καὶ θαρραλέον κ.τ.λ. Here Plato uses the middle τιθώμεθα for τιθῶμεν which he generally prefers (*Soph.* 219 D, *Pol.* 281 C, *Rep.* 360 E, &c.), because he is referring to a theory which he proposes that he and Protarchus should agree to adopt as their own. But when he turns to Protarchus and desires him to give external effect to their agreement, the command 'hold (or 'express') the following view' is ineffective and inappropriate, and the active is necessarily substituted[1]. *Rep.* 430 B καλῶ καὶ τίθεμαι shows the latent antithesis of the two voices though literary reasons do not permit of the same verb being employed.

It only remains to point out that the use of the different persons and tenses reflects this distinction. It may be here remarked that this is a point about which lexicographers and others are generally far too careless. If a meaning is established for one part of a verb, it is generally assumed to hold good for all the parts in use[2]. And yet no really scientific lexicography is possible until the authorities for the use of every part of a word in every sense have been collected and its senses have been properly distributed and delimitated through its forms. The classification of the forms for this purpose is by no means that of accidence merely. Forms like those of the participles and the infinitive have very different values in different contexts; and these values can only be ascertained by the inspection of the particular context in which they occur and their conversion into the corresponding so-called finite verbs.

It has already been hinted that the hortative of the middle is rarely appropriate. Hence we have τίθει...τίθετε...θές; but no τίθεσο. τιθῶμεν, θῶμεν but not τιθώμεθα. *Soph.* 237 B τὸ μὲν ἐμὸν ὅπῃ βούλει τίθεσο='I place myself at your disposal' does not come under this meaning of τίθημι: *Phil.* 32 B has already been dealt with. It would not be a usual expression to refer to a person as one who has laid down

[1] It may be noted that the *Philebus* shows a tendency to use the middle, even in cases when the active is quite admissible.

[2] Thus, for example (see below), Professor Campbell seems tacitly to assume that an example for a use of συμβάλλω in the plural is good to establish the same use for the singular.

a proposition for the purpose of conducting the argument. It is more natural to attribute to him, even with a certain inaccuracy, the views that were then proposed. Hence we find the middle rather than the active in the participle, *ὁ τιθέμενος*, *οἱ τιθέμενοι*, but not *ὁ τιθείς* or *οἱ τιθέντες*, in *Phil.* 14 C as well as in *Phaedo* 93 C, *Laws* 860 D. The writer or speaker is not to be debarred his natural liberty of expression. Side by side with *ἐτίθεμεν Rep.* 507 B *ἃ τότε ὡς πολλὰ ἐτίθεμεν* we have *ἐτιθέμεθα* 454 C. It is part of the natural liveliness of conversation to attribute a view to your interlocutor; cf. *Rep.* 352 D, *Phil.* 31 C *ἐτίθεσο* where Protarchus marks the view as that of Socrates, although himself a party to its acceptance.

It formed no part of my purpose to examine the general employment of the two voices of *τίθημι* either in Plato or, still less, in the other Greek classics. There are, however, two other pairs of phrases which may be referred to in conclusion. The first, *νόμον τιθέναι, τίθεσθαι*, has been discussed by Messrs Barton and Chavasse in their edition of Thucydides book IV. p. 130; and I am glad to find that both in particular conclusions and in the general tenour of the argument their views coincide with my own. The second, *ὄνομα τιθέναι, τίθεσθαι*, may be shortly treated here. The *middle* is in this case far more frequent than the active. Thus we have it in *Cratylus* 384 D, 385 D, 389 A (bis), 389 D *πάντα τὰ ὀνόματα ποιεῖν τε καὶ τίθεσθαι*, 390 D, 391 B, 393 A, 393 E, 394 E, 397 B, 400 C, 401 A, 401 B, 401 D, 402 B (bis), 406 B (bis), 411 B, 411 E, 416 B, 416 C, 417 B, 418 A, 426 D, 436 B (ter), 436 C (quater), 437 C, 437 E (ter), 438 A (quinquies), 438 B, 438 C *μείζω τινὰ δύναμιν ἢ ἀνθρωπείαν τὴν θεμένην τὰ πρῶτα ὀνόματα τοῖς πράγμασιν*, 439 C, 440 C[1]. Also in *Phaedr.* 244 B, 267 D, *Theaet.* 195 C, *Rep.* 369 C. In *Theaet.* 157 B *τίθεσθαι* is used without *ὄνομα*, the name given being, as it were, in inverted commas, *ᾧ δὴ ἀθροίσματι "ἄνθρωπον" τίθενται.* So also in *Crat.* 402 B *ὁ τιθέμενος τοῖς τῶν ἄλλων θεῶν προγόνοις Ῥέαν καὶ Κρόνον.* Compare *ib.* 392 E *τὸν "Ἀστυάνακτα" ὀρθότερον ᾤετο κεῖσθαι τῷ παιδὶ ἢ τὸν "Σκαμάνδριον"*[2].

[1] The list of examples of *τιθέναι* and *τίθεσθαι* from the *Cratylus* will, I think, be found to be complete. The rest are taken from Ast.

[2] It may be noted in passing that the passive of *τίθημι* is freely used to

The *active*, on the other hand, I can only find in the following passages; *Cratylus* 425 D *οὕτως εἰπόντες...ὅτι τὰ πρῶτα ὀνόματα οἱ θεοὶ ἔθεσαν καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ὀρθῶς ἔχει*, and, in close connexion with the middle, 416 B *τὸ γὰρ ἐμποδίζον καὶ ἴσχον τῆς ῥοῆς τὰ ὄντα λοιδορεῖν μοι διὰ παντὸς ὁ τὰ ὀνόματα τιθεὶς καὶ νῦν τῷ ἀεὶ ἴσχοντι τὸν ῥοῦν τοῦτο τοὔνομα ἔθετο ἀεισχοροῦν*, 431 B *εἰ δὲ ῥήματα καὶ ὀνόματα ἔστιν οὕτω τιθέναι, ἀνάγκη καὶ λόγους*, 438 C *εἶτα, οἶει, ἐναντία ἂν ἐτίθετο αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ὁ θείς, ὢν δαίμων τις ἢ θεός*; we find it with the infin. in *Crat.* 385 A *ὃ ἂν θῇ καλεῖν τις ἕκαστον, τοῦθ' ἑκάστῳ ὄνομα* where the middle could also have been used without injury to the Greek as in Eur. *Ion* 75 *Ἴωνα δ' αὐτὸν κτίστορ' Ἀσιάδος χθονὸς ὄνομα κεκλῆσθαι θήσεται καθ' Ἑλλάδα*. In all these passages it is merely the giving of the name, the laying down, fixing, settling of it that is expressed by the active. The idea of motive, purpose or end is rigidly excluded. There is a parallel here between *ὄνομα τίθεσθαι* (*τιθέναι*) and *νόμον τίθεσθαι* (*τιθέναι*) which must not be overlooked. The *ὀνοματοθέτης* is by his nature a *νομοθέτης*. See *Crat.* 388 D, E ΣΩ. *ἆρ' οὐχὶ ὁ νόμος δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ὁ παραδιδοὺς αὐτά*; ΕΡ. *ἔοικε*. ΣΩ. *νομοθέτου ἄρα ἔργῳ χρήσεται ὁ διδασκαλικὸς ὅταν ὀνόματι χρῆται*; ΕΡ. *δοκεῖ μοι*. Cf. 390 D etc. And though the active is not so commonly used in the case of the name-giver as in that of the lawgiver, that is only because the assignment of a name has to be regarded as something absolute much less frequently than the promulgation of a law. It is therefore no accident that in three out of the four passages quoted above it is a god that is the *ὀνοματοθέτης*. The finality of the names selected by him is naturally represented by the use of the active, although, when a *particular* case of choosing is in question, a reference to his purpose may be permissibly expressed in the middle.

II. *Politicus* 273 A *ὁ δὲ μεταστρεφόμενος καὶ συμβάλλων ἀρχῆς τε καὶ τελευτῆς ἐναντίαν ὁρμὴν ὁρμηθεὶς σεισμὸν πολὺν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ποιῶν ἄλλην αὖ φθορὰν ζῴων παντοίων ἀπειργάσατο.*

represent both the middle and the active. This also applies to the verbals e.g. *θέτης* which = *ὁ τιθέμενος* as *ὁ τιθείς*.

This passage describes what occurs when the world reaches the end of one of its eras of revolution and suddenly begins to revolve in the opposite direction, as takes place when the god who has hitherto guided its course relinquishes the helm and retires to his own place and it is twisted back by its destined and natural impulse (*τὸν κόσμον πάλιν ἀνέστρεφεν εἱμαρμένη τε καὶ σύμφυτος ἐπιθυμία*). So far as I am aware, two explanations have been offered for the text as it stands. Ast, Stallbaum and apparently others explain *συμβάλλων* as meaning '*simul, coniunctim*,' a quite inadmissible translation. Campbell, in his edition of the *Sophistes* and *Politicus*, translates *συμβάλλων* "coming together with a shock" and compares Theophr. *de sensu* 1 *τοὺς τύπους ἀνάγκη συμβάλλειν ἑαυτοῖς*, Soph. *Oed. Col.* 901 *ἔνθα δίστομοι μάλιστα συμβάλλουσιν ἐμπόρων ὁδοί*, where however the *ἑαυτοῖς* in the one case and the plural in the other make all the difference.

Until other evidence can be adduced, such a translation for *συμβάλλων* may be safely regarded as impossible. There is another objection in the common rendering of the genitives *ἀρχῆς...τελευτῆς* which are forced into meaning 'an impulse opposite in respect both of beginning and end.' Both difficulties will disappear if we read *ἀρχήν τε καὶ τελευτὴν* and put the comma after the latter word, taking the passage "The world now turned in the reverse direction and bringing end (of old motion) and beginning (of new) into conflict by starting on a contrary course it created a great concussion within itself and produced another destruction of all kinds of living creatures." *συμβάλλων ἀρχήν τε καὶ τελευτήν* is a Platonic subtlety of expression for the fact that the old motion and the new are in opposite directions thus: *τελευτή ἀρχή*. The corruption was caused by construing the words with what followed instead of with what preceded.

J. P. POSTGATE.

ON THE SIGNIFICATION OF THE MONSTER GRENDEL IN THE POEM OF BEOWULF; WITH A DISCUSSION OF LINES 2076—2100.

[Read before the Cambridge Philological Society, Dec. 3, 1885.]

The story of Beowulf is well known to resolve itself into two parts, viz. the two principal undertakings of the hero. The first was his successful battle with the monster Grendel, and subsequently with the same monster's mother; the second, his expedition against the fiery dragon, which was fatal both to the dragon and himself. With the latter story I have at present nothing to do; but the former story seems to me to admit of a very much simpler interpretation than any which it has yet received. I cannot find that any one has explicitly said what is to be understood by Grendel. Even Beowulf himself has been variously explained; for Kemble fancied that he was a god, whilst Thorpe says on the other hand—"preceding editors have regarded the poem of Beowulf as a myth, and its heroes as beings of a divine order; to my dull perception these appear as real kings and chieftains of the north." It now seems to be agreed that Beowulf was not a god, but a hero, possibly even a real individual. Mr Sweet, in his essay prefixed to Vol. II. of Warton's History of English Poetry, ed. 1871, well sums up the matter by supposing that the poem was made up from earlier sources; for "the variety of incidents, their artistic treatment, and the episodes introduced, shew that the poet had some foundation to work upon, that there must have been short epic songs about the exploits of Beowulf current among the people, which he combined into a whole."

I assume, then, that Beowulf was a real man; and that one of his exploits was his slaying of Grendel. If there is any substratum of truth in the story, it follows that Grendel *may* have been a real creature, capable of being slain. If so, it is obvious from the whole tenour of the story, that Grendel was not a man at all, but a carnivorous beast. I shall go a step further, and shew that he may have belonged to that particular kind of beast which is known by the general name of *bears*. Further than this, it is needless to enquire.

Little is gained by calling Grendel "a monster", which is the usual vague phrase, and useful only because it conveniently evades all difficulties. Still less explicit is the statement in Harrison and Sharp's edition that he was "a fen-spirit", which is, in fact, a translation of Grein's statement that he was a "Sumpfgeist". To any one who will read the poem as a whole with even moderate attention, for which purpose I would recommend Garnett's translation, now in a second edition, it will be obvious that Grendel is very realistically described, and has nothing ghostly about him. It is quite true that, when he is first introduced at l. 101, he is called "a fiend of hell" and "a grim ghost"; but these are very pardonable poetical expressions. The curious statement which immediately follows, that he belonged to the race of Cain, whence also proceeded elves and giants, and various monsters, is certainly, to use Mr Sweet's words, "a palpable interpolation." It alludes to the very general notion, common in the middle ages, that Cain and Judas were the fathers of evil-doers: a statement which was hardly intended, in any case, to be taken literally. See my note, on this very point, to Piers Plowman, c. xi. 220, where a parallel passage may be found.

Putting this aside, let us first take the name *Grendel*, and analyse it. The analysis is easy, for the etymology has been given, long ago, by Ettmüller, who shews that it is a mere derivative of the verb *grindan*, to grind. This verb is a strong one, and the original past tense was *grand;* whence, by adding the suffix *-el*, here signifying the agent, and observing the usual mutation from *a* to *e*, we get the very form *Grendel*. Oddly enough, Ettmüller explains it by *noxius*, *nocivus*, as if it meant

no more than "harmful"; but, on his own shewing, the literal sense is precisely "grinder". To my mind, this is clearly equivalent to "carnivorous"; for the reference can only be to the grinding of bones, just as in the nursery rhyme we hear of the giant who "grinds men's bones to make his bread".

Next, turning to the poem itself, we find that Grendel was "fierce and furious", and seized no less than thirty thanes in one night—obviously a poetical exaggeration—bore them off, and ate them; that he was a mighty one who abode in the moors and fens; that he used to prowl round the great hall every night, just like Horace's "vespertinus *ursus*" (Epod. xvi. 51), and caught and carried off so many men, that at last the great hall was deserted at night, because no one dared to sleep there, but retired to sleep beside the "bowers" or ladies' apartments. I just note here, by the way, that it was once usual for warriors to sleep in the dining-hall, whilst ladies slept in remote and safer apartments which were called "bowers". After seizing his prey, Grendel always retired to the misty moors, or to the fen, where no one dared to track him. When the hall was abandoned by night, he even dared to make it his lair, though he again retired at the approach of morning. Beowulf calls especial attention to the fact, that Grendel never used weapons (l. 434), but trusted solely to the strength of his grip, i.e. of the well-known bear's hug. Unluckily for Grendel, the power of gripping was a peculiar virtue of Beowulf's; every one said that he had "thirty men's great strength of might in his hand-grip" (l. 380). On this account, Beowulf refuses to use any weapon himself, and trusts entirely to this gift of his. Beowulf says that he knows Grendel will eat him up, if he fails; but he nevertheless refuses the help of weapons, and even lays aside his breastplate at night. Grendel, on the contrary, is not recorded to have had any *separable* armour, either of an offensive or defensive kind. The result is, that Beowulf and some of his men venture to occupy the hall by night. Grendel comes as before, "seized a sleeping warrior, tore him unresisting, bit his bone-frame, drank blood from his veins, and in great bites swallowed him" (l. 740). This is obviously the mode of procedure of a carnivorous beast, not of a savage descendant of

Cain in human form. After devouring this unfortunate victim, Grendel next made an attempt to seize Beowulf, but he quickly met his match; "he never found in this mid-earth, in another man, a greater handgrip." Grendel was frightened, and would have escaped; but Beowulf held on, with his own terrible hug. So furious was the struggle that the poet wonders how the hall withstood it; had they not been secured with iron clamps, the wooden walls must have fallen. The thanes of Beowulf tried to help him, drawing their swords, and attacking Grendel. But their swords could not touch him; not, as the poet would have us believe, because he was absolutely sword-proof, but obviously because they could get no sure cut at him, seeing that the place was in darkness, and that they were in great danger of wounding their own master, who was grappling at close quarters in his desperate wrestling-match. Grendel tries to get away; Beowulf still holds on, and at last actually tears from its socket the beast's arm. Thus it was that Grendel eventually got away, but only to die from loss of blood, in the lake to which he managed to escape. The next day Beowulf had his trophy to shew; for there was the arm and shoulder all together, and there was "Grendles grápe", which Garnett translates in a way that suits my view well enough, by "the *claw* of Grendel" (l. 836); though the context shews that it really means the entire arm, from claw to shoulder.

To save further prolixity, I here mention a few of the reasons why I suppose Grendel to have been a bear.

1. Grendel was carnivorous, and used no iron weapons.

2. He trusted to the strength of his grip or hug; the "bear's hug" is proverbial.

3. The name *Grendel* means "grinder", i.e. grinder of bones.

4. The brown European bear was common enough in wild places. Like Grendel, it is "a solitary animal", and "an excellent swimmer, notwithstanding its uncouth appearance"; its retreat is often a cavern. (English Cyclopædia, s.v. *Bear*.)

5. It generally seeks its food at night, and "at dawn never fails to return to its own district". Figuier's Mammalia, ed. E. P. Wright (London), p. 431.

6. When Beowulf had slain Grendel, he had to perform the still harder task of slaying Grendel's mother, who is represented as possessed of still greater strength than Grendel himself[1]. This might easily happen in the case of an old she-bear, especially if angered by the loss of her whelp. "Let a bear robbed of her whelps meet a man, rather than a fool in his folly"; Prov. xvii. 12. We know of two Asiatic she-bears that "tare forty and two children" at one time; 2 Kings, ii. 24.

7. In order to get at Grendel's mother, who lived at the bottom of an ice-cold lake, Beowulf had to dive under water, and remain under water for many hours. This merely means that the she-bear's den lay on the other side of a lake, and that he had to swim across to get at it.

8. Grendel's mother had no weapons but her "grápum", i.e. her claws, or rather, her grasping arms (l. 1542). She too trusted to her power of grip, which was so tremendous that Beowulf well nigh got the worst of it; nothing saved him but his almost magic breast-plate (1552). He slew her at last by help of a magic sword, with which he gave her a death-blow on the neck.

9. Grendel's mother was carnivorous like himself. She carried off a thane named Æschere, of whom nothing was afterwards found except his head (1421). She too came by night, and retreated afterwards to her den beyond the lake.

10. It should be noticed that both Grendel and his mother are dumb beasts. There is no hint that they were capable of human speech. But Grendel uttered a terrible cry or howl (A. S. *wóp*) when he lost his arm (l. 785).

11. Mr Sweet remarks that the name *Béo-wulf* is, literally, "bee-wolf"; and the name of *bee-wolf* is applicable to no quadruped but the brown bear, whose fondness for honey is proverbial (A. S. Reader, note to § 20). Surely this is a remarkably strong hint. Of course the name was, as it were, a nickname, having reference to his deeds of valour. I take it to mean that he was a slayer of bears in particular. If his fame

[1] In l. 1282, the poet says Grendel's mother, being a woman, was less terrible than Grendel; but in l. 1550 he forgets all about her "womanhood", and says that her strength was *quite* a match for Beowulf's.

had been gained by the slaughter of *wolves*, there would have been no point in naming him *Bear*. Besides, Scandinavia had no lions or tigers; the bear is the sole animal which was capable, even in poetry, of carrying off a warrior and devouring him bodily. Indeed, it is remarkable, that the Norwegians had a proverb, that the bear "had the strength of ten men, and the sense of twelve" (Eng. Cyclop. s.v. *Bear*). A wolf was less formidable, being indeed of a cowardly nature; and to me it seems decisive, that wolves are often seen in droves: whereas we are expressly told that Grendel and his mother were a pair (l. 1347), and that no one had ever seen a third one of the same form in the same district.

I do not want to press this matter any further. If I have not said sufficient for conviction, it is useless to say more. I have to add, however, that, in my opinion, the commentators and translators have entirely missed the point of a certain passage, in lines 2076—2100, and have even completely mistranslated several words, solely because they did not know that Grendel was a bear. One distinguishing feature of a bear is his wonderful paw, with its shaggy covering and its strong claws, certainly a formidable weapon. On the mention of this paw, the poet delights to dwell; he frequently refers to it, and, as is the manner of alliterative poetry, in studiously varied terms. At one time, Beowulf says that he expects to be "féond-grápum fæst," held fast in the enemy's clutches (636): at another, Grendel comes to the hall, and finds the door fastened; but it soon gave way, when he touched it with his palms—"folmum hrán" (722). Again, he tried to seize Beowulf with his hands—"mid handa" (746); he reached towards him with his palm—"mid folme" (748); Beowulf grasped the paw so tightly that Grendel's fingers cracked—"fingras burston[1]." Beowulf tears off the beast's arm, with both shoulder and paw; it is hung up for a trophy, which all men may view. It is accurately described in these words—"after the princes, by the earl's might, upon the high roof had viewed the *hand*, the foeman's *fingers*, each one [seeing it] before him. Each place[2] of the *nails* was likest

[1] The bear has five toes; those on the fore-paws may fairly be called "fingers".

[2] Lit. "each of the places of the

to steel, the heathen one's *hand-spurs*, the horrible *spike*[1] of the fighter. Every one said, that no excellent weapon of the warriors could touch it (i.e. cut into it), so as to carry away (i.e. cut off) the monster's bloody *battle-hand*" (982—990). This is a difficult passage, but the general idea is clear enough. It describes the bear's paw or "battle-hand", with its fingers armed with nails or claws like steel spurs or spikes. It seemed so strong that it was doubtful if any warrior could cut it off at a single blow.

At a later passage in the poem, that which I now wish to explain, Beowulf tells the story of his struggle all over again; and it is evident that the above passage is the very one to which his speech chiefly refers. He has a great deal to say, naturally enough, about this paw which he tore off, arm, shoulder, and all. It is referred to especially by two new epithets, both of them natural enough. In one place, it is called *glóf*, i.e. a glove (2085); in another, *hond-sció*, which is precisely the G. *Hand-schuh*, and merely repeats the same idea. The shaggy paw, with its hairy covering, is likened to the glove of that early period, when, as I suppose, gloves were often made of skin with the fur or hair left upon it. Curiously enough, this simple word hand-shoe, i.e. glove or paw, has so puzzled translators that they have now, almost with one accord, resorted to the desperate expedient of supposing that Hondscio (with a capital H) was the name of a warrior; and, in order to explain the passage, they are obliged to resort to the further expedient of mistranslating other words in the same passage, in order to obtain, by desperate means, some glimmer of sense. The A.S. version has:

> þær wæs hondscio hilde on-sæge,
> feorh-bealu fægum; he fyrmest læg
> gyrded cempa; him Grendel wearð
> mærum magu-þegne[2] to muð-bonan.
>
> (2076—79.)

nails"; for the MS. has *steda*. Harrison and Sharp have *stéde*, and give the translation "each nail-place was firm as steel"; but if *stede* means 'firm', it cannot also mean 'place'.

[1] MS. *egl*, which is the mod. prov. E. *ail*, a spike, generally used of a spike or awn of barley, as Grein rightly has it. Garnett translates it by 'claw'. See *Ail*, sb., in Murray's Dictionary.

[2] MS. magum þegne; an obvious error; see Grein.

This Garnett translates by:

> "There was Hondscio destined for fight,
> life-bale to the fated: he lay the first,
> the belted warrior: to him was Grendel,
> to the great war-thane, a mouth-destroyer."

Put into prose, this means that a certain Hondscio, one of Beowulf's men, was seized by Grendel and devoured. And we are actually told that this very Hondscio was "a life-bale to the fated", i.e. that he killed somebody else. The fact is precisely the contrary, viz. that he was killed himself. Nor is this the only awkwardness; for the word "destined" is a very poor translation of the extremely picturesque, expressive, and happy word—*on-sægе.*

I will now explain *on-sægе* (with long *æ*), and with it, the whole passage. It is derived from *sígan*, to sink, descend; and means "ready to descend", or "impending". This sense will also suit well enough the only other passage where it occurs (l. 2483), where it has been translated "destructive". In the present passage it is exceedingly graphic, if we will but realise the situation. Grendel visits the hall by night. In the dimness of the twilight he tries to seize a hero. He stretches out his paw towards him gropingly[1], and at last holds it above him, ready to descend.

This then is how I translate it.

> "There was the glove, i.e. paw, ready to descend in conflict,
> a life-bale [was it] to the doomed man; he lay the nearest,
> a girded warrior; to him was Grendel,
> viz. to that great war-thane, a slayer with his mouth."

It was Grendel's paw that was ready to descend, and that was a life-bale, or destruction of life, to the doomed man. *Fægum* is precisely the Scotch *fey*, fated to die, doomed to destruction. This doomed man lay nearest the door, and was therefore seized first. There is absolutely no difficulty, though Grein goes so far as to say that *hand-scio*, if not a proper name, must mean an attack made by the hands, *impetus manibus factus*, and cannot possibly mean "a glove". My reply is, that

[1] Ræhte ongéan féond mid folme, "he reached towards his foe with his palm" (l. 747).

"glove" is the only assignable meaning, and is perfectly intelligible. The remarkable point about this *dictum*, that it cannot mean a glove, is that, only a few lines below, the very word *glóf* is used, in precisely the same way. With that remarkable parallelism which is as noticeable in Anglo-Saxon as in Hebrew poetry, the poet repeats the same idea in different words. His second version runs thus:

> ac he mægnes rof min costode
> grapode gearo-folm. Glof hangode
> sid and syllic searo-bendum fæst.
> sio wæs orðoncum eall gegyrwed
> deofles cræftum and dracan fellum.
>
> (2085—88.)

Here Beowulf is the speaker, and Grendel is the subject. Garnett translates it:

> "But he, strong in might, made trial of me,
> with ready hand grasped me. His glove was hanging
> wide and wonderful, in cunning bands fast;
> it was all wrought with curious skill
> with devil's craft and dragon's skins."

The general sense is well given, and with most of the translation I agree. But I wish to point out that I do not like the translation of *grapode* by "grasped me". This verb is precisely the modern English *grope*. It does not mean "seized" or "grasped", for that is denoted by the strong verb *grípan*, our *gripe*. The weak verb *grápian* means to try to seize, to feel after, to grope for; Grein translates it by *palpare*. We have the exact parallel in the difference between *findan*, to find, and *fandian*, to try to find. The whole point turns upon the fact that Grendel did *not* get a good hold of Beowulf. On the contrary, it was Beowulf who gripped the monster, and as he himself says, "repaid him a hand-payment"—*hondlean* (2094). Then again, "his glove was hanging" is a statement which tells us nothing, and sounds almost absurd; at any rate, it has no meaning. *Glof hangode* is the absolute repetition of *hondscio wæs on-sæge*. It plainly means—"His glove, i.e. his paw, hung suspended"—a most graphic description of the attitude of Grendel, as with outstretched paw he approached his victim,

groping for him in the darkness. I therefore translate the passage thus:

> But he, strong in might, made trial of me,
> groped (after me) with ready palm. His glove (or paw) hung suspended, &c.

It is proper to add that my view of this passage is nearly the same as that taken long ago by Thorpe. Thorpe actually remarks—"I once thought, with Grundtvig, that Hondscio was the name of the warrior slain by Grendel, but both the context and this mention of his *glove* are adverse to this interpretation." Accordingly, Thorpe translates *hondscio* by "glove", as I do; but he adds the remark: "This about Grendel's *glove* is not very intelligible. I imagine it to be identical with what at l. 1976 [986 in Grein] is called his *hand-sporu*." My contention is, on the contrary, that the passage is perfectly intelligible, and even admirable.

In l. 2098, there is another expression which is inadequately translated. It runs thus:

> hwæðre him sio swiðre swaðe weardode hand on Hiorte—

which Garnett translates:

> "Yet of him a trace remained behind, his right hand in Heorot."

But *swaðe* is accusative, not nominative, and *weardode* means "guarded," not "remained behind." It rather means:

> "Nevertheless his right hand guarded his track in Heorot."

The paw, when torn off, "guarded the track", or "shewed the trail", because it lay across the beginning of it. There it lay upon the ground, at the beginning of the trail of blood, which extended from the spot where the arm lay to the lake where the monster died. The expression, slightly varied, occurs at an earlier passage, l. 970:

> "Hwæðere he his folme forlet to lif-wraðe last weardian."

i.e. "nevertheless he left his palm behind (him) as a defence for his life, to guard his track", or "to preserve the trail".

It was "a defence for his life" because he hoped, by leaving it behind, to save his life, though the hope proved vain. It "guarded his track" by lying across the beginning of the trail of blood. There is no difficulty.

I have to add that my interpretations all remain the same, even if Grendel be not a bear. All uncouth monsters must be treated as having something in the way of hands, which a poet would more naturally liken to the paws of a beast than to the wonderful hands of man. I merely throw out the suggestion that Beowulf's feats may have been founded upon some actual encounter between two bears and a hero of antiquity who was remarkable for his strength of grip, and who was delivered, like David, "out of the paw of the bear." Bears were, no doubt, common enough in the south of Sweden, but I do not imagine that they were often attacked by a single man, who boasted that he would use no offensive armour. If any man ever performed such a feat, it would live long in tradition, and be marvellously magnified into something superhuman. The men who attributed to the bear the strength of ten men would naturally attribute to his conqueror the strength of thirty men, which is the expression actually used. The story only requires us to suppose that king Hrothgar built a hall, and afterwards found out that the situation which he had chosen, which seems to have been a lonely one, was subject to this drawback—that there happened to be two bears dwelling in a cave on the other side of a lake which was not far-distant. All the rest follows naturally enough, and all the supernatural incidents can easily be resolved into something that is not in the least incredible.

However this may be, I think I have shewn that something may be gained by comparing all the passages which concern the monster's paws, and translating them literally as they stand.

I may add that I intend no disrespect to Garnett's excellent translation, which appears to me to be much the best in the English language.

I must not now dwell on the occasional resemblances that may be found between the poem of Beowulf and the Icelandic Grettis Saga, or Story of Grettir. I may say, however, that the Icelandic version of the wrestling-match between Grettir and Glam is given at p. 209 of Vigfusson and Powell's Icelandic Prose Reader; and the translation of it at p. 105 of the Story of Grettir the Strong, by Magnússon and Morris. Another parallel passage is the description of the fight between Beowulf

and Grendel's mother; for which see p. 194 of the same translation. Here Grendel's mother is described as being "a huge troll-wife, with a trough in one hand and a chopper wondrous great in the other." This one sentence is quite enough to shew that the Icelandic adaptation is of later date, which is of course the case; for, in Beowulf, Grendel's mother has no weapons but her "terrible claws"—*atolan clommum* (1502)—and her "horrible fingers"—*láðan fingrum* (1505).

Mr Magnússon has kindly drawn my attention to another passage in the Grettis Saga, where Grettir (who answers to Beowulf) kills a bear with a short sword, *cuts off one of the paws, and brings it home as a trophy.* We may notice, in particular, the following passages. "Now it befell, that early in winter a savage bear ran abroad from his winter lair, and got so grim that he spared neither man nor beast." He became, like Grendel, the terror of the neighbourhood. He lived in a cave in rocks above the sea. "The bear lay in his lair by day, but went abroad as soon as night fell; no fold could keep sheep safe from him, nor could any dogs be set on him: and all this men thought the heaviest trouble" (p. 63). Curiously enough, the first man to attack the bear, though unsuccessfully, was one named Björn, i.e. Bear, who makes the remark—"now shall I try what sort of play we *namesakes* (i.e. Björn and the bear) shall have together." The comparison of the poem of Beowulf with the parallel passages in the Saga shews almost as many alterations as resemblances, proving that old writers took very great liberties with any story that caught their fancy, and that traditional tales suffered terribly in the process of transmission. I wish to add the concluding remark, that the resemblance of Grendel and his mother to the common brown bear is quite as close as can fairly be expected in an early poetical description. We have a parallel example in the description of leviathan, of whom it is said that "out of his mouth go burning lamps, and sparks of fire leap out"; (Job xli. 19). No one would expect, because of this description, to see flames issue from the mouth of a crocodile. On the other hand, no one need be surprised at the assertion in Beowulf, that the dragon against whom he fought his last fight breathed out flames of fire. WALTER W. SKEAT.

MISCELLANEA CRITICA. 1. DIERECTUS. 2. FOUR EMENDATIONS IN TIBULLUS. 3. TWO EMENDATIONS IN PROPERTIUS.

Dierectus[1].

We may distinguish at least four views held in modern times as to the scansion of this word. (1) That it is a quadrisyllable, the first two syllables being short. (2) That it is a trisyllable through synizesis, the first syllables *dĭĕ-* being contracted into one. (3) That it is really a trisyllable, not through synizesis, the form *dierectus* being merely a confusion between two trisyllabic words *directus* and *derectus*. (4) That it is a quadrisyllable, the first two syllables being long.

1. Ritschl's view as to the scansion of the word is sometimes, perhaps usually, misunderstood. He held it was of four syllables, the first two short. This is clear, first, from his words written in 1848, Preface to Trinummus, p. clxii. 'nam de *lien* et *dierectus* rectissime nuper Hermannus statuit.' Now Hermann in his preface to the Bacchides written in 1845, says p. v. '*dierecte, dierectus ubique ab anapaesto incipere*': and on p. vi. he states that he suspects, what is indeed a necessary corollary to this theory, or to a trisyllabic theory, that *lien* has *e* short in all its cases[2]: 'ut nesciam an in communi sermone *lien* per omnes casus vocalem brevem habuerit': though he admits that this contradicts the statement of Valerius Probus, p. 1444, 171[3], and the lines of Serenus Sammonicus, *De Med.* 418, 429:

> Nonnulli memorant consumi posse lienem.
> Dulcia, Plautus ait, grandi minus apta lieni.

[1] This paper is chiefly in defence of opinions expressed by the writer in a paper in "Hermathena," x. p. 65, seqq.

[2] See Curc. 240 quoted infra.

[3] I cannot find this statement in Probus; he does not say anything about the quantity. The 'Ars Anonyma Bernensis,' however, p. 113, 2 (Keil) makes an equivalent statement.

Secondly, Ritschl did not print *dierectus* with his usual mark of synizesis. What derivation Hermann and Ritschl assigned to *dĭĕrectus* I do not know. Their theory is metrically of the same value as that now commonly held in Germany, namely *dĭ͡ērectus*, with the first two syllables made one by synizesis: whatever passages the one scansion will fit, the other will fit also: and in speaking of Ritschl's view, I will call it as well as the second and third, the trisyllabic theory, in opposition to that which I hold is the correct theory, namely, that *dierectus* is a quadrisyllable, and that the first two syllables are long.

2. The word is marked in our modern Dictionaries *dīērectus*, and Brix on Trin. 457 (2. 4. 56) (quoted infra) remarks 'dass das Wort durch Synizese stets dreisilbig ist.' This is the view generally held; the meaning assigned being 'crucified,' and the derivation being supposed to be *dis-erigo*.

3. A third view is that of Professor Nettleship[1], adopted by Mr J. H. Onions[2]. Professor Nettleship supposes that there were two trisyllabic words *derectus* and *directus* (disrectus): that *dierectus* is a confusion between these two and must be translated according to the context 'go to hell' or 'go and be hanged, lit. crucified.' It is difficult to imagine a context which would nicely discriminate the proper use of these forms of imprecation: and the existence of two forms so nearly allied in sense and form, and so far apart in derivation is most improbable. For my part I doubt the existence of either form. It is very likely, indeed, as Festus says, that *dirigere* existed in Plautus in the sense of *discindere* or *discidere*: and *dirigit* is not an improbable suggestion of Dacier's in Curc. 424 (3. 54) *clypeatus ubi machaera elephantum dissicit*, where Nonius reads *diligit:* and the late Latin *directarius* 'a burglar' or 'housebreaker' may have been derived from this *dirigere* which means *discindere* or *discidere:* indeed it is the strongest evidence for its

[1] In his Review of Sonnenschein's 'Mostellaria,' Academy, May 16, 1885.

[2] Journal of Philology, No. 27, p. 61. Mr Onions's words do not make it quite clear whether he fully assents to Prof. Nettleship's theory. He says, "Professor Nettleship has shown that in all probability the original form of the word was *derectus*." That is not quite Prof. Nettleship's view.

existence. But surely *discissus* or *discisus* could not mean 'crucified'. As to *derectus* 'sent to perdition,' I see no evidence for that form whatever. *Ad inferos te dirige* or *derige* in Apuleius (Met. 6. 16) does not touch the question. It is not a curse, but merely a direction given to a person actually seeking the infernal regions, and it is of no moment whether Apuleius chose to use the form *derige* with the sense of 'down' in his mind, or the more usual *dirige*. Next it is urged that an unimpeachable gloss gives *derectarius* κατάρατος. What is the full gloss? I presume Prof. Nettleship refers to that given in Labbaeus's collection (Valpy's Ed. of Stephens, vol. viii. p. 229): *Derectarius* θυρεπανοίκτης, ἐπεισπηδητής, κατάρατος, ὁ εἰς τὰς ἀλλοτρίας ἕνεκεν τοῦ κλέψαι εἰσερχόμενος οἰκίας. That is to say *derectarius* is a burglar and κατάρατος evidently should be κατὰ κράτος, ἐπεισπηδητὴς κατὰ κράτος being a man who makes violent entry. As remarked above, *directarius* seems the better form of this word: it should come from *dirigo* in the sense of *discindo*: and Basil in one of his Epistles gives διρεκτάριος as its Greek equivalent: ὅτι πάντα λῃστῶν καὶ διρεκταρίων πεπλήρωται τὰ τῆς ὁδοῦ: sq. quoted in Dacier's note on Festus ad v. *dirigere*[1].

Both Mr Onions and Prof. Nettleship, of course quite unintentionally, minimise unfairly the evidence for the form *dierectus*. Thus Mr Onions says, p. 61: "the MSS. vary throughout between *dierectus, dlerectus, directus, derectus* and *d'rectus*." Prof. Nettleship says: "I admit that in several passages the form *dierectus* is supported by respectable MS. authority." But the evidence for the form *dierectus* is simply overwhelming. In three of the fourteen passages where the word occurs all MSS. give *dierectus* with no variant whatever: the Ambrosian, in the only passages where it now exhibits the word, either has

[1] I find I must give up this reference. For, in the first place, although the note is quoted in Valpy's Festus as Dacier's, it is not in Dacier's own edition: secondly, I cannot find διρεκταρίων mentioned even as a variant in Basil Ep. CCLXVII. (vol. 32, p. 998, Migne). The reading in the text is δησερτόρων. The nearest MS. reading to διρεκταρίων is διακτόρων of Harl. I conclude that the note is some one's else than Dacier, and that διρεκταρίων is a conjecture, but I have not leisure to trace it to its real author. I leave the citation standing *quantum valeat*.

dierectus legible, or *dierectus* with a letter between *d* and *e* scarcely legible: in every passage where *directus* or *derectus* is given, there *dierectus* is supported by equal or greater MS. authority. Taking into consideration only ABCDE, the only MSS. that have any pretence to authority, as far as recorded in the critical editions, we find: (1) Bacch. 577 (4. 1. 7) *dierecte* without variant. (2) Capt. 630 (3. 4. 103) *dierectum* B, *d . erectum* D. (3) Cas. 1. 1. 15 *dierectus* B, (perhaps A: Geppert records no variant from A: he quotes A in the previous line). (4) Curc. 240 (2. 1. 24) *dieructus* B. *di eructus* E. *dirruptus* E_3. (5) Men. 432 (2. 3. 87) *derectum* B, *dlerectum* CD. (6) Merc. 183 (1. 2. 71) *die rectus* B; otherwise no variant. (7) Merc. 756 (4. 4. 16) *die rectus* B, *dierectus* D; otherwise no variant. (8) Most. 8 *dierecte* BD: *directe* B_2C. (9) Most. 834 (3. 2. 163) *dierecte* CD, *dierecta* B, *dierecta* B_2. (10) Poen. 160 *Abid rectus* B, *Abidie rectus* C, *Abi dierectus* D. (11) Poen. 347 (1. 2. 134) *die recte*; otherwise no variant. (12) Rud. 4. 4. 126: *dierecta* without variant: at least neither Pareus nor Taubmann quote one. (13) Trin. 457 (2. 4. 56) *dierecte* A, *derecte* all other MSS. (14) Varro ap. Nonium p. 49, 22: the lemma has *dierecti*, without variant as far as I can find. In the note the MSS. are divided between *dierectum* and *directum*: and on p. 122, 24 of Nonius where the same line of Varro is quoted under *insanitas* the MSS. are again divided. (15) Festus s. v. *dierectum* gives, so far as I am aware, that form only: some interpolated MSS. have *diem rectum*.

From the above summary it will be seen that the MSS. do not vary throughout, and that to say there is respectable evidence for the form *dierectus* very much understates the case. The wonder is that the rare word *dierectus* did not pass into *derectus* or *directus* much oftener than it did. As to *dlerectus* it is a stronger evidence to *dierectus* than the occurrence of *dierectus* itself in the MSS. So is the unmeaning breaking up of *dierectus* into two words, *die rectus*. How could *directus* or *derectus* pass into those two words?

4. I hold that *dierectus* is always a quadrisyllable, and that

the first two syllables are long, a view often held formerly. I quite agree with Professor Nettleship that the word is a very extraordinary one: and I can only account for its total disappearance from the language after Plautus (save one solitary instance in his editor Varro), by the supposition that the word was looked upon as a base formation. I suppose the word meant crucified: that it is from *dis* and *erigo*, the *di* lengthened to compensate for the loss of *s* or of *r* into which *s* would have passed without compensation had there not been another *r* in the word. It seems like a word invented by a reckless slave, fond of joking grimly, as his class used to do, on the terrible punishment that might one day be awarded him. 'I know' says the slave in the Miles, 'that the cross is my destiny: my father, my grandfather, my ancestors all are buried there.'

As regards the evidence furnished by the metre of the fourteen passages where *dierectus* occurs, Mr Onions is unjust. He says, p. 63: "The word appears to be trisyllabic. This scansion suits a large majority of the passages, and the only cases where it presents any difficulty are the following" (and *four* passages are cited which have to be emended to suit the trisyllabic theory). Now admitting the statement of the case to be fair, which I deny, what is the argument like? It is just as if Robin Hood and Little John had been shooting a match, and the judge were to say: "I give the prize to Little John, for he has hit the target in a large majority of cases:" without considering that Robin Hood had hit the target in a larger majority of cases. According to Mr Onions the trisyllabic pronunciation suits ten passages out of fourteen: the quadrisyllabic certainly suits thirteen, yet Mr Onions, without mentioning any other criterion, gives the award in favour of that pronunciation which suits the lesser number of instances.

But is it true that the trisyllabic theory suits a large majority of the passages? Mr Onions admits it does not suit four: and he exhibits four rather violent emendations of the MS. readings in these four passages, Bacch. 577 (4. 1. 7): Merc. 183 (1. 2. 71): Men. 432 (2. 3. 87): Rud. 4. 4. 126. Of these passages nothing need be said, as the trisyllabic theory certainly "appears" not to suit them; while the quadrisyllabic

suits them perfectly. But how does the trisyllabic theory suit the passage from Varro, ap. Nonium, pp. 49 and 122;

Apage in dierectum a domo nostram istam insanitatem.

To scan this line on the trisyllabic theory we must suppose hiatus of the last syllable of *dierectum* before *a*. Such a hiatus would be illegitimate in Plautus: it is, if possible, still more questionable in Varro. If so, here we have a fifth passage, which is strongly against the trisyllabic theory.

But the argument from *abi*, which Mr Onions ignores altogether, is in my opinion most repugnant to the trisyllabic theory. In Most. 834 (3. 2. 163) Ussing reads, and undoubtedly reads rightly,

St! abi canis st! abi dierecta! st! abin hinc in malam crucem.

and so Mr Onions quotes the line. The MSS. give *est* for *st!* in each place, but *st!* is certainly right. To make this suit the trisyllabic theory the second *abi* must be an iambus. Now *abi* occurs in Plautus, exclusive of those passages where it ends a line, and those where it is elided, about seventy times: and it is only long in five passages, if so often. I give them here, in order to show that they differ materially from all the passages where *abi dierectus* is found.

1. As. 543 (3. 1. 39)

Intro abi: nam te quidem edepol nihil est impudentius.

2. Capt. 451 (2. 3. 92)

A. Tu intro abi. *B.* Bene ambulato. *A.* Bene vale.
B. Edepol rem meam.

3. Merc. 749 (4. 4. 9)

A. Abi. *B.* Quid, abeam. *A.* St! abi. *B.* Abeam? abi.

4. Aul. 273 (2. 3. 6)

Tace atque abi: curata fac sint quom a foro redeam domum.

5. Most. 572 (3. 1. 56)

Immo abi domum: verum hercle dico: abi domum.

There are no other passages where *abi* is necessarily an iambus. Amph. 1. 3. 35 and one or two other passages admit of its being a pyrrhic[1]. Now, weighing probabilities against each other, whether is it likely that a word of uncertain quantity is to be so scanned as to add three examples of *ăbī* to five, or so scanned as to add three examples of *ăbĭ* to forty? But these five examples may be pared down still. They all in the first place are commands where departure is actually wished for, and in four of them there is a strong stop after *abi*: not the quick continuous *ăbĭ* 'get along'. Next, the first two passages (1, 2) are instances of *Intro abi*, really a double compound *intro-abi*. Thirdly, in the third passage (3) the MSS. clearly point to the long *abei*: (*abii* B, *abei* C) and so Ritschl reads. In (4) Aul. 273, D, an excellent MS., gives *abi et curata*. This seems to Leo to point to *abei*. Possibly: but it more likely points to

Tace atque abi: *haec* curata fac sint quom a foro redeam domum.

Cf. Amph. 982 (3. 3. 26) *Haec* curata fac sint.

In (5) Ritschl, not believing in *abī* read *abi modo domum*.

I anticipate that it may be urged that such a scansion as *abĭ canis st!* *abī* comes under the rule that imperatives, when repeated, are repeated with a change of accent. That rule however only applies to words *immediately* following each other. *ádest, adést*: *máne, mané*, and so forth: and this would not cover *abī* in Poen. 160 (infra). And Pers. 215 (2. 2. 33) would be against such a rule, if it were proposed, for *abi* occurs there twice as a pyrrhic:

Fatear si ita sim. Iam abi vicisti. Abi nunc iam.
Ergo hoc mi expedi.

Ritschl never contemplated the possibility of the colloquial *abi* being anything but a pyrrhic, as may be seen from his note on Most. 1. 1. 8; nor did Bentley: see his note on Ter. And. 5. 6. 14. Now as to this line Most. 834, to scan *ăbĭ* is very closely paralleled by the following line, Amph. 1126 (5. 1. 74):

Abi domum iube vasa pura actutum adornari mihi,

[1] See Müller, Plaut. Pros. p. 153.

with a dactyl in the second foot, and that dactyl's thesis *iube.* For *abĭ* itself forming the thesis of a dactyl, see Capt. 870 (4. 2. 90):

> Nunc tu mihi places, abi stultus: sero post tempus venis.

I say then that this is a *sixth* passage which presents a difficulty to the trisyllabic theory. Cas. 1. 1. 15:

> Abi rus abi dierectus tuam in provinciam,

is a *seventh* passage, where the difficulty is similar, where Ritschl who did not believe in *abī* wrote *abi hinc*: Most. 8 (1. 1. 8) is an *eighth* passage:

> Abi rus! abi dierecte! abscede ab ianua.

A *ninth* passage is Poen. 160 (1. 1. 32):

> Abi dierectus. Dic mihi vero serio.

Ritschl who did not believe in *abī* was obliged to write *abin.* But *abin,* which is always a pyrrhic before a vowel, is more likely to be a pyrrhic even before a consonant: *iuben* for instance never is anything but a pyrrhic, even before a consonant, in Plautus. And so I should scan Merc. 756 (4. 4. 16) as beginning with an anapaest:

> Abin dierectast. Haud malust. At tu malus.

I will not say that Plautus could not have written *abīn* before a consonant, and I will give my adversaries this passage as suiting their theory as well as the quadrisyllabic. Four passages remain: (11) Curc. 240 (2. 1. 4):

> Lien dierectust. Ambula id lieni optumumst.

To scan *dierectus* here as a trisyllable, or to read *diruptust,* or any word but a quadrisyllable of the form of *dīērectus,* violates either the usage of Plautus as to *lien, lienosus,* for he always has synizesis in this word, if we suppose the *en* to be long: or violates all tradition by supposing Plautus to make the *en* in *lieni* to be short, (supra). (12) Poen. 347 (1, 2. 134):

> *A.* Bellula hercle. *B.* I dierecte in maxumam malam crucem.

To avoid the hiatus created by their theory, the Ritschelians are obliged to write *herclest*. This passage then makes the *eleventh* which favours the quadrisyllabic theory: although, as hiatus may possibly be allowable at the change of speakers, it is not a very strong case.

(13) Capt. 630 (3. 4. 103)

Quin quiescis dierectum, cor meum ac suspende te.

So the MSS. *i* is now universally inserted before *dierectum*, which would suit either scansion. But as *quin quiescis dierectum* might possibly mean 'be quiet, and be hanged to you', it is not impossible that the *i* should be inserted as formerly before *ac*: or not inserted at all. This would suit the quadrisyllabic theory only; and as the MSS. are in favour of *dīē-* I must reckon this as a *twelfth* passage which suits the quadrisyllabic theory rather better than the other. I now proceed to the solitary passage which refuses the quadrisyllabic theory.

5. The solitary passage which favours the trisyllabic theory is Trin. 457 (2. 4. 56),

Abin hinc dierecte. Si hercle ire accipiam, votes.

But the omission of *hinc* here is not only simple, but supported by the *necessity* of a similar omission in other passages. Aul. 660 (4. 4. 33):

Fugin hinc ab oculis? abin (hinc) an non?
Abeo cave ne revideam.

All MSS. have *hinc* here. All editors omit it. Most. 425 (2. 1. 78):

Clavim cedo atque abi (hinc) intro: atque occlude ostium.

All MSS. have *hinc* here. We must either omit *hinc* or *atque:* or else we must scan *abi hinc in* | as an anapaest. And, as I have already stated, we should omit *hinc* in the Trinummus, or write *Abi hinc*. But the passage in the Mostellaria is the only one I can quote for this anapaest: and therefore I should simply omit *hinc* in all three passages. Even if the remedy were not simple, a violent change of one passage would be more critical than a violent change of four. Καὶ περὶ μὲν

τούτων τοσαῦτα ἡμῖν εἰποῦσι καὶ παρὰ τῶν θεῶν καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἡρώων εὐμένεια εἴη. It is perilous to differ from such excellent scholars as Prof. Nettleship and Mr Onions: but as they have all the learning of Germany on their side, as to the scansion of the word at least, they will scarcely heed the dissent of one West Briton.

Mr Onions's paper indeed is one of the most important contributions to Plautine criticism which have lately appeared. His *vixe* Men. 711 (5. 1. 20) and *subnimium* Epid. 232 (2. 2. 48) are especially happy. The much-disputed line Trin. 540 (2. 4. 139), I write:

Sues moriuntur angin*is* acerrime.

Pliny is quite fond of the plural of *angina*[1]. Mr Onions's *angina macerrumae* is alluring, but quinsy does not make its victims thin: they have not time to get thin: it is the agony of their death that is the striking feature. For the phrase cf. Prop. 2. 3. 46: *Acrius ut moriar.*

Mr Onions rejects my conjecture *hircum* in Men. 842 (v. 2. 100)

Haud male illanc amovi: nunc hunc [hircum], inpurissimum.

on the ground that it seems hardly possible before 'Barbatum tremulum Tithonum' in the next line. Why, *barbatum,* I thought, was actually suggested to Plautus by *hircum*: cf. Pseud. 967 (2. 4. 12) *cum hirquina barba.* As to *Tithonum* it is an epithet as in Aristoph. Ach. 688

Ἄνδρα Τιθωνὸν σπαράττων καὶ ταράττων καὶ κυκῶν.

[1] According to Valpy's Index he uses the singular seven times, the plural thirty-one times. *medetur anginis suum* 25. 19; *suum anginas sanat* 26 fin.

Notes on Tibullus.

1. 5. 31 seqq.

Huc veniet Messalla meus, cui dulcia poma
Delia selectis detrahat arboribus:
Et tantum venerata virum hunc sedula curet
Huic paret atque epulas ipsa ministra ferat.

Read

Et tantum venerata virum *se*[1] sedula curet.

Delia is bidden to dress herself in her best to do honour to the illustrious guest: then to prepare dinner, and wait in person. *Se* dropped out before *sedula* and *hunc* was inserted to complete the line. For the phrase *se curare* used of a woman getting herself up nicely, see Plaut. Cist. 1. 1. 15: *Cura te, amabo. Siccine immunda, obsecro, ibis?* Cf. also Gell. 4. 20. The sentiment is illustrated by Tib. 3. 12. 3 (4, 6. 3):

Tota tibi est hodie: tibi se laetissima compsit.

1. 3. 71:

Tum niger in porta serpentum Cerberus ore
Stridet, et aeratas excubat ante fores.

I suggest *per centum Cerberus ora Stridet.* The *belua centiceps* growled through his hundred mouths. I attribute *serpentum* to a scribe who was unwilling to allow more than three heads to Cerberus. Pindar and Horace gave him a hundred.

1. 2. 49, 50:

Cum libet haec tristi depellit nubila caelo:
Cum libet, aestivas convocat ore nives.

ore is very weak and the MSS. are divided between *aestivas—ore* and *aestivo—orbe.* Perhaps *aestivas—aere*: *aes* might be a bell or cymbal, cf. Theoc. 2. 36: τὸ χαλκίον ὡς τάχος ἄχει, or a witch's cauldron.

[1] or *huic se.*

1. 4. 41, seqq.:

Ne comes ire neges, quamvis via longa paretur,
Et canis arenti torreat arva siti:
Quamvis praetexens picea ferrugine caelum
Venturam †annutiat† imbrifer arcus aquam.

No doubt *ortus* is rightly given by Bährens for *arcus*: and either *nubifer* or *nimbifer* is right for *imbrifer*. The verb for which the MSS. give the corruptions *annutiat, amiciat, annutet* and *admittat,* is probably *incutiat*: cf. Ov. Trist. 2. 11. 12:

Improba pugnat *hiems*, indignaturque quod ausim
Scribere, se rigidas *incutiente* minas.

Curt. 8. 4: *imber grandinem incutiens.*

Notes on Propertius.

3. 16. 9.

Peccaram semel et totum sum †portus† in annum
In me mansuetas non habet illa manus.

So the Neapolitanus, corruptly. Most MSS. give *pulsus:* the Perusinus gives *passus.* These variants seem to me to point to a defective line in the archetype wrongly filled up. I think that defective line was:

Peccaram semel et totum sum tus in annum:

that the true reading is

Peccaram semel et totum sum *tusus*[1] in annum.

'I offended her once, and I got thumped for it for a whole year': this agrees with 'non mansuetas manus': but how does 'pulsus' agree with it? For *tusus* cf. Mart. 5. 65. 4: *Et gravis in Siculo pulvere tusus Eryx:* where *tusus* is rightly read by Schneider

[1] Perhaps *optusus* would be a shade better: *optus* would account for *portus.* Cf. Lucilius, *obtuso ore pugil.*

with P for *fusus*. I believe that here *us* fell out after *us*, and the scribe of N put in the first word he thought of that would eke out a line: and that the more learned scribes corrected with *pulsus* and *passus* as words which would give some sort of sense. If this theory be true, the theory of a year long *discidium* between Propertius and Cynthia falls to the ground. In any case 1. 1. 7: *Et mihi iam toto furor hic non deficit anno* does not lend the faintest support to it.

4. 3. 53.

Omnia nuda tacent, rarisque adsueta Kalendis
Vix aperit clausos una puella Lares.

By separating *adsueta* into *ad sueta* these lines can be easily rectified. 'On the seldom recurring Kalends my solitary maid-servant takes out the Lares for their accustomed rites': for *sueta* in this sense of customary rites, see Apuleius, Met. 4. 8: *se ad sectae sueta conferunt.* Cf. Festus, s.v. *sueta.*

A. PALMER.

NOTE ON THE EARLY ITALIAN HUTS.

SINCE writing my paper on the Prytaneum, &c., which appeared in the last number of the Journal of Philology, I have learned from Helbig's able book (*Die Italiker in der Poebene*, Leipzig, 1879) that the views which I ventured to put forward in that paper on the shape and materials of the early Italian huts[1] had been strongly confirmed, if not fully established, by the result of excavations in Italy made some years ago. I have Prof. Helbig's leave to give a brief summary of his facts and conclusions in so far as they bear on the points raised in my paper.

A considerable number of prehistoric villages have been disinterred within late years in the Emilia and Lombardy. They are built on piles by the banks of rivers and streams, and usually on the same site there are remains of three such villages, one above the other; the lower villages exhibiting traces of fire. From the remains found in them it appears that the inhabitants belonged to the stone and bronze ages, or rather to a period in the bronze age at which stone implements were still not only employed but manufactured; the villages in the Emilia exhibit a preponderance of bronze, those in Lombardy of stone, utensils. Different views have been held as to the race which built these villages. Helbig decides against the Celts on the ground that the bronze utensils found in the villages are much inferior to those of the countries north of the Alps from which the Celts migrated[2], and also because the

[1] I described them as "round huts of wattled osiers with peaked roofs of thatch."

[2] Some archaeologists however now hold that the great majority of bronze objects which have been found in central Europe are not of Celtic but Italian manufacture. See J. N. von

objects which tradition regards as especially characteristic of the Celts (the long iron sword, the necklace, the gold ornaments) are all absent from the villages. Besides over some of the villages have been found remains of Etruscan settlements. But as the Celts are known to have invaded and conquered the Etruscans, to attribute the lower and older remains to the conquerors would be preposterous. Again the people could not have been Ligurians; for though the Ligurians appear at a remote date to have occupied a great part of Italy, and to be indeed the oldest race in the peninsula, they were found as late as about 104 B.C. by the philosopher Posidonius, who visited them on that lovely coast now familiar to us as the Riviera, to be in a state of barbarism or savagery much lower than that of the inhabitants of the pile-villages. Posidonius describes the Ligurians as wild huntsmen, almost ignorant of agriculture, clad in skins, and dwelling mostly in the clefts of the rocks. Helbig concludes that the people who built these pile-villages were the forefathers of the Italians who made a long halt in the valley of the Po before they resumed their southward march.

Out of 175 huts (or rather foundations of huts) found in the neighbourhood of Bologna, all but three were round and appear from the remaining fragments of the walls to have been constructed of clay and brushwood. In the Emilia and the valley of the Vibrata several hundreds of such foundations were found, all of them round and corresponding in size and arrangement to those of Bologna. This primitive sort of hut appears to have persisted down to the end of the fifth century B.C. on the east side of the Apennines, where the Greek influence was less felt; for to the Greeks the 'restless Adriatic' seems to have been almost a closed sea, at least on its western shores.

For an insight into the primitive mode of hut-building to the west of the Apennines, a clue is afforded us by the older portion of the cemetery at Alba Longa. Here the ashes of the dead are deposited in earthen vessels which are obviously copies of the

Sadowski; *Die Handelstrassen der Griechen und Römer durch das Flussgebiet der Oder, Weichsel, des Dniepr und Niemen an die Gestade des Baltischen Meeres* (Jena 1877), ch. iv.

dwellings of the living. The urns represent round huts, of which the walls (says Helbig) must be supposed to have been constructed of clay, brushwood, or other perishable stuff. The roof appears to have been made of layers of straw or reeds, held together by wooden ribs. There was no regular opening in the roof corresponding to the later *compluvium*, the door in primitive fashion doing duty also as window and chimney; though some of the urns have a small triangular hole on the front or back slope of the roof. The actual huts, of which remains were discovered on the Esquiline and not far from Marino, appear to have corresponded to these miniature huts. For evidence of the materials of the early Latin huts, Helbig next points to the Hut of Romulus, as it was called, a structure of reeds and straw on the Palatine, and to a similar structure in the temple of Jupiter on the Capitol, which was kept in constant repair by the addition of fresh brushwood (Conon, *Narrationes* 48, in Photius, *Bibliotheca*, p. 141 ed. Bekker). For evidence of the shape of the huts, he remarks that when an artist had to depict scenes from the early history of Latium with buildings in the background, these buildings were always round. From all this he infers that at the time when the Latin race settled on the Alban Mountain to spread thence over the Campagna, they still retained the primitive kind of hut which had housed their ancestors in the forest-clearings by the rivers of North Italy.

Applying these results to the temple of Vesta, Helbig concludes that its round shape was a survival of the old Italian hut; and he finds the origin of the perpetual holy fire of Vesta in the practical need of keeping up a fire from which the villagers could at any time get a light. Lastly, from the etymological connexion of Ἑστία and Vesta, he draws the inference that the custom of keeping up a public fire for the benefit of the village may date from Graeco-Italian times. That we should have reached the same conclusion independently and by different roads is a strong presumption in favour of its truth[1].

[1] In a note to my former paper I referred to the religious aversion of Roman priests to iron, but omitted to notice what is perhaps the most striking example of it, namely the obligation laid on the Arval Brothers to offer

As to Greek houses, Mr C. D. Tsountas in a paper on the prehistoric graves of Greece (in the Ἐφημερὶς ἀρχαιολογική, No. 1, 1885) supposes that the round shape of the beehive tombs at Mycenae, Orchomenus, &c., was a survival of the earliest form of Greek dwelling; and he thinks that the mysterious Homeric θόλος may have been a primitive round hut preserved in later architecture, like the round temple of Vesta or the Hut of Romulus on the Palatine. As he mentions the wide-spread custom of burying the dead in the house and then deserting it, he would seem to suggest that the custom of building these beehive tombs grew out of such an earlier custom. House-burial is certainly stated by the ancients themselves to have been the original custom both of Greeks and Latins (Plato, *Minos* 315 d; Servius on *Aen.* v. 64, vi. 152). But after all it is to be remembered that the motive to build tombs and dwellings of this shape in stone may have been simply a constructional one (for they are easiest to build), and not a desire to imitate earlier huts of this form built of wood and other perishable materials.

J. G. FRAZER.

an expiatory sacrifice of a lamb and a pig whenever they used an iron tool in their sacred grove (Marquardt, *Römische Staatsverwaltung*², iii. p. 459).

The sceptical Nissen whispers in a note to his *Italische Landeskunde* (p. 447) that the idyllic inhabitants of the pile-villages may have been mere prosaic Roman backwoodsmen of the second century B.C. His suspicions are roused by the fact that wheat has been found in the pile-villages, whereas according to Verrius Flaccus (in Pliny, *Nat. Hist.* 18, 63) wheat was unknown to the Romans up to 454 B.C. But Helbig with apparent justice thinks it incredible that the Romans should have been ignorant of wheat at a time when the Greek cities of Southern Italy and Sicily appear to have not only cultivated but exported it, and he ingeniously explains away the statement of Verrius Flaccus (p. 65 *sq.*). Besides, wheat was found in the earliest lake-dwellings of Western Switzerland (A. de Candolle, *Origin of cultivated plants*, p. 355). Finally Professor Middleton assures me that the objects found in these Italian pile-villages (at least those preserved at Rome) are beyond doubt prehistoric; the pottery in particular is of the rudest and most archaic type.

ON THEAETETUS 158 E—160 A.

THE consecution of the argument contained in this passage is by no means obvious at all points. Prof. Campbell indeed considers that it involves a logical fallacy. But since the theory of relativity herein propounded is in all essentials Platonic, it is certain that Plato did not intentionally introduce a fallacy; and that he did so unwittingly is a supposition which it is always unsafe to venture upon, except after the minutest investigation of his words. To such an examination it may be worth while, I think, to subject the present passage.

The argument runs as follows. If two things are in all points different, says Sokrates, they have no power or faculty in common, whether of doing or of suffering; they are dissimilar altogether. We may indeed use the terms different and dissimilar as equivalent, and likewise same and similar. Now we have agreed that the number of agents and of patients is alike unlimited, and the intercourse of different agents and patients produces different results. As an example, Sokrates well and Sokrates sick, each taken as a whole unit, are dissimilar and thus, by admission, different. Accordingly one and the same agent will find in Sokrates sick a different patient from Sokrates well: consequently the perception and percept generated between agent and patient will be different in the two cases. When wine, for instance, is acting on Sokrates well, the quality and perception of sweetness are generated; when on Sokrates sick, the quality and perception of bitterness. The reason is that the patient is different: for the result produced between a given agent and a given patient cannot be produced between a different agent and the same patient, nor between the same

agent and a different patient, nor finally by either agent or patient in relation to itself; since agent and patient reciprocally require each other and have their existence only in their mutual correlation.

In the foregoing propositions this difficulty presents itself. At 158 E special emphasis is laid on *complete* difference: *καὶ μὴ ὑπολάβωμεν τῇ μὲν ταὐτὸν εἶναι ὃ ἐρωτῶμεν, τῇ δὲ ἕτερον, ἀλλ' ὅλως ἕτερον.* Yet, as Prof. Campbell observes, 'Socrates ill can hardly be said to be *ὅλως ἕτερον*, wholly different, from Socrates well.' Since then a partial difference in the patient is sufficient to produce difference in the perception and percept, why is this stress previously laid on the totality of difference?

To this question I think an answer may be returned of this kind. At the beginning Plato is stating the theory universally: given a change in either *ποιοῦν* or *πάσχον*, the *αἴσθησις* and *αἰσθητὸν* will be changed too. But, it must be noticed, in order that this may be universally true, the difference must be complete. If we are to have two things which will be differently affected by every possible agent, it is clear that the two things must be absolutely dissimilar at all points, having no single quality in common. In its abstract and universal significance then the theory requires total dissimilarity. But when we come to apply it to particular instances, the case is changed. It may be doubted whether there exist in the nature of things two *πάσχοντα* which will not be similarly affected by some *ποιοῦντα*: and certainly Sokrates sick and Sokrates well are not of this kind. Wine may be sweet to one and bitter to the other, but fire will scorch both. In fact, when we descend to particular instances, the necessity for total dissimilarity ceases, because we are viewing the patient in one single relation only. For so far as concerns the particular experiment, Sokrates sick is totally different from Sokrates well. We are viewing Sokrates solely in his relation to the wine. What is Sokrates in relation to the wine? simply a capacity of tasting. So far as concerns the wine, Sokrates does not exist as anything else; and if the wine and Sokrates were the sum-total of things, Sokrates would be nothing else. So then, regarded from the point of view of the wine, Sokrates sick is *ὅλως ἕτερον*, although,

regarded in relation to other *ποιοῦντα*, he is not so. It would seem then that the apparent inconsequence is due to the fact that the law is stated universally, while in practice it never can be applied universally. The statement is in fact only partially correct, because the conditions which it assumes are only partially fulfilled.

I wish in conclusion to advert to the paragraph in 159 A: *εἰ ἄρα τι ξυμβαίνει ὅμοιόν τῳ γίγνεσθαι ἢ ἀνόμοιον, εἴτε ἑαυτῷ εἴτε ἄλλῳ, ὁμοιούμενον μὲν ταὐτὸν φήσομεν γίγνεσθαι, ἀνομοιούμενον δὲ ἕτερον.* On this Prof. Campbell comments as follows: '"What is the same is like, therefore what is like is the same." This is one of many examples of the imperfect state of logic which puts Socrates' respondent at his mercy.' Surely this does the Platonic Sokrates a little less than justice. For in the first place, if two objects are exactly similar in all respects, they may be said to be 'the same' in every sense short of numerical identity, which it will hardly be contended is here meant by Sokrates—indeed it cannot be meant, since what is numerically *ταὐτὸν* is not *ὅμοιον*. Suppose a naturalist were classifying a number of specimens and were to find a cockchafer among them, should we charge him with incorrect speech, if on finding another cockchafer he were to say 'this is the same as the former'? Secondly, even conceding for the moment that Plato has used the word *ταὐτὸν* in a loose manner, this is entirely immaterial to the argument. The conclusion turns, not upon the point that *ὅμοιον* is *ταὐτόν*, but wholly upon the point that *ἀνόμοιον* is *ἕτερον*, which in any case is true. Consequently no illogical inference whatever is drawn by Sokrates.

R. D. ARCHER-HIND.

NOTE ON PROPERTIUS I. 21, 1—4.

Mr J. P. Postgate did me the honour in the last number of the Journal of Philology to notice an emendation of this passage, which I had ventured to propose in the previous number. My note, which, as he truly says, was of a very "cursory" character, seems to have proved unintelligible to Mr Postgate. I can only plead *brevis esse laborabam*, and endeavour to express my meaning more clearly and fully than before. First however let me assure Mr Postgate that I much regret to find myself involved in a controversy as to the meaning of a Propertian Elegy with a scholar, whose claims to be heard on any subject connected with Propertius are so much higher than my own. I confine my remarks to the first four lines of the Elegy, which stand as follows in the MSS.[1]:

Tu, qui consortem properas euadere casum,
Miles, ab Etruscis saucius aggeribus,
Quid nostro gemitu turgentia lumina torques?
Pars ego sum uestrae proxima militiae.

[Mr Postgate writes *cursum* for *casum* in line 1. Is this a misprint?]

I quite agree with Mr Postgate as, I think, my previous note implied, that "*Quid nostro gemitu lumina torques?*" can "certainly not" mean, "Why do you turn your eyes from my *gemitus*?" The only translation, which the laws of grammar

[1] The interpretation of the remaining lines depends entirely upon the reading, which is very uncertain. As Mr Postgate justly surmises, our views are wholly at variance; and indeed (as he says) this is "by no means surprising." (For Mr Postgate's view see Select Elegies, p. 104.)

permit, is, no doubt, that suggested by Hertzberg, "Why do you turn your eyes at my *gemitus?*" This however, to quote Mr Postgate's own words (Select Elegies, p. 104), "makes Gallus ask a senseless question", and is therefore, as I hold, impossible. We are then agreed that *quid* is out of place here, and it becomes necessary to substitute some word in its stead. Mr Postgate adopts *qui*, an emendation of the renaissance; I would prefer *quin* on the following grounds: (1) That it makes better sense of the passage, (2) That, palaeographically, an original *quin* would be more likely to be corrupted to *quid* than an original *qui*. Mr Postgate, reading *qui*, holds that the first three lines of the Elegy are not "part of the dying man's speech, but are simply put into his mouth by the poet, to avoid the introductory mention, which would have been necessary in prose". This explanation seems highly forced and unnatural, and *Pars ego sum uestrae proxima militiae* is surely a very awkward and abrupt beginning for the dying speech. Reading *quin* instead of *qui*, I suppose the whole poem to be "put into Gallus' mouth by the poet", and therefore "part of his speech", though not of his last behests. The first three lines I regard as an adjuration or exhortation, in which Gallus urges a wounded soldier, who passes, escaping homeward from the sack of Perusia, to turn a pitying eye at his plaintive appeal. In the fourth line Gallus gives the grounds, on which he bases his appeal, *Pars ego sum uestrae proxima militiae;* the actual behest begins with *Sic te seruato* in the fifth line. *Pars ego sum uestrae proxima militiae*, I take to mean, I am the nearest and dearest of your fellow-soldiers. This view seems to be supported by the mention of *parentes* and *soror*, which should imply previous intimacy between the two men. Mr Postgate agrees with me in taking *militia* to mean "soldiery", and refers to a passage in Justin in support of his views (Select Elegies, p. 104). He would have done better to quote the authority of Ovid, a great imitator of Propertius, who uses the expression *pars militiae* no less than three times, (Her. VIII. 46, Met. VII. 483, and XI. 216). In the line from the Heroides, which runs *Hic pars militiae, dux fuit ille ducum, pars militiae* is equivalent simply to *unus e militibus*, its meaning in the passage now

before us. An exactly parallel use of *proximus* may be found in the Epistles from Pontus III. 6, 53,

longo mihi proximus usu
Si nulla libri parte legare mei,

where Ovid is writing to a *sodalis*, as Gallus here is addressing a *commilito*. Mr Postgate (Select Elegies l. c.) supposes the line to mean "I am the nearest of your fellow-soldiers", taking nearest in the strict sense of actual local proximity, an explanation, which, as he most justly says, "may seem too obvious". The picture, which these four lines are intended to convey, seems to me something like the following: It is the end of 41 B.C., or the beginning of 40 B.C.; not 51 B.C. as Mr Postgate, doubtless by a printer's error, is made to say (Select Elegies, p. 103). Perusia has for several months been held by L. Antonius against the forces of Octavian. At last after a desperate resistance it has been forced by famine to capitulate. Gallus, a distinguished soldier in the army of Antonius, has succeeded in escaping the swords of Octavian's soldiers, only to fall by the hands of brigands on his way home. As he lies dying on the road a wounded soldier passes by, hurrying homewards as fast as his wounds will permit. He looks neither to right nor left and is very little likely, after the scenes of horror through which he has just passed, to pay attention to any moans, which he may happen to hear. Gallus accosts him, and adjures him to turn a pitying eye at the plaintive appeal. At first the soldier hurries on unheeding, but when he hears the words *Pars ego sum uestrae proxima militiae*, he cannot close his ears to the urgent exhortation (*quin torques?*) of an old comrade, he stays and receives the message, which Gallus desires to send. In my former note I wrote the "dead" Gallus. I had the Archytas Ode of Horace in mind at the moment (Hor. Od. I. 28, where the "dead" Archytas implores a passing sailor to cast the three handfuls of dust), but gladly adopt the correction "dying", as the case of Archytas is not really parallel. This is however quite immaterial to the general sense of the Elegy. Mr Postgate objects to "tale of woe" as a translation of *gemitus*. "Plaint" or "moan" or "plaintive appeal" would no

doubt be preferable as a translation, which "tale of woe" is not and was not intended to be. The phrase was however used advisedly to shew that I regard *gemitus* as meaning not "moans of pain", but the "plaintive appeal" uttered by Gallus in the first four lines of the Elegy. Does Mr Postgate assert that *gemitus* necessarily means "moans of pain", or only that it does so in this passage? In the former case I would refer him, among other instances, to Vergil G. IV. 353, and Aen. II. 73, where *gemitus* is used, respectively, of the "plaintive appeal" made by Aristaeus to Cyrene, and by Simo to the Trojans. In the latter case it becomes a mere question of taste, and as such I am content to leave it. Mr Postgate censures "tear-laden" as a translation of *turgentia*. Again I employed the word purposely, to make it clear, that I take "*turgentia*" to mean not "swollen with pain", but "big with rising tears", *turgentia* being used proleptically, so that *turgentia torques* is almost equivalent in sense to *torques et fles*. Mr Postgate states that *turgentia* always means "swollen" never "swelling". Mr Postgate *dixit; ita est;* still the unbelieving world ventures sometimes to question even an *ex cathedra* statement. Take for instance two passages from Vergil, E. VII. 48, *Iam laeto turgent in palmite gemmae,* and G. I. 315, *Frumenta in uiridi stipula lactentia turgent.* Would Mr Postgate translate the buds "are swollen" on the vine-shoot, and the corn "is swollen" on the stalk? Professor Conington in his Translation gives the buds "are swelling", and the corn "is swelling", and the picture thus conveyed seems much more natural and poetical. Servius too, who wrote while Latin was still a living language, says in his note on the passage from the Eclogues, *non aestatem dicit* (*Vergilius*) *cum adhuc turgere* (*gemmas*) *dicat.* This must surely mean "are still swelling", not "are still swollen". So Ovid Fast. III. 757, *turgentia ora* means "swelling" not "swollen" face. Silenus has only just been stung, and his face is still "swelling" not already "swollen". It should also be noted that he has been stung in the face. That there is anything improbable in Gallus asking a fellow-soldier, even though wounded, to turn and shed a tear, when a dear old comrade lies dying before him, I entirely fail to perceive. To suppose that Propertius represented the wounded soldier with

his eyes swollen from the pain of his wounds, (was he wounded in the face?) seems to me pointless, tasteless and impossible. This however is again only a question of taste, and *de gustibus non est disputandum.* We now come to the real point at issue between us, viz. the meaning of *quin* interrogative, and the probability of its having been used by Propertius in this passage. On both these points I regret to find myself at variance with Mr Postgate. Mr Postgate asserts that this interrogative use of *quin* necessarily constitutes "one of the strongest imperatives in the Latin language" (that it may do so I do not for a moment deny), and quotes Mr Roby's Grammar in support of this assertion. Is Mr Postgate quoting Mr Roby from memory, or is his edition different from mine? (London, Macmillan & Co., 1874). In my edition (Pt. II. p. 265, §§ 1613—1617) Mr Roby's views on the subject of *quin* interrogative are expressed as follows: The interrogative, (*c*) "Implying an exhortation; especially with...*quin* (= *qui ne*, 'how not?') e.g....*quin urges?* 'why not press?'" The instances given by Mr Roby seem, not unnaturally, to support this theory of the meaning. Mr Postgate censures the use of "adjures" as too weak an equivalent for the command, necessarily conveyed by "one of the strongest of Latin imperatives", yet accepts Mr Roby's authority. Mr Roby says that this interrogative use of *quin* "implies an exhortation". Is an "exhortation" stronger than an "adjuration"? Mr Postgate objects to the translation "Why turnest thou not?", and proposes as an exact equivalent "Why don't you turn?" Does Mr Postgate hold that "Why don't you?" is necessarily "one of the strongest imperatives" in the English language, or that the English imperatives are stronger than the Latin? One of these views he must hold, if things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another. I used the second person singular, following Mr Postgate's own example (Select Elegies, p. 103). The plural "Why do you not turn?" would however answer the purpose equally well; "Why don't you?" is, possibly, a little too colloquial to be used in translating an elegy of so pathetic a character. What precise difference of meaning there may be between the three varieties of expression, Mr Postgate perhaps may be able to define. As a matter

of fact the interrogative *quin*, like "why don't?" in English, implies a wish or opinion, on the part of the speaker, that the suggestion conveyed in the question should be complied with. The strength of the wish or opinion depends entirely on the accent and tone of voice, with which the question is put. It may be little more than a mere suggestion, it may be an urgent appeal, it may be equivalent to a strong imperative. Mr Postgate says further that *quin* occurs "several times" in Propertius, nowhere with this interrogative sense. *Quin* is found twelve times in Propertius, never (elsewhere) with this special sense, unless II. 18. 21 (Baehrens) be reckoned as an instance. It also occurs thirty-four times in Vergil, once only with the interrogative, Aen. IV. 99, *Quin potius pacem aeternam pactosque hymenaeos Exercemus?* Assuming the proportion to be the same in Propertius and Vergil, the chances are considerably over five to one that if the interrogative *quin* occurred in this passage, it would not be found elsewhere in Propertius. The argument therefore—*valeat quantum*—tells strongly against the conclusion, which Mr Postgate attempts to draw from it. In the twelve passages where *quin* occurs in Propertius, *quis* is twice found as a variant, *quid*, as it happens, never. My view of the general situation, intended to be represented in these four lines, remains precisely the same as before, and is briefly the following:

Gallus, lying in his last agonies on the road, accosts a wounded soldier, who happens to pass by, and adjures him to turn and let his eyes grow big with tears at this plaintive appeal from an old and familiar comrade.

J. H. ONIONS.

A LAST WORD ON PROPERTIUS I. 21. 1—4.

I AM glad to have been allowed this opportunity of expressing my thanks to Mr Onions for the very courteous way in which he has spoken of my contributions to the study of Propertius and my regret at having still to differ from so accomplished a scholar as all readers of this Journal know Mr Onions to be. I must however ask permission to decline the numerous questions, interesting without doubt but not strictly germane to the interpretation of these lines, which Mr Onions has raised, and to confine myself to putting once more with all brevity the main grounds on which I am obliged to take exception to his conclusions.

I objected to the proposed reading and interpretation of *quin* for three reasons, to which I added parenthetically and with a *quantum valeat* a fourth—the non-occurrence of *quin* in the required sense in the extant works of Propertius. It was an *ex silentio* argument on which I did not insist and never should have insisted; and now in acknowledgment of Mr Onions' criticism I am glad to withdraw it. But the other three objections remain, and to these I now revert. (1) I maintained that *quin* was 'one of the strongest imperatives in Latin' and, as such, quite unsuitable to the present context. Mr Onions in reply considers how far I accept the statement of the usages of *quin* in Mr Roby's *Latin Grammar* to which I had only referred for illustrative examples, and in what way it should be translated in the present passage. To my mind the latter question, though admitted for the sake of convenience, is really quite irrelevant. We are concerned here with Latin meaning,

not English rendering: and until a parallel for the supposed usage is produced from some Latin author, I shall continue to hold that *quin torques* cannot express any entreaty, "exhortation" or "adjuration" appropriate to the present passage. (2) In reply to my observations on *turgentia lumina* Mr Onions swerves again to consider how I should render *turgentia* into English. "Mr Postgate," he says, "states that *turgentia* always means 'swollen' never 'swelling.' Mr Postgate *dixit; ita est;* still the unbelieving world ventures sometimes to question even an *ex cathedra* statement." And he goes on to ask if in Virg. Ecl. 7. 48 I should translate "the buds 'are swollen' on the stalk." Unfortunately, all this is beside the mark. What I wrote was: "*Turgentia lumina*," i.e. the *phrase*, "are not 'tear-laden eyes' but eyes '*swollen*' with crying"; and I quoted one passage (there are more) in support of my view. Let Mr Onions quote an example on his part; and I will admit that the modern and sentimental 'tear-laden eyes' is a *possible* interpretation in this passage. As a matter of taste indeed, Mr Onions says that "To suppose Propertius represented the wounded soldier with his eyes swollen from the pain of his wounds (was he wounded in the face?)" seems to him "pointless, tasteless and impossible." The view thus sweepingly condemned is not mine, though it is one which I should not be ashamed to defend. Why should not the man have been wounded in the face just as well as in some other part of his person? Is there nothing "pathetic" or "poetical" in an allusion to the marred features of the wounded soldier? Was there no special significance in Caesar's order to his veterans to strike at the faces of the young Pompeian nobles? As a matter of fact, we are not told to what the 'swollen eyes' were due, whether to actual wounds on the soldier's face or to his crying from the pain of wounds in an unspecified locality, or even, to take a still possible supposition (cp. Prop. III. 23 (II. 28) 7), to his crying under the influence of fear; and I am content to refrain from determining what Propertius has left uncertain. (3) Mr Onions cites two passages from Virgil G. 4. 353 and A. 2. 73 in support of his translation of *gemitu* as "plaintive appeal." It may be observed, however, that in those places the "plaintive appeal" has been fully set forth in the preceding

context, and so there is no possibility of mistake. But that is not the case here. The interpretation of the word in the present passage Mr Onions says is "a mere matter of taste." I should prefer to say of 'judgment'; and "as such I am content to leave it."

In conclusion I must express my surprise at the stricture of "highly forced and unnatural" which Mr Onions passes on my remark that the first three lines form a kind of preface to the poem for the purpose of putting the situation before us. Apart from the question of the interpretation of l. 3, I should have thought this self-evident.

J. P. POSTGATE.

CAMBRIDGE: PRINTED BY C. J. CLAY, M.A., & SONS, AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS.

ON AURELIUS VICTOR.

In 1884 a Berlin scholar, Dr Arthur Cohn, published a pamphlet[1] on Aurelius Victor's *Liber de Caesaribus, &c.*, in which he gave, as an appendix, the readings of a hitherto unknown MS. of Victor in the Bodleian. In collating the same MS. for Prof. Mommsen, I found that Dr Cohn had made several errors, and, though it would be useless to print the full collation (any new editor would make one for himself), some of the mistakes deserve correction. The MS. is a paper one of the 14th century, containing a Latin version of Xenophon's memorabilia as well as Victor, and is well written and very legible. The pressmark, which Dr Cohn oddly omits, is Canonici Lat. 131.

In the 'Praefatio' prefixed to the whole MS. (Cohn, pp. 71, 72) correct the following:—Episcopum Tusculanum] del. corr. Issarion] issarion, with a space for the capital B, commencing the paragraph. merenti (?)] meriti. 1.] L. Xenophontis] xenofontis. io (?)] iō, = ideo. tibitibi (sic)] tibi. rationem (?)] the word is unmistakable. immitationem] in imitatiònem. eorum] earum. Athenis...ia (??)] athenis īuria = iniuria. probatur] probato. proserpō] pro se īpo = ipso. dominus] dominus iudicum. The Greek at the bottom of p. 72 is quite wrong, though given correctly in Dr Coxe's printed Catalogue of the Canonici MSS. In l. 7 from the bottom of page 72, by *sinistra* is meant the right hand, in l. 3 the left hand of two opposite pages.

[1] *Quibus ex fontibus S. Aurelii Victoris libri de caesaribus et epitomes xi capita priora fluxerint.* (Berlin: Adolf Cohn) 1884.

In the collation of the *Caesares* (Cohn, pp. 85—104)[1] the following seem to be the chief corrections affecting the text of Victor or the general accuracy of the MS. Readings inside the lemma are Cohn's, outside, those of the Bodleian MS. (O)[2].

Ch. 1. 1. The edd. have secundo, exercitam, O, duobus, exercitum.

2. 1. imperrium] imperium. 3. circumuentus] circumuentus sueuorum rex. contractas] contractas undique cohortes.

3. 8. recens] recenss̩ (edd. veteris). 12. culto] cultu (corr.). 17. p̃rī] prīs̩ = patri.

4. 1. Drysadarum O, not Drysudarum, as Cohn, p. 81.

5. 1. nomen neroni O.

8. 3. compẽ O.

9. 1. brevi refecit] prebire fecit. 10. exercita] exercito (corr. from exercitu).

10. 5. provinciis] provincie firsthand, corr. to -ciis.

11. 5. persesequebatur] peresequebatur (firsthand) corrected to persesequebatur. 13. insitivvis] insitiṇuis.

12. 1. Narniensi edd., Cretensi O. 2. prospexit edd., perspexit O.

13. 1. loca] loco corr. from loca. 3. concuse] contuse Cui. uetestamento] ṇe testamento. 9. angebatur] agebatur.

14. 1. compoita] compoīta = composita. 10. idoque] idcircoque. 13. merebatur O.

17. 7. inseuit iam cauēt O.

20. 6. quae] que (and so correct elsewhere). 15 and 24. the letters are not superscriptae. 25. adesse] ^{ad}desse. 27. britanniae] britanie.

24. 2. tempetabatur] temtetabatur, corr. to temptabatur.

26. 5. iudices] iudices uulgo ceduntur.

29. et Iothapiani] uel Iothapinni.

31. 3. "cum or eum" Cohn] eum.

[1] Dr Cohn's readings are scattered over more pages, and are hard to collect. Most of them are pp. 85—104.

[2] This symbol is used by Mommsen.

33. 8. lelianum] leliani (Cohn correctly, p. 96).
34. 1. perdice] perdite.
35. 2. alemannorum] alam-.
37. 7. et] et before pene, ac before posteras.
38. 6. aṗri] apṛi.
39. 9. 'post Carinus rasura' Cohn. The '-us' is 'in rasura'.
40. 2. qůq] quaq̊.
40. 30. accius] acr̃ius = accrius, corr. to acrius.
41. 8. calcedone] calcedona.
42. 4. proclis] proclius.

In the important passage, 40. 15, O reads 'absistentibus', which as Mommsen remarks (*Sitzungsber. kgl. Pr. Akad.* 1884, 958) is probably nearer the true text than the older reading (ads-) was.

F. HAVERFIELD.

ARISTOTLE POLITICS III, 2. 2 (Congreve); 1275*b*, 26.

Γοργίας μὲν οὖν ὁ Λεοντῖνος, τὰ μὲν ἴσως ἀπορῶν, τὰ δ' εἰρωνευόμενος ἔφη, καθάπερ ὅλμους εἶναι τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ὁλμοποιῶν πεποιημένους, οὕτω καὶ Λαρισαίους τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν δημιουργῶν πεποιημένους.

Editors have always taken for granted that no record has been handed down of the particular occasion in the history of Larisa, which called forth this famous jest. There is however a passage in Xenophon's *Hellenica* II. 3, 4, which throws some light on the subject, and as far as I know has hitherto escaped notice. It is as follows:—

κατὰ δὲ τοῦτον τὸν καιρὸν περὶ ἡλίου ἔκλειψιν Λυκόφρων ὁ Φεραῖος βουλόμενος ἄρξαι ὅλης τῆς Θετταλίας τοὺς ἐναντιουμένους αὐτῷ τῶν Θετταλῶν, Λαρισαίους τε καὶ ἄλλους, μάχῃ ἐνίκησε καὶ πολλοὺς ἀπέκτεινεν.

Was then to repair these losses, and to strengthen themselves against the aggression of the chieftains of Pherae, that the Larisaeans created a new batch of citizens, just as we find them doing 200 years later under like circumstances, as recorded in the great inscription recently found at Larisa, part of which I quoted on this passage, when discussing it at length in the *Transactions of the Cambridge Philological Society*, Vol. II. pp. 137 seqq.?

There are no chronological difficulties. The slaughter of the Larisaeans mentioned by Xenophon is in the year of Anarchy (404 B.C.), whilst Gorgias did not die till 379 or 375 B.C.

Probably it was to this same event that the lost speech of Thrasymachus *ὑπὲρ Λαρισαίων* (Jebb *Att. Or.* II. 47, Sauppe *Or. Att.* II. 162) referred.

WILLIAM RIDGEWAY.

NOTES ON PLAUTUS, MERCATOR, PROL. 54, AND III. 1, 26, (524).

PROL. 54. *Summo haec clamore; interdum mussans conloqui*
Abnuere;

In a recent number of the *Philological Journal* I conjectured the existence of a word *mussim* from Paulus 6, 9, *quidam amussim dicunt non tacite.* I suggested at the same time that *musse* should be read for *mussans* in this passage of the *Mercator,* preferring *musse* to *mussim* as nearer to the MSS reading *mussa* or *missa.* Since then I have found that the form *mussim* actually occurs in the San Gallen Glossary, recently published by Professor Minton Warren, and in a Latin-German Glossary quoted by Dieffenbach in his Glossarium Latino-Germanicum. The San Gallen Glossary has *mussim, lente,* the Latin-German Glossary *mussim,* heymelich, and on the strength of these two glosses I would now write *mussim* rather than *musse.*

Merc. III. 1, 26, (524).

L. *Ouem tibi eccillam dabo, natam annos sexaginta,*
Peculiarem.
P. *Mei senex, tam uetulam!*

Eccillam is a conjecture of Bothe's; of the MSS, A has *ecillam,* B *ancillam,* C, D, F, *ecce illam.* Other conjectures are *ad rem illam, millam, bellam, aniculam* and *Apulam.* Of these the most attractive are perhaps Buecheler's *aniculam* and Bugge's *millam,* yet neither is entirely satisfactory. *Millam* seems to give the kind of sense required by the passage, but is wide of the MSS, and introduces a somewhat awkward rhythm. *Aniculam,* though close to the *ancillam* of B, would hardly account for *ecillam,* the reading of A, and it may perhaps be doubted whether Plautus would have applied the epithet *anicula* to an *ouis,* used simply as a comic term for an old man. Professor Warren's *Apulam* is hardly sufficiently near to the MSS, and scarcely seems to harmonize with the disparaging tone suggested

by *natam annos sexaginta* and *tam uetulam*. The sort of word which the context appears to require is some rather uncomplimentary adjective, probably a diminutive, applicable at once to a sheep and an old man, which will account for the MSS varieties *ecillam* and *ancillam*. I venture with considerable diffidence to suggest *apeiculam* (*apiculam*) as fulfilling these conditions perhaps better than any other word which has been suggested. It is the diminutive of *apeica* (*apica*), a word which as we know from Paulus 25, 13, was used of a sheep which had no wool on its belly, *Apica dicitur ouis, quae uentrem glabrum habet* (cf. Varr. R. R. II, 2, 3; Plin. VIII, 48 (75), 198). There does not seem to be any evidence to shew that *apicus* itself was ever applied to men, but the derivative *apiciosus* is found several times in glossaries with the explanation *caluus* or *caluaster*. (Gloss. San. Gall. has *apitiosus, calbus*, Gloss. Mai VII, 551 b, *apiciosus, caluus*, Gloss. Isid. and Osbernus, *apiciosus, caluus, caluaster*. In Mai VI. 508 b, there are two distinct glosses, *apiciolus, caluaster*, and *apiciosus, caluus*, and it would seem that this was also the case in the original of Gloss. Isid. and Osbernus.) *Apicius* too, which appears to be connected with *apicus*, was in use as a proper name in the same way as *Caluus*. *Apicus* or *apiculus* seems then just the adjective which might naturally be used at once of a sheep and an old man, who would no doubt be represented as partially bald. At the same time it accounts fairly well for the MSS varieties TIBIECILLAM (A), and *tibi ancillam* (B). The common archetype would have originally TIBEIAPEICULAM. In some ancestor of A in which the old orthography was preserved, this would be corrupted to TIBEICULAM, the copyist's eye passing from the EI of TIBEI to the EI of APEICULAM, and then altered to TIBIECILLAM, in order to make sense. In the B family of MSS on the other hand in which a modernized system of spelling had been adopted, an unusual word like APICULAM might very easily be altered to the much commoner ANCILLAM. I would suggest then that the line should run:

Ouém tibi apeiculám dabo, natam ánnos sexagínta.

J. H. ONIONS.

PLACIDIANA (ed. Deuerling).

P. 2, 13. *Altilitate,* ab alendo, id est ipsa res quae alitur.

I suggested in a previous number of the Journal that *altilitate,* which is confessedly corrupt, was due to a confusion of two distinct glosses, *altilis* and *aetatem* (cf. Nonius 72, 15—22, where the two glosses occur side by side). Now however I feel little doubt that the gloss originally ran *Altilis,* sitiste (σιτιστή) &c.

Cf. gloss. Labb. *Altiles,* σιτιστά.

P. 12, 18. *Blattit,* praecupide loquitur.

Leg. *Blatit* with the Hamburg MS.

Cf. Nonius 44, 8. *Blatis et* blateras &c.

P. 24, 14. *Conditiuo,* in quo corpora mortuorum conduntur.

For *conditiuo* the MSS give *conditio.* Was there a word *condicrum,* formed from *condo* on the analogy of *sepulcrum, ludicrum* &c.? *Condicro* would very easily be corrupted to *condicio* and *conditio.*

P. 29, 11. *Catillo,* gulosus, a catelli appetentia.

Cf. Paul. 44, 12. *Catillones* appellabant antiqui gulosos.

Catillatio graue opprobrium hominibus generosis obiiciebatur, si qui prouincias amicas populi Romani expoliassent.

Should *omnium catillonum* be read for *omnium nationum* in the passage quoted from a speech of C. Gracchus by Gellius xv, 12, 3? The passage runs as follows:

Biennium fui in prouincia; si ulla meretrix domum meam introiuit, aut cuiusquam seruulus propter me sollicitatus est, omnium nationum postremissimum nequissimumque existimatote.

For *omnium nationum* of the MSS, which is generally admitted to be corrupt, *omnium natorum* and *omnium latronum*

have been suggested. *Omnium natorum* is however very doubtful Latin, and both *omnium natorum* and *omnium latronum* seem too weak to suit the present passage. *Omnium catillonum* on the other hand harmonizes very well with the peculiar kind of crimes mentioned by Gracchus, and we have the direct testimony of Paulus that the charge of *catillatio* was regarded as one of the most opprobrious which could be brought against provincial governors. *Catillonum* is perhaps somewhat wide of the MSS, but had it been the original reading, it might well have been corrupted to *nationum*, especially in a MS copied from dictation. Was this fragment of Gracchus quoted in the original work of Verrius Flaccus? It constantly happens that the same passage is referred to by several commentators and often with different objects.

P. 39, 11. *Ex specula spectans*, ex alto loco intendens.

Leg. ex alto loco oculos intendens.

P. 41, 1. *E labore animi*, figurat et 'pro animi labore.'

Leg. *Elaboro animi*, figurate, pro 'animo laboro.'

The liber glossarum has *elaboro* and *animo laboro*, Mai gives *figurate*. Compare Servius on Aen. x 686, *Animi miserata, pro animo miserata; nam figurate locutus est.*

Ib. 15. *Exsciterit...*

Leg. *Escit, erit.* Cf. Paul. 77, 13.

P. 43, 3. *Fleminum*, uesicam, e qua sanguis ambulando in pedes fluit.

The MSS have *uestem* for *uesicam* and *in qua* for *e qua*, nor does any change seem to be required. *Fleminum uestem* may well have been used by a comic or satirical writer (Lucilius?) to describe some dress *in qua sanguis ambulando in pedes fluit. Fleminum* is apparently genitive plural from a nominative singular *flemen.*

Ib. 4. *Fabricora*, prouerbium in eos, qui domesticis alimentis usi aliis laborarent; dictum ab eo quod Capitolium aedificanti Tarquinio fabros ac structores corui cum suo uictu miserunt.

For *corui* the Hamburg MS has *comuni*, two others *corni.*

Leg. *Fabri Cora* (sc. *aduenerunt*).....fabros ac structores Corani &c.

Ib. 8. *Fauisae specus,* fossae quaedam in Capitolio, quae in modum cisternarum cauatae excipiebant dona Iouis, si qua uetusta erant hominum e fruge danda.

The last four words seem to be part of a separate gloss, which should run something like the following: *Frugi* dicebatur pars utilis hominum e fruge danda.

Cf. Papias, *Frugi,* homo utilis &c.

P. 46, 8. *Freta,* mota, crumata uel modulosa.

For *mota* the MSS have *moeta* or *meta.*

Leg. *Fretamenta,* crumata (*κρούματα*) uel modulos.

Cf. Gell. v, 1, 1. *Si modulis uerborum, si quibusdam quasi fretamentis mouentur.*

P. 52, 5. *Hostita,* aequata, liniata.

The MSS have *lenita* for *liniata,* and no change is required, cf. Non. 121, 13.

Hostire est comprimere.....Pacuuius, *nisi.....hostio ferociam.*

P. 58, 18. *Interficito,* interrumpe.

The Hamburg MS has *interfecto,* Mai *interficto.*

Leg. *Interfato,* interrumpe.

Praefato occurs Cato R. R. 134, 1.

P. 60, 9. *Ludicrum,* spectaculum ludibriosum.

The MSS have *ludibrium* for *ludibriosum* and this may well be right.

Leg. *Ludicrum spectaculum,* ludibrium.

P. 67, 12. *Maspiter,* Mars pater.

Cf. Gell. v, 12, 5, *Mars pater, hoc enim est Marspiter,* and Macrob. I, 19, 3, *Marspitrem, id est martem patrem, cognominantes.* The MSS of Placidus vary between *Maspiter* and *Marpiter.*

Should *Marspiter* be read here?

Ib. 13. *Mentitor,* inuentor.

For *mentitor* the MSS give *mentor,* which should apparently be retained, cf. Paul. 124, 19, *Mentum dicebant quod nos commentum,* and 122, 17, *Miniscitur pro reminiscitur antiquitus dicebatur.*

P. 76, 24. *Prolictabimi,* dicitur et multa significat. Nam prolici est persuaderi.

Prolicta bini is read in one MS.

Leg. *Prolectabimini* (or *Prolectamini?*) from *prolector*, the frequentative of *prolicior*, for this appears to be what is meant by *multa significat;* cf. Non. 530, 1, *Atque multam habet significantiam*, i.e. *atque* has a frequentative or strengthening meaning, or, as Gellius x, 29, 2, puts it, *auget intenditque rem.*

P. 79, 23. *Subleuit,* subiunxit a liniendo.

Leg. *subunxit.* Is not *subiunxit* merely a misprint?

J. H. ONIONS.

’ΑΠΡΑΚΤΟC—’ΑΠΡΑΤΟC

Pionii vita Polycarpi 8 (Lightfoot's Ignatius and Polycarp II 1021 39).

Reading with much interest so much as I can follow of Bishop Lightfoot's new volumes, I sent to him such illustrations and corrections as occurred to me. One of these corrections I submit to the readers of the Journal, as I can shew that Wyttenbach long since made the same correction in Plutarch, though Doehner neglects it. The word *ἄπρατος* also deserves a fuller treatment than it has yet met with from lexicographers.

> *ἐπανιόντι δὲ αὐτῷ ἐκ τῶν προαστείων εἰς τὴν πόλιν, εἰ πότε συνετύγχανον, ξυλοφόροι καὶ μάλιστα πρεσβῦται, συνέπασχέν τε τῆς ἀχθοφορίας ἕνεκα, καὶ συμπορευόμενος ἀνηρώτα εἰ ἅμα τῷ εἰσελθεῖν πιπράσκει τὸ φορτίον· τοῦ δὲ ἀποκρινομένου ὅτι ἐνίοτε ἤδη ἑσπέρας ἄπρακτα εἴη, ἐπιδοὺς αὐτῷ τὴν τιμὴν ἦγεν παρὰ τὰς ἄγχι τῇ πύλῃ οἰκούσας χήρας.*

Here (unless indeed ’ΑΠΡΑCΙΑ be thought to come nearer the *ductus litterarum*) it is plain that we must read ’ΑΠΡΑΤΑ for ’ΑΠΡΑΚΤΑ. In Wyttenbach's index to Plutarch, among many examples of *ἄπρακτος*, two (I 1060^{d}. II 107^{b}) have the note ‘f<*orte*> *ἄπρατος*.’ The latter passage seems to have been misplaced, for under *ἄπρατος* we read only ‘f. leg. I 1062^{d}.’

This reference is to the life of Galba 17 § 3, where Plutarch says of Tigellinus:

> *ὁ δὲ καὶ ποιήσας ἄξιον θανάτου Νέρωνα καὶ γενόμενον τοιοῦτον ἐγκαταλιπὼν καὶ προδοὺς περιῆν, μέγα δί-*

> δαγμα τοῦ μηδὲν ἄπρακτον [read, with Wytt. ἄπρατον] εἶναι παρὰ Οὐινίῳ μηδὲ ἀνέλπιστον τοῖς διδοῦσιν.

The words τοῖς διδοῦσι (compared with § 1, also of Tigellinus: ἐφθάκει δὲ ὁ γενναῖος προειληφὼς ἀρραβῶσι μεγάλοις τὸν Οὐίνιον) establish Wyttenbach's emendation beyond all question.

> Suid. s. v. Ζήνων (I 728 1 ed. Bernhardy = Malchus in script. hist. Byz. XIII 8 ed. Bonn): καπηλεύων ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀγορᾶς ἅπαντα καὶ μηδὲν ἄπρατον ἐῶν ἐν τῇ βασιλέως αὐλῇ διαπράττεσθαι.

The following examples of ἄπρατος are taken from an interleaved copy of Scapula (Lugd. 1663 fol.), which bears on the title the autograph, singularly clear and neat, 'Christoph. Noltenius. 1739. Brem.' He was, I suppose, of the same family as Johann Friedrich Nolten (1694–1754), a meritorious Latin lexicographer. I bought the book for a few shillings, years ago, out of a German catalogue, but certainly it is worth many pounds. Even now, after the lapse of a century and a half, it would, if published, make a very large addition, from every period of the language and every branch of Greek literature, to the registered vocabulary. The quotations are most exact, by page, or section, or line.

> Ael. h. a. II 44 ἤδη δὲ καὶ οἱ ἁλιεῖς ἡμιβρώτῳ καρίδι περιτυχόντες, καὶ ἀξιώσαντες τὸ θήραμα ἄπρατον[1] ὄν, εἰ ἀπογεύσαιντο αὐτοῦ ὑπὸ πενίας, κλονοῦνται τὴν γαστέρα καὶ στρέφονται.

[1] Jacobs vol. II p. 88 l. 2 'ἄπρατον in *m.* ex corr. ἄπρακτον fuisse uidetur. ... eadem est uarietas supra p. 41 31'. The reference is to h. a. II 26 fin. where he says the eagle which can gaze at the sun τοῖς γνησίοις ἐγγέγραπται, ἐπεὶ αὐτῷ πῦρ τὸ οὐράνιον ἡ τοῦ γένους ἀδέκαστός τε καὶ ἄπρατος ἀληθῶς ἐστὶν ἐγγραφή. On this Jacobs (vol. II p. 76 l. 1) notes: 'ante Gronov. ἄπρακτος. ἄπρατος quod dedi ex coniectura Pauwii ad Phil. c. 1 v. 16 firmauit Toup [em. Suid. tom. I p. 357] e loco Suidae Κορνοῦτος. ubi est ὁ χρόνος δὲ ὁ ἄπρατός τε καὶ ἀδέκαστος. quem Aeliani esse suspicatur. [vid. fragm. p. 351 ed. C. G. Kühn (=n. 83 p. 227 Hercher)]. SCHNEIDER. ἄπρατος h. l. emendare voluisse T. Hemsterhusium, apparet ex eius anecdotis I p. 55. ἄπρατος et ἄπρακτος confusae apud Polluc. IV 34.' See the commentators there (p. 365), where Jungermann refers to IV 37 and VII 10, passages in which ἄπρατος is read without v. l.

Luc. vit. auct. 12 fin. *ἄπρατος ἔοικεν ὦ Ζεῦ οὗτος ἡμῖν μένειν.* ib. 14 fin. *ἄπρατοι καὶ οὗτοι μένουσιν.*

Achill. Tat. v 18 § 4 *διὰ σὲ πέπραμαι...καὶ ἐμαστιγώθην...* § 5 *σὺ δὲ ἄπρατος*[1], *ἀμαστίγωτος γαμεῖς.*

Nolten also cites 'Heliod.' without adding a reference. I have searched through the Aethiopica in vain.

I think that fuller inquiry will prove that *ἄπρατος* is a very rare, *ἄπρακτος* a common, word; and that the latter must give place to the former, whatever the testimony of MSS. may be, where the context suggests the correction.

JOHN E. B. MAYOR.

SUETONIUS *Augustus* 92.

AT the end of the twelfth of Chrysostom's homilies on the epistle to the Ephesians, there is an interesting passage on the superstitious dread of omens. None of the commentators on Suetonius have remembered it in commenting on these words:

> *auspicia et omina quaedam pro certissimis observabat:* si mane sibi calceus perperam ac sinister pro dextro induceretur, ut dirum.

Compare Chrys. XI 94[b]:

> *νῦν ὁ οἰκέτης ὁ μιαρὸς τὰ ὑποδήματα ἐπιδιδοὺς πρῶτον ὤρεξε τὸ ἀρίστερον· συμφοραὶ δειναὶ καὶ ὕβρεις.*

JOHN E. B. MAYOR.

[1] Jacobs ad loc. (vol. II p. 803): '*ἄπρατος. ἄπρακτος* Mon. Thuan. quem librarii errorem Bodenius adoptauit, et inepte explicat. ap. Aeschin. or. de fals. leg. p. 209 s. *ὁ δ' οὐδὲν ἄπρατον ἔχων μέρος τοῦ σώματος.* ante H. Wolfium legebatur *ἄπρακτον.*'

Ἡ ἐνεγκοῦσα in Heliodorus.

The later editions of Liddell and Scott (after Rost and Palm) cite (s. v. *φέρω*) Lydus as the only[1] authority for *ἡ ἐνεγκοῦσα* in the sense of 'one's native land'.

In Didot's Stephanus s. v. *φέρω* col. 718^{c} the only examples cited are those collected more than 300 years ago by Budé, viz. one from Basil, three from Synesius. In the *Ellipses Graecae* of L. Bos (Lips. 1808) Schwebel adds one passage of Themistius (or. 1 p. 21^{d}) and Schäfer one passage of Heliodorus (Musgrave on Eur. Tro. 831, cited by Schäfer, only repeats Budé's quotations from Synesius).

Having had occasion to take notes of the language of Heliodorus, I can shew that this phrase is characteristic of the *Aethiopica*. As both Koraïs in his index and E. Rohde (*Der griechische Roman*, Leipz. 1876, 460—462) have omitted to notice this, it seems worth while to collect the passages[2].

I 14 (234 6 7) *κἀγὼ μὲν οὕτως ἐξηλαυνόμην ἑστίας τε πατρῴας καὶ τῆς ἐνεγκούσης.*

II 23 (260 29—31) *εἰ δὲ καὶ τῆς ἐνεγκούσης ἐπιβαίημεν,...ἀρύσει πλοῦτον ὅσον ἂν δύναιο πλεῖστον.*

II 25 (262 28—30) *φυγῇ κολάζω τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ τῆς ἐνεγκούσης ὁ βαρυδαίμων ἐξήειν.*

II 29 fin. *ἐμαυτὸν μὲν οὐκ ἐξάγω τοῦ βίου,...ὑπεξάγω δὲ τῆς ἐνεγκούσης καὶ τὴν ἐρημίαν τῆς οἰκίας ἀποδιδράσκω.*

II 30 pr. *ἤδη γάρ μοι τῆς λίαν ἀλγηδόνος τῷ χρόνῳ πεττομένης ἡ πρὸς τὴν ἐνεγκοῦσαν ἐπάνοδος ἐσπουδάζετο.*

III 11 fin. *'ὥρα σοι' ἔλεγον 'εἰς τὴν ἐνεγκοῦσαν ἐπανήκειν'.*

III 14 fin. *αὐτὸς μὲν τὸ ἴδιον [ὄνομα] οὐ λέγων ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πόλιν ἢ γένος ὀνομάζων...Τί δὲ σκοπῶν, ὦ πάτερ,*

[1] It is perhaps doubtful whether *γῆ* is the substantive to be supplied in the passage cited from Antoninus.

[2] Where the chapters are long, and the examples neither at the beginning or end, I add Hirschig's page and line (*Erotici Graeci*, Didot, 1856) for convenience, though he often goes wrong where Koraïs was right.

ἐσιώπα τὴν ἐνεγκοῦσαν; Ἤτοι τὸ φυγὰς εἶναι καταιδούμενος.

III 15 *εἰς τὴν ἐνεγκοῦσαν ἐπανήξειν προσδοκῶν.*

III 16 (379 43 44) *δι' ἣν [σοφίαν] κἀγὼ τῆς ἐνεγκούσης εἰς καιρὸν ἐξέστην.* (ib. 49 50) *οἱ καὶ τὴν φυγήν μοι τὴν ἐκ τῆς ἐνεγκούσης...ἐπέβαλον.*

IV 9 *εἰσῄει γάρ με πολλῶν ἔννοια, τίνων μὲν γενομένη, τίνων δ'*[1] *ἐνομίσθη, πόσῳ δὲ τῷ μεταξὺ τῆς ἐνεγκούσης ἀπήχθη.*

IV 12 fin. *αὖθις ἱκέτευεν ἐπιζητεῖν καὶ προτρέπειν ἥκειν εἰς τὴν ἐνεγκοῦσαν.*

IV 19 (296 11 12) *τὴν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐνεγκούσης καὶ θεῶν τῶν πατρῴων ἀγανάκτησιν.*

VI 2 (320 34—36) *προσετίθει δὲ καὶ τὸν τρόπον καὶ ὅτι φυγαδευθείη τῆς ἐνεγκούσης ὡς πατραλοίᾳ τοῦ δήμου ταύτην τὴν ζημίαν ἐπιθέντος.*

VII 14 (343 48 49) *ὁ ξεναγωγὸς τῆς ἐπὶ τὴν ἐνεγκοῦσαν, ὁ τῶν φύντων*[2] *ἀναγνωρισμός.*

VIII 3 fin. (357 37—40) *τὸ παρὸν ἀλητεύοντες πάντων ἐπίπροσθεν ποιοῦνται γένος τὸ ἴδιον ἀνακομίσασθαι καὶ εἰς τὴν ἐνεγκοῦσαν ἐπανήκειν.*

X 7 fin. *αἰχμαλωσία καὶ πόλεμος καὶ τοσοῦτος τῆς ἐνεγκούσης ἐξοικισμός.*

X 16 ter (398 45 46) *τῆς εἰς ὑμᾶς τε καὶ τὴν ἐνεγκοῦσαν εὐνοίας.* (399 5 6) *ἣν ἐξῴκισαν τῆς ἐνεγκούσης ἐπὶ πέρατα γῆς ἔσχατα.* (ib. 28 29) *ὦ σωτηριώδους μὲν τῆς ξένης, ἐπ' ὀλέθρῳ δὲ πειρωμένη τῆς ἐνεγκούσης.*

Thus Heliodorus by himself supplies more than double the number of examples of this use of *ἡ ἐνεγκοῦσα* that have hitherto

[1] *Dele δέ.* In *τίνων μὲν γενομένη τίνων ἐνομίσθη*, the *τίνων μὲν* corresponds to *πόσῳ δέ.* I see that Koraïs has no *δέ.*

[2] = *φυσάντων.* Of this 'the worst among the barbarisms of Heliodorus' (Rohde 462 2, who cites Koraïs, Cobet, Naber, as condemning the poor culprit) take some examples: IV 8 (288 40). 13 (291 15). V 28 (315 14). VI 9 fin. (326 49). 15 pr. (330 53). VII 7 bis (336 29 and 35). 8 pr. (331 23). IX 11 fin. (378 53). 25 bis (387 52 and 388 3). X 15 fin. (398 10). 38 pr. (411 7). This abuse is mercifully ignored even in the last edition of Liddell and Scott, though Rost and Palm (*φύω* 2374 col. 2 at top) quote Casaubon, Bekker, Hase, Döring, as dealing with it.

been registered; yet Schäfer alone has called attention to the fact, and he has spoken in vain. The new Stephanus is content with the collections of Budé; and the Greek lexicons in common use in Germany and England desert Basil, Synesius, Themistius, Heliodorus, for Ioannes Laurentius Lydus.

I may mention, in conclusion, that what led me to spend so much time on Heliodorus, was the wish to satisfy myself whether Nolten had any justification for citing ἄπρατος from the *Aethiopica*. He had none: even ἄπρακτος only occurs, if I have counted rightly, four times[1], and in each case the reading is certain.

JOHN E. B. MAYOR.

EUNAPIUS VIT. SOPH. p. 477 35 Didot.

Cobet in *Mnemosyne* n. s. VIII, 1880, p. 4 remarks on this passage:

> στολὴν ἀβροτέραν ἢ κατὰ φιλόσοφον περιχεόμενος. Ineptum est στολὴν περιχεῖσθαι. Reponendum videtur quod in ea re omnes dicebant: στολὴν ἀμπεχόμενος.

Much nearer to περιΧεΟμενος, and even more appropriate than ἀμπεχόμενος, is περιΚειμενος. See HSt. *thes.* ed. Didot and Cobet himself (*nov. lectt.* 145 seq. *collect.* 83 84). Lucian *hist. conscr.* 23. Chrys. XI 181[a] bis. 255[b]. 261[d]. 270[b]. 400[e]. 487[a]. 590[de]. 591[d]. 592[e]. 593[c]. 682[b]. 683[b]. cet.

EUNAPIUS p. 480 14.

Cobet (*ibid.* p. 6) justly expels a barbarism from the lexicons, but he has not succeeded in restoring the true reading, which nevertheless lies on the surface:

> τῆς ἀσινότητος τῆς περὶ θεουργίας —— πεπειρασμένος. Obiter eximendum est e Lexicis ἀσινότης vocabulum barbarum et vitio natum, in quo quid lateat non dispicio. Deinde scribe πεπειρΑμενός, *usu cognitum habens.*
>
> Read for ΑΣινότητος ΔΕινότητος.

JOHN E. B. MAYOR.

[1] IV 19 (295 28 29) ἄχρι τίνος ἀναυδοι καὶ ἄπρακτοι καθεδεῖσθε; IX 18 bis (382 23) εἰς τὸ ἄπρακτον σχολαζούσης. (ib. 41) ἄπρακτοι καὶ οὐδὲν δράσαντες. X 30 (406 25 26) τῶν σκελῶν δ' ἄπρακτα σκαιρόντων καὶ εἰς κενὸν ἀερονομούντων.

SENECA DE BENEFICIIS VI 16 § 2

medicus amicus, medicus imperator.

My attention was drawn to this passage by a conjecture of Madvig's (*Aduersaria* II 420):

> nihil amplius (medico quam mercedem) debeo, quia me non tamquam amicum uidit, sed tamquam imperatorem. Ineptum esse (de uno ex communibus aegris, quos medicus perambulat) imperatoris nomen plures uiderunt; aptum non inuenerunt. Credo scriptum fuisse *interpellatorem* (qui operam inuocando interpellat).

Madvig's meaning is plain. He divides physicians into those who welcome a summons to a sick bed as a call of friendship, and those who resent it as an intrusion. But we may question whether such a class of practitioners as the second exists.

Many months ago I read a paper before the Cambridge Philological Society, suggesting the emendation *amicus...imperator*. The scribe would naturally assimilate the substantives to the case of the foregoing pronoun *me*. The context imperatively requires the nominatives e.g. § 1 *quare et* medico *et praeceptori plus quiddam debeo nec aduersus illos mercede defungor? quia ex* medico *ac praeceptore in* amicum *transeunt et nos non arte quam uendunt obligant, sed benigna et familiari* uoluntate. § 2 *itaque medico, si nihil amplius quam manum tangit et me inter eos quos perambulat ponit,* sine ullo adfectu facienda uitandaue praecipiens, *nihil amplius debeo, quia me non tamquam* amicus *uidit, sed tamquam* imperator...

§ 4 *quid ergo est, quare istis debeamus multum?...quia nobis ipsis aliquid praestiterunt: ille magis pependit quam medico necesse est. non fuit contentus remedia* monstrare [as an *imperator*, see *praecipiens* above], *et* admouit [as an *amicus*]... § 5 *huic ego* non tamquam medico, sed tamquam amico *obligatus sum.*

Madvig's reading makes the temper of the physician or the teacher a temporary, secondary frame of mind, depending on the attitude of the patient or the scholar. But the whole gist of the chapter hangs on the permanent, original, character of the physician or teacher, as determining their title to the name of benefactor.

Many passages might be cited from medical authorities in proof of the curative value of gentleness and friendship. Every one has heard of patients given up by the faculty, and rescued by the devotion of a mother or a wife.

Celsus praef. p. 12 27 seq. (Daremberg) concipio ..cum par scientia sit, utiliorem tamen medicum esse amicum, quam extraneum.

I proceed to justify the reading *imperator*.

Sen. de ira 1 16 § 4 (as emended by Madvig l.c. p. 388) si intrassem ualetudinarium exercitus ut sciens aut domos diuitis, non idem imperassem omnibus per diuersa aegrotantibus.

Plin. h. n. XXIV § 5 (of Greek physicians) paremus externis et una artium imperatoribus quoque imperauerunt. XXIX § 11 (of the same) palamque est, ut quisque inter istos loquendo polleat, imperatorem ilico uitae nostrae necisque fieri.

Galen de methodo medendi 1 1 (X 4 K) rebukes the great who call in, not the ablest physicians, but those who humour their tastes, giving them snow and wine, *καὶ πᾶν ὑπηρετήσουσι τὸ προσταττόμενον ὥσπερ ἀνδράποδα, ἔμπαλιν ἐκείνοις τῶν ἰατρῶν τοῖς παλαιοῖς Ἀσκληπιάδαις, οἳ τῶν νοσούντων ἠξίουν ἄρχειν ὡς στρατηγοὶ στρατηγουμένων καὶ βασιλεῖς ὑπηκόων, οὐκ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ δεσπόζεσθαι, καθάπερ Γέται καὶ Τίβιοι καὶ Φρύγες καὶ Θρᾷκες ἀργυρώνητοι.* Plin. pan. 22 § 3 aegri quoque neglecto medentium imperio ad conspectum tui, quasi ad salutem sanitatemque prorepere.

The note on this last passage by Chr. G. Schwarz, a great master of silver age Latin, first informed me that my correction had been anticipated by Muretus. Schwarz supports it, and Lipsius, though he cannot resist the temptation of shewing that

patients are said *imperare medicis,* gives abundant evidence for the emendation which he rejects:

> Terentius [Andria 484 485] in persona medici *quod iussi dare bibere et quantum imperaui date.* Et sane pro Seneca fortasse magis haec lectio, ut ad ipsum medicum referatur uolentem et amicum, quae pars prima in beneficio.

Madvig has shewn that the later editors of Seneca, notably Fickert and Haase, have often deserted Erasmus, Muretus, Lipsius, Gronovius, to our loss, choosing *pro frugibus glandes.* Gertz in his edition of the *de ben.* (Berlin, Weidmann, 1876) does not even mention the reading *amicus...imperator*, though he had the note of Lipsius before him.

JOHN E. B. MAYOR.

CLEM. AL. *strom.* IV § 62 p. 592 Potter.

COBET, in his admirable criticisms on Clement, leaves the emendation of this passage as a problem. Dindorf also notes on *οἰκουροῦσι* 'requiritur aliud verbum.'

Cobet (ΛΟΓΙΟΣ ΕΡΜΗΣ Leyden 1866 I 513—4) states the case with his usual clearness:

> Μνημονεύων ὁ Κλήμης σελ. 592 *γυναικῶν τινῶν αἵτινες τῶν ἀνδρῶν οὐδὲν ἧττον ἔφερον τοὺς πόνους καὶ ἐκαρτέρουν γράφει τάδε· "ἤδη γοῦν αἱ γυναῖκες οὐδὲν ἔλαττον τῶν ἀρρένων καὶ οἰκουροῦσι καὶ θηρεύουσι καὶ τὰς ποίμνας φυλάττουσι."...*
> *Ἔσφαλται περιφανῶς τὸ οἰκουροῦσι· καταλέγει γὰρ ὁ Κλήμης τὰ τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἔργα ἅπερ αἱ καρτερικαὶ ἐκεῖναι γυναῖκες οὐδὲν ἔλαττον τῶν ἀρρένων ἐπετέλουν, οἷον ἐπὶ θήραν ἐξιέναι καὶ τῶν ποιμνίων ἐπιστατεῖν· τὸ δὲ οἰκουρεῖν, εἴ τι καὶ ἄλλο, γυναικεῖον καὶ παντὸς ἀπηλλαγμένον πόνου. Πολλὰ δὲ μάτην ζητήσας τὸ ἐν τῷ* ΟΙΚΟΥΡΟΥΣΙ *κεκρυμμένον ταλήθὲς ἐρευνᾶν καὶ ἀνιχνεύειν ἄλλοις παρίημι.*

In a note on the word *οἰκονομοῦσιν* (*ibid.* 516—7) Cobet adds a caution:

> *Ἴσως ἄν τις εἰκάσειε τοῦτ' ἀκούσας εὑρῆσθαι τὸ ἄνω σελ. 514 ζητούμενον, καὶ ἐν τῷ* ΟΙΚΟΥΡΟΥΣΙ *κεκρύφθαι τὸ οἰκονομοῦσι. Ἐμοὶ δὲ οὐ πάνυ τι ἀρέσκει τὸ "κατὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν οἰκονομεῖν." βραχὺ δέ τι βέλτιον ἴσως "τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν οἰκονομεῖν." Ὁ δὲ*

> Κλήμης ἀντὶ τοῦ οἰκονομεῖν ὠνόμασέ τι τῶν ἐπιπονωτέρων καὶ ἐν οἷς ἔδει σώματος ἰσχύος καὶ ῥώμης.

Remembering that Musonius was a favorite author with Clement, I turned to his two excellent pieces, 'whether daughters should have the same education as sons,' and 'whether women also should study philosophy.' They are preserved in the Florentine MS. of John of Damascus, have been printed by Wyttenbach, and may also be found in the appendix to Stob. *flor.* in Gaisford's and Meineke's editions.

Immediately after the lines cited from Clement follows a hexameter verse, and then these words: φιλοσοφητέον οὖν καὶ ταῖς γυναιξὶν ἐμφερῶς τοῖς ἀνδράσι. These are the very words of the *lemma* in the second essay of Musonius above cited:

> *excerpta e cod. ms. Florentino parallelorum sacrorum Ioannis Damasceni*, pt. 2 n. 126 (Meineke's *Stobaeus* IV 220 21) Μουσωνίου ἐκ τοῦ ὅτι καὶ γυναιξὶ φιλοσοφητέον.

The opening words are:

> ἐπεὶ δ' ἐπύθετό τις αὐτοῦ εἰ καὶ γυναιξὶ φιλοσοφητέον, οὕτω πως ἤρξατο διδάσκειν ὡς φιλοσοφητέον αὐταῖς.

The following passages suggest the emendation ΑΥΤουρΓοῦσι for ΟΙΚουροῦσι.

> *ibid.* p. 222 14—28 καὶ μὴν καὶ ἀνδρειοτέραν εἶναι προσήκει γυναῖκα τῆς ἀπαιδεύτου τὴν πεπαιδευμένην καὶ τὴν φιλόσοφον τῆς ἰδιώτιδος· ὡς μήτε θανάτου φόβῳ μήτε ὄκνῳ τῷ πρὸς πόνον ὑπομεῖναί τι αἰσχρόν, μηδὲ ὑποπτῆξαι μηδενὶ ὅτι εὐγενὴς ἢ ὅτι δυνατὸς ἢ ὅτι πλούσιος ἢ καὶ νὴ Δία ὅτι τύραννος· ὑπάρχει γὰρ αὐτῇ μεμελετηκέναι μέγα φρονεῖν, καὶ τὸν μὲν θάνατον ἡγεῖσθαι μὴ κακόν, τὴν δὲ ζωὴν μὴ ἀγαθόν· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸν μὲν πόνον μὴ ἐκτρέπεσθαι, τὴν δὲ ἀπονίαν μὴ διώκειν ἐξ ἅπαντος. ὅθεν εἰκὸς εἶναι τὴν γυναῖκα ταύτην καὶ αὐτουργικὴν καὶ κακόπαθον, οἵαν ἃ μὲν

ἂν τέκῃ τρέφειν μαστῷ τῷ ἑαυτῆς, τῷ δὲ ἀνδρὶ ὑπηρετεῖν χερσὶ ταῖς ἑαυτῆς, ἃ δὲ δουλικὰ νομίζουσιν ἔνιοι, ταῦτα ἀόκνως ποιεῖν. p. 223 13—22 πρὸ παντὸς δὲ σκοπεῖν τὸν λόγον χρή, ᾧ ἕπεσθαι τὰς φιλοσοφούσας ἀξιοῦμεν, εἰ δύναται θρασείας ποιεῖν ὁ τὴν αἰδῶ μέγιστον ἀποφαίνων ἀγαθόν, εἰ ζῆν ἰταμώτερον ἐθίζει ὁ καταστολὴν πλείστην ὑφηγούμενος, εἰ μὴ διδάσκει σωφρονεῖν ὁ κακὸν ἀποδεικνὺς ἔσχατον τὴν ἀκολασίαν, εἰ μὴ προτρέπει οἰκονομεῖν ὁ παριστὰς ἀρετὴν εἶναι τὴν οἰκονομικήν, καὶ στέργειν δὲ καὶ αὐτουργεῖν [ὁ τῶν φιλοσόφων λόγος] παρακαλεῖ [? -ῶν] τὴν γυναῖκα. cf. *id.* ibid. LXX 14 (III 33 4—6) ἀλλὰ σώματα μὲν πρὸς γάμον ἀποχρῶντα τὰ ὑγιῆ καὶ τὴν ἰδέαν μέσα καὶ αὐτουργεῖν ἱκανά.

cf. Hierokles ἐκ τοῦ Οἰκονομικοῦ (*ibid.* LXXXV 21, vol. III 150 21—23) δεῦρο μέντοι τοῦ λόγου γενόμενος οὐκ ἂν ὀκνῆσαί μοι δοκῶ καὶ τῆς αὐτουργίας ποιήσασθαί τινα μνήμην. (p. 151 21—152 1) ἐπιμετρῆσαι δέ τι καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα πρέπον, ὥστε μὴ τῆς ταλασίας κοινωνεῖν μόνον ταῖς θεραπαίναις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔργων τῶν ἐπανδροτέρων. καὶ γὰρ σιτοπονίας ἅψασθαι κατὰ τὴν ἐλευθέραν εἶναί μοι δοκεῖ καὶ ὕδωρ ἀνιμῆσαι καὶ πῦρ ἀνακαῦσαι καὶ κλίνην καταστρῶσαι καὶ πᾶν τὸ τούτοις ἐοικός. πολὺ δ' ἂν ἀνδρὶ φαίνοιτο καλλίων τῷ γε ἑαυτῆς, καὶ μάλιστα νεᾶνις οὖσα καὶ μηδέπω τετρυμένη κυοφορίαις, εἰ καὶ τρύγης ἀμπέλων αὐτουργοῦσα συμμετάσχοι καὶ συλλογῆς ἐλαῶν, εἰ δὲ παρείκοι, καὶ σπόρου καὶ ἀρόσεως καὶ παραδόσεως ἐργαλείων τοῖς σκάπτουσιν ἢ φυτεύουσι.

Lucian *dial. marin.* 6 1 ὁ Δαναὸς δὲ σκληραγωγεῖ τὰς θυγατέρας καὶ αὐτουργεῖν διδάσκει καὶ πέμπει ὕδωρ τε ἀρυσομένας καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα παιδεύει ἀόκνους εἶναι αὐτάς.

Io. Chrysost. *homil.* '*laus Maximi et quales ducendae sint uxores*' c. 9 (III 226de 227^{a}) μετὰ γὰρ τῆς ἀρετῆς τῆς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τὰ σώματα ταῖς παρθένοις τὸ παλαιὸν πολλῆς μετεῖχε τῆς εὐεξίας. οὐ γὰρ οὕτως αὐτὰς ἔτρεφον αἱ μητέρες, καθάπερ τὰς νῦν, βαλανείοις

> *πυκνοῖς, μύρων ἀλοιφαῖς, ἐπιτρίμμασι σκιαγραφίας, μαλακοῖς ἱματίοις, ἑτέροις μυρίοις διαφθείρουσαι τρόποις καὶ τοῦ δέοντος μαλακωτέρας ποιοῦσαι, ἀλλ' εἰς ἅπασαν αὐτὰς ἤγαγον ἐκεῖναι σκληραγωγίαν. διὰ τοῦτο αὐταῖς καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἡ ὥρα σφόδρα ἦν εὐανθὴς καὶ γνησία, ἅτε φυσική τις οὖσα, ἀλλ' οὐ χειροποίητος οὔτε ἐπιτετηδευμένη. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὑγείας ἀπέλαυον καθαρᾶς καὶ κάλλος αὐτοῖς ἀμήχανον ἦν, οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρρωστίας ἐνοχλούσης τῷ σώματι, ἀλλὰ πάσης βλακείας ἐκβεβλημένης. οἱ γὰρ πόνοι καὶ αἱ ταλαιπωρίαι καὶ τὸ ἐν ἅπασιν αὐτουργεῖν βλακείαν μὲν ἀπήλαυνε πᾶσαν, εὐρωστίαν δὲ καὶ ὑγείαν μετὰ πολλῆς παρεῖχε τῆς ἀσφαλείας.*

We need not search further for proof that *αὐτουργὸς* and its kindred were familiar to moralists, recommending bodily labour to the fair sex. Aelian (*n. a.* v 11 pr.) uses the verb to indicate the active outdoor operations of the workers among bees as contrasted with the home life of their queen (or as the ancients say, *king*):

> *αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ βασιλεύς, ἀπόχρη οἱ τούτων πεφροντικέναι* [i.e. to give his orders] *καὶ νομοθετεῖν ὅσα προεῖπον κατὰ τοὺς μεγάλους ἄρχοντας, οὓς οἱ φιλόσοφοι φιλοῦσιν ὀνομάζειν πολιτικούς τε καὶ βασιλικοὺς τοὺς αὐτούς· τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἡσυχάζει καὶ τοῦ αὐτουργεῖν ἀφεῖται.*

Evidently *αὐτουργεῖν* may well be opposed to *οἰκουρεῖν*. I proceed to shew that *αὐτουργία* is a school of health, from which graduate heroes and demigods.

> [Teles] in Stob. *flor.* XCIII 31 (III 187 27—32, speaking of wealth) *εἶτα τὸ σῶμα λυμαίνεται ταῖς τρυφαῖς· ἐθίζει μὲν εἰς πλησμονὰς ἀπὸ τῶν ἀφορμῶν καὶ πλείστας νόσους συλλέγει· τὴν δὲ αὐτουργίαν ἀνθρώπων ἀφαιρεῖται, τὸ πάντων ὑγιεινότατον· γυμνάσιον γάρ ἐστιν οὐχ ὡρισμένον, ὥς παλαίστρα καὶ κυνηγεσία.*
>
> CATO THE ELDER. Plut. *Cato maior* 1 § 6 *τὴν δὲ τοῦ σώματος ἕξιν αὐτουργίᾳ καὶ διαίτῃ σώφρονι καὶ*

στρατείαις ἀπ' ἀρχῆς συντρόφου γεγονότος πάνυ χρηστικὴν εἶχε καὶ πρὸς ἰσχὺν καὶ πρὸς ὑγείαν ὁμαλῶς συνεστῶσαν. cf. 3 § 2. *Aristidis cum Catone compar.* 1 § 4 of the Curii and Fabricii, ἀπ' ἀρότρου καὶ σκαφείου πένητας καὶ αὐτουργοὺς ἀναβαίνοντας ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα.

MARIUS. Plut. *Mar.* 3 § 1 γενόμενος δὲ γονέων παντάπασιν ἀδόξων, αὐτουργῶν δὲ καὶ πενήτων. 13 § 1 ἐν δὲ τῇ στρατείᾳ τὴν δύναμιν διεπόνει καθ' ὁδὸν ἐξασκῶν δρόμοις τε παντοδαποῖς καὶ μακραῖς ὁδοπορίαις, ἑαυτῷ δὲ ἀχθοφορεῖν ἀναγκάζων καὶ αὐτουργεῖν τὰ πρὸς τὴν δίαιταν, ὥστε καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα τοὺς φιλοπόνους καὶ σιωπῇ μετ' εὐκολίας τὰ προστασσόμενα ποιοῦντας ἡμιόνους Μαριανοὺς καλεῖσθαι.

HERCULES. DChrys. *or.* 1 (I 64 R = I 14 4—7 Dindorf) ὅτι δὲ αὐτουργὸς ἦν καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ πρόθυμος καὶ τὸ σῶμα ἱκανὸς καὶ πάντων μάλιστα ἐπόνει, μόνον αὐτὸν ἔφασαν βαδίζειν καὶ πράττειν ἅπαντα ὅσα βούλοιτο. id. *or.* 60 (II 311 R = II 192 30—193 4 D) καὶ τοῦτο δὴ ἦν ὁ λεγόμενος τῆς Δηϊανείρας χιτών, ὃν ἐνέδυ ὁ Ἡρακλῆς. ἅμα δὲ τῇ στολῇ καὶ τὴν ἄλλην δίαιταν ἐποίησεν αὐτὸν μεταβαλεῖν, ἐπί τε στρωμάτων καθεύδοντα καὶ μὴ θυραυλοῦντα τὰ πολλά, ὥσπερ εἰώθει πρότερον, μηδὲ αὐτουργοῦντα μηδὲ τροφῇ ὁμοίᾳ χρώμενον, ἀλλὰ σίτῳ τε ἐκπεπονημένῳ καὶ ὄψῳ καὶ οἴνῳ ἡδεῖ καὶ ὅσα δὴ τούτοις ἑπόμενά ἐστιν.

But Clement himself (*paedag.* III § 67 pr. 297 fin.) affords the most convincing evidence:

ἡ δὲ αὐτουργία ταῖς γυναιξὶν μάλιστα τὸ γνήσιον ἐπιφέρει κάλλος γυμνάζουσα τὰ σώματα αὐτῶν καὶ σφᾶς αὐτὰς δι' αὐτῶν κοσμοῦσα, οὐ τὸν ὑπ' ἄλλων πεπονημένον προσφέρουσα κόσμον ἄκοσμον καὶ ἀνελεύθερον καὶ ἑταιρικόν, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἑκάστης σώφρονος γυναικὸς διὰ τῶν χειρῶν αὐτῆς, ὅποτε χρῄζοι μάλιστα, ἀρκούμενον καὶ ἐξυφαινόμενον· οὐ γάρ ποτε καθήκει ἐξ ἀγορᾶς ὠνητοῖς, ἀλλὰ τοῖς οἰκουρικοῖς τοῖς ἰδίοις ἔργοις κοσμουμένας φαίνεσθαι τὰς κατὰ θεὸν πολιτευομένας.

ibid. § 49 p. 283 pr. *ἔτι δὲ αὐτουργικῶς προκομίζειν χρὴ ἐκ τοῦ ταμιείου τὰς γυναῖκας ὧν δεόμεθα καὶ τῷ μύλῳ προσελθεῖν οὐκ αἰσχρὸν αὐτάς*[1].

JOHN E. B. MAYOR.

[1] Since the above left my hands, I have noted other examples: *paedag.* III § 27 pr. p. 268 *τῶν οἰκετῶν τὴν πολυκτημοσύνην ὀνειδιστέον. φεύγοντες γὰρ αὐτουργίαν καὶ αὐτοδιακονίαν ἐπὶ τοὺς θεραπεύοντας καταφεύγουσιν, ὀψοποιῶν καὶ τραπεζοποιῶν καὶ τῶν ἐντέχνως εἰς μοίρας κατατεμνόντων τὰ κρέα τὸν πολὺν συνωνούμενοι ὄχλον. ibid.* § 35 p. 274 f. *πολλοῦ δὲ ἄξια οὐ λίθος, οὐκ ἄργυρος, οὐκ ἐσθής, οὐ κάλλος σώματος, ἀλλ' ἡ ἀρετή, ὅ ἐστι λόγος διὰ τοῦ παιδαγωγοῦ παραδιδόμενος εἰς ἄσκησιν, λόγος οὗτος ὁ τὴν τρυφὴν ἐξομνύμενος, τὴν δὲ αὐτουργίαν διάκονον παρακαλῶν καὶ τὴν εὐτέλειαν ἐξυμνῶν τῆς σωφροσύνης τὴν ἔγγονον. ibid.* § 41 p. 278 *ὅπως μὲν οὖν συμβιωτέον ἀνδρὶ τὴν γυναῖκα καὶ περὶ αὐτουργίας καὶ οἰκουρίας καὶ οἰκετῶν χρήσεως, ... ἐν τῷ γαμικῷ διέξιμεν λόγῳ.* cf. Numen. in Eus. p. e. xiv 7 § 1 p. 734[b] (of Lakydes) *ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ἐποίει πάντα δι' αὐτουργίας.* Herodian vii 2 § 8 *γεγόνασι δὲ καὶ ἕτεραι συμβολαί, ἐν αἷς ὡς αὐτουργός τε καὶ αὐτόχειρ τῆς μάχης ἀριστεύων τε πανταχοῦ ἐπῃνεῖτο.* [Mr Bensly reminds me that in Tit. 2 5 the leading MSS. read *οἰκουργοὺς* for *οἰκουρούς*, and both MSS. of Clem. Rom. 1 fin. *οἰκουργεῖν*.]

DIERECTUS.

Professor Arthur Palmer's careful discussion of this word in the last number of the *Journal of Philology* calls for some reply on my part.

My belief, expressed some time ago in this *Journal* and more recently in the *Academy* (May 18, 1885) is that *dierectus* is a *vox nihili*, and represents, as the case may be, either *directus* or *derectus*. Thus *i directum* would mean 'Go and be crucified', *i derectum* 'Go downwards, go to hell'. The difficulty which I feel with regard to *dierectus* (whether scanned *dī-* or *dĭ-*) is that, so far as I know, there is no analogy for such a form in Latin. The adverb *dis* before a vowel becomes *dir-* (*dir-imo, dir-ibeo*): before a semivowel, liquid, sibilant, or spirant, it may become *di-* (*dis-moveo di-moveo, dis-rumpo di-rumpo, dis-rectus di-rectus, di-(f)fringo, dī-vello, di-scribo*, &c.). Professor Palmer, scanning *dī-ē-rectus*, supposes 'that the word is from *dis* and *erigo*, the *di* lengthened to compensate for the loss of *s* or *t* into which *s* would have passed without compensation had there not been another *r* in the word.' On this analogy one would have expected *per-erro* to become *pe-erro*. The suggestion is ingenious enough: but can it be supported by any known process of Latin phonetics?

Holding the existence of *dierectus*, as a Latin word, impossible, though I can imagine that it might possibly represent some bastard issue of διαρρήγνυμι, I am bound to attempt some explanation of a form which often appears in the manuscripts of Plautus, and once in those of Paulus and Nonius.

I admit at once that in saying 'in several passages the word *dierectus* is supported by respectable MS. authority,' I

understated Mr Palmer's case. I should have said "in many passages." But is the manuscript evidence, as Mr Palmer puts it, 'simply overwhelming'? Taking his list of passages, it seems that in Menaechm. 432 B gives *derectum*: in Poen. 160 *d rectus*: in Trin. 457 A has *dierecte*, the rest *derecte*. In Curc. 240 I would certainly read *lien disruptust* (or *diruptus*), as giving better sense and keeping nearer to the MSS. than Camerarius' *dierectus*. We know too little about Plautus's scansion of *lien* to build much upon that. The manuscript evidence, taking it all in all, seems to me to point to a very early corruption of *deirectus* or *derectus* into *dierectus*: a corruption probably confirmed by a conceit of some scholar of the Augustan age or older, who thought that *dierectus* had something to do with *dies*. Paulus p. 69 (Müller) says *Dierectum dicebant per antiphrasin, volentes significare malum diem. Dirigere apud Plautum invenitur pro discidere.* These words are probably a miserable fragment of a note of Verrius in which *dierectus* and *dirigere* were discussed in connection. The scholars of the Augustan age were liable to mistakes, even in matters of orthography, as may be seen in the case of *incoho*, which some wished to spell *inchoo* as if from *Chaos* (Paulus p. 107).

Professor Palmer says 'the existence of two forms so nearly allied in sense and form' (as *directus* and *derectus*) 'and so far apart in derivation, is most improbable.' Why more improbable than the existence of the two forms *diluo* and *deluo*, *diruo* and *deruo*, *diripio* and *deripio*, *discribo* and *describo*, *dispicio* and *despicio*, and fifty others? Agroecius p. 115 Keil says *derectum in rectum vadens, directum in latera rectum. Derigo* is common enough, and indeed was not so long ago supposed to be the only form in existence: as for *di-* or *disrego*, Hildebrand's Paris glossary gives *disrectum divisum*, and the ancient Bodleian glossary (meaning, I suppose, the same thing) *disrepti separati, disreptum divisum.* I had thought that scholars were now fairly agreed as to the existence of two words *derigo* and *dirigo*, *derigo* = to direct downwards or in a straight line, *dirigo* = to stretch in two directions. No doubt

manuscripts, even good ones, and glossaries get confused in the spelling of these words, as in all cases affecting *e* and *i*: but the distinction of Agroecius has fair support on the whole, and is, I believe, acted upon by Halm in his Tacitus and Quintilian. *Derigere se in locum* seems to have meant 'to get down into a place.' In the passage of Apuleius there is no doubt about the word, the manuscript, if Eyssenhardt may be trusted, giving *derige*.

Derectarius, not *directarius*, is the form twice attested by the Florentine MS. of the Digest: Dig. 47 11 7 *qui derectarii appellantur, hoc est, qui in aliena cenacula se dirigunt* (read *de-*) *furandi animo:* 47 18 1 2 *simili modo et sacculariі et derectarii erunt puniendi, item effractores:* add Paulus Sent. 5 4 8 *ab his qui vulgo derectarii appellantur, in quos extra ordinem animadvertitur.* With regard to the two Latin-Greek glosses of 'Philoxenus,' made up into one by Labbè and so quoted by Mr Palmer, I hold to the reading κατάρατος. The *derectarius* or person who 'lets himself down' or 'sneaks' into another person's house is distinguished in the Digest from the violent burglar or *effractor*.

Coming to the passages in which *dierectus* is used, I would observe first that the words of Varro[1] quoted twice by Nonius (pp. 49, 122) prove nothing. For all we know they may be prose: or, if metrical, may form, not an iambic, but a trochaic tetrameter of which the last two syllables are lost. Then in Plautus Trin. 457 *dierectus* must be trisyllabic, and so almost certainly in Capt. 630: so it may be in Mercator 756, Cas. 1 1 15, and Most. 8, for it seems to me very likely and natural that in such a combination as *abi rus abi, abi*, a compound word, may have been accented first on the first syllable and last on the last, and scanned first as a pyrrhic and then as an iambus. In other passages I admit that the scanning *dīērectus* is possible: but the previous question to my mind is, is the word possible?

H. NETTLESHIP.

[1] *Apage in dierectum a domo nostra istam insanitatem.*

THE STUDY OF LATIN GRAMMAR AMONG THE ROMANS IN THE FIRST CENTURY A.D.

THE history of Latin Grammar in antiquity demands a new chapter in the record of Latin literature. The seven volumes of Keil's edition of the *Grammatici Latini* appear to contain a large number of independent grammatical treatises, which bear different names, and are often quoted as the works of independent authors. A nearer study of them soon reveals the fact that they consist, in large part, of matter nearly or quite identical; that the same rules, lists, and instances served as the stock in trade of a great number of different professors at various times and in distant places: and that the whole mass might probably be so sifted as to reduce the bulk of original work to a comparatively small amount, and enable us to refer it to the authorship of probably less than a dozen scholars, none of them later than the age of the Antonines.

The work of analysis will certainly be tedious beyond expression, but it will be worth going through, and indeed must be gone through before the history of Latin literature is complete. I can personally claim to have done no more than attempt an account of the labours of Verrius Flaccus, and make a beginning in the way of investigating the sources of Gellius's *Noctes Atticae* and the *De Compendiosa Doctrina* of Nonius. The present essay will be devoted to an extension of these enquiries. It may fairly be said of this troublesome piece of research, as Quintilian says of grammar in general, *plus habet operis quam ostentationis.* As far as I know, there is no continuous work in which the subject is dealt with with anything like thorough-

ness. Much has been done towards the investigation of particular points by several scholars in Germany, as by Schottmüller in his monograph *De C. Plinii libris grammaticis*, by Morawski's *Quaestiones Quintilianeae*, by the same author's analysis of the first part of Charisius's *Ars Grammatica*, by Neumann's essay *De Plinii Dubii Sermonis Libris Charisii et Prisciani fontibus*, and by Schlitte *De Plinii Secundi Studiis Grammaticis*. These treatises, none of which exceed the length of an ordinary dissertation for the degree of *Doctor of Philosophy*, are, with some German reviews upon them, the only aids which I have been able to procure[1].

It will perhaps be convenient that I should divide my subject into two parts; giving, in the first place, a short account of the scholars who wrote upon grammar during this period, with a sketch of their works, and in the second place endeavouring to ascertain the contents of these works, and mark the progress of the science, if any, recorded in them.

It would be impossible to gain anything like an intelligent idea of the progress of grammatical study in the first century without taking notice of the labours of Marcus Terentius Varro, on which, to a large extent, though perhaps not to so large an extent as has sometimes been supposed, the work of succeeding scholars was based.

Varro, then, composed neither a regular *Ars Grammatica*, nor a lexicon. But he treated *grammatica* as one of the nine *disciplinae*, or stages of the ordinary educational *curriculum*, translating the word γραμματική by *litteratura*, a term fairly equivalent to our word *philology* when used in the wider sense. Of *litteratura* or γραμματική Varro took the broader view which was the inheritance of the Alexandrian tradition. He defined it as consisting of four parts, reading, interpretation, correction, and criticism: *lectio, enarratio, emendatio, iudicium*. His book is known to have included also a treatment (*a*) of the alphabet, (*b*) of parts of speech, of which he recognized four, (*c*) of pronouns, (*d*) of local adverbs or prepositions. And it can

[1] Dr Beck has kindly presented the writer with his *Quaestiones Novae de M. Valerio Probo* since these sheets were sent to press. A short notice of Dr Beck's views will be found at the end of this essay.

hardly be doubted that he must also have handled the subject of nouns and verbs.

Besides the *Disciplinae,* which was more or less an educational handbook, Varro was the author of several fuller and more valuable treatises.

(1) The *De Lingua Latina,* in twenty-five books, only a few of which remain. This was a comprehensive work on the Latin language, including discussions on etymology, gender, case-formation, comparison of adjectives, conjugation of verbs, and the collocation of words in forming sentences.

(2) *De Sermone Latino. Lingua* means language, *sermo* language in a connected form: in other words, *lingua* is language, *sermo* is usage. The treatise of Varro consisted of five books, which discussed orthography, accent, quantity, metre, and the various styles of prose composition.

(3) *De Antiquitate Litterarum;* probably one of his earliest works, treating of the origin and history of the Latin alphabet.

(4) *De Origine Linguae Latinae;* probably a discussion of the connection between the Greek and Latin languages.

(5) *De Similitudine Verborum.* Of this only a single fragment remains, and the same must be said of

(6) *De Utilitate Sermonis.*

Two other important works belonging to the last years of the republic must be mentioned, the *Commentarii Grammatici* of Nigidius Figulus, and the *De Analogia* of Julius Caesar. The first was a work in some thirty books, which according to Gellius, who has preserved some fragments of it, was prevented by its style from becoming popular, or even as widely known as the writings of Varro. Julius Caesar's treatise *De Analogia* consisted of two books, the first of which dealt with the alphabet[1] and with words[2]: the second with irregularities of inflection in nouns and verbs.

We have now arrived at the Augustan age. The first work which meets us here is the lexicon (*De Verborum Significatu*) of Verrius Flaccus, a contemporary of Livy. Of this work and

[1] Pompeius p. 27 P. [2] Gellius I. 10.

its author I have already given an account in my *Lectures and Essays*. Verrius also wrote a work *De Orthographia*, of which I shall have occasion to speak further on.

Of M. Pomponius Marcellus, a scholar of the age of Tiberius, I believe that nothing is known but what Suetonius tells us in the twenty-second chapter of his *De Grammaticis*[1]. Originally a boxer, and one must presume a slave, he for some reason or other turned his attention to scholarship, and became a very severe critic of the Latin of his contemporaries. He informed Tiberius that though he could confer the franchise upon human beings, to confer it upon words was out of his power. We must suppose from the account given us by Suetonius—and this I believe is all we have—that he made his livelihood by practice at the bar and teaching grammar: that he wrote anything there is no evidence.

I come next to a figure notable for a time in Roman society and ever afterwards in the history of Latin Grammar, that of Remmius Palaemon of Vicenza[2]. This vain, arrogant, talented, luxurious and immoral man was born, it is probable, during the last years of Augustus's reign. He was originally a slave, by trade a weaver, and learned the rudiments of literature while accompanying his master's son to and from school. Having obtained his freedom, he took to teaching grammar at Rome. Although there was no vice with which he was not commonly charged, although both Tiberius and Claudius openly stated that he was the last man to whom the education of youth ought to be committed, his long memory, his readiness as a speaker, and his power of extemporizing verses, enabled him to distance

[1] *M. Pomponius Marcellus, sermonis Latini exactor molestissimus, in advocatione quadam (nam interdum et causas agebat) soloecismum ab adversario factum usque adeo arguere perseveravit, quoad Cassius Severus, interpellatis iudicibus, dilationem petiit, ut litigator suus alium grammaticum adhiberet: 'quando non putat is cum adversario de iure sibi, sed de soloecismo controversiam futuram.' Hic idem, cum ex oratione Tiberium reprehendisset, adfirmante Ateio Capitone, et esse illud Latinum, et si non esset futurum certe iam inde, 'Mentitur,' inquit, 'Capito; tu enim, Caesar, civitatem dare potes hominibus, verbo non potes.' Pugilem olim fuisse Asinius Gallus hoc in eum epigrammate ostendit: 'Qui caput ad laevam didicit, glossemata nobis Praecipit: os nullum, vel potius pugilis.'*

[2] Suetonius *De Grammaticis* 23.

all his competitors. Nor was his school his only source of emolument, though it brought him in £4000 a year. He made a considerable profit from clothes-shops, and succeeded to a marvel in the cultivation of the vine.

Palaemon's *Ars Grammatica*, or handbook of grammar, seems to have been the first exclusively scholastic treatise on Latin Grammar. For the section on *Grammatica* in Varro's *Disciplinae* was, in all probability, no more a school-book than Freund's *Triennium Philologicum*, or Iwan Müller's *Handbuch der Classischen Philologie.* Varro and Verrius Flaccus had taken the trouble to collect stores of material; our able pedagogue knew how to turn their labours to his own profit. Nor was he in the least grateful to the scholar who was no doubt indirectly responsible for much of his success. Terentius Varro he called a pig, and boasted that letters had been born and would die with himself.

The *Ars* of Palaemon, which gained its author considerable celebrity in his day, contained, as we learn from Juvenal, rules for correct speaking, instances from ancient poets, and chapters on barbarism and solecism[1]. When it was published is not known, but for a reason which I will mention below I think it probable that the date fell between 67 and 77 A.D.

I now proceed to mention the eight books of Pliny the elder entitled *Dubii Sermonis*, an expression which may be paraphrased *On Irregularities in Formation.* This work was written in the last years of Nero's reign, when, as the younger Pliny puts it[2], the atmosphere of despotism made it dangerous to pursue any free or manly branch of study. It had been published for ten years when Pliny, in 77 A.D., was writing the Preface to his Natural History[3]; and it had excited some opposition among the philosophers of all the principal sects.

The *Ars Grammatica* attributed to Pliny by Priscian and Gregory of Tours is, it can hardly be doubted after all the

[1] Juvenal 6. 452 *Odi Hanc ego, quae repetit volvitque Palaemonis artem, Servata semper lege et ratione loquendi, Nec curanda viris opicae castigat amicae Verba: soloecismum liceat fecisse marito.*

[2] *Epist.* 3. 8. 5.

[3] *H. N.* Praef. § 28.

labour expended on the point by recent scholars, the same work as the *Dubii Sermonis*.

I must finally mention the man who was probably the best scholar of the century, M. Valerius Probus of Berytus in Syria. This remarkable man took up the study of scholarship, if we may believe Suetonius, only after failing to succeed in the military profession. The study of the ancient authors—and such was the self-confidence of the Augustan writers and their immediate successors that Cicero, Lucretius, Catullus, and Varro were reckoned and perhaps half-despised as ancients long before the century had run its course,—soon began to languish at Rome. But these writers maintained their reputation out of Italy, and the curiosity of Probus was awakened by reading some of them with a provincial lecturer. The study of these authors inspired him to go on to others, and regardless of the fact that the pains he was spending were likely to gain him nothing but discredit, he determined to devote his life to the emendation, punctuation, and explanation of ancient texts. He appears to have paid especial attention to Terence, Lucretius, Vergil and Horace[1]. He published but little of importance during his lifetime, but left a considerable posthumous work in the shape of a *Silva Observationum Sermonis Antiqui*, or miscellaneous collection of ancient usage; and also a book *De inaequalitate consuetudinis*. He was alive in 88 A.D., but his merits had been recognized at Rome some thirty years before[2].

So much upon the external history of grammatical study during this period. We have now to enter upon the more difficult and interesting part of our task, and endeavour to ascertain approximately what were the contents and character of the various works just mentioned.

Much of the treatise of Verrius Flaccus *De Orthographia* can be recovered from the books *De Orthographia* of Terentius Scaurus and Velius Longus, and from the seventh, with part of the fourth, chapters of Quintilian's first book. This statement

[1] Suetonius *De Viris Illustribus*, p. 138 (Reifferscheid): *Probus, qui illas (notas) in Vergilio et Horatio et Lucretio apposuit, ut in Homero Aristarchus.*

[2] Conington's Virgil, vol. I. 4th edition, p. lxiv.

I am, of course, bound to make good; and must ask for the patient attention of the reader while I develop a somewhat tedious argument.

The treatises of Terentius Scaurus and Velius Longus on orthography are so generally similar that they may almost certainly be referred to a common authority. Now we have already seen that Varro had a disquisition on orthography in his *De Sermone Latino*. But, so far as we can infer from the remaining fragments of this work, Varro treated the subject incidentally only, as a branch of Latin usage. He does not seem to have written any special work on correct spelling. Nor, again, is it at all likely that Scaurus and Longus had direct recourse to this section of the *De Sermone Latino*. They often, indeed, mention Varro, but as an authority of whom they are independent, and from whom they are quite ready to differ. And their range of quotations includes Vergil, which Varro, who died in 27 B.C., could hardly have done.

It is next to be observed that the authority followed by Scaurus and Longus must have been more ancient than Quintilian. For it is impossible to read the fourth and the seventh chapters of Quintilian's first book side by side with Longus and Scaurus *De Orthographia* without noticing the remarkable correspondences between them. Let me exhibit these in detail, by printing Quintilian in the text, and the parallel passages from Longus, Scaurus and Paulus in the notes:

Quintil. I. 4.

§§ 7, 8. *Desintne aliquae nobis necessariae litterae, non cum Graeca scribimus (tum enim ab iis duas mutuamur) sed proprie in Latinis, ut in his 'servus' et 'vulgus' aeolicum digamma*[1] *desideratur, et medius est quidam 'u' et 'i' litterae sonus: non enim sic 'optimum' dicimus ut 'opimum*[2]*.'*

[1] Scaurus p. 12 K. *quia antiqui per 'uo' scripserint...ignorantes eam praepositam vocali consonantis vice fungi et poni pro ea littera quae sit F:* so Longus 58.

[2] Longus 49 *ut iam in ambiguitatem cadat, utrum per i quaedam debeant dici an per u, ut est optumus maxumus. In quibus adnotandum antiquum sermonem plenioris soni fuisse, et, ut ait*

§ 9. *An rursus aliae redundent (praeter illam notam adspirationis, quae si necessaria est etiam contrariam sibi poscit), ut k, quae et ipsa quorundam nominum nota est, et q, cuius similis effectu specieque, nisi quod paulum a nostris obliquatur, coppa apud Graecos nunc tantum in numero manet*[1], *et nostrarum ultima, qua tam carere potuimus, quam psi non quaerimus*[2].

§ 10. *At quae ut vocales iunguntur aut unam longam faciunt, ut veteres scripserunt, qui geminatione earum velut apice utebantur*[3], *aut duas, nisi quis putat etiam ex tribus vocalibus syllabam fieri, si non aliquae officio consonantium fungantur.*

§ 11. *Littera i sibi insidit: 'coniicit' enim est ab illo 'iacit,' et u, quomodo nunc scribitur 'vulgus' et 'servus.' Sciat etiam Ciceroni placuisse 'aiio Maiiamque' geminata i scribere; quod si est, etiam iungetur ut consonans*[4].

§ 12. *Quare discat puer, quid in litteris proprium, quid commune, quae cum quibus cognatio: nec miretur cur ex 'scamno' fiat 'scabillum,' aut a pinno, quod est acutum, securis utrimque habens aciem 'bipennis*[5]*.'*

§ 13. *Ut Valesii Fusii in Valerios Furiosque venerunt,*

Cicero, rusticanum, atque illis fere placuisse per u talia scribere et enuntiare. Erravere autem grammatici, qui putaverunt superlativa per u enuntiari. Ut enim concedamus illis in optimo, in maximo, in pulcherrimo, in iustissimo, quid facient in his nominibus in quibus aeque manet quaestio superlatione sublata, manubiae an manibiae, libido an lubido? See ib. 67.

[1] Scaurus 14 foll. *K quidam supervacuam esse litteram iudicaverunt, quoniam vice illius fungi satis C posset..... Q littera aeque retenta est propter notas ...Unde et Graeci coppa, quod pro hac ponebant, omiserunt, postquam usu quoque, quod auxilio eius litterae non indigebant, supervacuum visum est:* comp. Longus 53.

Ib. 23 *Primum illud respondemus, H esse litteram, &c.* Comp. Longus 52, 53, who concludes on the whole that *h* is a letter. This was denied by Varro: see Prisc. I. p. 12, 13.

[2] Longus 50 *Z lingua Latina non agnoscit.*

[3] Scaurus 18 *Accius geminatis vocalibus scribi natura longas syllabas voluit, cum alioqui adiecto vel sublato apice longitudinis et brevitatis nota posset ostendi.* Comp. Longus 55.

[4] Longus 54 *Cicero videtur auditu emensus scriptionem, qui et Aiiacem et Maiiam per duo i scribenda existimavit: quidam unum esse animadvertunt ...Inde crescit ista geminatio, et incipit per tria i scribi coiiicit, ut prima syllaba sit coi, sequentes duo iicit.*

Ib. 58 *Cum per o (volgus et servos) scriberent, per u tamen enuntiabant.* Comp. Scaurus 12.

[5] Scaurus 14 *B cum p et m consentit, quoniam origo eorum non sine labore coniuncto ore respondet...Et alii scamillum, alii scabillum dicunt.*

ita arbos labos vapos etiam et clamos ac lases et asae fuerunt[1].

§ 14. *Atque haec ipsa s littera ab his nominibus in quibusdam ipsa alteri successit: nam 'mertare' atque 'pultare' dicebant*[2]*:*

quin 'fordeum fuedosque' pro aspiratione f ut simili littera utentes[3]*:*

§ 15. *Sed b quoque in locum aliarum dedimus aliquando, unde 'Burrum' et 'Bruges' et 'Belena*[4]*.'* (?Read *ballena* from Paul. 31, *ballenam:...hanc illi φάλαιναν dicebant antiqui consuetudine, qua πύρρον burrum, πύξον buxum dicebant.*) *Nec non eadem fecit ex 'duello' 'bellum,' unde Duelios quidam dicere Belios ausi*[5].

§ 16. *Quid 'stlocum stlitesque*[6]*' ?*

Quid t litterae cum d quaedam cognatio[7]*?*

Quid o atque u permutata invicem? ut 'Hecoba' et 'notrix,' 'Culcides' et 'Pulixena' scriberentur, et ne in Graecis id tantum notetur, 'dederont' et 'probaveront[8]*.'*

§ 17. *Quid? non e quoque i loco fuit? 'Menerva' et 'leber' et 'magester' et 'Diove Victore,' non 'Diovi Victori*[9]*.'*

[1] =Paulus p. 23 M.: Scaurus 13, 23: Longus 69, 73.

[2] Paulus 81 *exfuti effusi, ut mertat pro mersat.* 124 *mertat pro mersat dicebant.*

[3] Paulus 84 *'faedum' antiqui dicebant pro 'haedo,' 'folus' pro 'holere,' 'fostem' pro 'hoste,' 'fostiam' pro 'hostia.'* Scaurus 11 *ubi illi f litteram posuerunt, nos h substituimus, ut quod illi 'fordeum' dicebant nos 'hordeum,' 'fariolum' quem nos 'hariolum,' similiter 'faedum' quem nunc nos 'haedum' dicimus.* Comp. ib. 13, 23: Longus 69.

[4] Paul. 31 *'Burrum' dicebant antiqui quod nunc dicimus 'rufum.'* Scaurus 14 *quem Graeci* Πυρρίαν *nos 'Byrriam,' et quem nos 'Pyrrhum' antiqui 'Burrum,' &c.*

[5] Paul. 66 *duellum bellum.*

[6] Paulus 312 *ea consuetudine qua 'stlocum' pro 'locum' et 'stlitem' pro 'litem' dicebant.*

[7] Scaurus 11 and Longus 69 notice this, instancing the necessary distinction between *ad* and *at.*

[8] Longus 49 (after quoting Verrius Flaccus he proceeds, probably from Varro) *Apud nos quoque antiqui ostendunt, qui aeque confusas o et u litteras habuere. Nam 'consol' scribebatur per o, cum legeretur per u, consul. Unde in multis etiam nominibus variae sunt scripturae, ut fontes funtes, frondes frundes.* Comp. Pliny ap. Prisc. i. p. 26, 27.

[9] Longus 73 discusses *delerus* and *delirus, fesiae* and *feseae.* Paul. 12 notices *loeber* and *loebertas* for *liber, libertas.*

Quintilian I. 7.

§ 4. *Putaverunt illa quoque servanda discrimina, ut 'ex' praepositionem, si verbum sequeretur 'specto,' adiecta secundae syllabae s littera, si 'pecto,' remota scriberemus*[1].

§ 5. *Illa quoque servata est a multis differentia, ut 'ad' cum esset praepositio d litteram, cum autem coniunctio, t acciperet*[2].

'Cum,' si tempus significaret, per q et m, si comitem, per c ac duas sequentes scriberetur[3].

§ 6. *Frigidiora his alia, ut 'quidquid' c quartum haberet, ne interrogare bis videremur*[4], *et quotidie, non cotidie, ut sit quot diebus*[5].

§ 7. *Quaeri solet, in scribendo praepositiones sonum, quem iunctae efficiunt, an quem separatae, observare conveniat, ut cum dico 'obtinuit': secundam enim b litteram ratio poscit, aures magis audiunt p*[6].

§ 10. *K quidem in nullis verbis utendum puto nisi quae significat, etiam ut sola ponatur*[7].

§§ 14, 15. *Diutius duravit usque et i iungendis eadem ratione qua Graeci ει uterentur: ea casibus numerisque discreta est, ut Lucilius praecipit*

> *iam puerei venere: e postremum facito atque i*
> *ut pueri plures fiant:*

ac deinceps idem

> *mendaci furique addes e, cum dare furi*
> *iusseris*[8].

[1] Longus 63 *In eo quod est expectatus duplicem scriptionem quidam esse voluerunt.* (But the distinction is a different one from Quintilian's.)

[2] = Scaurus 11: Longus 61, 62, 69.

[3] Caper 95.

[4] Caper 95.

[5] Longus 79 (*Existimo*) *illos vitiose et dicere et scribere, qui potius per quo quotidie dicunt, quam per co cotidie.... Non enim est a quoto die quotidie dictum, sed a continenti die cotidie tractum.*

[6] Longus 64 *'Ob' praepositio interdum...ad eam litteram transit, a qua sequens vox incipit, ut est 'offulsit,' 'ommutuit': item et si p sequatur, ut 'opposuit.'*

[7] Longus 53 *Qui k expellunt, notam dicunt esse magis quam litteram, qua significamus kalumniam kaput kalendas.* Comp. Scaurus 15.

[8] Longus 55 *Hic quaeritur etiam an*

Quod quidem cum supervacuum est,.....tum incommodum aliquando.

§ 18. *Ae syllabam, cuius secundam nunc e litteram ponimus, varie per a et i efferebant, quidam semper ut Graeci, quidam singulariter tantum, cum in dativum vel genetivum casum incidissent, unde 'pictai vestis' et 'aquai' Vergilius amantissimus vetustatis carminibus inseruit. In eisdem plurali numero e utebantur, 'hi Sullae Galbae'[1].'*

§ 20. *Quid quod Ciceronis temporibus paulumque infra, fere quotiens s littera media vocalium longarum vel subiecta longis esset, geminabatur? ut 'caussae' 'cassus' 'divissiones': quomodo et ipsum et Vergilium quoque scripsisse manus eorum docent[2]. Iam 'optimus maximus,' ut mediam i litteram, quae veteribus u fuerat, acciperent, Gai primum Caesaris inscriptione traditur factum[3].*

§ 23. *Quid? non Cato Censorius 'dicam' et 'faciem' 'dicem' et 'faciem' scripsit[4], eundemque in ceteris, quae similiter cadunt, modum tenuit?*

per e et i quaedam debeant scribi secundum consuetudinem Graecam. Non nulli enim ea quae producerentur sic scripserunt, alii contenti fuerunt huic productioni i longam aut notam dedisse. Alii vero, quorum est item Lucilius, varie scriptitaverunt, siquidem in iis quae producerentur alia per i longam, alia per e et i notaverunt, velut differentia quaedam separantes, ut cum diceremus 'viri,' si essent plures, per e et i scriberemus, si vero esset unius viri, per i notaremus. Et Lucilius in nono

'iam puerei venere,' e postremum facito atque i,
ut puerei plures fiant, i si facis solum,
'pupilli,' 'pueri,' 'Lucili,' hoc unius fiet.

item

'hoc illi factum est uni,' tenue hoc facies i:
'haec illei fecere,' adde e, ut pinguius fiat.

...Hoc mihi videtur supervacaneae esse observationis.

[1] Paulus 25 *Ae syllabam antiqui Graeca consuetudine per ai scribebant, ut 'aulai,' 'Musai.'* Pompeius 297 *'Aulai medio'...una syllaba in duas divisa est. Legite Verrium Flaccum et Catonem, et ibi invenietis.*

Longus 57 *Illud etiam adnotandum circa i litteram est, quod ea quae nos per ae antiqui per ai scriptitaverunt, ut 'Iuliai' 'Claudiai.' hac scriptione voluerunt esse differentiam, ut pluralis quidem numeri nominativus casus per a et e scriberetur, genetivus vero singularis per a et i.* Comp. Scaurus 16.

[2] Scaurus 21 *Causam item a multis scio per duo s scribi, &c.*

[3] Longus 67 *Varie etiam scriptitatum est mancupium aucupium manibiae, siquidem C. Caesar per i scripsit, ut apparet ex titulis ipsius, at Augustus per u, ut testes sunt eius inscriptiones.*

[4] Paulus 72 *'dice'* (? *dicem*) *pro 'dicam' antiqui posuere.*

§ 26. *Nostri praeceptores 'servum cervumque' u et o litteris scripserunt, quia subiecta sibi vocalis in unum sonum coalescere et confundi nequiret, nunc u gemina scribuntur ea ratione quam reddidi.....Nec inutiliter Claudius aeolicam illam ad hos usus litteram adiecerat*[1].

§ 27. *Illud nunc melius, quod 'cui' tribus quas posui litteris enotamus, in quo pueris nobis ad pinguem sane sonum qu et oi utebantur, tantum ut ab illo 'qui' distingueretur*[2].

§ 28. *'Gaius' C littera significatur, quae inversa mulierem declarat*[3].

Now we know of no special treatise on orthography older than Quintilian, except that of Verrius Flaccus. And of one of the notes quoted above, that on *pictai vestis* from the Aeneid, it is nearly certain that it cannot be from Varro, while Pompeius in the passage cited tells us that it came from Verrius; indeed a note very like it is preserved by Paulus p. 25. Moreover two other notes, that on *dicem, faciem,* for *dicam, faciam,* and that on *Gaius,* occur in the epitome of Verrius's lexicon; and this, as we have seen, is the case with many of the notes in the fourth chapter. May we not then pronounce almost with certainty that in Quintilian, Scaurus, and Longus we have part at least of the treatise of Verrius *De Orthographia?*

If I am right in referring these parallel or identical notes to Verrius, it is not impossible to state with some precision what was the nature of his book. That it was largely based on the researches of Varro is evident: and if we may trust Pompeius, Verrius must have also used the *grammatici libelli* of Valerius Cato. *Legite Verrium et Catonem, et ibi invenietis.* It discussed the various changes of letters as known to the history of

[1] Scaurus 12. Longus 58 *Aeque ab iisdem 'equus' per v et o scriptus est, et quaeritur utrum per unum u an per duo debent scribi. Sed priusquam de hoc loquamur, v litteram digamma esse interdum non tantum in his debemus advertere, &c.*

[2] Longus 76 *Itaque audimus quosdam plena oi syllaba dicere 'quoi' et 'hoic' pro 'cui' et 'huic,' quod multo vitiosius est, quam si tenuitatem y litterae custodirent. Est autem ubi pinguitudo u litterae decentius servatur.* Comp. ib. 72.

[3] Longus 53 *C conversum, quo Gaia significatur: Gaias enim generaliter a specie omnes mulieres accipere voluerunt.* Comp. Paulus 95.

the Latin language, and their variations in contemporary writing. While Verrius must have derived much of his information from Varro's *De Sermone Latino* and *De Antiquitate Litterarum,* his book was probably more systematic than anything which Varro had written; it was, with equal probability, written in no spirit of servile adhesion to Varro's opinions; and it included, of course, instances of the usage of authors later than those quoted by him.

Let us now pass to the consideration of Pliny's work entitled *Dubii Sermonis.* We know that this consisted of eight books, *libri* as the younger Pliny calls them, *libelli* in the modest phraseology of their author.

A considerable number of notes, bearing Pliny's name, are quoted by the later grammarians, and a great deal more has almost certainly been taken from Pliny without acknowledgment. I hope to make it probable, also, that parts of the early chapters of Quintilian's first book (I. 5. § 54—I. 6. § 28) are based on the same authority.

It may be certainly inferred, from the remains of Pliny's treatise which have come down to us, that it covered a very wide field. It embraced the consideration (*a*) of letters, their changes and pronunciation; (*b*) of nouns, their gender, declension, and forms of derivation; (*c*) of the article and pronoun; (*d*) of verbs, active, passive, and deponent, with questions about their irregular formation; (*e*) of prepositions and their usage; (*f*) of conjunctions; (*g*) of solecism and barbarism. Nor was it a mere collection of lists. We owe to Pliny more than one successful or unsuccessful attempt to frame a grammatical terminology. He reckoned the gerunds *dicendi dicendo,* &c., as adverbs[1]. He applied to the comparative adverbs such as *magis* and *potius* the terms *relativae ad aliquid.* He seems (Charisius p. 118) to have invented the phrase *nomina facientia* for the primary forms of nouns as opposed to their derivatives. He is probably responsible for the use of *articulus* in the sense of the definite article (Probus *Inst.* p. 133). He was careful, when he could, to point out a difference of meaning coincident with

[1] So Dionysius Thrax (Neumann, p. 35) called *ἀναγνωστέον, γραπτέον,* &c. *ἐπιρρήματα θετικά.*

a difference of form, as, e.g., when he remarks that *vertex* means height (*immanem vim impetus*) and *vortex* a whirlpool (Charis. p. 88), or that *auguro* means to have a presentiment, *auguror* to take the auguries.

We know from his own statement that the book excited the opposition of the philosophers. Why this was the case we can to a certain extent conjecture with probability; and here again I must ask for the reader's attention to a somewhat complicated argument.

The fourth chapter of Quintilian's first book, and the fifth as far as § 54, includes, as I shall endeavour to shew further on, the main chapters of an *Ars Grammatica;* and indeed at the end of § 54, Quintilian seems to take leave of grammar altogether. He then proceeds to consider the question of words, provincial, Gallic, Spanish and Greek, simple and compound, literal and metaphorical. Thus the chapter ends, and the sixth is a dissertation on *sermo* or usage, considered under four heads, that of *ratio* or reason, including *analogia* and *etymologia*, antiquity, authority, and custom.

Now this division is not the same as that adopted by Varro in his *De Sermone Latino*. According to Varro, *sermo* depended on *natura, analogia, consuetudo, auctoritas*[1]. Again, Varro is expressly attacked by Quintilian in his remarks upon etymology. The authority for this section then can hardly be Varro, but must be some later writer.

It is not probable that this writer was the same as the author of the fourth chapter, and the fifth down to § 54. For Quintilian, in several instances, repeats, in a different connection, remarks which he has already made there, without any sufficient notification of the fact. This looks as if he were, in the later of the two passages, borrowing or adapting from another treatise which partially covered the same ground.

There is good reason for supposing that this treatise was Pliny's *Dubii Sermonis*. Several of Quintilian's remarks coincide exactly with notes quoted from that work by later grammarians. Thus in 5 § 63 his observation on the declension

[1] Diomedes p. 439.

of such words as *Dido, Calypso—neque enim iam Calypsonem dixerim ut Iunonem, quamquam secutus antiquos C. Caesar utitur hac ratione declinandi. Sed auctoritatem consuetudo superavit*—agrees nearly with what Pliny says in Charisius (p. 127), *consuetudinem facere hanc Calypso, hanc Io, hanc Allecto.* Again, Quintilian lays stress on the gender of the diminutive as a test of the gender of the principal noun (6 § 4). So Pompeius (p. 164) tells us of Pliny, *Ait Plinius Secundus secutus Varronem, quando dubitamus principale genus, redeamus ad deminutionem.* We may compare Quintilian's remarks on *lepus* and *lupus* with those of Charisius p. 135, which are in all probability Pliny's. In 6 § 15 Quintilian notices *Albanus* and *Albensis* as a double form from *Alba,* and this observation Pompeius (p. 144) quotes from Pliny. In § 17 he laughs at persons who insist on saying *tribunale* for *tribunal.* So Charisius p. 62, in a context full of material taken from Pliny, says *quod tamen consuetudine extorqueri non potuit, quin vectigal et cervical et capital et tribunal animalque contempta ratione dicamus.* I would also call attention to the constant appeal of Charisius in this part of his compilation to *ratio,* known to be a favourite principle with Pliny[1].

To return then to the point of this argumentation. We know that Pliny was fond of appealing to *ratio* and *consuetudo;* and that he recognized *veterum licentia* and *veterum dignitas,* or antiquity, as an element in the explanation of usage (Charis. p. 118). Whether he reckoned *natura* as a positive principle active in the formation of words is not certain: all that we know is that he spoke of an irrational expression as violating *natura* (Servius on Donatus p. 444, Pompeius p. 283). On the other hand we know that Quintilian describes *sermo* or usage as depending on *ratio, vetustas, auctoritas,* and *consuetudo.* Now if other important remarks in this chapter of Quintilian can be shewn to come from Pliny, is it too much to infer that it is to Pliny that Quintilian owes his fourfold division? And if this is

[1] See the quotations from Pliny ap. Charis. p. 116 foll.: and comp. Charis. p. 79, *Plinius quoque Dubii Sermonis V adicit esse quidem rationem per duo i scribendi, sed multa iam consuetudine superari. Ratio* was opposed to *auctoritas* by Verrius Flaccus *in epistulis:* Servius on Aen. 8. 423.

so, the reason will appear why Pliny feared the contradiction of the philosophers. For while Varro, following his favourite Stoics, allowed a large field to *natura* and *analogia*, and (as in duty bound) distinguished between *auctoritas* and *consuetudo*, Pliny probably expunged *natura*, introduced *ratio*, which he made to include *analogia* and *etymologia*, and *vetustas*, a head which should have been distributed between *consuetudo* and *auctoritas*. It is small blame to the philosophers if they were expected to rise up in arms against a division like this.

The authorities upon which the work was mainly based were Caesar's two books *De Analogia*, the various writings of Varro, and the lexicon and grammatical treatises of Verrius Flaccus. These authorities Pliny used with respect, but in no spirit of servile repetition. It is probable that in philosophical grasp (if indeed such an expression can be used in reference to any Latin writer) he fell behind Varro; but his collections of instances would of course include later authors than those accessible to the latter, and would bring to light changes which had crept in since his time.

What was the arrangement of the work, what subjects were treated in each of its eight divisions, cannot be exactly ascertained. We know that the sixth book, largely used by Julius Romanus in the age of the Antonines in his work *De Analogia*, contained lists of words whose case-forms were uncertain. In all probability these were arranged, as they had been by Julius Caesar, according to the endings of the nominative case. For Quintilian, in the Plinian passage quoted above (I. 6. 4), recognizes this, the *comparatio similium in extremis maxime syllabis*, as one of the guides for the grammarian. Whether this arrangement was further subordinated to an alphabetical one, as by Julius Romanus and later authors, is uncertain[1].

From the fifth book Charisius (p. 79) preserves a quotation relating to the doubling of *i* in the genitives of words ending in *-ius:* from the second a distinction is cited between *clipeus* and *clupeus* (with a notice of the doubtful gender) and a remark on the postposition of *cum* in *nobiscum, tecum*, &c.

[1] It may be observed that Martianus Capella, in the chapter on *analogia* in his third book, treats nouns in much the same way.

That the subject of gender was treated early in the work is probable, from the fact that Quintilian treats it early in his sixth chapter. He also, it may be observed, takes the question of analogy in declension late, which coincides with the fact that the quotations on this subject in Julius Romanus mostly come from the sixth book.

If I were to be allowed to conjecture roughly what was the order of Pliny's eight books, I should suppose it may have been as follows:

1. Alphabet and words (Priscian I. p. 26, Quint. I. 5. 54 foll.).
2. Substantives doubtful in form, gender, and meaning (but Priscian quotes a doubtful gender from lib. I.).
3. Pronouns.
4. Verbs: doubtful conjugation, doubtful voice.
5. Cases of nouns.
6. Question of analogy in doubtful declension.
7. Adverbs.
8. Prepositions and conjunctions.

It may be that the lists of adverbs and conjunctions given by Diomedes and Charisius come ultimately from Pliny, though there is no direct evidence for this statement.

It is in any case morally certain that much of Nonius's third book (*De Indiscretis Generibus*) and of his seventh and tenth books on verbs comes ultimately from Pliny: perhaps the same may also be said of his eleventh book on adverbs. And the crowd of later grammarians, whose writing is for the most part mere scissors and paste work badly cut out and put together, are in large parts of their treatises greatly indebted to him. The same must be said of the later authors of lists of synonyms, or as they were called *differentiae:* for nothing is more characteristic of Pliny than the attempt to shew that differences of grammatical form often cover differences of meaning.

I now come to the *Ars Grammatica* of Remmius Palaemon.

We have already seen that he was the author of an *Ars Grammatica*, that is a manual of grammar, not a philosophical

treatise on usage and word-formation. What was the nature of this book?

A scholar named Palaemon is not unfrequently quoted by the later grammarians. Charis. p. 225—6 (= Diom. p. 415) cites him on the subject of conjunctions: Charis. p. 231 (roughly = Diom. 409) on prepositions, and soon afterwards on the various usages of prepositions (essentially = Diom. 411 foll.).

Schottmüller has made a very curious observation with regard to the pages of Charisius (225 foll.) which treat of conjunctions and those (p. 231 foll.) on prepositions. It is that before hypothetical instances (such as *cum dico* as example of *cum* with indicative) Charisius in these places mostly uses *velut* instead of *ut*, or *ut puta:* and as Palaemon's name is mentioned in the neighbourhood, he jumps to the conclusion that this use of *velut* is a sure test of the presence of quotations from Palaemon. Applying this test to other passages in Charisius, he vindicates to Palaemon all in which *velut* is found in this connection. Some other passages in Charisius he claims for Palaemon on other grounds.

But the Palaemon of Charisius and Diomedes is not, in Schottmüller's opinion, the Remmius Palaemon of Quintilian and Juvenal. He is a late grammarian of the age of Sidonius Apollinaris. The arguments for this position are

(1) The Palaemon of the grammarians sometimes quotes Pliny. Now Remmius Palaemon died before the publication of Pliny's preface to the Natural History (77 A.D.) and Pliny must have mentioned his *Ars Grammatica* had it been written after the publication of his own book *Dubii Sermonis*, that is, had it been written between 67 and 77 A.D. It must therefore have been written before 67, and consequently Remmius Palaemon could not have quoted Pliny.

(2) Quintilian mentions Palaemon as a second Aristarchus (p. 28 *cum Aristarchis comparat*): a compliment which would be quite out of place as applied to the author of the very weak remarks which are attributed by the later grammarians to Palaemon.

I propose to take the last point first, and to argue that

there is no valid reason why the Palaemon of the grammarians should not be identified with the Palaemon of Quintilian.

Quintilian, it may be observed, does not (I. 4. 20) speak of Palaemon as a second Aristarchus, but says merely that he followed Aristarchus in making eight parts of speech: *ut Aristarchus et nostra aetate Palaemon.*

This argument being disposed of, let us now consider whether there is any necessity that Palaemon's *Ars Grammatica* should have been written before, and not after, Pliny's *Dubii Sermonis.* Pliny says that he has waited in vain for the grammarians to attack his book. But supposing Palaemon to have meantime written a book friendly to Pliny, why should the latter mention him as hostile? What objection is there to supposing that the *Ars* of Palaemon was partly based upon the collections made in the *Dubii Sermonis*, and that Palaemon may really, as he is represented in the grammarians as doing, have quoted Pliny?

Again, the definitions and remarks attributed to Palaemon by Charisius and Diomedes are by no means those of an incompetent writer. The passage on conjunctions (Charis. 225—6 = Diomedes 415) is very sound work, and so is a good deal of the dissertation on prepositions in Charis. 231—2. Indeed it must be added that the notes on this subject in Diomedes p. 411—413, which only differ from those in Charisius as an older and better draft differs from a later and inferior one, must also be from Palaemon, and that they shew not only good sense but learning. They are probably due to Pliny[1] and ultimately to Verrius Flaccus.

Supposing then that they come from Remmius Palaemon, can Schottmüller's test of the use of *velut* be applied to detect his hand in other passages?

While I admit the oddness of the phenomenon to which Schottmüller has called attention, I doubt whether he draws the right inference from it. For the same passages from Palaemon (or depending mainly upon him) are quoted more than once by both Charisius and Diomedes, but where Charisius

[1] See Audax p. 355 Keil.

uses *velut,* Diomedes uses *ut.* This we find to be the case if we compare the passage on conjunctions as given by the two grammarians (Charis. p. 225—6, Diomedes p. 415): and again if we compare the chapter on the usages of prepositions (Charis. p. 232, Diom. 411) where Diomedes gives fragments of a much fuller version than that of which Charisius, perhaps, abridges the whole.

I suppose then that the use of *velut* is a sign, not of Palaemon's hand, but of some late redactor using old material and putting his own mark upon it.

Assuming then that the Palaemon of the grammarians is the real Palaemon, we infer that he wrote fully upon prepositions and conjunctions, and (at least in his account of prepositions) may have been indebted directly to Pliny and indirectly to Verrius Flaccus. Priscian tells us further (I. p. 35) that he called the ψιλή or soft breathing *exilis:* and from Quintilian we learn that he recognized eight parts of speech and no more.

But can we not learn more than this from Quintilian about Remmius Palaemon?

I have before observed that the part of Quintilian's first book which begins I. 4. 1 and ends I. 5. 54 contains in an abridged and adapted form much of what might well have been found in an *Ars Grammatica.* I. 4. §§ 2—17 treat of letters: §§ 18—21 of the parts of speech: §§ 22—26 of nouns and cases: §§ 26—29 of the verb: I. 5. §§ 5—33 of *barbarismus:* §§ 34—54 of *soloecismus:* and at this point Quintilian bids adieu to grammar.

That Quintilian had some technical treatise before him, the rules of which he throws into literary form, may be assumed as almost certain: have we any means of deciding who its author was?

No careful reader of Quintilian can fail to observe that these sections go over, in part, the same ground as is again traversed in chapters 6 and 7, and at the same time that Quintilian takes hardly any notice of the fact.

The authority cannot be Varro. For to Varro, as we saw, *grammatica* or *litteratura* included *lectio enarratio emendatio* and *iudicium.* To Quintilian (I. 4. 2) it is no more than *recte*

loquendi scientia and *poetarum enarratio:* the schoolmaster has driven the philosopher away, or put him in the background—*enarrationem praecedit emendata lectio, et mixtum his omnibus iudicium est.* Again, Quintilian or his authority does not accept Varro's theory about the letter *h* (comp. I. 5. 20 with Cassiodorius 153 K.). Accent is by Quintilian (I. 5. 22) called *tenor,* to Varro it is *prosodia:* nor is Quintilian's treatment of accentuation at all like Varro's (Sergius on Donatus 528 foll.). Varro called the ablative the *sextus casus* (Diomedes 302): Quintilian is disposed to divide it into two, making the instrumental a *septimus casus.* Nor again are we reading Pliny in these sections. This is proved by the fact that the definition of *barbarismus* given by Pliny is different from Quintilian's. Quintilian accepts on the whole the theory which reappears very often in the later grammarians, that *barbarismus* is a mistake in a single word (*quod fit in singulis verbis vitium*), *soloecismus* a faulty combination of words expressed or implied, which may be committed in one or more words, but never in a word isolated from its expressed or implied context: I. 5. 36 *sit aliquando in uno verbo, numquam in solo verbo.* Now Pliny made quite a different distinction: *barbarismus* was what violated *natura, soloecismus* what offended against rule (Pompeius 283). What this meant we may perhaps gather from Pompeius's remark (p. 290), *cum per naturam nemo dicat scalam, nemo dicat quadrigam, sine dubio barbarismi sunt.* Quint. I. 5. 16 says it may seem absurd to apply the term *barbarismus* to mistakes such as *scala scopa* for *scalae scopae:* but had he been adapting from Pliny, is it conceivable that he would not have mentioned Pliny's theory of nature and art as applied to barbarism and solecism?

If Quintilian, then, is in these sections consulting neither Varro nor Pliny, it is most probable that he had the *Ars* of Remmius Palaemon before him.

There is some positive evidence to help us here.

Quintilian I. 4. 27 uses the word *qualitas* for mood: so again I. 5. 41 *modos sive cui status eos dici seu qualitates placet.* This term seems to have been used by Palaemon. Charisius 226 and Diomedes in his corresponding section, a passage which, as we have seen, comes essentially from Palaemon, says *superest ut*

dicamus quae coniunctio cui qualitati iungatur: and so *subiunctiva, finitiva qualitas* Charis. 263.

Remmius Palaemon, if we may believe the Scholia on Juv. 6. 452, was Quintilian's master: what more likely, then, than that Quintilian should give him the place of honour in his grammatical dissertation?

And I may finally observe that the sketch of *Ars Grammatica* which Quintilian gives, as a system beginning with *recte loquendi scientia*, ending with *soloecismus*, and including especially the explanation of poets, coincides exactly with Juvenal's description of Palaemon's work: *Odi Hanc ego, quae repetit volvitque Palaemonis artem, Servata semper lege et ratione loquendi, Nec curanda viris opicae castigat amicae Verba: soloecismum liceat fecisse marito.* There it is, all of it: rules, poetry, and solecism.

If I am right then in supposing that these sections of Quintilian are no more than a literary adaptation of the principal parts of Palaemon's *Ars Grammatica*, I may proceed to state what seem to have been the main characteristics of that work, and to make a few observations on its influence upon the later writers of *Artes Grammaticae*.

The first part consisted of a dissertation on the alphabet and the combination and changes of letters. As almost all of this coincides closely with the treatises on *Orthographia* of Velius Longus and Terentius Scaurus on the one hand, and with notes in Festus or Paulus on the other, it is highly probable that it was taken by Palaemon from Verrius Flaccus *De Orthographia:* a work which as we have seen was, in all likelihood, partly transcribed by Quintilian in his seventh chapter. After letters came syllables: Quint. 1.4.17. Palaemon (after Dionysius Thrax) made eight parts of speech, not distinguishing *appellatio* or *vocabulum* from *nomen*[1]. He divided substantives according to their genders, not omitting to inquire into the etymology of such substantives as had passed into *cognomina*. He in all probability distinguished the uses of the ablative proper from those of the same form used instrumentally or otherwise—the *septimus casus*. He discussed the half verbal half nominal

[1] The distinction is given from Scaurus by Diomedes 320.

nature of the participle, the impersonal use of the passive, and the passive after nouns of cognate signification. The supines he called participial, while remarking that the form of the passive supine resembled that of some adverbs. Finally he gave a very full treatment to the various kinds of *barbarismus* and *soloecismus*.

Whether or no it be admitted that Palaemon was the author of the treatise which Quintilian was consulting, there can be no doubt that that treatise was the foundation of large parts of the later *Artes*. All the later grammarians adopt Palaemon's eight parts of speech. Many are kindly disposed to the seventh case: the discussions on participles and impersonal passives and supines recur in fuller or shorter forms; and the doctrine of *barbarismus* and *soloecismus* is expounded on the same principles, but with differing degrees of fulness, in many *Artes*. Quintilian's authority may, on this point, be best studied in Pompeius and Consentius[1].

The sum of my conclusions with regard to the grammatical chapters of Quintilian's first book is, then, as follows. The fourth chapter, and the fifth as far as § 54, is a rough literary adaptation of the *Ars Grammatica* of Remmius Palaemon. Chapter 5 § 54—6 § 27 is probably from Pliny's *Dubii Sermonis*. §§ 28—38 of the same chapter, on etymology, is partly directed against Varro, partly against etymological writers and their science in general. It is impossible to point out any particular authority for these sections, which may well represent no more than the general recollections which Quintilian had carried away from lectures and from his own reading. The seventh chapter, on orthography, from § 1 to § 28, is taken or adapted from the *De Orthographia* of Verrius Flaccus.

Of the *Silva Observationum Sermonis Antiqui*[2] written

[1] Pompeius p. 284 foll., Consentius p. 386 foll.

[2] The main contentions of Dr Beck's excellent essay on Valerius Probus are as follows: (1) That the *Silva Observationum Sermonis Antiqui*, attributed by Suetonius to Valerius Probus, was not a work composed by that scholar, but a collection of the notes taken home by the young men who had conversed with him. (2) That Probus was not the author of any regular grammatical treatise, but only left behind him a few *obiter dicta* on grammatical points. (3) That in several places where Priscian professes,

by Valerius Probus little can be said positively except that it was the work of a pure scholar, untinctured by any philosophical theories perfectly or imperfectly apprehended. It was a collection of apparently irregular usages taken from ancient authors; and undoubtedly it must have covered much the same ground as Pliny's *Dubii Sermonis*. Its general character can be inferred from what remains of it in the grammatical books of Nonius Marcellus, which I hope I have shewn (in my essays prefixed to the first volume of Conington's Virgil) are based upon Pliny and Probus. It may indeed be said that these two authors are responsible for most of

and has hitherto been supposed, to be quoting Valerius Probus, he is really quoting Diomedes: and that this is sometimes true also of other grammarians. (4) That, in consequence, the grammatical observations usually attributed to Valerius Probus must be assigned to other scholars, and, in particular, to Pliny.

Dr Beck's second proposition will probably not be disputed: but I am not so sceptical as he is as to the *Silva Observationum*, and the relics of this work generally supposed to have been preserved by Diomedes and Priscian. It may be, of course, that Probus did not himself entitle his book *Silva Observationum Sermonis Antiqui*, though it has been generally assumed that he did. Gellius, it is true, never mentions such a book when he quotes Probus; but Gellius's method of quotation is so unsatisfactory that little can be made of his evidence one way or the other. On the whole, there seems to me to be nothing in the evidence to disprove the existence of such a work, whatever its title. Suetonius's words, *reliquit autem non mediocrem silvam* &c., seem to point to more than a mere collection of notes.

I am unable to agree with Dr Beck as to the quotations in Priscian and Diomedes. I grant, of course, that the Probus of Priscian is, in a great many cases, not Valerius, but the Probus of the *Instituta Artium*. I still think, however, that when Priscian quotes, with the name of Probus, specimens of really ancient Latin usage, it is not unreasonable to suppose that they come from Valerius: especially as those quotations are exactly what one would have expected from a miscellaneous collection of ancient usages. Nor do I see any sufficient reason for supposing that Probus, in Priscian, is ever a mistake for Diomedes. Not only does Priscian quote Diomedes more than once by name, but in the important section on verbs (Diomedes p. 367 foll. Keil) where the two grammarians go over the same ground, and partly with the same instances, Priscian is fuller than Diomedes, and adopts a different method of arrangement. The impression left on my mind is that both authors are, very likely at second or third hand, consulting the same authority, very probably Caper, who was himself using the collections of Probus and Pliny. A comparison of Diomedes and Priscian with Nonius will, I think, be found to bear out this conclusion.

the notes on irregularities in conjugation or declension which meet us in the later grammarians.

The conclusion to which my argument points is that the main outlines of the traditional Latin grammar, such as we find it in the numerous, but often identical, expositions which bear the various names of the later grammarians—Charisius, Diomedes, Pompeius, Donatus, Cledonius and others, were drawn in the first century A.D. The rules and arrangement of the conventional *Ars Grammatica*, such as was used and taught during the later empire by the professors in the large cities, were in all probability, in most cases, those of Remmius Palaemon. The instances were mostly supplied by scholars of the age of Hadrian and the Antonines, who drew their information largely from Pliny and Valerius Probus.

The grammatical studies of the first century A.D., when compared with those of the last century of the republic, exhibit, in some respects, the same character as the other literary work of the same period. There is more system, more effort after compilation and arrangement, but less freedom, less grasp, and altogether a narrower sphere of ideas. Pliny's researches are inspired by a philosophy more hasty and commonplace than that which Varro had adopted from the Stoics, and Verrius, Palaemon, and Probus write without any philosophy at all. Again, the scientific impulse is checked by the requirements of practical necessity. The passion for correct speaking and writing is strong in the upper class, and is instilled into the boy from his earliest school-days; just as it is the fashion in literature, whether in prose or verse, to hunt for choice expressions and telling points. With the increase of wealth and population at Rome the demand for education increases. A boxer like Pomponius Marcellus, a weaver like Remmius Palaemon, find teaching grammar a profitable occupation. Scholarship is one of the dozen accomplishments of the *Graeculus esuriens*, and Juvenal's complaint that the schoolmaster is badly paid shews only that the market was overstocked. The modern scholar may lament this degeneracy, and bitterly regret the loss of Varro's encyclopaedic treatises; but he must remember that but for the educationists and scholars of

this period he might have lost much even of what he seems to have, and have been left ignorant of the very existence of the Latin studies in philology, one of the most remarkable and interesting intellectual efforts of the ancient world.

H. NETTLESHIP.

HERODOTUS IN EGYPT.

In a paper (XIV, p. 257 of this Journal) Mr Sayce maintains three theses:

1. That Herodotus arrived in Egypt by Canobus when the inundation was at such a height as to allow him to "sail through the plain" by Naucratis to Memphis, making an excursion to Sais; that "he *must always* have travelled by water, and had no need of following the windings of the river, or the angles of the canals" (p. 261); that the inundation still prevailed so as to determine his course when he visited the Pyramids from Memphis, and when he went to the Fayoum (p. 282); and moreover that though he never did visit Thebes yet had he done so it must of necessity have been at a time when "Karnac with its lofty obelisks and hall of gigantic columns, the Ramesseum with its monstrous image of Ramses, *shattered by earthquake* [how does he know this?], Medinet Aboo not yet buried under the mounds of a Coptic village, all alike would have stood at the edge of the water and forced themselves on the attention of the most incurious traveller: and the Colossi of the temple of Amenophis would have risen out of the flood in grim majesty." 2. That he never went south of the neighbourhood of the Fayoum. 3. That, arriving at Memphis, "after inspecting the great temple of Ptah there, *first* visiting its northern entrance and then *walking round it from east to west,* he went by water to Gizeh in order to see the Pyramids; an expedition which would not have occupied more than a day; and this was followed by a voyage southward, past Dashur, to Anysis or Heracleopolis, and thence to the Fayoum. He then returned to Memphis, and either now, or more probably on his first visit, made an excursion

to Heliopolis"; and eventually, visiting Bubastis and Buto, and the valley of the winged serpents on his way, reached either Naucratis or Pelusium, and thence made his trip to Tyre (p. 285).

Mr Sayce does not tell us what conclusion he would draw from these facts if established. But we shall not be wronging him, if we take this paper as an appendix to his *Herodotus, Books I—III*, to which he refers without any retractations, and as meant to enforce his opinion of the worthlessness of the author. At least, the sneer with which he prefaces the paper shews what that opinion is. He has found some Greek *graffiti* on the walls of the temple of Seti at Abydos "ranging in date from the beginning of the sixth century B.C.," and therefore covering the times of both Hecatæus and Herodotus. And, making no application to the former author, for whom he has expressed much admiration, he observes "it would seem to be a moral certainty that Herodotus followed the fashion of his countrymen and helped to deface the monuments of Egypt like the British tourist of modern times." Has then Mr Sayce followed the fashion of his own countrymen in this particular? If not, what is the distinction he would have us draw between his own character and that of Herodotus? But without further discussion of his motives, I proceed to his arguments.

The absence of Herodotus' handwriting at Abydos is, I presume (though out of place), intended as a step towards proving the second thesis—*valeat quantum*. He proceeds, "if however we can no longer expect to find [his handwriting] it is yet possible to determine *from the words of his narrative* the route he followed, and the extent of his travels."

This sentence gives a fundamentally erroneous impression of the character of Book II, and the error affects the whole argument. The only narrative in it is in the first chapter, "Cambyses invaded Egypt"; and it is resumed in the first chapter of Book III, "It was against this Amasis that Cambyses marched." What intervenes is a description of the country, and an account of what Herodotus thought most interesting in the institutions, manners, and history of the people. He incidentally, here and there, mentions that he visited this and that place—Memphis, Thebes, Heliopolis, an Eastern valley—and went up the Nile as

far as Elephantine: he speaks of what he saw or heard at Sais, Buto, Bubastis, and elsewhere: and he describes scenes in other places as a man would who has seen them. But there is no sequence of time and place, as belonging to *travels*, in these notices; and nothing at all of the guide-book kind. He indicates the plan of his book clearly enough, though he was not the man to stick very closely to any plan. The first four chapters concern the origin and early civilization of the race; then follow 30 chapters on the geology and geography; then 64 on manners, religion, and institutions, in which his conviction that Egypt was the teacher of Greece in these matters is strongly brought out; then follows the ancient history as delivered by the "Egyptians" and the "priests," in 48 chapters, almost every sentence beginning "They say that..." And the rest is the modern history, from the epoch of what the Greeks called the Dodecarchy, which we know to have been the time of the breaking up of the native rule by the inroads of Ethiopians and Assyrians, down to the conquest by the Persians.

Neither is there the least indication that he thought himself (as Mr Sayce alleges, p. 262) "specially concerned to describe the great monuments of Egypt." I doubt whether he mentions a single building except in connexion with some historical personage, incident or custom; though, no doubt, when he is thus brought to speak of it in its historical connexion, he sometimes enlarges upon what struck him as wonderful or curious in it. Of the temple, or rather the whole *τέμενος*, at Bubastis, "than which there are others bigger and more costly, but none more pleasant to look at," he gives a picturesque description: the Pyramids in their massive simplicity and the Labyrinth in its curious complexity unlike any other buildings he had seen, are described in detail: but of the ordinary temple architecture we have no notice,—only mention of monolith shrines, obelisks, and colossal statues; the wall sculptures are merely "remarkable[1]."

[1] Perhaps Herodotus would have assented to Strabo's observations on some "Hall of columns" at Memphis: *ἔστι δέ τις καὶ πολύστυλος οἶκος, καθάπερ ἐν Μέμφει, βαρβαρικὴν ἔχων τὴν παρασκευήν. Πλὴν γὰρ τοῦ μεγάλων εἶναι καὶ πολυστίχων τῶν στύλων οὐδὲν ἔχει χαρίεν οὐδὲ γραφικόν, ἀλλὰ ματαιοπονίαν ἐμφαίνει μᾶλλον.*

However, from a book thus planned Mr Sayce proceeds to pick out dispersed sentences and thence to deduce the substance of a traveller's diary, prefacing: "Before we make the attempt it is necessary to ascertain *the season at which* he paid his visit."

Here is an assumption with no attempt at proof, that Herodotus was in Egypt during one season only; so that if he can adduce a single sentence indicating acquaintance with the appearances of the inundation, it is to be taken as a proof that he saw nothing more. And here, according to Mr Sayce, is that sentence, taken from the very close of the third portion (as I have divided it) of the Book (c. 97), which he thus renders: "He describes the appearance of the Delta at the time of the inundation, in words which none but an eye-witness could have used...the *traveller* sails not along the river, but through the plain. At this season...*he* leaves the sea and Canobus behind him, and *after* passing Anthylla and Archandria reaches Naucratis. In going from Naucratis to Memphis *he* has to pass by the Pyramids instead of the apex of the Delta."

The passage is torn from its context, and dislocated and mistranslated so as to produce the impression that "the traveller" means Herodotus: Mr Sayce uses it (p. 261, last paragraph) as "implying" this conclusion. Restoring the context and the true order and meaning, the passage stands thus. Herodotus has just described "in words which none but an eye-witness could have used," the ordinary course of inland navigation with barges of considerable tonnage, not adapted for sailing against the stream unless with a strong favourable wind, but towed from the banks; with equipments, however, fitted for taking full advantage of the current when floating down it. And then he adds "But *when the Nile overflows the country*, the towns stand out as the islands in the Aegean Sea...So, when this is the case *they carry on their traffic*—*πορθμεύονται*—no longer along the stream of the river, but through the middle of the plain. Going from Naucratis [not from the sea] to Memphis one sails close by the Pyramids, whereas the usual course is not this, but by the apex of the Delta *and by Cercasorus* [which words are strangely omitted by Mr Sayce]: and when sailing from the sea and Canopus to Naucratis you will come by Anthylla, &c." There

is no question of a "traveller" coming from the sea to Memphis. It is a fair conjecture—nothing more—that Herodotus may have been at Naucratis when he could witness these vessels arriving and departing in these unusual courses. But Mr Sayce himself allows that Herodotus may have been there twice—coming and going (p. 286); and there is no reason why he should not have spent months there among his countrymen the "Ionians" (cf. cap. 178).

This is Mr Sayce's main argument to prove that Herodotus "*always* travelled by water"! He attempts to support it by some others. Having omitted the mention of Cercasorus in the above passage, he goes on: "It is noticeable that the city of Cercasorus at the apex of the Delta does not seem to have been visited by Herodotus himself, since in chap. 15 his reference to it is stated to have been derived from 'the Ionians.'" This is adduced as a further proof that Herodotus went from Naucratis to Memphis in the flood, and so never passed that way.

In this chap. 15 Herodotus merely states, in order to controvert, the opinion of the Ionians (whom I take to be rather the Naucratians than Hecatæus) that "the Delta alone constitutes Egypt, alleging that its coast line is from the watch-tower of Perseus to the Pelusiac salt-works, and that it extends inland as far as Cercasorus where the Nile parts and runs to Pelusium and Canobus." He might as well argue that Herodotus only heard of the two ports from the Ionians!

Then he adduces what he calls a misstatement which Herodotus could never have made had he seen the country about Naucratis in its normal state. In chap. 179 he says that, "of old, if any trader arrived at any other mouth of the Nile than the Canobic, he had to swear it was involuntarily, and then to proceed with his ship to the Canobic mouth, or if prevented by adverse winds, he must unship his cargo into Nile boats and carry it round the Delta to Naucratis." To this Mr Sayce objects, firstly that it is inconsistent with the former statement about the course of navigation in flood-time. He does not say how: and I cannot see it. He adds "as Naucratis was more than 50 miles from the sea and not on the Canobic arm of the Nile, this would have been an impossible feat." Now the second of these alternatives

was neither impossible nor difficult on his own shewing. For he says, referring to Mr Petrie's discovery of the site, that there was a canal passing by the town which "ran from Lake Mareotis to the Kanopic arm of the Nile, which it joined south of the modern Kafr-ez-Zaiyât": so that the cargo, after passing upwards from the mouth at which it had arrived to the apex of the Delta, would descend the Canobic arm till it reached the junction, and then proceed by the canal. And as to the first alternative, does not Mr Sayce himself tell us that Herodotus "arrived like other Greeks of his age at the mouth of the Kanopic arm of the Nile, and...made his way to Naucratis"? Mr Petrie does not say the navigable canal debouched into Lake Mareotis; and if it did, there cannot be a doubt but what Naucratis communicated somehow with the river which was, as Mr Petrie holds, a couple of miles off. To give no other proof: Pliny (cited by Mr Petrie) says some called the Canobic mouth "the Naucratic". I am however not convinced by his argument that Strabo did not *see* the town "on his left"—the *Eastern* bank of the river[1].

Having thus satisfied himself that Herodotus never saw the soil of Egypt below Memphis, except in the towns, Mr Sayce "passes from the Delta to the country above it," as follows: "In c. 18 he states that the Nile overflows not only the Delta but also some parts of the western and eastern banks of the river *to the south of the Delta* for a distance of two days' journey on either side, more or less." And he argues that there is only one place in the upper valley of which this is true, to wit the Fayoum, and that therefore the words "some parts" have been inserted by Herodotus at a venture without knowledge, which both proves that he saw that district in flood-time, and also helps to prove the second thesis, that he never went further. And with this second object he repeats the statement (p. 270), adding, "though he does not express himself very clearly, he must here be referring to the banks south of the Delta, *since the desert on either side of the Delta was not*

[1] I have it from Mr Petrie himself that, at present and subject to further investigation on the spot, he thinks his "canal" communicated with the river at Damanhur, or perhaps somewhat further to the south.

inundated." He does express himself clearly; and does refer to the Delta.

In this particular instance there would have been some excuse for Mr Sayce's neglect of the context if he had not edited this Book II. For in the old editions (such as I have seen) this passage is placed at the beginning of c. 19, which discusses the causes of the inundation, instead of concluding, as it ought, c. 18 which closes the argument against the "Ionians" about the true boundaries of the Egyptian territory. Gaisford (and may be others) had perceived the true connexion; and so, while retaining the place of the chapter in the margin, spaces his text so as to shew the sense. And Mr Sayce (whether following some other editor or not) makes the change complete, and here cites the passage as from c. 18. And yet he misses the meaning.

He might have gathered from c. 15, on which I have already remarked, that the Ionians and Herodotus meant by the Delta the Δ formed by the coast line and the two outermost arms of the river, and if he consults Strabo and Ptolemy he will find that this continued to be the meaning of the word down to the latest Greek times: the flat alluvial country on either side did not belong to the Delta. Herodotus therefore alleges against his opponents that the Ammonian Oracle had told the inhabitants of Marea and Apis—living west of the Delta in the neighbourhood of Lake Mareotis and claiming to be Libyans and free from the restraints of Egyptian ritual—that "Egypt is the country which the Nile waters; and those are Egyptians who live below Elephantine and drink Nile water." Now, says Herodotus, the Nile flood reaches over not the Delta only but part of what is called Libyan and Arabian soil. The inhabitants of Marea and Apis would not have been silenced by being told that the Fayoum was part of Egypt. I imagine the "two days journey" includes some of the side valleys: but I am not concerned with the accuracy of the estimate.

And so end the arguments intended to prove that both the Delta and the Fayoum were under water all the time of Herodotus' visit. That the intermediate country about Memphis was seen in the same season would naturally follow. But

Mr Sayce adduces a further argument from the fact that no mention is made of the Sphinx, "that wonder of Greek travellers of a later date." This, he conceives, implies that Herodotus never saw it; which again implies that he must have reached the Pyramid platform by a certain canal, from the ascent above which he might have seen enough of each of the Pyramids and yet have avoided facing the Sphinx; which again implies that there was water in the canal; which finally implies that it was flood-time. Such books and indexes as I have by me do not point to this wonder of the later Greeks. Strabo, at least, gives a full description of the platform without noticing the Sphinx. Why then should Herodotus do so, when he omits the mention of so much else? I suppose his guide had no good story to tell about it.

I have dwelt at such length on this first thesis, not because I think it could not be refuted more briefly from internal evidence of a longer stay in Egypt, but because my main object in this paper is to shew by what kind of reasoning and suggestion of non-existent facts it is that, not the accuracy, but the honesty of Herodotus is persistently assailed.

I now come to the second thesis, in which the real issue is—Did Herodotus lie when he said he went to Thebes and saw the course of the Nile upwards as far as Elephantine?

"South of the Delta he visited Memphis and the Fayoum. Did he penetrate further? Greek scholars who have not been in Egypt answer 'yes.' Egyptian travellers answer 'no.' Let us consider why they do so."

Egyptian travellers now count by the thousand, and no doubt many of them carry their Herodotus with them. How many of any note have given a deliberate and reasoned answer either way? Or does Mr Sayce represent the wisdom of them all?

Mr Sayce started this will-o'-the-wisp of Herodotus' lie in his book with a notion that it was a very grand exploit for a Greek to get as far as Thebes: one which Hecatæus had achieved, but of which Herodotus was incapable; wherefore he contrived dishonestly to make his readers believe he had done so. But, besides that the Edinburgh Reviewer (April, 1884) has shewn

that this rivalry is a mere imagination, Mr Sayce has now cut the ground away from his own feet by shewing that no credit attached to the performance, whether in the fifth or even in the sixth century. Crowds of Greeks, it seems, of that class who sought to have their fortunes told reached the Oracle at Abydos: and if they could get so far beyond "the Egypt into which the Greeks sail" (p. 269), why not as much further as their business or curiosity invited them?

This motive failing, was it a desire to make his account of Egypt as complete as he could and to take credit for it as a result of his own observations?

But this is just what Mr Sayce observes that he has not done: "whereas he is full of information about the Delta and the Fayoum, his references to Upper Egypt are scanty and meagre; and the only towns he mentions are Khemmis, Neapolis, Thebes, and Elephantine" (p. 267).

And yet nothing could have been easier. There were plenty of drago*men* (as Mr Sayce always calls them!) at Naucratis itself, at Memphis, and elsewhere who could have given him names and some description of the wonders of that region. And Herodotus himself lets us know (why did he not conceal it?), and Mr Sayce himself observes, that there were in many places (Naucratis for one, in Mr Petrie's opinion) "priests" *οἱ Διὸς Θηβαιέος ἵδρυνται ἱρόν*, from whom he did no doubt obtain some —may be most—of the information he gives about the religious customs of Thebes; and might have obtained more, and something about the buildings. That he tells us so much more of Lower than of Upper Egypt is a very good argument to prove that, contrary to Mr Sayce's contention, he spent a considerable time in the former, and only made a hasty visit to the latter country. This seems to me the only fair inference.

And when we examine the passages in which he speaks of his having been to Thebes or elsewhere up the Nile, we find that they occur quite incidentally and naturally in reference to the particular matter in hand, with no prominence given to the voyage itself, and with no apparent sense of pride about it.

In c. 3 he tells us he got much information at Memphis, and so betook himself to Thebes and Heliopolis (both places renowned for learning) to test it; and then gives us a summary of the points on which all agreed[1]. If he claims any special credit it is for his careful sifting of tradition; just as when he went to Tyre and Thasos—whither many other Greeks went for other purposes—to test the stories about Hercules.

The next allusion is in cc. 55, 56, where in the course of a long account of the religion and rites of Egypt and of the points of resemblance with those of Greece (which he firmly believed derived from them), he gives the legend of the foundation of the Oracle of Dodona. Mr Sayce contends that "Herodotus *carefully avoids saying* that he heard *in Thebes* what 'the priests of the Theban Zeus' said about it." But why should he care either to say or to avoid saying this? The point of interest with him was the assurance he conceived he had got at head-quarters of the derivation of the Greek from the Egyptian Oracle: "About Oracles in Egypt and in Greece this is the Egyptian account. The priests of the Theban Zeus *said*..... and when *I asked* how they knew, they answered..... So much I heard from the priests in Thebes: and this is what the prophetesses at Dodona say.... And this is my conclusion." Is there any indication that he was thinking of doubts that might arise in any mind about his having been at Thebes?

The third occasion is in c. 143. It is part of a long discussion running through five chapters, in which he urges the facts of Egyptian history, as he understood them, against the Greek belief in pedigrees traced through a few generations up to a god: "Egyptian history shews a lapse of over 11,000 years, during which the sun four times changed its places of rising and setting (probably a misunderstanding of some astronomical

[1] If any one accepts Mr Sayce's interpretation of ἐς Θήβας τε καὶ ἐς Ἡλιούπολιν ἐτραπόμην (p. 274)—"he turned into," with the comment "Thebes was too far away from Memphis to turn into it" [as one turns into bed, I suppose]—he must surely allow that Herodotus did not mean to make much of the feat! But this is only *ad hominem*. As usual also he mistakes the context. Herodotus did *not* go to Thebes "to enquire about the linguistic experiment" of Psammetichus, but about "other things." And he *does* tell the result.

theory—may be an exaggeration of the phenomena of the Precession of the Equinoxes); and yet no change in the order of things on earth or among living things, and a succession of men born in natural course with no god intervening. And in proof of this they shewed me, as they had done to Hecatæus, 340 and odd statues, ranged in order, of priests who had succeeded each other from father to son; each statue made in the life-time of the person represented." Such is the substance of what he says. Whether he meant to banter Hecatæus on his pedigree or not must depend upon the tone in which Hecatæus himself (as I suppose) told the story—with a smile, or a look of offended dignity. I hope the former; for he appears to have been a sceptic or a rationalist from the first sentence of his *Genealogies*—*οἱ γὰρ Ἑλλήνων λόγοι πολλοὶ τε καὶ γελοῖοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνονται, εἰσίν.* And these, I think, are the only passages where Herodotus alludes to his presence at Thebes. Some general statements there are about Upper Egypt which seem meant to give the results of his own observations on the spot. And as to these, in the absence of any signs of fraud and of any conceivable motive for it, the question—if there is a question—must be whether the inaccuracies or misstatements that can be pointed out are such as to be inconceivable as the result of haste, carelessness, imperfect memory, and other human infirmity of this kind. And to shew how far such causes may operate, I will take the case of Mr Sayce himself. When he published his *Herodotus*, had he been as far as Thebes? In his preface he says "with the exception of Babylonia and Persia there is hardly a country or *site mentioned* by Herodotus which I have not visited." Taking this in connexion with other passages where he speaks of Thebes and other places up the river in the tone of a man who has seen them, I think a commentator 2000 years hence will be justified in saying he "wishes his readers to believe" he had been so far. And yet he tells us (note 4 to II. c. 122) that there is a "representation of Ramses III. seated at draughts with a woman of the harem, which holds a *prominent place on the outer wall* of the Palace at Medinet Abu"! Now (as Mr Sayce or the commentator would say) "no one who has

actually seen" the representation in the inner corner of an upper chamber of the palace "could have said" it is prominent on an outer wall. And if the commentator is bent on making a charge of unveracity he will be at no loss for an assignable motive. Mr Sayce suggests that the story of Rhampsinitus' dice-playing in Hades, as given by Herodotus, is of Grecian origin, and was suggested by this scene. Now a Greek would not be likely to have penetrated into that chamber, but might have seen any thing on the outer wall!

Did Mr Sayce trust to his drago*men*?

Before further examining the charges of inaccuracy made against Herodotus with reference to their weight in this question of veracity, it will be well to enquire what were, most probably, the circumstances under which he made the voyage, if he did make it. And I think we have some material. In the Ptolemaic and subsequent times, we know that the Greeks had come to translate the names of all or most of the important towns in Egypt into their own language; and these names have subsisted in literature up to quite recent times. But in the history of Herodotus, and therefore presumably at Naucratis and among the Greek population generally, the process had only reached (if I am not mistaken) Hermopolis Parva (not Magna as Mr Sayce twice writes it) on the Canobic arm, near the coast and Naucratis; Heliopolis always the resort of learned strangers; and Elephantine—the "ivory-island" as Brugsch in one place calls it, that is, I suppose, the mart for ivory and other southern produce (and certainly there was never room for many elephants there). Other Greek names—Naucratis and Neapolis—belonged to towns which apparently never had native names and were trading stations from the first—or else, if old towns, were renamed, on their becoming such. Of Naucratis we know the history. If Neapolis be Keneh (*καινὴ πόλις* in Ptolemy) it probably grew up as a rival to Coptos in the trade through the mining district and to the Red Sea; lying probably more convenient to the river traffic (Ptolemy calls Coptos "inland"; that is away from the river bank). I conclude that these were the towns with which Greeks had most relations, whether of residence or of traffic.

And I therefore conclude that there was Greek trade with, if not residence in, Neapolis and Elephantine in the time of Herodotus, and probably not much elsewhere. It is true he speaks of "the Egypt which the Greeks navigate," meaning Lower, or at most Middle Egypt; and Mr Sayce says, but as usual with no references, that it is otherwise known that "Greek ships did not sail further south" in those days. But he also tells us they had no difficulty in getting to Abydos. They may have used Egyptian or Persian bottoms; or they may have travelled by land in caravans. Now we have seen that the only towns in Upper Egypt which Herodotus mentions, besides Thebes, for which alone (as he tells us) he made the journey, are these two, Neapolis and Elephantine, and "Chemmis" (of which more anon), which is described as "near Neapolis." It seems to me probable that, wishing to have an interview with the priests at Thebes, he joined some trading party, travelling by water or by land, which was bound to these places, for the trip up and down again. The visit to the Labyrinth and Lake Moeris may or may not have been on this occasion[1]. Otherwise he would seem to have kept entirely on the Arabian bank; and so Mr Sayce is still at liberty to think he would have scratched his name on the wall at Abydos had he had the opportunity. It also makes it quite likely that his visit to Thebes, both going and coming, may have been short and need not have extended to the western suburb. So that Mr Sayce's difficulty in conceiving the possibility of Herodotus having seen it and not describing it is minimized by this hypothesis.

But Mr Sayce makes much of the blunder of describing "Chemmis" as "near Neapolis." And if Neapolis be Keneh—which no one seems to doubt—it is a blunder. The towns are over 80 miles apart, with two towns lying between them on the same side of the river, big enough to be mentioned by Ptolemy. Mr Sayce does not think it a mere chance shot of Herodotus wishing to fill up his canvas with imaginary details;

[1] He speaks as one of a party in this visit, "we saw," and "we speak of what we saw." Does he ever elsewhere use the plural as of himself? It suits the hypothesis that it was an excursion with others from Memphis.

but he insists that what he tells of Chemmis is what some wandering Chemmites endowed with strong imaginations told him at Memphis or elsewhere in Lower Egypt, and that in placing it near Neapolis (obviously taken as well-known, by name at least, to Greeks at all acquainted with Egypt), "he *must* have been led astray by that foreshortening of distances which is *inevitable* in geographical information *derived at second hand*."

I am quite unable to accept this psychological law. But supposing it true, how does it account for these Chemmites describing the position of their native town by such a reference? How came they to think of Neapolis? Moreover, if Herodotus did not see what he describes, he lies by insinuation as assuredly as he does if he was never at Thebes. Mr Sayce is as ingenious here in exonerating Herodotus from responsibility, as he is elsewhere in fixing it upon him.

As usual, he takes no notice of the context.

In c. 91, towards the close of his account of Egyptian manners and customs, Herodotus says: "They eschew Grecian, and indeed all foreign customs. At least all others do, but there is a large town, Chemmis, of the Thebaic nome, near Neapolis. Here there is a quadrangular ἱρόν of Perseus the son of Danae. Round it grow palm-trees. The πρόπυλα of the ἱρόν are of stone and very large, and upon them stand two large statues. And *in this enclosure* [this must refer to ἱρόν; so that here ἱρόν is equivalent to enclosure, or τέμενος] there is a νηός, and in it stands an image of Perseus. The Chemmites tell"—a legend about Perseus haunting the district and leaving his monstrous shoe behind him, and the luck it brings—"This is their tale, and they celebrate games in his honour in Grecian fashion, and when I asked why, they said...." Can anything be clearer than that he means us to understand that he saw the ἱρόν and asked the questions on the spot?

But Mr Sayce says no such sight can have been seen: "It certainly corresponded to no fact....The propylæa of *an Egyptian temple* were lofty....Statues never stood upon them.. it would have contravened the primary rules of Egyptian sacred architecture." And he adds something quite unintelligible to me:

"Had they done so however, they would have been visible far and near; *so that* in affirming their existence Herodotus implies that his account was taken at second hand"!

But Herodotus is professedly telling of a place where Egyptian rules were not observed.

Nor is there anything in the description suggesting an Egyptian rather than any other style of sacred building. The ἱρόν as I have pointed out is a τέμενος, the πρόπυλα any kind of gateway on which statues could stand (everywhere else Herodotus uses the word προπύλαια for the special Egyptian gate and towers), and the νηός a shrine or chapel big enough to hold the image of the god or saint (which would be equally unorthodox according to Strabo XVII. 1, sec. 28). There is an exactly parallel passage in the account of Babylon I. 181: a ἱρὸν τετράγωνον with brazen gates; within, the eight-staged tower of Belus; and his νηός at the top.

There remains then that Herodotus says that the town where all this was to be seen was near Neapolis and was called Chemmis; both which facts cannot be true. Is it not the obvious and most probable explanation that his memory failed him, when he wrote, as to the name of the town? I can think of no other which has any plausibility; and it is surely not an unlikely thing, if he made no note at the time and wrote long after.

The nearest large town, on the same side of the river, was Coptos. While his companions were trafficking at Neapolis he could spend a short day in visiting it; or he might precede them and be picked up on their way upwards. This alone suggests that Coptos was the town in question. But, besides, it was, together with the neighbouring passes to the Red Sea, as much under the patronage of the god Khem as was Chemmis itself (*Brugsch, History, English Translation* I. 133, 134): so that there is little difficulty in conceiving how Coptos and Chemmis may have been confounded in Herodotus' memory. And it may be added that Coptos, as connected of old with Eastern commerce, was a more likely place than any other in Upper Egypt to have admitted or adopted foreign worships. Nor is it, perhaps, irrelevant to observe that it appears to have

been the residence of two Persian governors throughout the reigns of Cambyses and Darius and part of that of Artaxerxes (*Brugsch* II. 212). They acknowledged Khem as their patron; but one may imagine there may have been enough of Persian air about the place to favour the notion—however suggested—that Perseus, the eponymous hero of the race, was the occupier of the shrine. Whether this is the true explanation of the blunder or not, it seems to me much more plausible than Mr Sayce's: and if it is accepted it involves the admission that Herodotus was there.

However he is certainly incorrect in his description of the physical character of Upper Egypt; though here also Mr Sayce misquotes so as to make the case stronger. At p. 296 he says: "He adds that the country above the Fayoum is *similar to that below it.* Now no one who has actually sailed there [we do not know whether he sailed or went by land and over the hills] could have said that the country resembled the Delta in any respect *even in the inundation.*" What he does say is that the upper country is equally ἐπίκτητός τε γῆ καὶ δῶρον τοῦ ποταμοῦ, which Mr Sayce does not deny, and which would be not less but more obvious in the time of low Nile.

But at p. 270 we get the only weighty case of incorrectness. In the description of Egypt at the commencement of the book (c. 8) he says that above Heliopolis Egypt is narrow "being confined between two ranges of hills for about 4 days' journey"; and then adds "after this it is wide again."

Now I cannot attach so much importance as Mr Sayce seems to do to these specific measurements. As they stand, whether as to Upper or Lower Egypt, they appear to me inconsistent not only with the facts, but with themselves. As regards those given in stadia we learn from Strabo that the schænus, which Herodotus took as 60 stadia, varied locally from 30 to 40 or more in the Delta, and (as he found it stated by Artemidorus) was 120 in Middle Egypt (!), and only in the Thebais (so far as his information went) 60 stadia; *Strabo* XVII. cap. 1, secs. 24 and 41. So that this seems a case in which Herodotus is more correct for the Thebais than for the country below. And as regards measures by time every one with any experience knows

how untrustworthy they are in general; and of all such measurements I suppose days' journeys up the Nile against stream must be the vaguest. Add to this the liability of figures to alteration by transcribers, and the personal liability of Herodotus, admitted by the Edinburgh Reviewer, to slips in sums of addition, and it seems to me unsafe to expend much critical sagacity in this direction.

But taking the statement broadly to mean that at some point in the ascent of the river the valley changes its general character and from "narrow" may be said to become "wide," it is not such an account as an observant traveller at his ease on the deck of his dahabeeah, setting down his impressions while fresh, might be expected to make. And yet Strabo, who was in this condition, and a geographer by profession, could sum up the physical character of the valley thus: *ἡ ποταμία ἐστιν Αἴγυπτος ἡ ἑκατέρωθεν τοῦ Νείλου, σπάνιον εἴ που τριακοσίων σταδίων ἐπέχουσα συνεχῶς πλάτος τὸ οἰκήσιμον*—rarely if anywhere 35 miles broad; while Mr Poole (*Encyc. Brit. Egypt*, p. 705) having, no doubt, maps and measurements at hand, gives a maximum breadth of some 13 miles! So little are eye estimates to be trusted. From another passage in Herodotus (c. 11) one may infer that he would be content with Strabo's estimate, or even less; for he compares the Nile valley with that of the Gulf of Suez, "half a day's journey across *at its widest*." And we must remember that we are quite in the dark as to how and in what circumstances—by land or sea; in high or low Nile, and with what rapidity—the trip was made; whether any notes were made (there was little occasion for them, seeing how little he tells us); and how many years elapsed before he wrote this sentence. And then we must ask the question whether, if this be the only serious objection to our taking Herodotus' word, the error is such as exceeds ordinary human faculty in that way[1].

But Mr Sayce urges one or two other objections.

[1] I cannot say where the spot is; but I remember one where the Eastern range diverged far away from the river bank and seemed to lose itself in the distance, and thinking to myself "this must be where Egypt widens again." I was soon undeceived. But an impression made in a traveller's mind by a single view often dwells there to the obscuring of all others.

"He invariably calls Elephantine a city. But the proper name of the city on the island was Kebh, and not Abu 'the elephant island.' Moreover it was as an island rather than as a city that it was known to the Egyptians, *the important city of the neighbourhood* being Syene on the main land opposite."

My first authority against this statement shall be from a work which passes as Mr Sayce's—*Append. to Herodotus* II. "List of nomes: first nome To Ken, *Capital* Abu (Elephantine)." The same information is to be found elsewhere *passim*. As also that Abu, and not Syene, gave its name to an early dynasty. We also know, and Mr Sayce himself immediately after reminds us, that from the time of the sixth to that of the 19th dynasty, whenever the bringing down of granite from the south is mentioned, it comes from Abu, or from "the quarries of the red mountain," or simply from "the south"—never from Syene; and that Herodotus was told that Amasis got his material from Abu. It is as we speak of Aberdeen granite, not meaning that it is taken from the paving of the town.

So much I knew from sources open to all. But not being an Egyptologer, I have questioned a friend who is, and he sends me the following information, referring to Brugsch as his main authority.

1. Many cities have a sacred as well as a profane name, and Kebh is the sacred name of Abu.

2. The usual determinative for Abu is either *city* or *land*—never that he knows or remembers *island*. So that it happens that Ἐλεφαντίνη πόλις is exactly what an Egyptian would write.

3. According to Brugsch the name Syene occurs but rarely until "a late date." The ancient inscriptions call the town Abu. Obviously, as it seems to me, it was originally a village of quarriers dependent on the capital of this name, which in course of time increased in importance and so acquired a name of its own.

But (4th) the old name Abu for Syene continued to be in use concurrently till quite late times: "the demotic form Ib is found, and the name very likely vanished with the Egyptian language."

This last fact may perhaps be thought to throw light on the only puzzle I can see about the way in which Herodotus tells the story of the scribe at Sais—his taking no notice of the impossibility of there being mountains between Elephantine and Syene. Of course one explanation may be that, as he certainly did not believe it but told it as a story, he did not think it necessary to do more. But is it not very possible that he never heard the name of Syene when he was at Elephantine? He never mentions it again; and, while assuming the name of Elephantine to be well known, he thinks it necessary to state (as he heard it from the scribe) that Syene was a town somewhere "in the Thebaid." There is no reason for imagining that he ever visited the quarries, in which Mr Sayce thinks he would have been particularly struck by the sight of a half-finished obelisk, because it interests our sentimental race, lying on the now deserted hill-side.

Another point made about Elephantine is that Herodotus asserts that "*on starting from* the city of Elephantine *to ascend* the river, the country is up-hill; whereas no one who had been at Elephantine could have imagined that the country *immediately* south of it was up-hill." Well! Assouan is in a hilly situation. But this is not the way to construe ἀπὸ Ἐλεφαντίνης πόλιος ἄνω ἰόντι ἀναντές ἐστι χωρίον· ταύτῃ οὖν κ.τ.λ.—"as you ascend the river from Elephantine there is a steep place. Here the boat has to be hauled up": which seems to me quite a natural way of describing the fact.

Mr Sayce seems to have been lucky enough to "shoot the cataract" *upward* in five hours (p. 272), as happened also to Sir G. Wilkinson (Rawlinson's *Herodotus*). I was five days. It does not appear that Herodotus went up it, or saw it.

One more effort to oust Herodotus, if not from Thebes yet from the country beyond it, must be noticed as a specimen of Mr Sayce's zeal. He cannot abide the "extremely startling" and plain passage in c. 29 μέχρι μὲν Ἐλεφαντίνης πόλιος αὐτόπτης ἐλθών. In his *Herodotus* he proposed to follow an obvious blunder in some MS. and leave out αὐτόπτης and 10 words following, with the result that the cataract would be placed below Elephantine! Now he is inclined to adopt the suggestion

of a friend (*οὗτος δ' ἐμοί γε παίζειν δοκεῖ*), that (if I rightly understand him) five whole chapters (29 to 34), which begin with this passage, "are more probably a *verbatim* quotation from another author, embodied in the text of the Greek historian without acknowledgment, after the fashion of his age and race, and so producing [intentionally?] the impression in the mind of the reader that he actually went as far as the First Cataract." Three reasons are given: one that it would explain the want of an apodosis to the *μέν* after *τοσόνδε*, which I cannot see. Another seems cogent to him for want, as usual, of looking to the context. Herodotus in c. 28 had said he could find no one who pretended to know the "sources" of the Nile, except the scribe at Sais; and after telling the story he repeats *ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ἐδυνάμην πυθέσθαι*. Of course the *οὐδέν* means "nothing about the sources." But Mr Sayce chooses to *say* it looks as if when first written it was intended to be interpreted "*literally*." If Mr Sayce is here speaking literally, he means that after the scribe shut his mouth no one ever gave Herodotus any information about anything! I presume he means "nothing about the Nile." But this is quite arbitrary. The chapters to be expunged contain an account of all he could hear, conjecture, or infer from analogy about the upper course of the Nile, commencing *ἀλλὰ τοσόνδε μὲν ἄλλο ἐπυθόμην*.

The third reason is, "It is certainly noticeable that he uses the word *αὐτόπτης* elsewhere (III. 115) *not of himself but of others*." A wonderful reason, of which I leave the reader to discover the force[1].

We now come to the third thesis, which is prefaced "He arrived in the country during the inundation, and he did not travel further than the Fayoum. These are the two *facts*

[1] The passage here referred to is one he has strangely misused in his *Herodotus*, *Introduction*, p. xxv: *οὐδενὸς αὐτόπτεω γενομένου οὐ δύναμαι ἀκοῦσαι, τοῦτο μελετῶν, ὅκως θάλασσά ἐστι τὰ ἐπέκεινα* (to the north) *τῆς Εὐρώπης*—"I have never been able, though I have tried, to hear from any one who has seen it that there is a sea on that side of Europe" (I translate for Mr Sayce's benefit). He was sceptical, not to say prejudiced against that opinion. Mr Sayce apparently takes *τοῦτο* to mean "finding eye witnesses in general"; and calls the passage "an ostentatious assertion that it was his invariable rule to hear things from eye witnesses"!

which I believe I have *established.* In order to *trace his journey in detail* we must have recourse to his account of Egyptian history from the time of Menes to the rise of the 26th dynasty under Psammeticus."

I have set out in his own words, at the head of this paper, what these "details" are: and I think the reader will agree with me that if a study of the history of ancient Egypt as given by Herodotus leads to nothing more than to that conclusion the trouble will have been poorly repaid. I suspect that the true moving power on Mr Sayce's mind was the wish to prove that Herodotus took no pains at all about getting at the history, and that the blunders are his own. However, here is the argument.

First, with much comment, he sets out the order which Herodotus assigns to the old kings: Menes, 330 successors including Queen Nitocris, and Mœris the last on the list; Sesostris, Pheron, Proteus, Rampsinitus; Cheops, Chephren, and Mycerinus, the builders of the three famous pyramids; Asychis who also built a pyramid; Anysis and Sabaco (the Ethiopian), contemporaries; and Sethos, the Memphite priest, contemporary with Sennacherib. Mr Sayce adds the so-called Dodecarchy. But this is a mistake, the Dodecarchy—really the time of Assyrian dominion—is no part of what Herodotus professes to have learnt from "priests" whether at Memphis or elsewhere; but is part of the modern history known by common repute, native and foreign (c. 147, and cf. c. 154). Then he says: "It is *plain* that such a list of kings could not have been derived from any Egyptian source." If he had said "not from any one, Egyptian, Greek, or Persian, who had the materials which Eratosthenes or Manetho used centuries after," no one now-a-days would dispute it. But Mr Sayce elsewhere takes it for granted that Herodotus got his information from the drago*men* of Memphis, inferior servants of the temples, guides and *ciceroni*" (p. 264, and cf. his *Herodotus*, p. xxxi and *passim*). We know from Herodotus himself that the "interpreters" claimed to have existed as a class from the times just after Psammetichus (c. 154); and it is surely reasonable to surmise that before the time of Herodotus some consistency in the stories they repeated to

visitors must have established itself. And if others than Mr Sayce bring themselves to believe that he did contrive to get interviews with higher dignities of the priesthood, one must remember that at the time of his visit antiquarian and literary learning was probably at its lowest level. Thebes, one seat of such learning, had been sacked and plundered and its monuments carried away by Assyrians and Persians, and had been for some centuries left to the fate of deserted capitals in Eastern countries: the renewed kingdom had had its centre in Sais and Lower Egypt: and Persian, Greek, Libyan, and native had since mingled and influenced one another, hostilely or otherwise, over the whole country up to Memphis. On the other hand, under Macedonian rule there was a general revival: old temples restored and new ones built: learning encouraged and libraries founded: and the old religion taken into alliance with Greek philosophy. And yet, though Eratosthenes and Manetho wrote learnedly, and Hecatæus of Abdera and "many Greeks who visited Thebes in the time of Ptolemy Lagus" wrote more popularly, Diodorus corrects none of the errors of the earlier author, but (with some new names which can be identified) confuses times and mixes up purely Greek sophistications with native legends so as to depart much more systematically from genuine history than Herodotus.

I do not therefore anticipate that any light will be thrown on the chronology of Herodotus' Egyptian history by any reference to his own personality or circumstances. However, setting aside the question of its validity, let us see what use Mr Sayce makes of this dogma.

"There is *only one way* in which he *could* have arrived at this list. He *must* have given the names in the order in which they occurred in his note-book [what kind of portable apparatus was this?]. And this order *was* determined by the order of his visits to the various monuments to which the names were attached." This might be true without explaining anything if his guides intentionally took him to the monuments in their chronological order *as they conceived it*. But as this would make them, and not Herodotus, the authors of the chronology, I understand Mr Sayce to mean that the guides took him in the

order most convenient for him and themselves, round one temple, and then to another, and so on: and that Herodotus, either at the time or afterwards when using his notes for his book, took this order for a chronological one. As some of the kings are connected with more than one monument we must, I conceive, take the first-mentioned one in each case as that in front of which Herodotus made the entry in his note-book.

First, then, comes Menes, connected with the dam (still existing) by which the course of the Nile is said to have been diverted to make room for the city: this then must have been the starting-point of his journey, and this, and not common fame, the reason why Menes comes first.

2. King Mœris was named in the papyrus roll, but he also built the northern propylæa of the Hephæsteum. And Sesostris set up a family group of statues of which Mr Sayce assumes that the well-known existing statue of Ramses II. is one (which seems to me doubtful); and he says that modern excavation shews that this lies on the northern side of the temple. So we will admit without disputing that the next point Herodotus was brought to was this northern front of the temple, which therefore is to be taken as the cause of Sesostris following Mœris. But, thirdly, "Pheron" follows, not connected with any part of this temple, but with two obelisks before the "temple of the Sun," and with "all the temples of note"—I suppose over all Egypt. Mr Sayce takes this temple of the Sun to be that at Heliopolis[1]: but there appears to have been one at Memphis. Anyhow, to explain the position of "Pheron" in the series, we must suppose that Herodotus saw no more of the Hephæsteum until he had visited this spot. Mr Sayce chooses to say this is unnecessary, but then what becomes of his theory? 4. "Proteus" is not stated to have left any work behind him (naturally enough); but Herodotus saw a "very fine" *τέμενος* which he understood to be consecrated to him in the quarter of the *Τυρίων στρατόπεδον*, where the *Φοινίκες Τύριοι* dwelt; within which *τέμενος* was a temple *τῆς Ξείνης Ἀφροδίτης*, whom Herodotus identi-

[1] He asserts that the obelisks were those of Usertasen, of which one remains there. This may or may not be, for Strabo tells us the Romans carried off two, and still left some behind.

fies with Helen (and others with Σελήνη, *Strabo*). We are to suppose then that this is the place Herodotus visited on his return from Heliopolis, or wherever the temple of the Sun stood. 5. Rhampsinitus built the western propylæa, which must be the next monument visited. 6. Next came the Pyramid kings in their proper chronological order, as among themselves. 7. Then came Asychis who built the eastern propylæa, "much the finest and largest," which was therefore the next monument visited; though, here again, if Mr Sayce is right in identifying Asychis with "the third successor of Mykerinus," he also, by good luck, is in his true relative place. 8. Anysis and Sabaco seem to have left no monument. How did they get into the note-book in this place? They however belong to the time of the Ethiopian invasion, and therefore, in true chronology, came after all the others and before.—9. Sethos, a Memphite High Priest, who withstood Sennacherib, and who left a statue of himself somewhere within the temple precincts—we know not where—but who, if he represents any historical person, rightly closes the roll of the old monarchies.

If any one can make out of this a walk round the Hephæsteum from north by east and south to west, I cannot. And this it was that Mr Sayce undertook to prove.

And, as I have incidentally shewn, the only distinct chronological misplacement (as distinguished from gaps) which can be made out is that of the kings of the fourth dynasty. And this is an error repeated with exaggeration by Diodorus; who adds that there was much dispute about the true history of the Pyramids (I. 63, 64, and compare previous chapters). The substance, then, of this third discussion is the laying down of an arbitrary dogma about what *must* have been, and then refusing to apply it honestly to the facts and so *inventing* the march round, &c.

To sum up. For the first and third theses Mr Sayce has made absolutely no case whatever; but has only confirmed the justice of the appreciation of his critical powers made by the Edinb. Reviewer. And, had I not already taken up so much space, I think I could without much difficulty shew from the internal evidence that the theses are not only unproved but

false: at the least that it is highly probable that Herodotus first dwelt some time in towns near the coast among his fellow-countrymen, observing and picking up information, critical and credulous by turns; and there mainly learnt the history of Psammetichus and his successors, which he afterwards introduces in its right place; that he then went to Memphis and Heliopolis, and there obtained at least the chronology (such as it is) of the ancient kingdom, and perhaps most of the stories about the named kings—though there may be ground, from the local colouring, for surmising that some of them were picked up elsewhere (cf. c. 100 about Nitocris, c. 122 about Rhampsinitus and the temple of Demeter, c. 129, &c. about Mycerinus and his daughter).

But, wherever he got the information, there is no ground whatever for Mr Sayce's assertion that in Herodotus' list of *ancient* kings "most of them belonged to dynasties which were essentially northern"—it is not his fault that the *modern* ones were so. Except the fancied Proteus and Sethos the priest of Hephæstus all are simply kings of Egypt. That such of them as were real kings, whether rightly or wrongly named, would have left their monumental mark at Memphis as well as elsewhere, and that, this being so, the guides would shew them and Herodotus would record them, is only what was to be expected, and leads to no further inference. With respect to the second thesis, if a man is resolved to believe that Herodotus did not go beyond the Fayoum, there is no syllogism which can confute him. I have noticed all the arguments which Mr Sayce uses which seem to me to need notice. The rest of what he says is, either that Herodotus was bound to tell us more of what he saw (though it was not his habit to do so in Lower Egypt); or that if he had really been up and down the Nile he could not possibly have avoided obtaining full, and always accurate, information about every usage of every town there,—and this though, in his *Herodotus*, he had pointed out many inaccuracies about Lower Egypt (where he does not dispute his having travelled) quite as grave.

But my paper is already too long. I will merely add that ill-luck seems to attend Mr Sayce whenever he meddles with

Herodotus, however innocently. In a note (p. 277) he tells us he is engaged on working out Herodotus' Assyrian chronology, and that the foundation of his synchronisms is that "he counts 30 years to a generation." He will find himself 70 years out in the 700 years he is dealing with! And, while I am writing this paper, I see in the *Contemp. Review* for July 1886, he speaks of the Greek settlement on the Pelusiac branch of the Nile "whence, according to Herodotus, they were transferred by Amasis to Naucratis." Herodotus says to Memphis!

D. D. HEATH.

NOTES OF A FORTNIGHT'S RESEARCH IN THE BIBLIOTHÈQUE NATIONALE OF PARIS.

THE last week of August and the first of September 1886 I spent, in company with my friend Mr D. Margoliouth, in examining some of the many valuable and early Latin MSS in the great National Library of Paris. Owing to the kindness of M. Léopold Delisle and M. Deprez, I was allowed to work in a room where the conditions of light permitted me to proceed without interruption; for which my most grateful thanks are here offered, as well as for the invariable courtesy which I received not only from them, but from M. Pierre de Nolhac, a friend of M. Plessis the author of *Études sur Properce*, and himself an habitual researcher not only in the Bibliothèque, but in the Vatican and other great libraries.

I shall begin with Ovid: and first, the *Ibis*.

In the Preface to my edition, I stated that Salvagnius used a MS which came from the Library of S. Victor, and I quote (p. v.) such readings from it as he mentions in his Commentary. The MS itself I have not seen; yet it is more than probable that it still exists. For, as I learnt in a conversation with M. Léopold Delisle, there is in the Bibliothèque Nationale a manuscript Catalogue of the MSS in the Library of S. Victor, made by one Claude de Grande Rue (Claudius de Grandi Vico) in 1514, now numbered 14768, with a companion and elucidatory volume, also in manuscript, No. 14767. The former of these is in a large and perfectly clear writing; the MSS are catalogued under the author's name, when it was known. Thus under *Ovidius* is given a list of some twenty MSS, and at the side of the page the lettering by which each MS was distinguished.

To this lettering the other volume 14767 corresponds: so that by turning from one Catalogue to the other a more or less detailed account of each MS may be found. The Catalogue gives under the heading *Ovidius* two '*in Ibim*,' one of them '*glosatus*,' but I could not find any specification of the date of either; and probably at the time when the catalogue was made, there were very few who could even approximately fix the period at which MSS were written. But one of these, if not both, must have been used by Salvagnius; and if not in the Bibliothèque Nationale, which possesses half the MSS of S. Victor, is probably in the Mazarin Library, which possesses the other half.

METAMORPHOSES.

At the end of MS 12246 is a fragment, ascribed by M. Delisle to the Xth century, of Met. I. 81—193, II. 67—159. At intervals it has a prose analysis. I copy the four fragments of this which still remain.

The first is after I. 88, and is a prose analysis of the four ages.

Mundus in saecula quattuor aureum argenteum aereum et ferreum ex quo chos tenebrosum missecta luce discussum est et discretis elementis faciem hanc tam claram mundi accepit. Deinceps quasi in aetate, quasdam in saecula quattuor distributus est. Hoc est aureum et argenteum aereum et ferrum (*sic*) quibus pro qualitate sui adscripta sunt nomina. Nam aureum saeculum dictum est quod saturno regnante omnium rerum erat plena tranquillitas. Non furor saeuiebat armorum non auaritia hominum fluctibus commiserat uitam et cessantibus rastris inarata grauides (*sic*) fruges terra praebebat. Otiosa erat ac secura uita mortalibus ac sine uicissitudine corporum continua ueris gratia fruebantur deinde saeculum in argenteum aureo[1] colore migrauit tunc primum et aestus ardentior caeli et grauiora frigora incubuere mortalibus tunc aedificata domorum tutiora secreta antea enim aut in antris habitabant aut incolebant tecta siluarum semina etiam tum primum sulcis coepere committere cum iam terra solita hominibus negaret alimenta tertium saecu-

[1] Probably aureo *ex* colore should be read.

lum successit aereum argento iam durius coepere homines inuerecundius uiuere nam cupiditate habendi auaritia cum fidia (*l.* perfidia) ex orta est inde mare peruium factum dum diuitiae requiruntur. Terra quoque cunctis antea communis limitibus terminisque discreta est et inuenis eius sola (*l.* non sola) frumenta quaesita sunt et (*l.* set) metalla inuenta crepuerunt. Quartum saeculum ferrimineafrigore (*f.* ferri nimio rigore) duratum est quod in tantam rabiem furoris erupit ut omnia scelera cupiditatis excederet (*cod.* cupiditat$\overset{i}{e}$s ($\overset{e}{i}$ *changed into* i) excideret) nam ab (*originally* ad) odios$\overset{is}{a}$ uiti$\not{a}$ et sanientis auaritiae grassationibus ad parricidia usque peruentum est (*fortasse* ab odiosis uitiis et insanientis auaritiae gr.).

After v. 112.

Saecula in tempora quattuor cum saturno aurei saeculi (*add.* fine) caeli arce deiecto teneret iuppiter mundum sicut ipse mundus (*add.* habebat) quattuor ac diuersa tempora coartabit (*l.* coartauit) ut uer quod fuerat ante unum semper ad serenam tranquillitatem continuum in parte (*l.* partem) anni quartam et angustissimum cogeret tempus ut huic succederet ardor aestatis et tertio sequeretur autumni infida temperies et post haec totus annus rigida hieme clauderetur quae quattuor tempora ueris exordio qualitatem imitarentur et ordinem saeculorum.

After 150.

GIGANTVM SANGVIS IN HOMINES.

Gigantes nomine inmensa moles (*l.* mole) et similes matri filios parens terra genuit quorum magnitudini par. exparsit audatia (*l.* par exarsit). Nam extructis inexcelsum aggerem montibus sacrilegas manus iniecere caelestibus sed fulminum (fluminum *the first hand*) igne deiecti impium genus paene suo cruore generarunt. Nam sanguis eorum permixtus terre homines procreauit haut longe ab origine discrepantes.

After 162.

LYCAON IN LVPVM.

De Gigantum sanguine natum quam sacrilegam te
statur exemplum. Qui tyrrannus
here the et hospites trucidaret etiam
MS et iratum. Nam Iuppiter hu
is paciens in deos quą̈erimonia delata
torn ominis specie ad lycaonis regiā ueñ
on quasi mortali pręparens (*sic*) mortem
prius humana membra de(u)oranda uelut hos
pitali humanitate adposuit. Quam postquam iuppiter
sensit non eum paenitus interemit ne supplicii
amitteret sensum sed in lupi ferā formā conuertit
Qui et mores in rabi⸗e et nomen lycaonis in appel
latione seruaret nec contentus fuit iuppiter
ceteros homines unius lycaonis terrere supplicio
nisi in genus omne seuiret. Indidemque tantam
iussit aquarum copiam redundare ut opertis
diluuio montibus cuncti homines interirent.

[In this last extract I have retained the exact lineation of the MS, as a guide for restoring the lost portions.]

VARIANTS OF PARIS 12246.

I collated the MS with Le Maire's ed. A comparison of its readings with those of the British Museum fragm. (Harl. 2610) published in *Anecdota Oxoniensia* I. part 5, shows that the two MSS constantly agree.

Met. I. 91—93 om.
117 inaequales
126 Non scelerata
128 Protinus inrupit uaene peioris in aeuum
132 neque adhuc
140 Effodiuntur opes inritamenta m.
142 Prodierat
146 Imminet
148 patrios inquirit in annos

149 cedema dentis
150 astrea
152 Adfectasse celeste gigantes
155 subiecto pelio nossae
156 cum corpora
158 Inmaduisse
159 monimenta
160 sed illa propago
173 hac fronte
183 parabat
184 Inicere
188 Perdendum est
189 sub terras
190 temptanda sed inmedicabile
193 Satyrique

II. 68 Tunc etiam quae me subiectis (*rest lost*)
69 Ne ferar in praeceps tethys so (*rest lost*)
70 Adde quod assidua rapitur uer (*rest lost*)
71 Sideraque alta trahit celerique uolum (*rest lost*)
74 quid ages
75 nec tecitus auferet axis
76 urbesque deorum
82 circumitu brachia
83 brachia
84 quadripedes
86 Inpromptu regere est
90 genitum te sanguine
92 aspice uultus
104 Propositumque premit flagratque
109 chrysolithi
110 redebant
111 magnanimis
112 nitido
113 fores
116 Quam pater ut terras mundum rubescere uidit

119 ignemque uomentis
l' iungunt
121 Quadripedes ducunt
122 suis acro
124 Inposuitque
125 sollicito
128 uolan|||
132 Effugit australem
135 mulire
136 Altis egressus
137 tutissimis
143 Vmida
144 et fulgit (i *subsequently changed to* e)
146, 147 *inuerso ordine sic leguntur*
Dum potes et solidis etiamnum sedibus ad st
Est tibi consiliis non curribus utere nostris
148 optatus nondum pr/emis
150 iuuenali
152 inde *marg.* ille
153 pyrois et euos et a&hon
154 *begins with* Quartusque phlegons innitibus auras
in the left margin solis equi
155 implent
157 inmensi mundi l' celi
158 aera /no/tis
159 leuati
160 ortus isdem

The last page of the fragm., two columns containing 161—254, is now illegible.

EPISTVLA SAPPHVS.

Paris 11867, which Delisle's catalogue assigns to the end of the XIIIth century, contains a long Latin poem thus intituled *Incipit liber magistri alexandri canonici cyrecestrie qui inscribitur laus sapiencie diuine.* Into the text of this poem of Alexander Neckam's have been woven a great number of quotations from Ovid and other poets. Thus fol. 233^{b} contains the well-known citation from A. A., *Otia si tollas periere*

cupidinis artes, with the 5 following vv. On fol. 134[a] the de Medic. Faciei is cited, with slight alterations, 23—26

> Iam non indignum sit nimphis cura placendi
> Cum comptos habeant secula nostra uiros
> Miror femiñea pociuntur lege mariti
> Et uix ad cultus nupta quid addat habet

and again 45—48

> Certus amor morum est formam populabitur etas
> Et placidus rugis uultus aratus erit
> Tempus erit quo uos speculum uidisse pigebit
> Et ueniet rugis altera causa dolor.

fol. 234[b] from Maximianus I. 133, 4 and another writer unknown

> Pro niueo rutiloque prius nunc inficit ora
> Pallor et exanguis funereusque color
> Et cąpud obrizo radians prestantius auro
> Resperget canis mesta senecta suis

fol. 233[b] after two verses obviously medieval

> Illecebras carnis male dulces carmine dulci
> Detestans uates dulcia uerba dedit

is quoted, as from Martial, the following distich

> Gaudia perpetuis conpenso breuissima penis
> Talia consequitur gaudia talis amor.

The real author of these two verses I have never been able to discover. They occur in an epigram which I have published in Anecd. Oxon. I. part 5, page 20, and are there followed by a distich really taken from Martial VII. 96, 5, 6,

> Quid species, quid lingua mihi, quid profuit aetas?
> Da lacrimas tumulo, qui legis ista, meo.

On fol. 237[b] is a note, written I think at the same time as the rest of the MS.

7° Oracius Mediocribus esse poetis non homines non dii non concessere columpne. Sapho Vlteriora pudet narrare. Et iuuat et sic te non licet esse mihi.

These two vv. (133, 134) are not in the excerpts quoted by De Vries p. 3 from Paris 17903 and 7647, and indeed from their character could not come into any such collection. It is clear that the scribe who copied them at the bottom of fol. 237^{b} of 11867 took them from *a complete codex* of the Epistle of Sappho to Phaon. De Vries' careful examination[1] shows how very few MSS of saec. XIII now existing contain this Epistle. That at Frankfort is not *certainly* older than saec. XIV, and De Vries speaks doubtfully of the Wolfenbüttel codex called by him g^{5}. There is thus a factitious interest attaching to this note, slight as it is, which makes it worth recording. For it is clear that the *Sappho* was read and even quoted in the thirteenth century, although, as is well known, almost all the MSS of it hitherto examined were written in the fifteenth century, and many of these speak of it as newly discovered then.

GLOSSES ON OVID.

Paris 8207, of which I shall speak again presently and which is made up of pieces of various dates and wholly different matter, has glosses of considerable length on Ovid, beginning with the Pontic Epistles fol. 96. They are written in a hand so minute as to require a magnifying glass. I was not able to make any extracts, but it seems high time that this important branch of Ovidian criticism should be examined.

A similar collection of glosses exists in Paris 8320, (1) on Amores, (2) Rem. Amoris, (3) Heroides, (4) Tristia, (5) is an abstract of Metamm.

It seems worth while to notice that the early X cent. 8069 has many extracts from Ovid, including some from the Tristia. These extracts from Ovid are at the *beginning* of the MS. I copied one from the Metamm. (II 775—778, 781, 796), but there is no variant of any importance.

I shall now speak of a MS which though not unknown, has hardly received, I think, the attention it deserves. Paris 8207 contains fol. 1—8 the *Copa, Est et Non, Vir bonus, Ver erat et blando, Moretum, Quid hoc noui est,* and *Culex* IV 1—94. This

[1] Epistula Sapphus ad Phaonem apparatu critico instructa Commentario illustrata et Ouidio uindicata. Leyden 1885.

part of the codex M. Léopold Delisle assigned, when consulted by me, to the XIIIth century. It is the MS which Sillig calls in his edition of the opuscula Vergiliana Colbertinus[4]; and some of its readings are given in Ribbeck's Apparatus Criticus to the Culex. In the Copa and Moretum its lections do not materially differ from those of the earliest MSS: the following are the most noticeable.

Cop. 10 in ore, *not* more
25 Huc calibida
26 nostri delicium
35 Qui

Mor. 7 quem laesus denique sentit
15 claue quae peruidet hostia clauis
16 terre
23 P̄uertit
27 Tunsa
32 patriam tota
36 *omitted*
42 sincere
43 Emundata
45 admixtos nunc fontes atque farinas
51 ignem
52 peragunt
.i. iterum et iterum uiuentia
62 redimita
(*This is strange: the gloss explains* rediuiua, *the reading of other* MSS, but not of 8207.)
66 Non sumptus erat ullus opus sed regula cure
71 curat
75 *omitted*
The v. ending crescitque in acumina radix (77 in Bährens) is omitted.
80 natisque
97 caui

The best of these are the last two, both of which seem to me preferable to the ordinarily accepted readings *nonisque* and *cauum*.

But it is in the fragment of the *Culex* that our MS is most distinct. When I read it for the first time, after having made a careful collation of the three earliest Paris MSS of the same poem, as well as of the Stabulensian fragment (all four of cent. X or XI), my impression was that I had lighted on a source as completely distinct (so far as it went) for the text of the *Culex* as the Codex Gyraldi for that of the *Aetna*. But as I read on the MS deteriorated, and from 67 to 94 was so obviously interpolated as to throw grave suspicion over the integrity of the former portion. Yet each time I returned to a reperusal of vv. 1—66 (and I did so again and again), my conviction, not only of the distinct position which the MS held, but of its goodness, returned. At the time I had not Ribbeck's edition by me; Bährens either did not see the MS or followed Ribbeck's judgment, who, on the evidence of Sillig's excerpts, pronounces it worthless (p. 33). But, as sometimes happens, our MS is not one which can fairly be judged by an occasional variant cited here and there; it must be read as a whole. I shall therefore give entire passages from it, and leave my readers to judge for themselves whether in many cases it does not clear up difficulties which the other MSS leave unexplained, or at least offer an alternative which cannot be dismissed without consideration.

I must premise by confessing that when the MS first came under my notice, I did not know that what seems to be another and in some respects a more accurate transcript of it exists in the British Museum, Harl. 2534. This, like Paris 8207, merely contains vv. 1—94, and is similarly assigned to the XIIIth century. It differs from its Paris duplicate in being far less interpolated in vv. 67—94. A careful collation of it, made by E. R. Horton, of University College School, London, will be found in W. Wagner's review of Ribbeck's Appendix Vergiliana[1].

It is a significant fact that both MSS are fragmentary to exactly the same extent. No doubt the archetype from which each was copied contained 1—94 and no more; and this is, so far, in favour of the *independence* of the archetype, and there-

[1] Harl. 2534 once belonged to the Jesuit College at Agen in the South of France. It contains the Eclogues, Georgics, Aeneid, and has the same Vergilian opuscula as Paris 8207.

fore of its *value* as a fount distinct from the other MSS in which the *whole* poem was contained. It is no uncommon phenomenon to find some part of an author existing in a purer form in some fragment than in the completer MSS. The Brussels fragment of the Ciris is an instance in point: it contains only vv. 458—541, yet is so indubitably drawn from an uncorrupted original as to outweigh in value all the other MSS and to leave us in despair for the far larger section of the poem which it does not contain. It seems quite worth while then to give a complete and exact collation of the two MSS above mentioned of *Culex* 1—94. The Paris MS I shall call G (so Ribbeck), the British Museum duplicate Γ.

1 camelus G, camena Γ.
2 foruimus G, formauimus Γ.
3 sint GΓ.
4 onus G, omnis Γ.
5 et hystorie (historie Γ) proludens consonat GΓ.
6 Notitiaeque (Noticie Γ) ducum uoces GΓ.
7 feretur G, feritur .i. mordetur Γ.
8 Posterioṛus Γ, Posterius G, loquatur Γ, loquetur G.
9 Nostra dabunt cum securos mihi tempora fructus GΓ.
10 dignato poliantur carmina uersu GΓ.
12 actor G, autor Γ.
13 recinente GΓ.
14 Alma GΓ, cireneo G, cythareo Γ.
15 decus astriferum G, decus astrigerum Γ.
16 pretendent carmina G, prependit cornua Γ.
17 Castaliae resonant liquide pede labraque nuda G,
Castaliaeque sonans liquido pede labitur unda Γ.
18 ire G, ite Γ.
19 ludente corona GΓ.
20 sqq. I copy here G, the variants of Γ are below.
Quod tu sancta palles ad quam uentura recurrit
Agrestum bona sors cura secura tenensque
Herbiferos saltus nemorum siluaeque uirentes

Te cultrice uagus saltus feror inter et astra
Et tui cui meritis oritur fiducia canis
Octaui uenerande meis allabere ceptis
Sancte puer tibi namque canit non pagina bellum
Flegra giganteo sparsa est quo sanguine tellus
Nec Centaureos laphitas cōpellat ad ensem
Vertit erithonias oriens non ignibus arces
Nec perfossus athos nec magno uincula ponto
Lecta meo querens per tanta uolumina famam
Non hellespontus pedibus pulsatus equorum
Grecia contenuit uenientes undique persas
Mollia sed tenui pede carmina currere uersu
Viribus acta suis phebo duce ludere gaudent
Hec tibi sancte puer memorabitur et tibi certet
Gloria perpetuum lucens m̄sura per euum
Et tibi sede pia maneat locus et tibi sospes
Debita felices memoretur uita per annos.

20 Et Γ, pales Γ. 21 Agrestum bona ṣiṭ sors que ṣiṭ secura cura tenentem Γ. 22 Aerios estus nemorum Γ. 24 et tu Γ. .l. canis benignis Γ. *post* 27 Γ *addit* Triste iouis ponitque canit non pagina bellum (28). 29 ĩñ *pro* ad Γ. 30 erictonias Γ. 32 querent iam sera uolumina Γ. 34 9tinuit cum Γ. 36 apta Γ, gaudet Γ. 38 mansura Γ.

Except in these variants Γ agrees exactly with G.

41 Ignibus GΓ. ethneas G, etherias Γ. penetraret a Γ, penetrarat G.

45 Protulit G, Propulit Γ.

47 Humida qua GΓ. 48 uagae GΓ.

49 sceleres se G, celeres se Γ.

50 uiridancia Γ, uiridentia G.

Scrupea l' lapidea

51 Ruppea G, Scrupea Γ. desertis errabant ad caua ripis (rúppis G) ΓG.

53 Heret suspensa carpente G, Hec suspensa rapit Γ.

54 Vel salicis G, Hec salicis Γ. alni G, alnus Γ.

55 miratur GΓ.

56 Iminet Γ, Īminet G. prestantis marginis G, prestantis l' marginis imaginis Γ. unda GΓ.

59 docta Γ, doctat G. illa G, illi Γ.

60 Omnia luxurie preciis incognita uitans GΓ.

61 nimis auido inimico G.

62 Sed non G, Si non Γ. fiunt ΓG. in uita pastorali hic Γ, hic G. l' leta lauta Γ, lauta *marg.* lauta l' lota .i. laudata l' lauata et tincta G.

63 data uellera GΓ. si nitor Γ, sed nitor G.

64 domos G, domus Γ. tangit GΓ.

65 lapidum G, lapidis Γ. illa G, ulla Γ.

66 pocula grata G, pocula quater gratum Γ.

Alconem referunt doctum thoreuma G, Alconis referant boetique toreuma Γ.

67 Concha bacca maris precio est a^{t} pectore puro Γ,

Ornat bacca maris nec flagrat pectore puro G

(*a very gross interpolation*).

70 a gemmentes Γ.

71 duris districta ligonibus ΓG.

72 Atque illi calamo litus redimente (d reimente Γ) palustri GΓ.

73 Ociaque in rure degentem fraude remota Γ,

Ocia deducit degendo et fraude remota G.

74 Pallentemque G, Pollentemque Γ. uiridem G, uiridi Γ. lucem Γ, bāte G.

75 Thmolia G, Thmoli Γ.

76 rorante G, rorantes Γ.

77 et mollis yacus (iacus Γ) GΓ.

78 Ṣed et per opaca Γ, Sed peropaca G.

79 Quis Γ, Qui G.

81 cognoscit G, agnoscit Γ.

83 A G, Non Γ. spoliis hic Γ, spoliis ḣ (hec) G. ornat GΓ.

84 Templa nec euentus finem transcendit h. GΓ.

87 panchasia Γ, panchesia G.

88 Floribus agrestes herbe uariantibus assunt GΓ.

90 hec eximit GΓ.
91 Dirigit hec G.
92 Qualibet Γ, Quolibet G. requie Γ, requiē G.
93 liget GΓ.
After 94 G adds O fortunatos nimium bona si sua norunt.

It will be enough if I call attention to some strong points of verisimilitude (1) in the passage (20—40) which I have cited in its entirety from G, (2) in the variants following.

20—21. Of G's reading here I will not say anything, though Scaliger quotes it as if he thought it right. But *tenensque* suggests *tenesque*, i.e. (*quae*)*que tenes*, which at first sight struck me as very plausible.

26. G is perhaps not likely to be right in omitting the extra v. *Triste Iouis ponitque canit non pagina bellum*, since it is found not only in the early MSS, but in Γ, and I have myself suggested after Bährens (American Journal of Philology III. p. 272) that the original verse and a half which has become so strangely corrupted ran

Sancte puer, tibi namque *merent mea carmina, quanquam*
Triste Iouis Pontique canit non pagina bellum

since Poseidon took part in the war with the Giants (Apollod. I. 6. 2). Yet it is also possible that the v. *Triste Iouis ponitque canit non pagina bellum* is an early bungle, originating in some displacement of the words *canit non pagina bellum*, and possibly written in the margin of the archetype whence G and Γ both spring. At any rate none of the emendations of *ponitque* are quite convincing.

31, 32. Here I speak with more confidence. Our fragm. has obviously preserved the right word *Lecta* for which the three earliest Paris MSS all give *Leta* or *Iacta*. But *per tanta uolumina* cannot be right, as *meo* requires *uolumine*. Nor on the other hand can *iam sera*, the reading of the earlier MSS, well represent anything so different as *per tanta*. If we read the two vv. thus

Nec perfossus Athos nec magno uincula ponto
Lecta meo quaerent *portanda* uolumine famam

'Nor will the canal dug through Athos, nor the reading in my volume the story of the chains forged for the great sea to bear, seek to themselves a poet's reputation,' we secure a meaning of the best kind, and a construction which as unusual might easily be corrupted into the form it has in G.

35, 36. Here again G carries conviction to my mind in one word which it has preserved alone of all MSS. *Viribus acta suis*, 'driven on by its own strength,' is as clearly a consistent whole, as *apta* is awkward and unnatural. Equally certain, I think, is *gaudent*, for which the earlier MSS give *gaudet*. We have gained the main point at issue in the interpretation of the two vv. The infin. *currere* will depend on *acta*, and the reading of our fragm. may be retained, by following Heinsius in preferring the order of the earlier MSS *pede currere carmina*, and supposing *pede currere* a corruption of *decurrere*.

> Mollia sed tenui decurrere carmina uersu
> Viribus acta suis Phoebo duce ludere gaudent

'but my soft lines, urged by their own strength to run along in slender verse, sport with delight under the guidance of Apollo.'

50—52.

> Tondebant tenero uiridantia gramina morsu
> Scrupea desertis errabant ad caua rīpis
> Pendula proiectis carpuntur et arbuta ramis.

This is the order of our fragm. as of the earlier MSS. I think it is right: for in vv. 48, 49 the poet describes the she-goats as wandering through the woods and brakes, then losing themselves to sight in the valleys, then browsing at will in every direction. Next, *leaving the low ground by the river* (*desertis ripis*) they struggle upwards to the cliffs and then crop the arbutes which depend from the heights. But whether this be so or not, I have no doubt our fragm. is right in giving *desertis ripis* as against *desertas rupes* of the earlier Paris MSS; for who can believe that *desertas rupes* is an apposition to *ad caua?*

The last point I shall touch upon is the variant *marginis* in 57. Ribbeck, who follows Scaliger in adopting this reading, does not cite any MS authority for it, nor does Scaliger, who

however possessed excerpts from G. It must, I fancy, be right, as *prostantis*, 'projecting,' for *praestantis* of MSS is a very slight and in meaning most natural conjecture.

On the whole, making allowance for the obvious deterioration of G in the latter part of the fragm. I agree with the judgment of Scaliger, Sillig and W. Wagner, as to the substantial value of both G and Γ. The words of Sillig are temperate and deserve to be quoted, p. 22 'Hunc librum (G) iam a Scaligero in usum uocatum et membranas Pithoeanas dictum, si integrum haberemus, multis in locis certius de Culice iudicium ferre possemus.'

I ought not to omit mentioning, in the interest of students of Latin poetry, a collection made by some scholar of the 17th (?) century of, so far as a very hurried glance enabled me to judge, all the fragments of early Roman poetry, under their respective authors, Ennius, Lucilius, &c., with the Scenici. Whether it is a mere copy of the text of Nonius and the other writers who preserve these fragments, or gives a new and emended one, I had no time to inquire; and I made no excerpts. It has 376 pages, and is no. 7923 in the Catalogue.

ROBINSON ELLIS.

ON THE TRILOGY AND TETRALOGY IN THE GREEK DRAMA.

It has generally been considered as an established fact that the Athenian tragic poets contended against each other, not with single plays, but with groups of four; that such groups of four plays were called tetralogies, and consisted of three tragedies and a satyric drama; and that some of the ancient critics preferred to disregard the satyric dramas altogether, and to call the three tragedies, which had been performed at the same time, trilogies. But in a paper published in the Journal of Philology for 1877 (vol. vii. p. 279 fg.) Mr Richards has endeavoured to show that there is no evidence which justifies this belief, and that the Greek poets contended with single plays, and trilogies and tetralogies were the invention of a later age. In another paper published in the Transactions of the Oxford Philological Society for 1880–1881, he suggests that the τετραλογίαι of Antiphon, which were groups of four speeches, two for the plaintiff and two for the defendant, were the original source of this invention; and that this arrangement by fours was transferred by the later grammarians from oratory to the drama. I wish in the present paper to examine these arguments and suggestions, and to endeavour to show that the difficulties in the way of abandoning the ordinary opinion about tetralogies are far greater than the objections which can be brought against it.

In the first place I should explain that all I am contending for is that it was the custom to produce new plays in tetralogies during the most flourishing period of the Greek tragic drama, that is to say, during the fifth and earlier part of the fourth

centuries B. C. As to the preceding and following periods nothing can be laid down for certain. A considerable amount of new light has been thrown upon the subject by the discovery in recent years at Athens of an inscription containing lists of the competitors in tragedy for the years 341 and 340. A fragment of the list for 339 is also preserved. This inscription is given in full in the Mittheilungen der deutschen archäologischen Instituts in Athen for 1878, p. 113 fg. From this inscription we obtain a good deal of interesting information as to the nature of the proceedings at exhibitions of tragedy during this late period. We learn that they commenced with the production of a single satyric drama. Instead of each poet producing a satyric drama along with his tragedies, one such drama was produced at the commencement of the feast. Then followed a reproduction of a tragedy by one of the old poets. In 341 the tragedy so produced was the Iphigeneia of Euripides. In 340 it was the Orestes of Euripides. In 339 it was again a play of Euripides, but the name of the play has been lost. Then followed the new tragedies. In 341 three poets contended with three tragedies each; in 340 three poets contended with two tragedies each. In both cases the victorious poet was Astydamas. Whether the occasion of these tragic contests was the City Dionysia or the Lenæa is not stated in the inscription itself. Probably it was the City Dionysia. For we know that the special characteristic of the City Dionysia was the production of new tragedies; and at this late period of the Athenian drama, when new tragedies were becoming scarcer year by year, it seems hardly likely that such a large number of new tragedies should have been produced in two successive years at the Lenæa, in addition to those which must have been produced at the City Dionysia. Therefore we may with a fair degree of certainty assume that the competitors enumerated are those at the City Dionysia. The evidence then of this inscription proves that by the year 341 B.C. the custom of producing tetralogies had died out, and that the number of plays produced by each poet varied from year to year; for we find two plays produced by each poet in 340, three plays in 341. It also shows that the satyric drama had fallen very much into

the background, only one such drama being retained at the commencement of the feast, apparently as a sort of reminiscence of old times. But all this evidence in no way affects our position that in earlier times tragedies were produced in tetralogies. We have detailed accounts of several tetralogies produced in the fifth century B.C., and evidence which points in the direction of tetralogies being produced in the early part of the fourth century. On the other hand we have no definite evidence that tragedies were ever produced during this period in any other way. I think we may therefore conclude that during the fifth and the first half of the fourth century B.C. it was the regular custom to produce new tragedies in groups of four. Mr Richards is inclined to doubt the existence of tetralogies altogether. I will first examine his arguments on this point in succession.

The first objection is that there is no direct evidence of tetralogies earlier than the second century after Christ. This is hardly correct. For one tetralogy at any rate there is the direct evidence of Aristophanes of Byzantium, the celebrated grammarian, who flourished about 260 B.C. The second of the two arguments to Euripides' Medea is by Aristophanes of Byzantium, and we are there told that the play was produced in the archonship of Pythodorus, that Euphorion was first, Sophocles second, and Euripides third, and that the four plays with which Euripides contended were the Medea, the Philoctetes, the Dictys, and the Theristæ, a satyric drama. Thus we have direct evidence of a very early date for one tetralogy. The arguments which we know to be by Aristophanes of Byzantium, and which bear his name in the MSS, are eight, viz. those to the Eumenides, Antigone, Medea, Bacchæ, Phœnissæ, Orestes, Rhesus, and Œdipus Coloneus. These arguments, though in a more or less mutilated condition, have a strong resemblance to one another. In all of them we have the same formulæ of expression recurring, and the subjects dealt with are the same. By comparing them together we find that the contents of an argument of Aristophanes were as follows: (1) a brief account of the legend on which the play was founded; (2) an examination as to how far the poet was indebted to other poets for his treatment of the legend; (3) the

scene of the action, composition of the chorus, and name of the character which speaks the prologue; (4) the διδασκαλία, or account of the time and circumstances of the production; (5) the place which the play held, in regard to date of composition, among the poet's other works; (6) a brief literary criticism; (7) a brief statement of the plot. These being the characteristics of one of Aristophanes' arguments, as is shown from the analysis of the eight which are confessedly his, we are clearly justified in inferring that when we find exactly the same characteristics in any of the numerous other arguments which are prefixed without the author's name to the Greek plays—when we find the same subjects treated in much the same order and with exactly the same formulæ of expression—we are justified in inferring that these arguments also are by Aristophanes of Byzantium, and that his name has been omitted by chance. Among the arguments which may safely be assigned to Aristophanes on these grounds, and which are so assigned by Kirchhoff, Schneidewin, Dindorf, and others who have examined into the matter, are the first argument to the Septem versus Thebas, and the arguments to the Persæ, the Agamemnon, and the Alcestis. This being so, we have thus the direct evidence of Aristophanes of Byzantium for six more tetralogies. The first argument to the Septem versus Thebas tells us that Æschylus was first with the Laius, the Œdipus, the Septem, and the satyric drama Sphinx; that Aristias was second with the Perseus, the Tantalus, and the satyric drama Palæstæ. In this case only two tragedies and a satyric drama are mentioned, but it is probable that the name of the third tragedy has dropped out. We can hardly suppose that Aristias contended with three plays against Æschylus' four. The third poet was Polyphradmon, who contended with the τετραλογία Λυκούργεια. The argument to the Persæ says that the four plays with which Æschylus contended were the Phineus, the Persæ, the Glaucus Potnieus, and the Prometheus. The argument to the Agamemnon states that Æschylus was victorious with the Agamemnon, Choephori, Eumenides, and satyric drama Proteus. Lastly, the argument to the Alcestis states that Sophocles was first, and Euripides second with the Cressæ, the Alcmæon, the Tele-

phus, and the Alcestis. It appears therefore that we have the direct evidence of Aristophanes of Byzantium, certainly for one tetralogy, and in all probability for six more.

Another piece of direct evidence, which is not mentioned in Mr Richards' paper, is from an inscription in Böckh's Corp. Ins. Gr., no. 231. The inscription is upon a marble found at Athens, and is arranged in two columns. The first column has been effaced at the top and the bottom, but the central part, which remains, contains a list for the years 355 and 354 B.C. of the competitors in comedy, arranged in order of merit, together with the names of their plays, and of the leading actors in each case. The other column has been much more mutilated, but enough remains to show that it contained a list of the competitors in tragedy, with the names of the tragedies and of the leading actors in each case. The part which remains is for the year 346 B.C., in the archonship of Archias. In one part of this fragment, where a little more is left than usual, we have the following words: Καλλίστρατος.....Ἀμφιλόχῳ Ἰξίο..... ὑπε. Καλλιππι.... The regular formula in this marble is to put (1) the name of the poet; (2) his place in the contest; (3) the play he exhibited; (4) the name of the chief actor. Thus in the column in which comedies are given we have, Διόδωρος δευ. Νεκρῷ, ὑπε. Ἀριστόμαχος ("Diodorus was second with the Necrus, Aristomachus was the actor"). Now in the part of the inscription we are considering we have first the poet's name Callistratus, then a gap of eight or nine letters, then the names of two tragedies with which he contended, the Amphilochus and Ixion, then another gap of about the same size, then the name of the actor (ὑπε. Καλλιππίδης). The conclusion is almost irresistible that in the intervening spaces we should fill in the names of two more plays, and the specification of the poet's place in the contest, either πρω., δευ., or τρι. Böckh considers, judging from the style of this inscription, that it was contemporary with the events which it records. This evidence therefore is of great importance, as showing that in all probability tetralogies were produced in Athens as late as the year 346 B.C.

I now come to evidence which is of greater antiquity than

that of Aristophanes of Byzantium, and which, though indirect, is of just as much value as direct evidence. The names of four tetralogies are on different occasions quoted from one of Aristotle's works, the *Διδασκαλίαι*. If there had been only one quotation, it might have been suggested that a mistake had been made. But when, on four different occasions, four different tetralogies are distinctly cited from a particular work of Aristotle's, it is impossible to suggest that there is a mistake in all four cases, and we must allow that we have the authority of Aristotle for these four tetralogies. This work, the Didascaliæ, is quoted five times with the author's name. It is also quoted eight times without the author's name, simply as *αἱ Διδασκαλίαι*. All the quotations are given in Bekker's Aristotle, vol. v. p. 1572. That Aristotle's work is meant, when the work is quoted simply as *αἱ Διδασκαλίαι*, is clear for two reasons. First, we do not hear of any other author who wrote a book with this exact title. Secondly, if there had been two works with this same title, *αἱ Διδασκαλίαι*, both equally well known, it is impossible that anyone should have quoted from one or the other of them, simply by the title of *αἱ Διδασκαλίαι*, without specifying the author's name, to show which of the two works was meant. But there being only one book with this title, namely Aristotle's, it was quite enough to refer to it simply as *αἱ Διδασκαλίαι*. The quotations show that the book consisted of lists of tragedies and comedies, arranged according to the date of production, with the poets' names attached; and we can hardly be wrong in supposing that it was compiled from the innumerable tripods and tablets, commemorating dramatic victories, with which Athens abounded, and of which the inscriptions already referred to are specimens. The four tetralogies quoted from this work are (1) the Pandionis of Philocles (Schol. Aristoph. Birds 282, *τῇ Πανδιονίδι τετραλογίᾳ, ἣν καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν ταῖς Διδασκαλίαις ἀναγράφει*); (2) the Œdipodea of Meletus (Schol. Plat. Apolog. p. 330 Bekk. *ᾧ ἔτει οἱ Πελαργοὶ ἐδιδάσκοντο καὶ ὁ Μέλητος Οἰδιπόδειαν ἔθηκεν, ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης Διδασκαλίαις*); (3) the Iphigeneia in Aulis, Alcmæon, and Bacchæ of Euripides (Schol. Aristoph. Frogs 67, *οὕτω γὰρ καὶ αἱ Διδασκαλίαι φέρουσι, τελευτήσαντος Εὐριπίδου τὸν υἱὸν*

αὐτοῦ δεδιδαχέναι ὁμώνυμον ἐν ἄστει Ἰφιγένειαν τὴν ἐν Αὐλίδι, Ἀλκμαίωνα, Βάκχας). Here only the trilogy is mentioned, the satyric drama being omitted, probably because it was not written by Euripides himself, but supplied by his son. (4) The Oresteia of Æschylus (Schol. Aristoph. Frogs 1155, *τετραλογίαν φέρουσι τὴν Ὀρέστειαν αἱ Διδασκαλίαι, Ἀγαμέμνονα, Χοηφόρους, Εὐμενίδας, Πρωτέα σατυρικόν*). The Orestean tetralogy has already been quoted from one of the Arguments of Aristophanes of Byzantium, the other three are new. We have thus the testimony of Aristotle to the existence of three tetralogies, and his joint testimony in favour of a fourth.

The next important writer on the same subject was Callimachus, the poet and grammarian, who flourished about fifty years after Aristotle, and wrote a book entitled, *Πίναξ καὶ ἀναγραφὴ τῶν κατὰ χρόνους καὶ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς γενομένων διδασκαλιῶν*, which may be translated, "A Table and Chronological List of Dramatic Productions from the earliest times" (Suidas, v. *Καλλίμαχος*). One of his authorities, in compiling this work, seems to have been Aristotle's Didascaliæ, for we are told by the scholiast on the Clouds (v. 552) that he found fault with the Didascaliæ for putting the Maricas of Eupolis three years after the Clouds, although it is mentioned in the Clouds. The fact shows that Callimachus used the Didascaliæ in the composition of his book. Now we know that Aristophanes of Byzantium studied these lists of Callimachus. He wrote a book about them. The title of the book was, *Πρὸς Καλλιμάχου Πίνακας* ("On the Tables of Callimachus"), and it is referred to by Athenæus (p. 408). We also know for a fact that Callimachus was the authority from which Aristophanes of Byzantium drew the information contained in his arguments to the Greek plays. In the Etym. Mag. v. *πίναξ*, we read as follows: "Callimachus the grammarian made tables, in which were lists of the ancient poets. Aristophanes the grammarian took these lists and from them composed his arguments to the dramas." Thus it would appear that the arguments of Aristophanes, which are our authority for several tetralogies, are derived from materials collected by Callimachus, and that Callimachus himself used Aristotle's Didascaliæ in

compiling his lists. So that in addition to the facts directly quoted from the Didascaliæ, much of the rest of our information may be traced indirectly to the same source.

Three other tetralogies are mentioned, but without any indication of the source of the information. The schol. on Aristoph. Thesm. 142, tells us that the Λυκούργεια of Æschylus consisted of the Ἠδωνοί, Βασσαρίδες, Νεανίσκοι, and Λυκοῦργος σατυρικός. Ælian (V. H. 2. 8) remarks that in 415 B.C. the poet Xenocles, with the Œdipus, Lycaon, Bacchæ, and satyric drama Athamas defeated Euripides with the Alexander, Palamedes, Troades, and the satyric drama Sisyphus. Lastly, Ælian (V. H. 2. 30) says that Plato wrote a tetralogy in his youth.

Mr Richards admits that it may be urged that these notices of tetralogies are ultimately derived from Aristotle and the Alexandrine grammarians, but he meets this argument by a quotation from Athenæus. Athenæus (p. 21) is asserting that Æschylus probably acted in his own plays, and in proof of this assertion he quotes a passage from Aristophanes, adding parenthetically this remark: παρὰ δὲ τοῖς κωμικοῖς ἡ περὶ τῶν τραγικῶν ἀπόκειται πίστις ("the comic poets are our authorities about the tragic poets"). From this remark Mr Richards infers that Athenæus at any rate did not consider that any trustworthy information about Greek tragedy could be obtained from any other source than the comic poets, and that these didascaliæ can hardly have existed in his time. It is obvious that this is a very large inference to make from one casual sentence. But curiously enough this same Athenæus offers us, in another place, the most striking testimony not only to the existence, but also to the value, of these same lists of plays by Callimachus and Aristophanes, from which our notices of tetralogies are largely derived. Athenæus (p. 336) had seen the Asotodidascalus of Alexis quoted. He doubts the existence of the play, as he had never met with it himself. How does he confirm his doubts? Why by appealing to the lists of Callimachus and Aristophanes, in which he says it is never mentioned. His words are, "Though I have read more than 800 plays of the Middle Comedy, I never came across the Asotodidascalus, and I am not aware that it is included in any of the

lists. Certainly neither Callimachus nor Aristophanes have inserted it in their lists." Thus we have a proof that these didascaliæ of Callimachus and Aristophanes were not only still in existence in the third century A.D., but were the best authority to be had on the subject of the titles and existence of plays.

The result then of this examination is to show (1) that we have in a marble inscription probably a contemporary record of one tetralogy; (2) that we have the direct evidence of Aristophanes of Byzantium certainly to one, and probably to six more, tetralogies; (3) that four tetralogies are quoted directly from Aristotle's Didascaliæ; (4) that three more tetralogies are given by later writers without any citation of the authority; (5) that one tetralogy is ascribed to Plato by a late writer.

But there can be no doubt that we have evidence still earlier and more convincing, and that is the evidence of Aristophanes the poet. Two of the tetralogies we have already come across are mentioned by name by Aristophanes. In the Frogs (1124) Euripides asks Æschylus to recite "the prologue from the Oresteia (*τὸν ἐξ Ὀρεστείας λέγε*)." Æschylus then recites the first few lines of the Choephori. The scholiast on the line says that the Didascaliæ give the Oresteia as a tetralogy, consisting of the Agamemnon, Choephori, Eumenides, and Proteus. Thus we have the authority of Aristotle to show that by the name "Oresteia" was denoted the tetralogy, of which we now possess the first three plays. But Mr Richards says the tetralogy cannot have been meant, as the prologue quoted is that to the second of the four plays, the Choephori, while the phrase "the prologue from the Oresteia," if the Oresteia had been a tetralogy, could only have referred to the prologue of the first of the four plays. But surely this does not follow. If you have a tetralogy called the Oresteia, consisting of four plays, each with a prologue, and you are asked to quote "the prologue from the Oresteia," you might certainly be expected to quote any one of the four. The phrase is not an accurate one, but natural enough in a comedy. The other tetralogy mentioned by Aristophanes is the *Λυκούργεια*. In the Thesmoph. (135) Mnesilochus, surprised at the effeminate appearance of Agathon, says he should like to question him in the

words of Æschylus in the Λυκούργεια (κατ' Αἴσχυλον Ἐκ τῆς Λυκουργείας ἔρεσθαι βούλομαι). The scholiast says that the Λυκούργεια was a tetralogy, consisting of the Edoni, Bassarides, Neanisci, and Lycurgus, and that the words quoted by Aristophanes are taken from the Edoni, being part of the speech addressed to Dionysus when he was captured. Here we are not merely told that the Λυκούργεια was a tetralogy, consisting of such and such plays, but we are also told from which particular play of the four the quotation was taken, and to whom it was spoken, and under what circumstances, in the original play. It is therefore clear that the commentator who originally wrote this note must have had the four plays of the tetralogy before him, and his evidence is decisive of the matter.

Mr Richards says the Oresteia and Lycurgeia may have been names of single plays, just as parts of the Homeric poems are called the Δολώνεια, and so on; but at any rate that the names are so dubious that no argument can be founded upon them. But what are the facts of the case? Aristophanes twice quotes passages from Æschylus, once from the Choephori, once from the Edoni; yet on both occasions he says he is quoting, not from the Choephori and Edoni, but from the Oresteia and Lycurgeia. What possible inference can be drawn from this, even apart from the express testimony of the scholiast, except that the Oresteia and the Lycurgeia were names of groups of plays, of which the Choephori and Edoni were individual members?

Having thus shown that it is incorrect to say that there is no evidence for tetralogies earlier than the second century A.D., but that on the contrary some of the evidence is as early as the third, fourth, or even the fifth century B.C., and that other evidence, though indirect, can be traced to very early sources, I will now go briefly through the other arguments, which are brought against the ordinary belief about tetralogies.

It is said that Aristotle never mentions trilogies or tetralogies in his Poetics. This form of argument, which assumes that a thing did not exist, because a particular author does not mention it, is at best a very unsatisfactory one, as it proceeds on the assumption that an author always mentions everything

he ought to do. But when this argument is applied to the Poetics of Aristotle, it is doubly weak. Whether the work was left in its present fragmentary condition by Aristotle himself, or whether it was cut up and mutilated in after times, it is certainly a fact that many things are not found there, which we should expect to find. There is no mention of the satyric drama. If we had no other evidence but the Poetics of Aristotle, we should never have known that the satyric drama existed. But the relationship of the satyric drama to tragedy proper, and the manner in which the two species of the drama were gradually differentiated from one another, certainly formed an interesting and an important chapter in the history of Greek tragedy. Again, Themistius (p. 316 D) quotes from Aristotle the statement that Thespis first invented the *πρόλογος* and the *ῥῆσις*; but we find nothing about this in the Poetics. Yet in the sketch of the development of tragedy, which Aristotle gives in ch. 4, hardly anything could less deserve to be omitted than a description of the inventions of Thespis, the founder of tragedy. We know from Themistius that Aristotle had something to say about Thespis; therefore he must have omitted it purposely in the Poetics, or if it was inserted, it must have dropped out, owing to mutilations of the original work. Whichever view we take, it is obvious that we cannot found arguments upon omissions in the Poetics. But there is another reason for not being surprised at Aristotle's silence about tetralogies. The tragic writers with whom he most concerns himself are Sophocles and Euripides. It is from a consideration of their dramas that he draws up his rules and theories about tragedy in general. Æschylus is left comparatively in the background. In describing the functions of the chorus, he compares the practice of Sophocles and Euripides, but says nothing about the chorus in Æschylus. The large space which he allots to the consideration of various kinds of *ἀναγνωρίσεις* or recognitions, show that his interest was more with the complex plots of later tragedy, than with the epic simplicity of the Æschylean drama. Now it was only during the period of Æschylus that the custom of writing in tetralogies was anything more than a mere external law of the Greek drama. In Æschylus the three

tragedies are, at any rate in many cases, so composed as to form successive acts in one long drama; and each individual play cannot be properly understood, unless we consider at the same time its position in the trilogy, and its relation to the other plays. But although the successors of Æschylus produced their plays in tetralogies, the separate plays, with very few exceptions, were quite unconnected with one another in plot. The habit of producing four plays together at a time had no appreciable influence upon the intrinsic qualities of the separate plays. Each play was a complete work of art, to be judged by itself. Thus throughout the later period of Greek tragedy the custom of producing tetralogies was nothing more than one of the external circumstances relating to dramatic performances. It was not an essential quality of Greek tragedy. Now in the Poetics (whatever may have been his custom in other works) Aristotle tells us little or nothing about the external circumstances of the exhibition of a Greek play. He tells us nothing about the music, nothing about the evolutions of the chorus, nothing about the time of the performance, or the judges, or the scenery, or the construction of the stage. It was only natural therefore that, the system of tetralogies being, during that period of the drama with which he was most concerned, merely an external circumstance of this kind, he should leave it unnoticed.

Another argument which is brought forward is that Pratinas is said to have written 50 plays in all, of which 32 were satyric dramas. But if it was customary to produce three tragedies and a satyric play together, in that case, if he produced 32 satyric dramas, he ought to have written 96 tragedies, and the total number of his plays would have been 128. Now in the first place these numbers depend on the authority of Suidas alone, and the numbers in Suidas are not very reliable. Whether it was carelessness on his part, or whether the mistakes are due to the ease with which the letters denoting numbers are altered, certainly the fact is that numbers in Suidas, if unaccompanied by other testimony, are not of much value. One instance among many may be cited. He tells us that "the tragic poet Nicomachus wrote eleven tragedies, among which are the following"—and he then gives the names of

fourteen tragedies. But assuming that the numbers are correct, there are two ways in which they may be accounted for. Pratinas flourished, along with Chœrilus and Phrynichus, at a very early period of the Greek drama, and had been before the public for some time when Æschylus appeared upon the scene. It is quite possible that the custom of producing four plays together may not have developed into an invariable law until after he had begun his career. All we are concerned to prove is that from the time of Æschylus onwards new plays were produced in groups of four, and not singly. But there is nothing inconsistent with this theory, if we suppose that when Pratinas began to exhibit, plays might be produced singly, or in twos, or any other way. We simply have no evidence upon the point. Therefore arguments drawn from the number of Pratinas' plays do not affect our conclusions as to the practice which obtained from the time of Æschylus downwards. But there is another point to be considered. Suidas, and other writers of a similar kind, when they give the number of a man's plays, are often giving merely the number of those preserved, and not the number originally produced. This is the reason why we find such a variety in the number of plays assigned to different poets. Thus Suidas says that Ion of Chios wrote 12 plays, but that others put the number at 30 or 40; and that Achæus of Eretria produced 44 plays, but that others said 30 or 24. These discrepancies are due to the different commentators giving the numbers of plays preserved in their own times, or else giving the number originally written. In the case of Pratinas, the inventor of the satyric drama, it is clear that his satyric plays would be preserved in much greater numbers than his tragedies. His satyric plays, as Pausanias tells us (ii. 13. 6), were considered the best after those of Æschylus. It is not therefore an improbable supposition that he produced 32 tetralogies, consisting of 32 satyric dramas and 96 tragedies, and that while the satyric plays were preserved, the tragedies had mostly been lost, at the time when the notice which appears in Suidas was written. But whatever view we take, I do not think the case of Pratinas can affect our theory about tetralogies one way or the other.

Mr Richards asks why *four* plays were required from a tragic writer, and not more or less: and also why the same rule did not apply to comedy also. But this latter argument certainly cuts both ways. If, as Mr Richards thinks, the whole system of tetralogies was a fabrication of later ages, we might certainly ask why the system was applied to tragedy only and not to comedy. Yet we get no hint of a man competing with groups of comedies. But surely it would have been just as easy and just as satisfactory to group comedies together into fanciful tetralogies, as to group tragedies. Again, as to the question why the number four was chosen as the number of plays to be performed, of course this is a question we cannot answer, especially as we know so little of the time and duration of tragic performances at Athens. Experience must have shown that this was the most convenient number. But of course there is always something arbitrary in this sort of rule, and something which cannot easily be defended on abstract grounds. We should find it hard to say why three poets only, and not more or less, competed in tragedy at the same time; why the number of poets who competed in comedy was five, and not more or less; why the tragic chorus was limited to fifteen members, the comic chorus to twenty-four; why the later Greek comedies, and the Roman comedies derived from them, were divided into five acts, and not more or less. Four or six acts would have done just as well. In all these numbers there is something arbitrary; but experience no doubt showed that on the average they were most convenient.

Again, Mr Richards asks how we are to account for the second half of the words τετραλογία and τριλογία; λόγος cannot mean 'a play'. Now it is clear that any difficulties we may find in the *words* τετραλογία and τριλογία do not justify us in disbelieving the *fact*, that new tragedies were produced in groups of four at Athens. We have no reason to believe that the terms trilogy and tetralogy existed from the earliest period of the drama. The custom of producing four plays together may have existed for some time before a word was discovered to denote those four plays so produced. Apparently the word τετραλογία was in use in the time of Aristotle, if the words of

the schol. on the Frogs (1155 τετραλογίαν φέρουσι τὴν Ὀρέστειαν αἱ Διδασκαλίαι, Ἀγαμέμνονα, κ.τ.λ.) imply that the word τετραλογία occurs in the Didascaliæ. The word τριλογία was certainly in use in the time of Aristophanes of Byzantium, as we are told (Diog. Laert. iii. 61) that he arranged Plato's dialogues in trilogies. And we know that both τετραλογία and τριλογία were in regular use in their dramatic sense by the time of Aristarchus (220 B.C.), since the schol. Frogs, 1155, after quoting from the Didascaliæ the fact that the Oresteia is a tetralogy, adds that Aristarchus and Apollonius preferred to speak of trilogies, disregarding the satyric drama. It appears then that there is no reliable evidence for the use of the word τετραλογία in its dramatic sense before the time of Aristotle, or of the word τριλογία before the time of Aristophanes the grammarian. I think then that there is much probability in the suggestion of Mr Richards, that the word τετραλογία was first used in reference to speeches, to denote groups of four speeches, two for the prosecution and two for the defence. This would be a natural meaning for the word, λόγος being regularly used to denote a speech. We have preserved, under the name of τετραλογίαι, three groups of speeches of this kind by Antiphon, who was put to death in 411 B.C. We may suppose then that this was the original meaning of the word, and that in later times, probably in the fourth century A.D., the word was transferred by analogy to groups of four plays; and that on its analogy was formed another word, τριλογία, to denote the three tragedies, apart from the satyric drama. It does not seem very likely that the word τριλογία could have arisen among the orators, as a group of three speeches is not easily explicable. Of course all this is mere conjecture. The words τετραλογία and τριλογία are not of frequent occurrence, and their origin and exact meaning, in the absence of evidence, must remain an open question. But the point I wish to insist upon is that the question of the etymology and origin of these two words does not affect the credibility of the fact, for which we have ample evidence, that new tragedies were produced four at a time.

There is some further evidence, which has not yet been alluded to, and which I will now briefly mention. There is the

well-known passage in Diog. Laert. (iii. 56) to the following effect, "Thrasyllus says that Plato published his dialogues in fours, in imitation of the tragic tetralogy. Thus the tragic poets contended with four dramas, at the Dionysia, the Lenæa, the Panathenæa, and the Chytri, of which four dramas the last was a satyric play. The four dramas were called a tetralogy. Well then, says Thrasyllus, all Plato's genuine dialogues amount to fifty-six, &c." Thrasyllus was a Platonic philosopher, who flourished under Tiberius, and had a passion for this sort of classification, as he classified the works of Democritus in tetralogies also (Diog. Laert. ix. 56). In the passage before us the clause about the performance of four plays at four different festivals is apparently a note of Diogenes' own, and not a quotation from Thrasyllus. To whomsoever it is due, it is certainly wrong, as Mr Richards remarks, as we have no other evidence anywhere of the performance of tragedies at the Panathenæa or Chytri; and the notion of the four plays of a tetralogy being performed at four different festivals is manifestly absurd. We learn from Aristotle's Didascaliæ that Euripides' son produced three of his father's plays, the Iphigeneia in Aulis, Alcmæon, and Bacchæ, at one and the same festival, the City Dionysia (Schol. Frogs, 67). Still the mistake as to the festivals does not affect the credibility of the story that Thrasyllus divided Plato's dialogues into tetralogies. But I do not lay any stress upon this passage, as all it shows is that by Thrasyllus' time, viz. the first century A.D., the tragic tetralogy was quite a familiar notion. There is also the passage in Suidas (v. Σοφοκλῆς) about Sophocles—*καὶ αὐτὸς ἦρξε τοῦ δρᾶμα πρὸς δρᾶμα ἀγωνίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ μὴ τετραλογίαν.* It is not necessary to consider the various interpretations of these much-disputed words. Taking them by themselves, it is difficult to attach a definite meaning to them. Possibly Suidas himself thought that Sophocles contended with single plays, and not with tetralogies. But one knows how often Suidas misunderstands and misquotes his authorities; and I think the probability is that in the original passage, from which Suidas is here compiling, the meaning was as follows—that Sophocles first began to write tetralogies in which the individual plays had no connection with one another;

that he exhibited one play against each play of his opponent, but that his four plays did not constitute a tetralogy in the sense of a united artistic whole. That Sophocles produced four plays at a time, though the arguments to his plays do not tell us so, may be considered as certain, as we know that on two occasions he contended against Euripides, when the latter was producing four plays, viz. in 431 and 428 (vide args. to Medea and Alcestis), and it is impossible to suppose that of two contending poets one could have produced four tragedies, and the other a smaller number.

Besides attacking the ordinary theory about tetralogies, Mr Richards has also endeavoured to show that the Greek tragic poets contended with single plays. That this was not usually the case is proved conclusively by the inscription referred to at the beginning of this paper, from which we learn that in 341 the tragic poets contended with three plays each, in 340 with two. Another cogent proof may be derived from considering the number of plays which the tragic poets are said to have written. New tragedies were produced almost exclusively at the City Dionysia. For this fact we have Æschines' testimony (in Ctesiph. p. 58, *τραγῳδῶν ἀγωνιζομένων καινῶν*), and Mr Richards himself admits that such was the case. This being so, if plays were generally produced only one at a time, the rate of production could not be much greater than one a year. Now Æschylus was producing plays for a period of about 43 years, and yet we possess the titles of about 80 plays of his, and he is said to have written still more. Sophocles produced plays for about 60 years, and we know the titles of more than 100 of his plays. The most general account puts the number of Euripides' plays at 92, though his period of production was less than 50 years. Obviously they could not have produced so much, if they had only produced single plays once a year. Mr Richards says the answer to this is that though the comic poets only produced plays singly, yet this did not prevent them from writing a large number. Thus Eubulus wrote 104, Alexis wrote 245, Antiphanes, according to one account, 365. But it should be remembered that the comic poets regularly produced new plays both at the City Dionysia and the Lenæa. Thus, of the plays of Aristophanes,

the Acharnians, Knights, Wasps, and Frogs were produced at the Lenæa; the Clouds, the Peace, and the Birds at the City Dionysia. Moreover the same poet might produce two comedies at the same festival. Five comedies were usually produced (arg. Plut., Corp. Ins. Gr. no. 231), but two of these comedies might be composed by the same poet, though of course in such cases he counted as two poets. Thus in the argument to the Wasps we are told that the Wasps was produced under the name of Philonides, and was second: that Philonides was first with his Πρόαγων, Leucon third with the Πρέσβεις. This means that Philonides was first with his own play, and second with the Wasps, which he produced as his own play. Again, in the Corp. Ins. Gr. no. 231 we have a record of the five comedies produced in 353 B.C., and we find that Diodorus was second with the Νεκρός, and third with the Μαινόμενος. It appears therefore that a comic poet might produce comedies twice a year, and might produce more than one play on each of these occasions. Hence the number of plays produced by the comic poets does not in any way affect the argument that it was impossible for the tragic poets to have produced so many plays as they did, if the usual custom had been to produce tragedies one at a time.

The passages which Mr Richards produces in favour of his views, that tragedies were produced singly, are as follows. First, there is the passage in the Frogs (1021 fg.), where Æschylus, when asked how he incited the Athenians to bravery, replies, "By writing a play full of battle, the Seven against Thebes, which made every one who saw it wish to fight. Then after this I produced the Persæ, in which I taught my countrymen to desire to conquer their foes (δρᾶμα ποιήσας Ἄρεως μεστόν—ποῖον;—τοὺς Ἑπτ' ἐπὶ Θήβας.....εἶτα διδάξας Πέρσας μετὰ τοῦτο). Now though only single plays are mentioned here, there is absolutely nothing in the language which is inconsistent with the fact of their having been produced along with three other plays. Aristophanes, writing about fifty years after the death of Æschylus, only mentions the particular plays which were most celebrated and most warlike in tone. It was quite unnecessary for him to add the names of the other plays

which composed the trilogy. Moreover this particular passage is a very unfortunate one to choose, for the purpose of founding an argument on the exact language used, as it contains a most flagrant inaccuracy. The words are, "Having produced the Seven against Thebes.....and then after this the Persæ." But the Persæ was produced five years before the Seven against Thebes, as we learn from the scholium on the passage, where it is sensibly remarked, that this is no demerit in the poet, as accuracy in such points is not required in a comedy. But this shows that we cannot found arguments upon mere verbal expressions in works of this kind. The second passage is Herod. vi. 21, of which the following is an exact translation. "The Athenians showed they were deeply grieved by the capture of Miletus, in many other ways, and also, when Phrynichus wrote a play, the capture of Miletus, and exhibited it, the whole theatre was moved to tears, and they fined him a thousand drachmæ for having reminded them of their own troubles, and passed a law that no one in future should exhibit this play." Here there is no mention of a tetralogy. But there is nothing in the language to prove that the play called "the Capture of Miletus" was not produced along with three other plays. This particular play being the one which caused the commotion, it only is mentioned, and the three other plays produced along with it are disregarded. Mr Richards points especially to the fact that a law was passed that no one should in future exhibit "this play" (*χρῆσθαι τούτῳ τῷ δράματι*), not "this tetralogy." But no one contends that it was the custom, when a poet's plays were reproduced, that they should necessarily be reproduced in exactly the same tetralogy in which they originally appeared, especially when the plays which composed the tetralogy were entirely unconnected with one another. Thus if the historical play of Æschylus, the Persæ, had been condemned by the Athenians, and they had forbidden that it should ever be produced again, they certainly would not have included in this condemnation the Phineus, the Glaucus, and the Prometheus, plays which had nothing to do with the Persæ, but simply chanced to be produced along with it. Consequently when the Athenians condemned "the Capture of Miletus," they were

not bound to condemn also the three other plays of the tetralogy.

The third and most important passage is from Plato's Symposium, p. 173 A. Describing the occasion of the dialogue Plato uses the words, ὅτε τῇ πρώτῃ τραγῳδίᾳ ἐνίκησεν Ἀγάθων, "when Agathon was victorious with his first tragedy." We know so little of the conventional language used about this sort of subject in classical times, that we cannot say for certain whether these words are merely one of the customary ways of saying "when Agathon won his first tragic prize," or whether they are to be taken literally, and we must conclude that we have Plato's testimony to the fact that on this occasion Agathon contended with one tragedy only. The occasion of the victory was the Lenæa of 416 B.C., as we learn from Athenæus (p. 217); and we might at first sight be tempted to assume that at the Lenæa, which was a much less important festival than the City Dionysia, new tragedies were produced singly. In this case Plato's language about Agathon (ὅτε τῇ πρώτῃ τραγῳδίᾳ ἐνίκησεν) would be strictly correct. But it so happens that on another occasion when we hear of new tragedies being produced at the Lenæa, the testimony is very strongly in favour of the theory that at the Lenæa also new plays were produced in tetralogies. Plutarch, in the vita Isocratis, gives a very accurate and detailed account of the dramatic career of Aphareus, the son of Isocrates. He says, "He wrote about 37 tragedies, of which two are said to be spurious. He began to produce plays in 368 B.C., and continued to do so until 341, and in this period of 28 years he exhibited 6 didascaliæ at the City Dionysia, and won 2 victories; and he also exhibited 2 didascaliæ at the Lenæa." Thus he wrote 35 confessedly genuine plays, and engaged in 8 contests. Assuming that on each occasion, both at the City Dionysia and at the Lenæa, he produced tetralogies, this would account for 32 out of his 35 plays, leaving 3 over, which might naturally be regarded as part of an incomplete tetralogy, which he did not live to finish. But assuming that only single plays were produced at the Lenæa, we should have 24 of his plays produced in 6 contests at the City Dionysia, and 2 plays produced at the Lenæa, making 26 plays in all, and leaving 9 plays

unaccounted for. Therefore setting the testimony of this passage, which is most accurate and detailed in the information it contains, against the testimony of Plato, I think that the balance of probability is that new plays were produced in fours at the Lenæa as well as at the City Dionysia, and that the language of Plato, *ὅτε τῇ πρώτῃ τραγῳδίᾳ ἐνίκησεν Ἀγάθων*, is not to be pressed to its literal signification, but should rather be regarded as a conventional form of speech, meaning "when he won his first tragic prize."

The mention of Aphareus brings us to the question as to what was the exact date when the custom of producing tetralogies died out. I am inclined to think that 341 B.C., the first year of the inscription alluded to in the beginning of this paper, was about the date of the change. In that year, as we have seen, the poets contended with three tragedies each, and in the succeeding year with two. Now Aphareus' dramatic career was from 368 to 341, and the fact that he engaged in 8 contests and wrote 35 plays seems to show that during this period the custom of writing tetralogies still flourished.

The facts which we learn about Theodectes, the orator and poet, also point the same way. Theodectes devoted himself to tragedy during the latter period of his life. He wrote fifty tragedies in all, and engaged in thirteen contests, as we learn from the epitaph upon his tomb,—

ἐν δὲ χορῶν τραγικῶν ἱεραῖς τρισὶ καὶ δέκ' ἀμίλλαις
ὀκτὼ ἀγηράντους ἀμφεθέμην στεφάνους.

(Suidas, v. *Θεοδέκτης*, and Steph. Byzant. v. *Φασηλίς*.) If he produced 50 tragedies in 13 contests, it is clear that during the greater part of his career, which terminated about 335 B.C., it must have been customary for tragic poets to contend with four plays each. As to the fact that all his plays were tragedies (Steph. Byzan. l. c. *ἐποίησε δὲ τραγῳδίας ν'*), and no satyric plays are mentioned, this need not surprise us. As early as 438 B.C. we know that Euripides substituted a tragedy, the Alcestis, for the usual satyric drama. And we have seen from the inscription already referred to that by 341 B.C. the satyric drama had

lost much of its former glory, and that the practice then was to produce only one satyric play at the beginning of the proceedings. So that we may well imagine that Theodectes wrote tetralogies consisting entirely of tragedies, as was the case with the tetralogy of Euripides which concluded with the Alcestis. There is also, in regard to this question of the date of tragedies, the evidence of the inscription in the Corp. Ins. Gr. no. 231, which has already been referred to, and which seems to prove almost conclusively that tetralogies were acted in Athens in 346 B.C. I think the cumulative effect of all this evidence is to make it highly probable that it was rather later than the middle of the fourth century when tetralogies began finally to be discontinued. It was about this time, as we know from other sources, that tragedy began to decline in Athens; and the first symptoms of the decline would consist in the smaller number of tragedies produced.

To sum up the results of this paper, I have shown that we have definite and detailed information as to fourteen tetralogies, ranging in date from the beginning to the end of the fifth century: we have evidence of one tetralogy in the middle of the fourth century, and other indications which point to the conclusion that tetralogies were customary during the earlier half of the fourth century. On the other hand, during this period, from 500 to 350 B.C., we have no definite or reliable evidence of a new tragedy being produced in any other way than in a tetralogy. Putting the one set of facts against the other, I think we may conclude that during this period, or the greater part of it, the regular custom was to produce new tragedies in groups of four. If we take an opposite view, we must regard all this positive evidence about tetralogies as fictitious. In this case we shall be driven to the most violent suppositions. We must suppose, as Mr Richards does, that at first, in later times, commentators began to group plays in threes or fours, for convenience of classification; and that in still later times people misunderstood these classifications, and thought the plays grouped together in this way were plays which had been performed together at the same time. But the people who originally made these groups would surely have joined together

plays connected by subject with one another. They could hardly have failed to group together the Œdipus Tyrannus, the Œdipus Coloneus, and the Antigone of Sophocles. Yet we find no hint anywhere of these three plays forming a trilogy. On the contrary, the majority of tetralogies which we are acquainted with consist of plays which are quite unconnected one with another. Moreover the later generation, besides inventing the idea of tetralogies being four plays performed at once, must have likewise invented the dates when these tetralogies were performed, as we always find the dates affixed in the didascaliæ; they must have arranged the three contending poets in order of merit; they must have added, in some cases at least, the name of the choregus. They must have quoted from Aristotle's Didascaliæ statements which are not found there. They must have ascribed to Aristophanes of Byzantium notices which he did not write. Such a systematic scheme of forgery, carried out at different times and places, seems almost an impossibility; and I think that any one who considers the matter will agree that the difficulties which can be urged against the ordinary theory are trifling as compared with the difficulties that would be experienced in rejecting it.

A. E. HAIGH.

PLATO'S LATER THEORY OF IDEAS.

VI THE *POLITICUS.*

It has been seen that the *sophist,* having for its ostensible subject the question 'Are sophist, statesman, and philosopher, one, two, or as their distinct names would seem to imply, three,' is concerned also with the question raised in the *Theaetetus,* 'What is knowledge.' Plainly these questions should reappear in the *politicus;* the one in virtue of that dialogue's connection with the *sophist,* the other in virtue of its connection at once with the *sophist* and with the *Theaetetus.* I propose to say something about both, giving precedence to that which is peculiar to the *sophist* and the *politicus,* in order that I may clear the way for the more important inquiry which is common to all three dialogues.

§ 1 *Are sophist, statesman, and philosopher, one, two, or, as their distinct names would seem to imply, three?*

As in the *sophist* the Eleate addresses himself to the definition of the term 'sophist,' so in the *politicus* he addresses himself to the definition of the term 'statesman,' *μετὰ τὸν σοφιστὴν ἀναγκαῖον τὸν πολιτικὸν ἄνδρα διαζητεῖν νῷν* 258 B: and as in the one dialogue he discovers that changing circumstances have modified the meaning of the one term, so in the other dialogue he finds that changing circumstances have modified the meaning of the other. For, whereas in the Saturnian age the statesman, the guardian of the human herd, enjoyed absolute authority, and fulfilled for his charges all those multifarious functions which the guardians of sheep, of oxen, and of goats,

perform within their several spheres of action in our own epoch, so far from enjoying absolute authority, the statesman is expected to govern in accordance with written rules, and, so far from retaining in his own hands the details of administration, is surrounded by a host of subordinates, over whom he exercises no more than a general superintendence[1]. In a word, 'statesman,' like 'sophist,' is the name, not of a natural kind, eternal and immutable, but of a conventional group, inconstantly and inconsistently defined at different times by different persons. Hence here, as in the *sophist*[2], it is necessary to make sure that we, the parties to the inquiry, understand and use the term in question in the selfsame sense.

Now, according to the popular view, the statesman is one who, whether with or without knowledge, exercises authority in the state: but according to the Eleate[3], that man, and that man alone, deserves the name, who, whether he exercises authority or not, has knowledge, so that he is qualified to advise in political matters; while the statesman commonly so called is no more than an imitator of the statesman proper,—a good imitator, if he governs in accordance with written law, a bad one, if in governing he disregards it. Hence, in attempting an answer to the question discussed in the two dialogues, it will be necessary to distinguish two cases, according as by 'statesman' we mean the true statesman, or his ape, the contemporary politician. Now if by 'statesman' we mean the true statesman, the statesman and the philosopher are, as appears

[1] Ξ. *Ὅτι μὲν ἐρωτώμενοι τὸν ἐκ τῆς νῦν περιφορᾶς καὶ γενέσεως βασιλέα καὶ πολιτικόν, τὸν ἐκ τῆς ἐναντίας περιόδου ποιμένα τῆς τότε ἀνθρωπίνης ἀγέλης εἴπομεν, καὶ ταῦτα θεὸν ἀντὶ θνητοῦ, ταύτῃ μὲν πάμπολυ παρηνέχθημεν· ὅτι δὲ ξυμπάσης τῆς πόλεως ἄρχοντα αὐτὸν ἀπεφήναμεν, ὅντινα δὲ τρόπον οὐ διείπομεν, ταύτῃ δὲ αὖ τὸ μὲν λεχθὲν ἀληθές, οὐ μὴν ὅλον γε οὐδὲ σαφὲς ἐρρήθη, διὸ καὶ βραχύτερον ἢ κατ' ἐκεῖνο ἡμαρτήκαμεν.* 274 E.

[2] *νῦν γὰρ δὴ σύ τε κἀγὼ τούτου πέρι τοὔνομα μόνον ἔχομεν κοινῇ· τὸ δὲ ἔργον, ἐφ' ᾧ καλοῦμεν, ἑκάτερος τάχ' ἂν ἰδίᾳ παρ' ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἔχοιμεν.* *sophist* 218 C.

[3] Ξ. *Τί δ';* *ὅστις βασιλεύοντι χώρας ἀνδρὶ παραινεῖν δεινὸς ἰδιώτης ὢν αὐτός, ἆρ' οὐ φήσομεν ἔχειν αὐτὸν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἣν ἕδει τὸν ἄρχοντα αὐτὸν κεκτῆσθαι;* N. Σ. *Φήσομεν.* Ξ. *Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἥ γε ἀληθινοῦ βασιλέως βασιλική;* N. Σ. *Ναί.* Ξ. *Ταύτην δὲ ὁ κεκτημένος οὐκ, ἄν τε ἄρχων ἄν τ' ἰδιώτης ὢν τυγχάνῃ, πάντως κατά γε τὴν τέχνην αὐτὴν βασιλικὸς ὀρθῶς προσρηθήσεται;* N. Σ. *Δίκαιον γοῦν.* 259 A B. See also 258 B, 292 C E, 293 C.

plainly enough in the latter part of the dialogue, identical; and accordingly between the philosopher-statesman and the sophist there is all the difference that there is between knowledge and ignorance. If again by 'statesman' we mean the contemporary politician, the statesman is merged in the sophist, being, in fact, *πάντων τῶν σοφιστῶν μέγιστος γόης*[1]; so that between the sophist-statesman and the philosopher there is all the difference that there is between ignorance and knowledge. In a word, he who, with or without office, influences public affairs, is philosopher or sophist according as he has, or has not, knowledge. Whence it appears that, whether by 'statesman' we mean the true statesman or the contemporary politician, philosopher, statesman, and sophist, are, not one, nor three, but two, statesman and philosopher being identical in the one case, statesman and sophist identical in the other[2].

At this point it will be convenient to advert to a familiar controversy. Assuming that in the absence of a *philosopher* the *sophist* and the *politicus* are incomplete, the commentators either look for a *philosopher* in one, or in more than one, of the extant dialogues, for instance, the *Parmenides*, or the *symposium* and the *Phaedo*, or conjecture that the dialogue, though planned, remained unwritten. In thus taking for granted that Plato intended to write a *philosopher*, the critics rely, (i) upon supposed necessities of the discussion which is begun in the *sophist* and continued in the *politicus*, (ii) upon indications given by Plato himself in the course of the two dialogues.

[1] 291 C. See also 303 B C. Ξ. *Οὐκοῦν δὴ καὶ τοὺς κοινωνοὺς τούτων τῶν πολιτειῶν πασῶν, πλὴν τῆς ἐπιστήμονος, ἀφαιρετέον ὡς οὐκ ὄντας πολιτικοὺς ἀλλὰ στασιαστικούς, καὶ εἰδώλων μεγίστων προστάτας ὄντας καὶ αὐτοὺς εἶναι τοιούτους, μεγίστους δὲ ὄντας μιμητὰς καὶ γόητας, μεγίστους γίγνεσθαι τῶν σοφιστῶν σοφιστάς.*

[2] Here by 'sophist' is meant the eristical sophist of the last *διαίρεσις* of the preceding dialogue. The claims of the *δημολογικός* to be regarded as a statesman have been already dismissed at *sophist* 268 B, where he is expressly distinguished from the *πολιτικός*: and the pretensions of the itinerant sophists of the fifth century are incidentally disposed of at *politicus* 289 E, where the *ἔμποροι* who purvey wares from city to city,—and therefore the *ἔμποροι περὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς μαθήματα*, compare *sophist* 231 D,—are summarily put out of court.

Now (i) we have seen that the relations of the sophist to the philosopher are determined in the *sophist;* and that the relations of the statesman—not only of the true statesman, but also of the contemporary politician—to both his rivals are determined in the *politicus;* and that accordingly the discussion raised at the beginning of the *sophist* finds at the end of the *politicus* its natural conclusion. There is then neither occasion, nor even room, for the addition of a *philosopher,* so that the argument from supposed necessities of the discussion falls to the ground.

But it may be thought (ii) that Plato himself in the course of the two dialogues signifies an intention of devoting a supplementary dialogue to the study of the philosophic character. In justification of this view the following passages have been cited:

(1) *sophist* 217 B *φθόνος μὲν γὰρ οὐδείς, οὐδὲ χαλεπὸν εἰπεῖν ὅτι γε τρί' ἡγοῦντο· καθ' ἕκαστον μὴν διορίσασθαι σαφῶς, τί ποτ' ἔστιν, οὐ σμικρὸν οὐδὲ ῥᾴδιον ἔργον.*

(2) 253 E Ξ. *Ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε διαλεκτικὸν οὐκ ἄλλῳ δώσεις, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, πλὴν τῷ καθαρῶς τε καὶ δικαίως φιλοσοφοῦντι.* Θ. *Πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἄλλῳ δοίη τις;* Ξ. *Τὸν μὲν δὴ φιλόσοφον ἐν τοιούτῳ τινὶ τόπῳ καὶ νῦν καὶ ἔπειτα ἀνευρήσομεν, ἐὰν ζητῶμεν, κτλ.*

(3) 254 B Ξ. *Οὐκοῦν περὶ μὲν τούτου καὶ τάχα ἐπισκεψόμεθα σαφέστερον, ἂν ἔτι βουλομένοις ἡμῖν ᾖ· περὶ δὲ τοῦ σοφιστοῦ που δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἀνετέον, πρὶν ἂν ἱκανῶς αὐτὸν θεασώμεθα.*

(4) *politicus* 257 A. Theodorus speaks of the triple gratitude which will be due from Socrates *ἐπειδὰν τόν τε πολιτικὸν ἀπεργάσωνταί σοι καὶ τὸν φιλόσοφον.*

(5) 257 C. Theodorus, inviting the Stranger to proceed, bids him *ἕξῆς, εἴτε τὸν πολιτικὸν ἄνδρα πρότερον εἴτε τὸν φιλόσοφον προαιρεῖ, προελόμενος διέξελθε.* To this the Stranger replies *Ταῦτ', ὦ Θεόδωρε, ποιητέον· ἐπείπερ ἅπαξ γε ἐγκεχειρήκαμεν, οὐκ ἀποστατέον πρὶν ἂν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἔλθωμεν*[1].

[1] To these passages Campbell, *politicus* p. lvii q. v., adds with a query *sophist* 231 A: but I fail to see the relevance of the quotation.

Of these passages (1) proves nothing; (2) and (3) when they contemplate a search for the philosopher, add the qualifying phrases *ἐὰν ζητῶμεν* and *ἂν ἔτι βουλομένοις ἡμῖν ᾖ*; (4) has no more than an incidental reference, and, being placed in the mouth of Theodorus, carries no authority; (5) however contains a distinct statement on the part of the Eleate that the inquiry must not be abandoned until the search for the philosopher, as well as that for the statesman, shall have been completed. But even in (5) we have no assurance that the search for the philosopher will occupy a separate dialogue.

Now in a notable passage of the *sophist*, 253 B ff, the Eleate briefly describes the functions of the philosopher, appending the remark that in our search for the sophist we have stumbled upon his rival: *ἢ πρὸς Διὸς ἐλάθομεν εἰς τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἐμπεσόντες ἐπιστήμην, καὶ κινδυνεύομεν ζητοῦντες τὸν σοφιστὴν πρότερον ἀνευρηκέναι τὸν φιλόσοφον*; 253 C: whence it would seem that something has already been done towards the fulfilment of the undertaking given at *politicus* 257 C. Furthermore, as the passage which I have quoted from the *sophist* indicates, the question What is the philosopher? is in effect identical with the question What is knowledge? It follows then that, if, as we have reason to expect, the *politicus* disposes of the question What is knowledge? it will dispose of the question What is the philosopher? also: in which case there will no longer be any ground for supposing that Plato ever wrote, or intended to write, a *philosopher*. I shall have a word to say on this subject at the end of the ensuing section.

§ 2 *What is Knowledge?*

As in the *sophist*, so in the *politicus*, the definition sought and found is of less importance than certain incidental results of the conversation. But, whilst the incidental results of the *sophist* are philosophical, or, to put it more exactly, logical, the incidental results of the *politicus*, so far as they are obvious, are political or moral; and between the ostensible subject of the discussion on the one hand, and, on the other, its political and moral lessons, there is, at first sight, no room for philosophy.

On further inquiry however we shall find, that the dialogue has its philosophical significance, and that Plato himself has been careful to emphasize it. At 285 D the Eleate plainly puts, and as plainly answers, the very question which now engages our attention: "What is our purpose in this inquiry about the statesman? Our purpose is, not so much to discover the statesman, as rather to make ourselves, generally, better dialecticians,"—Ξ. Τί δ' αὖ; νῦν ἡμῖν ἡ περὶ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ ζήτησις ἕνεκα αὐτοῦ τούτου προβέβληται μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ περὶ πάντα διαλεκτικωτέροις γίγνεσθαι; Ν.Σ. Καὶ τοῦτο δῆλον ὅτι τοῦ περὶ πάντα: and the whole context suggests,—see especially 286 D πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα καὶ πρῶτον τὴν μέθοδον αὐτὴν τιμᾶν τοῦ κατ' εἴδη δυνατὸν εἶναι διαιρεῖν,—as does that of the passage already cited from the *sophist*, 253 B ff, that the dialectician is one who is skilful in the discrimination of kinds. Whence I gather that the philosophical purpose of the dialogue is the study of the method of διαίρεσις or 'division' regarded as a means to the attainment of knowledge.

Now that διαίρεσις is no new thing, appears plainly enough in *Philebus* 16 C, where Socrates describes that method as "one which he has always affected, though it has frequently left him in the lurch," ἧς ἐγὼ ἐραστὴς μέν εἰμι ἀεί, πολλάκις δέ μ' ἤδη διαφυγοῦσα ἔρημον καὶ ἄπορον κατέστησεν. Accordingly, on turning to the *Phaedrus*,—a dialogue which, whatever its date, may be assumed to belong to an earlier period than the dialogues which now concern me,—we find that it contains a tolerably exact account of the method of 'division,' and of the use which in that stage the Platonic Socrates makes of it. Criticizing the discourse of Lysias, Socrates remarks *Phaedrus* 263 A that, whereas about some subjects men are agreed, about others they are at variance; that, for example, whereas all men, when they speak of iron or of silver, mean the same thing, they do not necessarily mean the same thing when they speak of just or of unjust. In this latter case then, that of 'debatable' subjects, a definition is required; and as Lysias in his discourse has omitted to define ἔρως, Socrates supplies the deficiency, first, showing it to be a sort of μανία, and next, dividing μανία into ἡ ὑπὸ νοσημάτων

ἀνθρωπίνων and *ἡ ὑπὸ θείας ἐξαλλαγῆς*, and subdividing *ἡ ὑπὸ θείας ἐξαλλαγῆς* into *μαντική*, *τελεστική*, *ποιητική*, and *ἐρωτική*. 'At this point,' he continues 265 D, 'it will be worth while to discriminate two processes here exemplified: first, the collection of scattered particulars under a single kind, that we may be able to define and make clear any subject which we wish to explain; for example, our definition of *ἔρως*, whether good or bad, has secured to our discourse perspicuity and consistency: secondly, division, not into parts, by brute force, but into kinds, at the natural joints of the organism, such as our recent division of *μανία*.' 'These *διαιρέσεις* and *συναγωγαί*,' the Platonic Socrates proceeds, 'I myself affect[1], that I may be able to speak and to think: and if I fancy that any one is skilful in discerning One and Many in nature, I attach myself to him, and call him a dialectician.' It would seem then that the purpose of *συναγωγή* and *διαίρεσις*, as conceived in the *Phaedrus*, is the discovery of Socratic definitions with a view to consistency in the use of debatable terms, *συναγωγή*, the purely Socratic process, collecting from familiar instances the common characteristics of the definiend, whilst *διαίρεσις* distinguishes the definiend from kindred concepts, thus checking and limiting the definition got by *συναγωγή*, and, in so far, improving upon the ruder method which had contented the Socrates of history. Similarly, at the beginning of the *sophist*, when the Eleate prescribes the method of *διαίρεσις*, he professedly seeks nothing more than consistency in the use of what are called in the *Phaedrus* *ἀμφισβητήσιμα*, 'debatable terms': 'it is necessary,' he says, 'that we should begin by defining "sophist"; for at present the name is all that we have in common, and consequently we have no assurance that we agree in our notions of the thing signified; a name without a definition is never satisfactory,'—*νῦν γὰρ δὴ σύ τε κἀγὼ τούτου πέρι τοὔνομα μόνον ἔχομεν κοινῇ· τὸ δὲ ἔργον, ἐφ' ᾧ καλοῦμεν, ἑκάτερος τάχ' ἂν ἰδίᾳ παρ' ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἔχοιμεν·*

[1] *Τούτων δὴ ἔγωγε αὐτός τε ἐραστής, ὦ Φαῖδρε, τῶν διαιρέσεων καὶ συναγωγῶν, κτλ.* 266 B. The occurrence of the word *ἐραστής*, at once in this passage and in *Philebus* 16 C, is notable. Is this a fortuitous coincidence, or does the *Philebus* consciously echo the *Phaedrus*? I incline to the latter view.

δεῖ δὲ ἀεὶ παντὸς πέρι τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ μᾶλλον διὰ λόγων ἢ τοὔνομα μόνον συνομολογήσασθαι χωρὶς λόγου. 218 B. Hence, when at the close of the exemplary διαίρεσις Theaetetus recognizes the definiend, ἀσπαλιευτική, the Stranger remarks Νῦν ἄρα τῆς ἀσπαλιευτικῆς πέρι σύ τε κἀγὼ συνωμολογήκαμεν οὐ μόνον τοὔνομα ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν λόγον περὶ αὐτὸ τοὔργον εἰλήφαμεν ἱκανῶς, 221 A, thus plainly acknowledging the definition of 'angling' as the end in view.

But at *sophist* 253 B ff, a passage which I have already had occasion to cite, διαίρεσις appears in a new light. Having ascertained that some εἴδη are capable of intercommunion, others incapable, the Eleate announces as the subject of dialectical science "division into kinds, whereby we perceive one form pervading many particulars, and many forms, differing from one another, embraced by a single form external to them; and again, one form pervading many forms or ones-in-many, and many forms separate from one another. To effect division into kinds, is," he proceeds, "the function of the philosopher[1]." Manifestly, this is not, and is not meant to be, a complete or final statement: but it is clear that, when the Stranger describes διαίρεσις as ἡ τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἐπιστήμη, 'the subject of dialectical science,' 'the region in which we may expect to find the philosopher,' the view which he takes of it is different from the view taken of it in the *Phaedrus*, where it leads to nothing more than agreement (ὁμολογία) between disputants, as to the meaning to be put upon certain technical terms.

In the *politicus* however, 285 C, which passage has been already quoted for the sake of the evidence which it affords about the subject of the dialogue, the Eleate is more explicit. Plainly asserting that the present inquiry is instituted in order

[1] Ξ. Οὐκοῦν ὅ γε τοῦτο δυνατὸς δρᾶν μίαν ἰδέαν διὰ πολλῶν, ἑνὸς ἑκάστου κειμένου χωρίς, πάντῃ διατεταμένην ἱκανῶς διαισθάνεται, καὶ πολλὰς ἑτέρας ἀλλήλων ὑπὸ μιᾶς ἔξωθεν περιεχομένας, καὶ μίαν αὖ δι' ὅλων πολλῶν ἐν ἑνὶ ξυνημμένην [? ξυνημμένων], καὶ πολλὰς χωρὶς πάντῃ διωρισμένας. τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν, ᾧ τε κοινωνεῖν ἕκαστα δύναται καὶ ὅπῃ μή, διακρίνειν κατὰ γένος ἐπίστασθαι. Θ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. Ξ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε διαλεκτικὸν οὐκ ἄλλῳ δώσεις, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, πλὴν τῷ καθαρῶς τε καὶ δικαίως φιλοσοφοῦντι. Θ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἄλλῳ δοίη τις; Ξ. Τὸν μὲν δὴ φιλόσοφον ἐν τοιούτῳ τινὶ τόπῳ καὶ νῦν καὶ ἔπειτα ἀνευρήσομεν, ἐὰν ζητῶμεν, κτλ. 253 D.

that we may be made διαλεκτικώτεροι περὶ πάντα 285 D,—in other words, τῆς τῶν ὄντων λόγῳ δηλώσεως εὑρετικώτεροι 287 A,—and emphatically commending the method of division, πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα καὶ πρῶτον τὴν μέθοδον αὐτὴν τιμᾶν τοῦ κατ' εἴδη δυνατὸν εἶναι διαιρεῖν 286 D, he intimates that the discovery of τὰ μέγιστα καὶ τιμιώτατα—in short, the discovery of νοητά—is the end which he seeks: δεῖ μελετᾶν λόγον ἑκάστου δυνατὸν εἶναι δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι· τὰ γὰρ ἀσώματα, κάλλιστα ὄντα καὶ μέγιστα, λόγῳ μόνον ἄλλῳ δὲ οὐδενὶ σαφῶς δείκνυται, τούτων δὲ ἕνεκα πάντ' ἐστὶ τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα. 286 A.

Thus, whereas in the *Phaedrus*, and ostensibly at the beginning of the *sophist*, Plato looks to διαίρεσις to help him in giving to the ἀμφισβητήσιμα of ordinary discussion a definite but temporary and provisional meaning, so that both in his conversation with himself and in his conversation with others he may avoid inconsistency and misunderstanding, in the *politicus* he proposes to apply the method to the incorporeal αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ εἴδη, and to the information thus obtained about their likenesses and differences he is prepared to give the name of 'knowledge.'

Now this theory, at once of knowledge and of the method by which it is to be obtained, exactly squares with the theory of being which has been elicited from the *Philebus*, the *Parmenides*, and the *Timaeus*. From those dialogues I gather that Plato in his later years regarded the universe as the eternal immutable thought of One infinite mind, this eternal immutable thought being localized in shifting space as the sensations of a plurality of finite minds. In other words, assuming as the single entity mind evolving itself in accordance with determinate laws, Plato opposed the perfect operation of each determinate law in mind universal and infinite to its imperfect operation in mind particular and finite, and conceived the events of these operations, the one as an eternal immutable original, the other as a transient variable copy. Of the particular—that is to say, of the moments which are the finite mind's only apprehension of the idea—the finite mind has αἴσθησις: and of the relation of αἰσθητόν to αἰσθητόν it has δόξα. But of the idea as such, since it correlates with the

finite mind not as idea but as particular, the finite mind has no direct intuition analogous to its direct apprehension of it as *αἰσθητόν*. If then there is for the finite mind any apprehension of the eternal immutable original, that apprehension must be indirect, analogous to what in the case of *αἰσθητά* is called *δόξα*: that is to say, in so far as the finite mind has any thing which deserves to be called knowledge, it apprehends the *αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ εἶδος* not in itself, but in the relations in which it stands to other *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ εἴδη*. Now *διαίρεσις*, applied, as according to the *politicus* it may be, to the investigation of the ideas, affords precisely what we are thus led to expect; namely, information about the relations of likeness and unlikeness in which ideas stand to one another: whilst the passage which I have quoted from the *sophist* indicates that information got by this application of *διαίρεσις* is to be regarded as knowledge. In short, admitting that we cannot directly know the *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ εἴδη*, Plato uses *διαίρεσις* as a means of ascertaining their likenesses and unlikenesses.

It would seem then that Plato regards any characteristic which distinguishes all the members of one natural kind from all the members of another natural kind, as a characteristic of the type of the natural kind first mentioned. We cannot indeed examine all the members of a natural kind, and consequently we can never have an absolute assurance that the observed characteristic is a characteristic of the type. But provisional assurance is something, and may be made to approximate to absolute assurance. Thus, whereas the relations of non-natural groups cannot be ascertained, because their limits are arbitrary and variable, the relations of natural kinds are known to infinite intelligence, and to its knowledge of them finite intelligence may approximate by the careful observation of an ever-increasing number of particulars. I hold then that Plato recognized classificatory science, and valued it as a means of approaching to the knowledge of natural types; that is to say, as a means of ascertaining approximately their mutual relations, the permanence and the causality of those types being guaranteed by the fundamental idealism, and the discovery of their mutual relations being a matter of laborious and continued observation.

In confirmation of this view of the connection of the theory of being and the theory of knowledge, it may be urged that it explains what is otherwise hardly explicable, the subsequent course of academic development. The doctrine of natural types approximately ascertainable by the observation of particulars, might be, though of course not without serious loss, dissociated from the idealism upon which that doctrine was based by its author. Accordingly we find that, while few, if any, even of Plato's immediate successors were true to his ontology, they all clung to his theory of natural kinds, and gave themselves to the construction of classificatory systems. It was in virtue of the scientific element of Plato's teaching that these incomplete Platonists regarded themselves, and were regarded by others, as his followers: and their imperfect science led to the scepticism which at a later time was the chief characteristic of the school and contrasted so strangely with the dogmatism of its founder.

But, it may be asked, is not this to attach too great an importance to physical inquiry? Does not Plato himself in the *Timaeus* 59 CD[1] speak of physical research as a harmless recreation rather than as a serious pursuit? To this question I reply that it is the study of natural types, of the fixities of nature, which alone Plato recommends in the *politicus;* whilst in the passage cited from the *Timaeus*, he is thinking, not of natural types, but of varieties and combinations, which, not being determined by types, cannot with propriety be regarded as matters of classificatory science. In short, Plato assigns an inferior value to the speculations in question, not because they are concerned with nature, but because they are not concerned with nature's fixities[2].

[1] *τἆλλα δὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν ποικίλον ἔτι διαλογίσασθαι τὴν τῶν εἰκότων μύθων μεταδιώκοντα ἰδέαν· ἣν ὅταν τις ἀναπαύσεως ἕνεκα τοὺς περὶ τῶν ὄντων ἀεὶ κατατιθέμενος λόγους τοὺς γενέσεως πέρι διαθεώμενος εἰκότας ἀμεταμέλητον ἡδονὴν κτᾶται, μέτριον ἂν ἐν τῷ βίῳ παιδιὰν καὶ φρόνιμον ποιοῖτο. ταύτῃ δὴ καὶ τὰ νῦν ἐφέντες τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο τῶν αὐτῶν πέρι τὰ ἑξῆς εἰκότα δίιμεν τῇδε.*

[2] The transition from the investigation of the elements, which, being determined by regular geometrical figures, rank with animal and vegetable species as natural kinds, to the investigation of varieties and combinations of the elements, which varieties and combinations are indeterminate, is plainly marked in 57 CD *ὅσα μὲν οὖν ἄκρατα καὶ πρῶτα σώματα, διὰ τοιούτων αἰτιῶν γέγονε· τὸ δ' ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσιν αὐτῶν ἕτερα ἐμπεφυκέναι γένη τὴν ἑκατέ-*

Nor does it surprise me that both in the *Timaeus* and in the *politicus* Plato refrains from applying his method to natural types. He was aware that he did not possess the detailed information necessary for such an application, and accordingly contented himself with exemplifying his method in the case of non-natural groups. Nevertheless in the course of his exemplary researches he contrives to introduce διαιρέσεις of the animal kingdom, thus recognizing the application of the method to natural kinds without committing himself to any specific results. In so limiting himself he seems to me to have shown a wise discretion[1].

If then there is ground for thinking that in the *sophist* and the *politicus* Plato contemplates a novel application of that method of διαίρεσις which, ever since he wrote the *Euthyphro*, he had employed in the search for Socratic definitions, it will be worth while to inquire whether this view explains any of the peculiarities and difficulties which are discernible in the διαιρέσεις of the two dialogues. Should we find that what, if διαίρεσις has

ρου τῶν στοιχείων αἰτιατέον ξύστασιν, μὴ μόνον ἓν ἑκατέραν μέγεθος ἔχον τὸ τρίγωνον φυτεῦσαι κατ' ἀρχάς, ἀλλ' ἐλάττω τε καὶ μείζω, τὸν ἀριθμὸν δὲ ἔχοντα τοσοῦτον, ὅσαπερ ἂν ᾖ τὰν τοῖς εἴδεσι γένη. διὸ δὴ ξυμμιγνύμενα αὐτά τε πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα τὴν ποικιλίαν ἐστὶν ἄπειρα· ἧς δὴ δεῖ θεωροὺς γίγνεσθαι τοὺς μέλλοντας περὶ φύσεως εἰκότι λόγῳ χρήσεσθαι. Accordingly in 58 c Plato enumerates varieties and combinations of fire, air, water, earth, plainly saying that there are many other sorts which are ἀνώνυμα, and concluding his statement at 61 c with the words καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ σχήμασι κοινωνίαις τε καὶ μεταλλαγαῖς εἰς ἄλληλα πεποικιλμένα εἴδη σχεδὸν ἐπιδέδεικται. It is in the middle of this passage that the sentences quoted above from 59 c D are introduced, and I can see no reason for supposing that they in any way refer to the study of natural kinds. In a word, Plato holds that, while the investigation of the affinities of natural kinds in order to the determination of the laws at once of thought and of being is the proper business of the philosopher, the investigation of the varieties and combinations of natural kinds is his harmless and agreeable recreation.

[1] It will be remembered that in a well-known fragment of the comic poet Epicrates Plato looks on, while Speusippus and Menedemus investigate the affinities of the common pumpkin. This seems to me an exact representation of the facts. Plato, together with the rectorship of the Academy, held the chair of philosophy, leaving to his subordinates the study and the teaching of mathematics and natural science, but exercising over them a general superintendence. The researches of Speusippus bore fruit in his Ὅμοια.

for its end the discovery of Socratic definitions, is unintelligible, becomes intelligible if the end of διαίρεσις is the determination of the affinities of εἴδη, this circumstance will go far to show that we are on the right track. Now

(1) in the *sophist*, at the end of each διαίρεσις, the sophist in question having been unearthed, the Eleate appends, not a concise definition by means of a genus and the fewest possible differences, such as from the Socratic point of view we should have expected, but a summary of the whole of the classification which the division has supplied. This is perfectly intelligible, if what is sought is, not a distinguishing mark, but a statement of the relations, whether of likeness or of unlikeness, in which the kind or class in question stands to other kinds or classes:

(2) in the *sophist* 227 A—C, and in the *politicus* 266 D with a precise reference to the former passage,—compare also *sophist* 231 A,—we are warned that our present method cares nothing about the comparative dignity of the classes recognized. Now if the purpose is merely to distinguish one class by means of the rejection of others, there is no particular point in this remark, as it is no insult to the dog to separate him from the wolf: but if we are concerned just as much with likenesses as with differences, if in the language of 227 B the μέθοδος λόγων endeavours to ascertain τὸ ξυγγενὲς καὶ τὸ μὴ ξυγγενές, in fact, to classify, the warning is reasonable enough:

(3) throughout both dialogues the Eleate requires that the division shall be effected as nearly as may be in the middle of the class divided[1], at the same time providing *politicus* 287 C that, when bisection is impossible, the class may be divided into a limited number of subclasses. Now if the purpose of διαίρεσις is no more than definition, it is difficult to see why bisection proper should be insisted upon, all that is required being the

[1] See in particular *sophist* 229 B Τὴν ἄγνοιαν ἰδόντες εἴ πῃ κατὰ μέσον αὐτῆς τομὴν ἔχει τινά, *politicus* 262 B λεπτουργεῖν οὐκ ἀσφαλές, διὰ μέσων δὲ ἀσφαλέστερον ἰέναι τέμνοντας, 265 A δεῖ μεσοτομεῖν ὡς μάλιστα: but as δίχα διαιρεῖν properly means to divide into *equal* parts, *sophist* 221 E Δίχα που νῦν διείλομεν τὴν ἄγραν πᾶσαν, κτλ, 227 C πειρώμενος αὖ τὸ λεχθὲν διχῇ τέμνειν, &c, are hardly less explicit.

certainty that the definiend is covered by, and in the last stage coextensive with, the selected section; but if the purpose of division is the discovery of the relations in which εἴδη stand to one another, bisection proper is plainly preferable to unequal division in so far as bisection proper brings out those relations more methodically and more completely:

(4) at one point in the *politicus*, 261 E ff, three dichotomies are suggested. Of these three, the first, which is propounded by the young Socrates, is condemned by the Eleate, seemingly on the ground that in it the infima species 'man,' whereof there is a natural type, is opposed, not to other infimae species of the genus animal taken severally, but to those infimae species taken collectively as an aggregate having no natural type. Now the Eleate's condemnation is hardly intelligible, if what is sought is a definition per genus et differentias; since *θηρίον*, i.e. 'animal other than man,' does not concern us: but it is perfectly just if the affinities of 'man' and other natural kinds, i.e. the infimae species of nature's classification, are to be determined. Indeed the division *κατὰ μέλη* in the last stage of the *διαίρεσις* is an absolute necessity. On the other hand, the second and third *διαιρέσεις*, proposed by the Eleate, are, inasmuch as they bring the infima species 'man' into comparison with other infimae species, both of them admissible: but the second is preferred to the third, on the ground that, though longer, indeed because longer, it affords more information,—compare 264 E and 266 D,—a consideration which, as has been already seen, is on the one hypothesis of the significance of *διαίρεσις* immaterial, and on the other hypothesis all-important:

(5) at 263 E the Eleate retraces his steps in order to introduce before the division into *ἰδιοτροφική* and *ἀγελαιοτροφική* a division of animals into *ἄγρια* and *ἥμερα*. Now on the one hand, since the objects of *ζῳοτροφία* are coextensive with *ἥμερα*, it makes no difference, so far as mere definition is concerned, whether we do or do not introduce the distinction between *ἥμερα* and *ἄγρια*. On the other hand, the recognition of this distinction adds an item to our knowledge of

the relations of animal types, and consequently from our new point of view has its importance[1].

The philosophical purpose of the dialogue is then, I apprehend, to show how by observation of the members of natural kinds the finite intelligence may ascertain, at any rate approximately, the relations in which their types, the ideas, stand to one another, and, in so far, may arrive at the knowledge of the eternal immutable causes of various and variable particulars. In this way we obtain an answer, not only to the question which is common to the three dialogues, namely, What is knowledge? but also to the question which is emphasized at *politicus* 257 C, namely, What is the philosopher? The philosopher is one who is acquainted with the affinities of natural types. Hence, as the relations of philosopher, statesman, and sophist, have been already determined, while, as we now see, the undertaking given by the Stranger at 257 C has been incidentally fulfilled, there is no longer any ground for the traditional assumption that the trilogy is imperfect and needs a *philosopher* dialogue to complete it.

§ 3 *The relations of the* politicus *to other dialogues.*

In the preceding section I have tried to show that the *politicus* announces a new application of the method of διαίρεσις. In the *Euthyphro*, which plainly belongs to Plato's Socratic period, we find him obtaining by διαίρεσις a definition of ὅσιον: in the *Phaedrus*, which apparently represents the period when, having emerged from Socraticism, Plato was beginning to think for himself, he uses διαίρεσις together with συναγωγή as a means of obtaining definitions of ἀμφισβητήσιμα: and in the *sophist*, and even in the *politicus*, we see διαίρεσις

[1] Why, it may be asked, is the division into ἥμερα and ἄγρια introduced, not in due course, but as an after thought? I conceive that the purpose of this correction, as well as of that which is made at 275 D, and at 276 C is found to carry consequences, is, to remind us that the results obtained by διαίρεσις are not final, and must be constantly revised and amended.

put to the same modest purpose. Thus applied, what does the method afford? It affords a statement of the meaning in which the framers of the division are content to employ a given term, and so constructs a class. But, (1) inasmuch as the class is made by the διαίρεσις, we are not at liberty to assume that there is anything to be known about the class, since, in all other respects than those already specified in the διαίρεσις, the members of the class may differ; (2) as we have seen in the *sophist*, changing circumstances make new classifications desirable or necessary, and the framers of the division thus find themselves obliged to modify the meaning which they have attached to the given term; and (3) the classification has, even for the moment, no authority except for those who voluntarily accept it. Hence, thus used, διαίρεσις cannot give knowledge.

In the *politicus* however Plato proposes to apply the method of division to precisely those μὴ ἀμφισβητήσιμα which in the *Phaedrus* were excluded from the scope of its operations. Besides classes arbitrarily constructed, there are, he now conceives, classes which, being determined for all eternity by nature, need no circumscription by us. Hence, when in the course of a division we come to such,—when, for example, in the division of 266 E we come to goose and man,—the summary of the dichotomy gives, not a definition to be used by us in making a class, but a statement of the relations of likeness and unlikeness in which these classes made for us by nature, or more exactly the types of these classes, stand to one another and to other similar classes or types: and whereas the infinite mind's apprehension of them in such relations is knowledge, the finite mind's apprehension of them, in so far as by elimination of what is occasional it can be brought into accord with the infinite mind's apprehension, may be called by the same name. The θριγκός of the theory of knowledge is then the fixity of the classes. Now that the classes in question are fixed by nature throughout all eternity follows from the fundamental idealism, because each member of any of these classes is the type of the class as that type is apprehended under conditions of time and space by finite mind. Thus the theory of know-

ledge has for its foundation the theory of being, whilst as I have already had occasion to remark, *J. of Ph.* XI 325, the theory of being, if it is to be anything more than an idle speculation, needs the theory of knowledge as superstructure. In a word, the theory of being is the warp, the theory of knowledge is the woof, of Plato's philosophical web.

If then the logical theory of the *Theaetetus, sophist,* and *politicus,* is thus intimately related to the ontological theory of the *Philebus, Parmenides,* and *Timaeus,* detailed proofs of the connection of the *politicus* in particular with the three dialogues last named might perhaps be dispensed with. Nevertheless it may be worth while to note two or three attachments.

In the first place it will be observed that the theory of διαίρεσις which I have elicited from the *sophist* and the *politicus,* explains the preliminary statement contained in the *Philebus,* 16 C—18 D. That statement, as the theory of ideas was then in suspense, was necessarily imperfect; so much so, that I found myself compelled to defer the consideration of it to § 4 of my paper on the *Parmenides, J. of Ph.* XI 325 ff. Now however, when the theory of ideas has been revised and reconstituted, we see that the Socrates of the *Philebus* was justified in still clinging to the method which had so 'often left him in the lurch.'

Of another link which joins the *politicus* to the *Philebus,* I have said something in my examination of that dialogue. By means of an analysis of *politicus* 283 B—287 A (*J. of Ph.* X 279, 289, note), I tried to show that the doctrine of μέτριον there enforced is none other than the doctrine of μέτριον which in the *Philebus* is so conspicuous. On the present occasion it is only necessary to add that the theory of the relations of μέγα and σμικρόν to one another and to μέτριον could not have been propounded at a time when, as in the *Phaedo,* Plato looked to immanent ideas of μέγεθος and σμικρότης for the explanation of the comparative size of things[1].

The connection of the *politicus* with the *Parmenides* is not so plainly marked: yet I may call attention to the passage in

[1] Compare my remarks upon *Theaetetus* 155 B ff, *J. of Ph.* XIII 267, 268.

the former, 262 E ff, where the Eleate, asserting a difference between *γένος* or *εἶδος* on the one hand and *μέρος* on the other, and further observing that, while every *εἶδος* is a *μέρος*, a *μέρος* is not necessarily an *εἶδος*, declines to say precisely how they differ. The reader of the *Parmenides* has little difficulty in filling the gap. The *εἶδος*, properly so called, is a kind of nature's making, not of man's; thus man or horse is an *εἶδος*, Greek or cart-horse is no more than a *μέρος*. Further it will be noticed that the Eleate's remark *Καὶ ἔμοιγε δὴ τότ' ἐφάνης μέρος ἀφαιρῶν ἡγεῖσθαι καταλιπεῖν τὸ λοιπὸν αὖ πάντων γένος ἕν, ὅτι πᾶσι ταὐτὸν ἐπονομάζειν ἔσχες ὄνομα, θηρία καλέσας*, 263 C, and the warning which he appends to it, imply the rejection of the doctrine, dogmatically asserted in the *republic*, 596 A, that there is an idea wherever a plurality of particulars is called by the same name.

Next it should be noted that the myth which ornaments the *politicus* has the same machinery as the mythical part of the *Timaeus*. The phrases *ζῷον ὂν καὶ φρόνησιν εἰληχὸς ἐκ τοῦ συναρμόσαντος αὐτὸ κατ' ἀρχάς* 269 D, *τὴν τοῦ δημιουργοῦ καὶ πατρὸς ἀπομνημονεύων διδαχὴν εἰς δύναμιν* 273 B, *θεὸς ὁ κοσμήσας αὐτόν* 273 D, immediately remind us of the teaching of the *Timaeus* about the relations of the universe to its *δημιουργός*. Whatever reading we adopt at 271 D, *τότε γὰρ αὐτῆς πρῶτον τῆς κυκλήσεως ἦρχεν ἐπιμελούμενος ὅλης ὁ θεός, ὡς νῦν κατὰ τόπους ταὐτὸν τοῦτο, ὑπὸ θεῶν δ' ἀρχόντων πάντ' ἦν τὰ τοῦ κόσμου μέρη διειλημμένα· καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ ζῷα κατὰ γένη καὶ ἀγέλας οἷον νομεῖς θεῖοι διειλήφεσαν δαίμονες, αὐτάρκης εἰς πάντα ἕκαστος ἑκάστοις ὢν οἷς αὐτὸς ἔνεμεν*, and at 272 E, *πάντες οὖν οἱ κατὰ τοὺς τόπους συνάρχοντες τῷ μεγίστῳ δαίμονες θεῷ, γνόντες ἤδη τὸ γιγνόμενον, ἀφίεσαν αὖ τὰ μέρη τοῦ κόσμου τῆς αὑτῶν ἐπιμελείας*, these passages recall the account given in the *Timaeus* of the relations of the creator to the lesser divinities, and of the relations of the lesser divinities to the regions and the mortal animals placed in their charge. The explanation of the degeneracy of the universe and its contents—*τούτων δὲ αὐτῷ τὸ σωματοειδὲς τῆς συγκράσεως αἴτιον, τὸ τῆς πάλαι ποτὲ φύσεως ξύντροφον, ὅτι πολλῆς ἦν μετέχον ἀταξίας πρὶν εἰς τὸν νῦν κόσμον ἀφικέσθαι. παρὰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ συνθέντος πάντα*

τὰ καλὰ κέκτηται· παρὰ δὲ τῆς ἔμπροσθεν ἕξεως, ὅσα χαλεπὰ καὶ ἄδικα ἐν οὐρανῷ γίγνεται, ταῦτα ἐξ ἐκείνης αὐτός τε ἔχει καὶ τοῖς ζῴοις ἐναπεργάζεται. 273 B—is in complete accord with the mythical theory of creation propounded in the *Timaeus*. The reference at 274 D to the particular's μίμησις of the κόσμος, ᾧ ξυμμιμούμενοι καὶ ξυνεπόμενοι τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον νῦν μὲν οὕτω τότε δὲ ἐκείνως ζῳμέν τε καὶ φυόμεθα, is in perfect harmony with the idealist cosmology. Finally, such less important phrases as Φθοραὶ τοίνυν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τότε μέγισται ξυμβαίνουσι τῶν τε ἄλλων ζῴων, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος ὀλίγον τι περιλείπεται. 270 C, θορύβων τε καὶ ταραχῆς ἤδη παυόμενος καὶ τῶν σεισμῶν, γαλήνης ἐπιλαβόμενος εἴς τε τὸν εἰωθότα δρόμον τὸν ἑαυτοῦ κατακοσμούμενος ἴῃει. 273 A, have their analogues in the other dialogue: compare 22 C ff and 44 B. These coincidences are not, I think, without their value as proofs that the *politicus* belongs to the same stage of Platonic development as the *Timaeus*.

But while in my judgment there is ample proof, both that the *politicus* and the series to which it belongs represent the same stage of metaphysical development as the *Philebus*, the *Parmenides*, and the *Timaeus*, and that this stage is a later one than that which is represented by the *republic*, the political element of the dialogue before us must not be wholly ignored. That the political views here enunciated were seriously meant, is, I apprehend, conclusively proved by the many exact references which occur in Aristotle's *politics*, indicating, as I think, that the *politicus* was one of the text-books which he placed in the hands of his pupils. Now in the political part of the dialogue we are frequently reminded of the *republic*. Throughout the *politicus* the true politician and the written law represent respectively the two sorts of ἀρετή, ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου and ἡ δημοτική τε καὶ πολιτική, which in the *republic* are so carefully distinguished: and there is no lack of detailed allusions. For example, Campbell is doubtless right in seeing in 297 E, Ξ. Εἰς δὴ τὰς εἰκόνας ἐπανίωμεν πάλιν, αἷς ἀναγκαῖον ἀπεικάζειν ἀεὶ τοὺς βασιλικοὺς ἄρχοντας. Ν. Σ. Ποίας; Ξ. Τὸν γενναῖον κυβερνήτην καὶ τὸν ἑτέρων πολλῶν ἀντάξιον ἰατρόν, "an echo

of Rep. 6, 488 A": and I have tried elsewhere[1] to show that the paragraphs 291 A ff,—in which the Eleate descries a motley crew of persons resembling Lions, Centaurs, Satyrs, and beasts feeble and shifty, who are indeed the veriest cheats in the sophistical world,—contain distinct references to the more celebrated dialogue. Furthermore, whereas in the philosophical parts of the six dialogues which principally concern me a reference to the *republic* or the *Phaedo* has always, or almost always, implied criticism and rejection, in the political part of the *politicus* the references to the *republic* imply, not criticism and rejection, but affirmation and fulfilment.

The *politicus* is not however the only dialogue in which Plato, while he supersedes the metaphysical teaching of his earlier years, resumes and endorses their political doctrine. At the outset of the *Timaeus* Socrates reviews, briefly but carefully, so much of the *republic* as is directly concerned with the ideal state, and asks and receives from his assembled friends a distinct approval of his recapitulation. Thus, while the six dialogues seemingly have for their purpose the criticism of the earlier philosophical system and its reconstitution on a broader and a firmer basis, the *Timaeus*, the last of the three dialogues which are specially concerned with the theory of being, affirms one portion of the political teaching of the *republic*, namely, the theory of the ideal state, and the *politicus*, the last of the three dialogues which are specially concerned with the theory of knowledge, affirms another portion—I may almost say, the other portion—of that political teaching, namely, the theory of philosophical and customary morality. Has this recognition of the political theories of the *republic* any precise significance?

If this question had arisen only in the case of the *politicus*, I should not think of pressing it, as it might fairly be argued that the search for the statesman almost of necessity suggested a chapter on statescraft. But bearing in mind that no such excuse can be made in the case of the *Timaeus*,—which might just as well have stood alone, and, as it is, has only a loose and superficial attachment to the *republic*,—I venture to offer a conjectural explanation.

[1] *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society*, May 25, 1886.

These recurrences to the non-philosophical portion of the *republic* are, I think, intended to show that, though it has been found necessary to revise and reconstruct its ontology, that dialogue, the most famous, and in some respects the most splendid, of all Plato's works, is not otherwise superseded, and still retains its position as the authoritative statement of the principles of Academic education and as the programme of Academic study.

If then, as I have tried to show, the six dialogues represent one and the same stage or moment of Plato's philosophical development, having been intended by their author to supplement one another, and to be studied conjointly, it matters very little in what order they were composed. They are indeed fitted together with a nicety hardly attainable if any one of them had been completed before its successor was begun: so that it may fairly be doubted whether, properly speaking, there is any order of composition to be discovered. But the unity of the design, if it relieves us from the task of determining the order in which the dialogues were written, makes it all the more necessary that we should ascertain in what order they were meant to be read.

Now it is plain that the *Theaetetus*, the *sophist*, and the *politicus* are to be read in the order in which I have named them: and in regard to the *Philebus*, the *Parmenides*, and the *Timaeus*, though there is here more room for difference of opinion, I cannot doubt that the *Philebus*, which rather prepares the way for the revised theory than announces it, and further, like the *Theaetetus*, has Socrates for protagonist, is the first of the three[1], and that the *Parmenides*, which is largely critical, takes precedence of the *Timaeus*, which is purely dogmatic. In short, taking the two trilogies separately, I place the dialogues which respectively compose them thus:

[1] It thus becomes necessary for me to retract the concluding sentences of a note in my paper upon the *Parmenides*, *J. of Ph.* xi 315, and to modify a phrase in my paper upon the *Philebus*, *J. of Ph.* x 259.

(1) *Philebus.*	(1) *Theaetetus.*
(2) *Parmenides.*	(2) *sophist.*
(3) *Timaeus.*	(3) *politicus.*

But how do the dialogues of the one trilogy stand to those of the other? It seems to me, that, though under other circumstances the references which occur in the *Theaetetus* 183 E and the *sophist* 217 C to a conversation between Parmenides and the youthful Socrates might possibly be disregarded, as it is, the *Theaetetus* and the *sophist* belonging to the same series of dialogues as the *Parmenides*, the allusion which is found in the two dialogues first named must be held to presume familiarity with the last named dialogue. In short, the proximity of the *Parmenides* makes it, in my judgment, impossible to regard the reference in question as mere ornament. Hence I conclude that the *Theaetetus* and the *sophist*, and with them the *politicus*, in virtue of the connection of its argument with that of the *sophist*, were meant to be studied after the *Parmenides*. It only remains then to decide whether the three logical dialogues are to follow the three ontological dialogues, or to be interposed between the *Parmenides* and the *Timaeus*.

In the present series of papers I have found it convenient to take the *Timaeus* in immediate succession to the *Philebus* and the *Parmenides*, so as to connect the three ontological dialogues and obtain a consecutive account of the ontological system: and I am inclined to think that, for the modern reader, who is not troubled by those logical difficulties which had barred the march of philosophy, had suggested the theory of the immanent idea, and now necessitated the writing of the *sophist*, this course is in general the best. To Plato however, as to his contemporaries, predication had been a mystery and a snare; and it was therefore proper that he should dispose of the Zenonian paradox before he attempted the final exposition of his reconstituted ontology. Now it has been seen, *J. of Ph.* XIV 215—217, that while the *Parmenides* deals with predications which have *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ εἴδη* for their subjects, it is not until the *sophist* that predications having for their subjects *εἴδη* which are not

αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά are dealt with. Hence I conclude that Plato intended the three logical dialogues to take precedence of the *Timaeus*, in which the ontology foreshadowed in the *Philebus* and the *Parmenides* is completed and affirmed.

This view, that the *Timaeus*, and not the *politicus*, stands last in the series, finds confirmation in the comparison of the concluding sentences of the two dialogues. While the *politicus* ends with a colourless statement from the young Socrates that the portraiture of the *πολιτικός* is complete, a declaration which plainly has no general significance, the last sentence of the *Timaeus* is an emphatic assertion of the unity of the *κόσμος*, which assertion, on the part of the protagonist, appropriately concludes, not only the particular dialogue, but also the series to which the dialogue belongs.

Finally, the supposition that the series culminates in the *Timaeus* explains that dialogue's connection, otherwise inexplicable, with the *republic* and the *Critias*. For, if the *Timaeus* held any subordinate position in the series, its attachment to two external dialogues, the one already published, the other still to come, could only confuse: but if it is the last of the six dialogues, and sums up their results, it is plainly convenient that its relations, and consequently the relations of the series, to certain other dialogues should thus be indicated.

In a word, though the modern student may without loss postpone the study of the logical dialogues until he has mastered the *Timaeus*, that great dialogue is in my opinion to be regarded as the conclusion of Plato's exposition of the Later Theory of Ideas.

Though the time has not yet come when I can attempt to deal in detail with the chronology of the Platonic writings, I may notwithstanding say a few words about their grouping, in so far as the inquiry which I have prosecuted in these papers throws any light upon it. My notions are roughly as follows.

(1) In his earliest dialogues, Plato, still a Socratic pure and simple, and therefore having no metaphysical aspirations, sought to produce upon the reader the same effect which his master had produced in conversation upon the hearer, and accordingly

deviated from the manner of Socrates only so far as deviation became inevitable in consequence of the use of written discourse. Of this period the *Euthyphro* is typical.

(2) In the dialogues of the next period, Plato first examined the instruments of education which were, or had been, in use amongst his contemporaries,—the humanism of Protagoras, the rhetoric of Gorgias, the politics of Isocrates, the dialectic of Socrates, the eristic of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, —and next, in the *republic*, the culminating dialogue of this group, propounded the scheme which he himself proposed to adopt, or had already adopted, in the Academy. This scheme, described in detail in the seventh book, while it included the sciences of numeration, geometry, stereometry, astronomy, harmonics, assigned to dialectic the chief place, and accordingly Plato, who now finds himself unable to resist the attractions of metaphysic, is careful to afford a glimpse of his philosophical system. This system is confessedly provisional and tentative: but it distinctly assumes the existence of an eternal immutable idea wherever a plurality of things is called by the same name, which eternal immutable idea is the object of knowledge. To the same period belongs the *Phaedo*, which announces the doctrine of the idea's immanence, and applies that doctrine to the resolution of Zeno's logical difficulties: but inasmuch as Plato here concentrates his attention upon the philosophical problems which in the *republic* hold only a subordinate position, and furthermore shows a deeper appreciation of their difficulty, I suspect that the *Phaedo* was not written till after the *republic* was completed.

(3) The six dialogues which in these papers have specially occupied me, belong to a later period, when Plato, having organized the school in accordance with the programme which appears in the *republic*, and having committed to his assistants the teaching of the propaedeutic sciences, gave himself without reserve to the study and the teaching of philosophy. These dialogues, which speak only to the professed student of metaphysics, contain, first, criticisms, serious and unsparing, not only of philosophical and sceptical theories of the past, but also of the provisional, tentative, ontology of the *republic* and the

Phaedo, which is found to be faulty in itself and insufficient to explain the current logical difficulties, and, secondly, theories of being and knowledge, which show a marked advance upon the popular, poetical, speculation of the earlier period. To be more precise, it is objected to the teaching of the *republic* and the *Phaedo*, (*a*) that the theory of the immanence of the idea entails its multiplication both in the world of sense and in the world of ideas, (*b*) that, even if the doctrine of the immanent idea accounts for predication in regard to sensibles, it leaves predication in regard to intelligibles unexplained, (*c*) that some classes have no stability, and consequently do not owe their existence to an eternal immutable idea, either immanent or not immanent, (*d*) that the idea, whether immanent or not immanent, is not cognizable by finite intelligence. According to the theory which is now substituted for the abortive speculation of the *republic* and the *Phaedo*, there are ideas only of natural kinds. In fact, the existence of the divergent members of a natural kind is finite mind's momentary apprehension, under conditions of space and time, of an eternal immutable idea, the thought of infinite mind. Infinite mind knows the types in their mutual relations, and finite mind may approximate to this knowledge by the study of the associated particulars. Thus the new ontology affords a foundation for the scientific study of nature. Meanwhile the difficulty raised by Zeno in respect of predication disappears in virtue of (*a*) the distinction between artificial classes and natural kinds, (*β*) the idealist theory of the existence of particulars, (*γ*) the doctrine of the *κοινωνία* of *εἴδη* which are not *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά*, both with one another and with *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ εἴδη*.

(4) Having thus revised and reconstituted his ontology, and having furthermore committed to his assistants the prosecution of those scientific researches for which the new ontology affords a basis, Plato towards the end of his life returned to ethical and political speculation, and composed the *laws*.

In short, I think that we may distinguish four stages or periods of Plato's literary career, and designate them as

(1) Socratic—of which the *Euthyphro* is typical;

(2) educational—including the *Protagoras*, the *Gorgias*, the *Phaedrus*, the *Meno*, the *Euthydemus*, the *republic*, the *Phaedo*;

(3) philosophical—including the *Philebus*, the *Parmenides*, the *Theaetetus*, the *sophist*, the *politicus*, the *Timaeus*;

(4) political—including the *laws*.

It will be seen that, while each of these periods marks a stage in the development of Plato's thought, the labours of each preceding period are not lost when he enters upon another. The unphilosophical morality of his Socratic youth is recognized and incorporated in the educational theory of his early manhood: and although the metaphysical element of this educational theory is superseded in his maturity by what I have ventured to call the Later Theory of Ideas, the educational programme remains otherwise unaltered, and, together with the new metaphysic, still retains its place in the background of the political theory of his old age.

Hence I do not suppose that, as Plato's mind developed, the dialogues which were characteristic of an earlier stage ceased to be used as text-books in the school. Rather, I think, they served to the last as means to lead the pupil in the track of Plato himself, from scepticism, through the Socraticism of the *Euthyphro*, to the rudimentary metaphysic of the *republic*, and from this to the perfected ontology of the *Timaeus* and the reasoned sociology of the *laws*, the educational aim being from first to last held always steadily in view.

HENRY JACKSON.

18 *August* 1886.

WILLIAM HEPWORTH THOMPSON.

Dr Thompson, the late Master of Trinity College, came up to the University in October, 1828. He was drafted, as I understood, from a small country school in Yorkshire[1], which did itself great credit in training so sound and intelligent a scholar as he soon proved himself to be. With none of the advantages of young men who came to the University from larger and more famous institutions, he was soon sought out by leading spirits among his contemporaries,—sought out, for he was not the man to push himself forward; his ability and sterling worth were equally recognised by Trench and Hallam and Spedding and a few others, not scholars merely but men of thoughtful and expansive intellect, and a few persons of lesser mark, but of taste and feeling enough to admire and follow them. Among this set of men, this rather exclusive coterie, as it soon became, there was none I think who was held in higher repute than Thompson, for qualities both intellectual and moral, none to whose opinion on a point of scholarship more deference was paid, none whose moral judgments were more valued, whose discretion was more highly esteemed. His principal study was in the Classics, but his acquisitions in Mathematics, so far as he cared to advance them, were readily made and accurately retained, and from the first he took much interest in ethical philosophy, in which he made himself a master in later years. From the first his genius

[1] He was first at a private school in York and afterwards with private tutors, the last of them being Mr Scott, Vicar of Gawcott, in Buckinghamshire, and father of Sir Gilbert Scott. (Edd.)

was of the staid and severe rather than of the light and lively type. Though an apt and discreet judge of poetry he was, I may say, himself no poet, as many of his companions were or wished to be. It would be rash to predicate of any young collegian that he never wrote a line of verse, but I do not think Thompson ever did, though he was very shy, and if he did he would never have owned it. It appeared to me that he had a sad contempt for Latin verse-making, but I never knew a youth, except himself, who seemed really to take a pleasure in the composition of Latin prose. This trivial trait of character may speak much to a college-man.

But with this feature the severity of Thompson's genius ended. No man was more kindly and good tempered among his associates, more considerate to their various infirmities, none, I think, inspired more confidence in those to whom he attached himself. I remember once pacing with him the long walk "Behind the Colleges," paved as it is with good counsels and sage determinations, when he happened to be suffering mortification from some fancied slight in his career, and allowed me to persuade him to forego his rash inclination to throw up his college prospects and seek his fortune elsewhere. A little later he repaid me the same good turn, and such mutual confidence proved of service to both of us.

Nevertheless, familiar as I was with him and as closely intimate, I suppose, as any of his associates, I hardly seemed to come to a more thorough knowledge of his inner self than was apparent to many others, of the depth and strength of his feelings on all serious subjects, his candour and sense of justice, the constancy of his regard for all those to whom he had once given his affection. He was, as I have said, very shy, and his reserve and reticence were too easily mistaken for pride by some, who in later days viewed him mostly from some social distance, and were awed perhaps by the serene dignity of his noble presence. I have not seen many of the notices of him which have appeared in the journals, but I think quite enough and too much has been made of his pungent sayings, which acquired their fame as much from the prominence of his position as from their own saliency. Though he lived for the last few years the life of a

recluse, both sickly and suffering, those who knew him but lately in college saw him just as he was some sixty years ago when he first came up. He was from first to last a singularly good man, and one who deserved the tender regard of all with whom he was connected. For tender-hearted he eminently was. The tears stood in his eyes when he showed me the portrait of Spedding lately placed by him in the Library of his College. A friend writes to me, 'I quite agree with what you say about the Thompsoniana. I was told the other day a story which si non est vera, &c.—Some one was dining at the Lodge, and after leaving the room had occasion to go back for something he had left. He found the Master still there, his eyes full of tears. "I wish", he said, "I had not said that to B—".'

C. MERIVALE.

CAMBRIDGE: PRINTED BY C. J. CLAY, M.A. AND SONS, AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS.